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articulated by the classical Indian philosopher Bha a Kumārilaṭṭ
SUMMARY
This thesis investigates the svata -prāmā yam doctrine of the 7ḥ ṇ th century 
Indian philosopher Bha a Kumārilaṭṭ , based on an analysis of this doctrine as 
presented in the B ha - īkā and in the Śloka-vārttika.ṛ ṭ ṭ   The original contribution 
of this thesis consists in a novel interpretation of Kumārila's claim which 
diverges from the interpretations of the classical Indian commentators as well 
as those of recent scholarship by John Taber and Dan Arnold.  
Rather than a phenomenological or Reidean epistemology, this research argues 
that Kumārila provides a normative epistemology.  In contrast to the 
interpretation of Dan Arnold, which roots justification and truth in the 
phenomenological fact of mere awareness which is undefeated, it is argued 
here that Kumārila articulates a normative process which mandates the believer 
to strengthen her beliefs through a purposive and goal-oriented process.
The thesis begins with a consideration of the notion of svabhāva, to which 
Kumārila appeals, making a dispositional essentialist reading of this term, as a 
real causal power or disposition which is the essence of an entity conditional on 
iii
its existence.  It is then argued that Kumārila's claim concerns the 
manifestation of a competence.  The operational dichotomy between pramā aṇ  
and non-pramā a is compared to that between Good and Bad Cases inṇ  
epistemological disjunctivism.
It is shown that Kumārila articulates a belief protocol by analogy with normative 
processes in generative grammar and in legal and ritual interpretation.  An anti-
foundationalist defence of this protocol and its applicability to the case of beliefs 
formed from Vedic testimony is provided.  It is suggested that Kumārila's claim 
engages more closely with Sosa's notion of aptness than with any notion of 
justification.
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1Chapter 1: Introduction
Section 1: Acknowledgements and sources
I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my supervisor, Prof. Jonardon 
Ganeri for his skilful guidance through the course of writing this thesis and for 
his thoughtful advice as to the most effective ways to develop the themes and 
lines of inquiry for each chapter.  I am deeply grateful to Prof. Kei Kataoka, who 
guided me through a very detailed study of the whole of Jayanta's discussion of 
the topic of prāmā yam, thereby introducing me to the conventions ofṇ  
philosophical Sanskrit and to the guiding themes of the debate about 
prāmā yam.  ṇ I thank Mr. Suguru Ishimura, who worked closely with me on 
translating Jayanta's discussion, and who encouraged me to think about the 
relative significance of the terms pramā atvam and prāmā yam.  ṇ ṇ I thank Prof. 
Piyushkant Dixit for reading through Jayanta's discussion of the topic of khyāti-
vāda with me.  I thank my Sanskrit teacher, Ms. Usha Mehta, for teaching me 
Sanskrit language and passing on her wide-ranging knowledge of Sanskrit 
literature, and for her encouragement to take my studies further.
The dependence of this research on existing scholarship will be evident from a 
reading of the thesis.  The work of John Taber and Dan Arnold constitutes a sort 
of pūrvapak a which was helpful as a point of reference against which theṣ  
distinctive features of this interpretation could be contrasted.  This 
interpretation builds on the research of Kataoka (2011), and in particular picks 
up on the attention to philological details found in that work.  Kataoka's 
translation of Kumārila's Śloka-vārttika presentation provided there was an 
indispensable foundation for this research.  Further, the findings of Dunne 
2(2004) have been helpful as a basis for identifying some important 
philosophical suppositions and strategies shared by Kumārila, and Dunne's 
translations of passages from Devendrabuddhi and Śākyabuddhi were used as a 
very helpful guide for examination of the Tibetan texts.  Details of editions of 
other texts referenced can be found in the abbreviations and bibliography 
sections.
The textual basis of the research is two similar presentations by Kumārila of the 
doctrine of svata -prāmāḥ yam in the ṇ B ha - īkāṛ ṭ ṭ  and in the Śloka-vārttika.  The 
B ha - īkā ṛ ṭ ṭ presentation is preserved within the larger Tattva-saṅgraha of 
Śāntarak ita.  The 1968ṣ  edition of the Sanskrit text by Swami Dwarikadas 
Shastri has been used as a basis for translation and analysis of this 
presentation.  That utilises photostat copies kept in the Nalanda Library, but 
also records variant readings elsewhere.1  The 1926 Embar Krishnamacharya 
edition, which is based on a single manuscript preserved in the Wā iḍ  
Pārśvanātha Bha ār in the ancient city of Pattanṇḍ 2, was also consulted. 
Analysis of the Śloka-vārttika presentation is based on the 2011 critical edition 
of that presentation by Kei Kataoka, in preparing which Kataoka “consulted five 
manuscripts and seven published editions.”3  Additionally, Kataoka has provided 
a felicitous translation, and it has not been possible to improve on this 
translation in any way in terms of cogency and accuracy.  Accordingly, the 
translation provided here represents a derivative work, where modifications 
reflect the attempt at a greater degree of engagement with the technical 
vocabulary of contemporary philosophy.
1 See Shastri (1968) 8
2 See Krishnamacharya (1926) Vol.1 ix
3 Kataoka (2011) Part I, vii
3Section 2: Introducing the research topic
Kahrs explains that a “model of substitution is certainly a well-developed 
methodological procedure in Pā inian grammar and in the ritual Sūtras”ṇ 4.  This 
thesis seeks firstly to extend Kahrs' finding by showing that Kumārila employs 
such a substitutional model in his epistemology.  This will be done through a 
study of Kumārila's choice of terminology, and in particular, the terms 'utsarga', 
'apavāda', and 'prāptā'.  It will be shown that such terminology appeals to a 
substitutional model, and relevant precursors in grammatical and ritual 
interpretation literatures will be considered.  Secondly, by employing this 
model, Kumārila's epistemology will be shown to constitute a pragmatist logic 
of inquiry with affinities to that of Peirce.  A pragmatics of inquiry will be 
identified in Kumārila's presentation, involving the stages of instigating, 
prolonging and terminating inquiry.  This reading of Kumārila is an anti-
foundationalist reading, on which inquiry is driven by pragmatic considerations 
and knowledge-claims do not rest on some secure foundation.  
However, Kumārila also separately characterizes deliverances from epistemic 
sources by reference to a paradigm of a Good Case deliverance, in which 
appropriately normal epistemic conditions ensure the truth of a belief.  This 
element of Kumārila's doctrine distinguishes his view from a more thorough or 
Rortian anti-foundationalism which would deny a metaphysical foundation for 
truth.  Rather, Kumārila's epistemological anti-foundationalism constitutes only 
a denial of the idea that any or all beliefs can be properly foundational in terms 
of justification, combined with a pragmatics of inquiry that involves attaining a 
sufficient threshold level of confidence in beliefs.
The case of beliefs formed via Vedic testimony is considered by Kumārila to 
involve a special application of the general process of inquiry.  Vedic injunctions 
are held to comprise an exclusive domain of judgments in the same way as 
4 Kahrs (1998) 176
4flavours do.  As such, defeat based on non-Vedic epistemic sources is not 
possible.
Renou describes how “[l]a pensee indienne a pour substructure des 
raisonnements d'ordre grammatical.  La Mīmā sā … implique une masse deṃ  
données philologique qui remontent en fin de compte à la grammaire”5. 
However, contemporary scholarship on Indian philosophy has only partially 
been guided by this insight.6  In particular, little research has been done into 
the use of grammatical forms of reasoning among philosophers of the Mīmā sāṃ  
school in their purely philosophical work.7  Kumārila was one of these 
philosophers and a grammatical form of reasoning can be found throughout his 
own work.
Diverse practices of reasoning exist within contemporary society, covered by 
broad categorical terms such as legal reasoning, scientific reasoning, and 
informal reasoning.  In the context of classical Indian intellectual traditions, we 
may expect to discover new forms of reasoning or applications of alternative 
forms of reasoning within otherwise familiar intellectual disciplines.  Such 
discoveries may constitute conceptual resources which can be applied in the 
context of our own intellectual practices.  This thesis builds on Renou's insight 
by identifying a grammatical model of reasoning which motivates Kumārila's 
model of an epistemic process and goal.  Such a form of reasoning constitutes a 
defeasible, case-based reasoning or informal logic, and thus has an affinity with 
legal reasoning.
5 Renou (1941) 164
6 K. Bhattacharya's work on Nāgārjuna is an instance of following up on Renou's 
general insight.  The discussion of the Indian epistemological framework as a 
relational model based on a grammatical case relations (strictly, kāraka-
relations) has been discussed in Matilal (1986) and Taber (2005): these 
presentations will be drawn on in the next two chapters.  By contrast, the 
distinctiveness of the grammatical terminology used by Kumārila in the doctrine 
currently under examination has not been examined.
7 Freschi (2012) discusses grammatical forms of reasoning in Mīmā sā in a moreṃ  
general context
5Section 3: Intellectual and social context
Kumārila has been described as “the most important representative of classical 
Mīmā sā thṃ ought and apologetics”8.  As Halbfass explains, “[a]ccording to 
Kumārila, the Mīmā sā is a “constellation of rules and arguments”ṃ  
(yuktikalāpa) that has been produced by a long tradition of human thought and 
teaching”9.  Taber similarly explains that “Mīmā sā consists in a system ofṃ  
establishing rules and procedures, as objective as those of logic, for 
interpreting scriptural passages.”10  Taber also describes Mīmā sā in terms ofṃ  a 
“science of exegesis”11 and suggests that its methods “were not altogether 
unlike the “objective” methods employed by modern philologists today in 
interpreting Vedic texts.”12  Verpoorten explains that the Mīmā sā school “isṃ  
also called … Karma-mīmā sāṃ  “Action-enquiry” or Karma-kāṇḍa “Action-
chapter,” because it explores the way of (ritual) action (as distinct from the way 
of knowledge) towards “Liberation” (mokṣa).”13  The focus on rules and 
arguments will become manifest in the presentation of Kumārila's doctrine in 
terms of reasoning strategies in this thesis.
Kumārila's primary intellectual opponents are held to be Buddhist philosophers 
such as Dignāga and Dharmakīrti.  Although fanciful stories about Kumārila and 
related authors are preserved in early works as well as in oral traditions14, fairly 
8 Halbfass (1992) 32
9 Halbfass (1992) 30
10 Taber (2012) 146
11 Taber (2012) 128
12 Taber (2012) 146
13 Verpoorten (1987) 1
14 See the introduction to Sharma (1980) for a survey of some stories about the 
life of Kumārila and speculative remarks about the identity of U veka.  Earlyṃ  
quasi-historical sources include for example the Śa kara-digvijaya by the 14thṅ  
century author Vidyāra ya (Mādhava) for Kumārila, and the Tibetan historiansṇ  
6little is known with certainty about their lives.  As Taber explains:
“We know virtually nothing about Kumārila's precise historical situation. 
We can guess, by the usual method of cross-referencing, that he lived in 
the seventh century.  He seems to belong to the same period as 
Dharmakīrti, Maṇ ana, Śaḍ kara, and Prabhṅ ākara.  His familiarity with 
South Indian forms and customs suggests but does not prove that he 
lived in the South.”15  
The Tibetan historian Tāranātha holds that the name 'Kumārila' is a corruption 
of the name 'Kumāra-līla'.16  According to Sharma's survey of textual evidence, 
Kumārila has been variously assigned to North India, South India and Bihar17. 
According to Bu-ston, Kumārila was in fact the uncle of Dharmakīrti, and other 
evidence also suggests South Indian origins.18  On the other hand, as Jha 
suggests, the uncertain reading 'procyāḥ' for the upholders of the doctrine of 
svata -prāmā yamḥ ṇ  in Śāntarak itaṣ 's text could be a corruption of 'prācyāḥ' or 
'easterners', which would locate Kumārila's intellectual community to the east 
of Nālandā.19  Also we read about how the 7th Buddhist philosopher Śāntideva 
“departed to the east, where he took part in a great dispute.  By the force of 
his miraculous powers, he reconciled (those who were quarelling) and gave 
pleasure to all.”20
for stories and some biographical details about the Indian Buddhist philosophers 
who travelled to Tibet
15 Taber (1997) 390
16 See Chimpa and Chattopadhyaya (1970) 230
17 Sharma (1980) 11: “[The Tibetan historian] Tāranātha says that [Kumārila] was 
a native of Southern India.  But it is also believed that he was a Brahman of 
Bihar who abjured Buddhism for Hinduism.  The tradition associating Kumārila 
with Northern India receives some support from the statement of Ānandagiri in 
his Śa kara Vijaya (Calcutta Edition, p.235) that Kumārila came from the Northṅ  
(udagdeśāt) and persecuted the Buddhists and Jains in the South.”
18 See Arnold (2014): “It is sometimes surmised from his evident knowledge of 
Dravidian languages (his Tantravārttika includes some discussion of Tamil word 
forms) that Kumārila may have been south Indian”
19 Jha (1939) 775
20 Obermiller (1932) 163
7Kataoka tells us:
“it is not yet clear what kind of relationship Kumārila had with 
Dharmakīrti … who severely criticizes Mīmā sā directly … Kumārila andṃ  
Dharmakīrti do not explicitly refer to one another in their works … 
Nevertheless, one finds theoretical parallels and allusions between the 
two … it is likely that Mīmā sā, or a particular Mīmā saka, played anṃ ṃ  
important role … at the time the young Dharmakīrti was developing his 
doctrines.  And the most probable candidate is the Mīmā saka Bha aṃ ṭṭ  
Kumārila, as Frauwallner [1962] suggested.”21  
Kataoka surveys textual evidence related to the question of the relationship 
between Kumārila and his Buddhist opponent Dharmakīrti, who seem to have 
been close contemporaries.22  Eltschinger, Krasser and Taber similarly state that 
“Dharmakīrti's main opponent was Mīmā sā, quite probably in the person of itsṃ  
main brilliant classical exponent, Kumārila Bha a (Dharmakīrti's seniorṭṭ  
contemporary).”23
Dharmakīrti “seems to have been born in South India and then to have moved 
to the great monastic university of Nālandā”24.  The account of the 14th century 
Tibetan writer Bu-ston discusses the activities of various Buddhist philosophers 
from India in Tibet, including those discussed here.  According to this account, 
as Obermiller explains: 
“[t]he pupil of Īçvarasena was Dharmakīrti.  The latter was born in the 
southern kingdom of Cū āma i in a heretical [i.e. non-Buddhist]ḍ ṇ  
Brāhma ic family … Once, as he took from his uncle, the hereticalṇ  
21 Kataoka (2011) 25-26
22 See Kataoka (2011) 47-59
23 Eltschinger, Krasser and Taber (2011) 7
24 Tillemans (2013)
8teacher Kumārila the garments of a Brāhma ic heretical ascetic, theṇ  
uncle spoke abusively to him and drove him away.  The teacher then 
made his resolve to vanquish all the heretics.  Accordingly, he took 
orders in the Buddhist church …”.25
Taber mentions that “the only item of significance [as to Kumārila's dating is] 
his assignment to the reign of Srong-tsan-gam-po, 627-650, by the Tibetan 
historian Tāranātha.”26  Taber also considers that “[m]ost scholars have tended 
to consider [Kumārila] an older contemporary of the great Buddhist logician 
Dharmakīrti, but recent evidence that the latter lived as early as 530-600 CE … 
makes this approach problematic.”27  Thus, in recent research, Helmut Krasser 
explains:
“Dharmakīrti's dates as proposed in FRAUWALLNER's famous “Landmarks 
in the history of Indian Logic” are 600-660.  These dates have been 
more or less accepted by the scholarly community, with the exception of 
Christian Lindtner and Toshihiko Kimura, who have proposed 530-600 
and c. 550-620, respectively.”28  
Krasser himself reconsiders the evidence and comes to a conclusion in which he 
“propose[s], as a working hypothesis, the time of activity of Kumārila and 
Dharmakīrti to be the middle of the sixth century.”29  However, Frauwallner's 
dates seem to remain the scholarly consensus.
During the 7th and 8th centuries, the Buddhist institution of learning at Nālandā, 
in the Magadha region, was at the height of its fame and intellectual influence. 
Most of the prominent Buddhist philosophers of the times were based there. 
25 Obermiller (1932) 152
26 Taber (2005) 163 note 2
27 Taber (2005) 163 note 2
28 Krasser, H. (2012b) 581
29 Krasser, H. (2012b) 587
9According to one apocryphal story, Kumārila disguised himself as a Buddhist in 
order to learn the doctrines of the Buddhists at first hand at Nālandā.30  The 
Magadha region covered part of present-day Bihar and present-day Nepal.  
As for the eight century Buddhist philosophers Śāntarak ita and Kamalaśīla,ṣ  
according to Das, “[i]n the first quarter of the seventh century A.D., Buddhism 
was introduced into Tibet from Nepal …”31 and subsequently both these 
philosophers, along with many of the prominent Buddhist philosophers of their 
times, visited Tibet and ultimately relocated there, and were “engaged in 
translating Sanskrit works into Tibetan”32.  Śāntarak ita was apparently “aṣ  
native of Gaur [Bengal], who was the High Priest of the monastery of 
Nālandā”33 and Kamalaśīla was a “great Buddhist philosopher of Magadha”34.
The debate about the epistemic good that is the aim of inquiry takes place 
within a wider context of debate about the source of the authority of the Vedic 
textual corpus.  Kumārila intended that his doctrine support the idea that the 
authority of Vedic texts is independent of any human author.  This idea and its 
motivating theory were vehemently denied by Kumārila's Buddhist 
contemporaries and successors, who by contrast took the words of the Buddha 
as a source of authoritative testimony.  As Kataoka explains:
“Xuanzang's travel accounts further depict the situation of intellectuals in 
those days.  One took part in public debates in order to defeat 
representatives of other schools and sects, thereby gaining rewards and 
patronage from kings and ministers.  Kumārila's criticism of omniscience 
30 See Aum Namah Shivaay (2011) for a popular dramatisation of this and one 
other episode from Kumārila's life
31 Das (1893) 49
32 Das (1893) 49.  See also Blumenthal (2014): “He made two trips to Tibet and 
ultimately spent the last fifteen years of his life there. Śāntarak ita was one ofṣ  
the most influential figures in the early dissemination of Buddhism in Tibet …”
33 Das (1893) 49
34 Das (1893) 49
10
[of the Buddha] and his defense of the Veda and Vedic animal sacrifices 
can be regarded as a result of lively arguments with his opponents.”35  
At the same time, the significance of philosophical interaction and polemical 
activity between different groups in driving forward philosophical research 
programmes should not be overstated.  One aim of this research is to show 
how Kumārila's epistemology can be read as a natural extension of his prior 
concerns with ritual interpretation and Vedic exegesis.  In this way, the 
philosophical development of Mīmā sāṃ  was driven at least in part by an 
endogenous process.
Section 4: Situating the research
Kumārila's theory has been discussed by classical Indian commentators 
including U vekaṃ  (also called Bha oṭṭ veka ṃ and Umbeka) and Pārthasārathi 
Miśra, and in recent work published by John Taber, Dan Arnold, and Kei 
Kataoka.36  Arnold alludes to the importance of this topic by commenting that 
the “inattention to the epistemology of Pūrva Mīmā sā is regrettable”.ṃ 37 
Kataoka presents a translation of Kumārila's discussion in the Śloka-vārttika 
and a comprehensive analysis of this, which represents a significant advance in 
understanding Kumārila's view but does not provide a critical evaluation of the 
doctrine or site it in the landscape of contemporary philosophy.  Taber and 
Arnold both examine two contrasting interpretations of Kumārila's doctrine 
presented by the 8th century philosopher U veka Bha a and by the 11ṃ ṭṭ th century 
35 Kataoka (2011) 24
36 See Taber (1992), Arnold (2001), Arnold (2005), Kataoka (2011); cf. also Arnold 
(2014)
37 Arnold (2001) 591
11
philosopher Pārthasārathi Miśra, and both favour the interpretation of the latter.
A study by Taber “attempts to explain what … Kumārilabha a meant by ṭṭ svataḥ  
prāmā yaṇ , by discussing and evaluating the distinct interpretations of 
Kumārila's statements by his commentators Umbekabha a andṭṭ  
Pārthasārathimiśra.”38  Arnold seeks to advance the work of Taber in two very 
similar publications, focusing on the interpretative differences between these 
two commentators.39  These two presentations will be assumed here to present 
a single view.40  Both Taber and Arnold focus almost exclusively on Kumārila's 
exposition in the Śloka-vārttika, on which the commentaries of U veka ṃ and 
Pārthasārathi are based, and do not engage substantively with the separate 
presentation in the B ha - īkā, as this thesis will do.  In doing so, they followṛ ṭ ṭ  
the lead of the classical Indian commentators, whose exclusive focus on the 
Śloka-vārttika is not easy to explain, except perhaps if this were a later text 
that were considered to supersede the earlier B ha - īkā.ṛ ṭ ṭ   Thus, there are no 
extant commentaries on the B ha - īkā apart from the antagonistic discussionṛ ṭ ṭ  
by Śāntarak ita and Kamalaśīla, and the text itself only survives in part, withṣ  
the only substantive preservation in the larger Tattva-saṅgraha of Śāntarak ita.ṣ  
Given that the B ha - īkā ṛ ṭ ṭ constitutes a “more refined and sophisticated”41 
discussion than that in the Śloka-vārttika, with “more detailed explanations”42, 
one might expect that a confident understanding of the doctrine would require 
a close study of this text.
Taber and Arnold not only explain the interpretative differences, but also 
express a firm preference for Pārthasārathi's interpretation.  Taber believes that 
“Pārthasārathi offers a much more coherent reading of Kumārila's text than 
38 Taber (1992b) 204
39 See Arnold (2001), esp. 592, and Arnold (2005)
40 Cf. Arnold (2005) viii: “Chapters 3 and 4 represent revisions of my article …”
41 Kataoka (2011) 46
42 Kataoka (2011) 42
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Umbeka”43 and that Pārthasārathi's interpretation “represents a viable position 
in an important philosophical debate”44, albeit “on no interpretation, neither 
Umbeka's nor Pārthasārathi's, can the notion of svata  prāmā yaḥ ṇ  serve 
specifically as a basis for the defense of the authority of the Veda.”45  Arnold 
writes that “I hope to have shown that [Pārthasārathi's] interpretation 
represents not only the best exegesis of the tradition … but also that it is a 
philosophically cogent account”46 whereas “Uṃveka’s interpretation 
compromises the major insight of Kumārila’s doctrine of svata  prāmā yaḥ ṇ .”47
Although the scope of this study is restricted to understanding Kumārila's 
doctrine in its own right, and does not discuss the later commentarial 
developments of his doctrine, nevertheless some engagement with the 
discussions of Taber and Arnold is necessary, insofar as these concern the 
question of the proper interpretation of Kumārila's claim.  The interpretation of 
Kumārila's doctrine presented here builds on the insights into the analytic 
nuances of Kumārila's terminology provided by Kataoka.  However, it differs 
significantly from the interpretations of Arnold and Taber on a number of 
grounds.  Firstly, Kumārila's doctrine is characterized as a Peircean form of anti-
foundationalism rather than a Reidean form.  Secondly, Kumārila's doctrine is 
characterized in terms of a culminating epistemic process constrained by a 
normative goal rather than by sole reference to the phenomenology of 
awareness.  Thirdly, an ontological aspect of Kumārila's understanding of how 
deliverances function is distinguished from Kumārila's analysis of inquiry, 
thereby clarifying the sense in which Kumārila endorses a metaphysical 
foundation for the truth of beliefs.  It is argued that the views of the two 
classical commentators correctly capture different aspects of Kumārila's claim.
43 Taber (1992b) 211
44 Taber (1992b) 218
45 Taber (1992b) 217
46 Arnold (2001) 642
47 Arnold (2001) 593
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U vekaṃ 's view has been characterized by Arnold as a causal account.  It will be 
suggested that U vekaṃ 's account is adequate to capture the nature of the Good 
Case deliverances which form the paradigm case and which constitute the goal 
of inquiry.  Pārthasārathi's view will not be considered separately, but only 
within the context of a general 'Pārthasārathi-Arnold' reading.  The 
Pārthasārathi-Arnold reading of Kumārila's doctrine is non-normative and 
appeals instead to phenomenological content as the sole basis for justification 
and a robust conception of truth.  It is suggested that such an account captures 
a regulative notion of justification present in Kumārila's doctrine.  However, the 
reading developed here identifies a dynamic element to Kumārila's doctrine 
whereby it constitutes a normative and purposive protocol that reflects the logic 
of inquiry of a rational agent.
Section 5: Methodological approach
Classical Indian epistemological texts constitute a major intellectual resource 
and there is significant potential for bringing this resource into engagement 
with contemporary epistemology.  Kumārila's presentation of the doctrine to be 
discussed is the earliest extant sophisticated discussion of an abstract epistemic 
goal, termed 'prāmā yam', common to all beliefs, rather than the description ofṇ  
particular information channels for forming beliefs.48  For him, this goal is 'from 
itself' ('svata '), rather than 'from something else' ('parata ').ḥ ḥ
Prominent features of the terrain of contemporary epistemology have developed 
in response to the Gettier counter-examples to the justified true belief analysis 
48 Uddyotakara discusses the topic of prāmā yam before Kumārila, but in a moreṇ  
rudimentary way and not in the context of an established debate: see Shida 
(2004) for details.  Śabara uses the terms prāmā yam and ṇ non-prāmā yamṇ  
before Kumārila.  Dharmakīrti provides his views at the same time as Kumārila, 
but does not situate them in a wider polemical context.
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of knowledge, including the purported need for modal conditions such as safety 
in an account of knowledge, and the distinction between internalist and 
externalist terminologies and positions.  The historical evolution of classical 
Indian epistemology obviously does not parallel that of contemporary 
epistemology, and thus any claim of equivalence of analytic concepts between 
the two traditions must be treated with extreme caution.  Nevertheless, in this 
thesis it is argued that, despite ostensibly different concerns, some notions in 
the classical Indian debate are allied to concepts in contemporary philosophy, 
and some of the same theoretical themes emerge in both contexts.
In describing his own methodological approach to classical Indian Buddhist 
epistemological texts, Christian Coseru explains his goal of “engaging the 
arguments of the Buddhist epistemologists in ways that make their thought 
relevant to contemporary debates”.49  Accordingly, Coseru advises that “one 
engages Buddhist thinkers philosophically, that is, in the same way one reads 
Descartes or Kant as informers of contemporary philosophical debates.”50 
Although this approach may seem to raise interpretive concerns, Coseru quotes 
Gadamer in order to make the point that “the texts of the Buddhist 
epistemological tradition do not wish to draw attention to them as textual 
materials fit for exegesis but rather to mediate our understanding of various 
logical and epistemological arguments in relation to a specific topic.”51  The aim 
of this thesis is to engage with Kumārila in such a manner.  In particular, a 
reading of Kumārila's doctrine that is philosophically coherent as well as 
appealing should be seen to speak in favour of the interpretative success of 
that reading.  The thesis thus constitutes a reading of Kumārila which draws on 
the language and debates of contemporary philosophy as a tool or resource for 
transposing Kumārila's ideas into the space of contemporary philosophical 
concerns.  Thus what Wiggins says about Peirce, that if his “ideas are to reach 
49 Coseru (2012) 22
50 Coseru (2012) 35
51 Coseru (2012) 36 fn.62
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again into the bloodstream of philosophy, then we need not only fresh studies 
of his texts but speculative transpositions of these ideas”52 may also be said in 
regard to Kumārila.
This thesis provides a reconstruction of Kumārila's doctrine based on a close 
reading of the Sanskrit texts of both the B ha - īkā and the Śloka-vārttika.ṛ ṭ ṭ  
Kumārila's sets out his doctrine on two separate occasions in these two 
different texts.  Their relative chronology and Kumārila's reasons for authoring 
two distinct works covering substantially the same ground are issues that are 
not fully settled among contemporary scholars.53  Both presentations are in 
verse and are terse and succinct, presenting difficulties of interpretation which 
led to interpretative divergences arising during the following century.  Thus 
U veka considers four alternative interpretations of ṃ Kumārila's doctrine at 
some length before giving his own interpretation.  Likewise Śāntarak itaṣ  
considers three and Kamalaśīla a further five versions of Kumārila's doctrine, 
one of which is U veka's.  This profusion of possible interpretations ratherṃ  
suggests that subsequent thinkers were in fact bewildered as to the actual 
significance of Kumārila's doctrine.
The presentation in the Śloka-vārttika involves a strategy of setting up a 
schema of four possible positions, and then fairly rapidly rejecting the three 
alternative views before advocating Kumārila's own view at greater length.  The 
presentation in the B ha - īkā does not involve this strategy and argues inṛ ṭ ṭ  
favour of Kumārila's own view in greater detail.  This thesis freely draws from 
52 Wiggins (2004) 89
53 See Kataoka (2011) 27-47 for a survey of the history of modern scholarship on 
these two questions.  See in particular p.47, where Kataoka concludes in 
accordance with Frauwallner that “the B ha īkā is a later, revised version of theṛ ṭṭ  
Śloka-vārttika.”  Similarly, Verpoorten (1987) 30 states that “[t]he B ha īkāṛ ṭṭ  
handles the same problems as the ŚV … we feel K's thought in this work to be 
more synthetic and riper.”  By contrast, Taber (1992a) 179 argues against 
Frauwallner and in favour of “the traditional opinion [of K.S. Ramaswami Sastri] 
that the ŚV represents Kumārila's mature philosophy.”
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both texts in order to present a coherent and philosophically appealing view, 
without attempting to find any difference in the two presentations that may 
indicate a development in Kumārila's own thinking.
The approach of this thesis aims to compensate for the terseness of Kumārila's 
presentation by examining how Kumārila selects technical terms with a pre-
existing history of usage in theoretical contexts.  This is not to claim that 
Kumārila did not adapt the precise meaning of the terms to suit his own 
dialectic purpose, but rather that an understanding of the pre-existing roles of 
technical terms can provide a sound basis for understanding Kumārila's own 
use of these terms.
This thesis seeks to reconstruct Kumārila's own doctrine as far as possible 
independently of the concerns of later Indian philosophers who may have had 
varied motivations for discussing Kumārila's work, and who were writing at a 
later time when the driving concerns of Indian epistemology would have 
changed to some extent.  Given the terseness of Kumārila's presentation, it has 
though been necessary to consult later authors who commented on or 
responded to these texts in more or less depth to strengthen the understanding 
of Kumārila's epistemology.  Later discussions of Kumārila's work have 
therefore been drawn on to throw light on the technical terminology used by 
Kumārila, but as far as possible without introducing any novel elements into the 
interpretation.  However, given the controversy which arose over the proper 
interpretation of Kumārila's doctrine among later authors, which seems to 
reflect an inherent ambiguity in Kumārila's own presentations, it may not be 
possible fully to realize this ideal.
The main later sources drawn on in this thesis date from the seventh and 
eighth century, and are the earliest commentaries on this doctrine.  As such, 
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they may be closer in spirit to Kumārila's own way of thinking.  The Tātparya-
Ṭīkā is a commentary on the Śloka-vārttika by U veka Bha aṃ ṭṭ 54, who was also 
affiliated to the Mīmā sā school and as such defended (his own reading of)ṃ  
Kumārila's doctrine.  The Tattva-saṅgraha of Śāntarak itaṣ 55 and its own 
commentary Pañjikā by Kamalaśīla56 excerpt Kumārila's presentation from the 
B ha - īkā and provide discussion of it.  As Buddhist philosophers, these twoṛ ṭ ṭ  
authors disagree with Kumārila's view, provide their own criticisms, and explain 
their own alternative view.  These two philosophers are discussed briefly, and 
are treated here as speaking in a single voice against Kumārila.  As close 
contemporaries to Kumārila, Devendrabuddhi and Śākyabuddhi have been 
drawn on to a limited extent, but a more detailed study of these two important 
Buddhist philosophers would be helpful in providing more insight into their 
contributions to the debate.
Unless otherwise stated, quotes from the Śloka-vārttika represent a 
modification of the translation in Kataoka (2011), and quotes from the B ha -ṛ ṭ
īkā andṭ  all other sources are translations made directly from published versions 
of the Sanskrit and Tibetan texts referenced in the abbreviations and 
bibliography sections.  Appendices are also provided with transliterated Sanskrit 
text and translations corresponding to extracts of the substantive part of 
54 Kataoka (2011) 21 gives the dates of U veka as 730-790 AD.  Mirashi (1966) 91ṃ  
says that “Umbeka flourished in circa A.D. 775-800”.  Kane (1928) 292-3 says 
that “the literary activity … of Umbeka [must be placed] between 700 and 730 
AD”.  However, Mirashi (1966) 93 fn.209 argues forcefully that Dr Kane's reasons 
for this dating “are absolutely baseless”.  Taber (1992b) 209 says that “It indeed 
appears that the first Mīmā sā theory of ṃ svata  prāmā yaḥ ṇ  discussed by 
Śāntarak ita in his TS (2812-45) is Umbeka's interpretation of Kumārila”.ṣ  
Although this is not entirely implausible, the fact Kamalaśīla appends to this 
chapter a separate discussion of U veka's views would suggest that the viewṃ  
discussed by Śāntarak ita is not Umbeka's interpretation of Kumārila, and thatṣ  
Umbeka wrote soon after Śāntarak ita.ṣ
55 Kataoka (2011) 21 follows Frauwallner in giving 725-788 AD as Śāntarak ita'sṣ  
dates.
56 Kataoka (2011) 21 follows Frauwallner in giving 740-795 AD as Kamalaśīla's 
dates.
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Kumārila's discussion of this topic in the B ha - īkāṛ ṭ ṭ .  These appendices cover all 
the verses quoted from those two texts in this thesis, and are intended as a 
reference guide for the reader.  No credit is taken for original research in 
respect of editing the Sanskrit text.  Further, it has not been possible to make 
any significant improvement on the translation of the Śloka-vārttika made in 
Kataoka (2011), so the translation provided here represents a mere 
modification of that in line with the interpretation developed in this thesis. 
Accordingly, no credit is claimed in respect of translation of the Śloka-vārttika 
text extract either.  The reader is directed to Kataoka (2011) for a full 
translation of the Śloka-vārttika text extract.
Section 6: Use of terminology
Terminology used in a philosophical discussion is of a technical character.  The 
range of terms available and the semantic range of these terms reflects the 
contingent historical development of the subject.  This is true for both 
contemporary Western philosophy and the classical Indian debate.  Key terms 
of the vocabulary of contemporary epistemology, such as the framing of a 
debate between internalist and externalist positions, has been developed in the 
literature attempting to respond to the Gettier problem, and the meanings of 
pre-existing terms such as justification has also been made more complex and 
also problematic through this literature.  Accordingly, this thesis will attempt to 
introduce whatever contemporary terminology is needed with a degree of self-
awareness about the contingent historical character of contemporary 
terminology.  The examination of wider usage of the Indian terminology in 
theoretical contexts mentioned above will also serve to introduce a degree of 
self-awareness about the contingent historical character of the terminology 
available to Kumārila.  At the same time, terminology is wielded in distinctive 
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ways by individual philosophers, and the examination of general use of 
terminology constitutes only a preliminary exercise for understanding 
Kumārila's use of these terms.
Accordingly, this thesis will proceed to recover an understanding of Kumārila's 
doctrine through an examination of his use of a number of key theoretical 
terms.  The question of how these terms should be rendered into the 
vocabulary of contemporary epistemology will be under examination throughout 
much of this thesis.  As such, it will not be possible to begin this examination 
with a translation of these terms into English without presupposing what is 
ultimately to be discovered.  In particular, the technical terms 'pramā a', 'ṇ non-
pramā a', 'prāmā yam', 'ṇ ṇ non-prāmā yam', ṇ 'svabhāva', 'virodha', 'utsarga', 
'apavāda' and 'prāptā' will be originally encountered in Sanskrit in this thesis. 
As well as developing novel formulations for translating these terms, existing 
translations such as 'validity' etc. will be used when engaging with the existing 
scholarship.  A glossary of key technical terms is provided at the end.
Part of the argument of this thesis is that Kumārila does not make his 
terminology any more exact than it needs to be in order to do the philosophical 
work he requires of it.  Thus there can be a variety of ways of filling out the 
details of Kumārila's position, but no such additional detail should be necessary 
in order to understand the structure of Kumārila's argument and its 
philosophical coherence.  Thus Kumārila did not see the attainment of 
maximum granularity in analysis as the aim of philosophical endeavour, but 
instead chose to use philosophical terminology that is determined with a level 
of granularity appropriate to his specific philosophical goals.  This can be 
compared to the way a tool is chosen that is appropriately coarse or fine to suit 
the purpose.  A similar phenomenon can be seen in contemporary legal 
reasoning, where a good legal principle involves the idea that cases should be 
decided on narrower rather than broader grounds.  
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Kumārila's approach contrasts with an analytic reductionist approach which is a 
prominent theme in at least some Buddhist philosophy.  In particular, it will be 
seen how Kumārila transfers paradigms of methodology and reasoning well-
established in grammatical and ritual and legal interpretation literatures to this 
new context.  It could also be that Kumārila sought to make a philosophical 
intervention in support of his extra-philosophical beliefs, and thus was not 
concerned to engage with details that were not material to his strategic aims. 
A wide variety of interpretations of Kumārila's doctrine formulated by later 
interpreters are preserved in the works of U veka and Kamalaśīla.  It will beṃ  
suggested that these later interpretations reflect a failure to understand this 
strategic dimension to Kumārila's use of terminology.
Given this approach, the challenge will be to find contemporary philosophical 
vocabulary which is sufficiently broad in its semantic range to convey the non-
specific import of Kumārila's use of the Sanskrit terms listed above.  Thus it will 
be necessary to directly address the question of how key terms from 
contemporary philosophical vocabulary are being used at various stages in this 
thesis.  The goal is to find a translation of each Sanskrit term which reflects the 
philosophical work being done by the term without introducing additional 
substantive claims which Kumārila would not be concerned to defend.
Italics have been used for passages translated as block quotes from Sanskrit or 
Tibetan.  Italics have not been used for transliterated Sanskrit terms, unless as 
part of a quotation, where the convention of the quoted author has been 
followed.  Bold font has sometimes been used to emphasize a term within a 
translated quotation that is of particular relevance to the larger discussion.  All 
page references to Kataoka (2011) are to Part II unless otherwise stated.
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Section 7: Thesis Summary
A connection between Kumārila's doctrine of svata prāmā yam and the ideas ofḥ ṇ  
fallibility and infallibility has been suggested by B.K. Matilal.57  This thesis will 
clarify how notions of fallibilism and infallibilism are involved in Kumārila's 
doctrine, and find an affinity with Peirce's rejection of skepticism and the 
Cartesian method of doubt in favour of a pragmatist method of inquiry.
Hookway distinguishes between two ways of characterizing fallibilism.58  A first 
way is as a “distinctive 'attitude of mind'”59, whereby “our acceptance of 
propositions should always have a detached or tentative character: the 
possibility of error must be real.”60  Hookway's interest however lies in a second 
characterization which he attributes to Peirce.  Here, “lack of ‘absolute 
certainty’ is compatible with the sort of ordinary certainty that arises when the 
possibility of error cannot really be entertained or taken seriously.”61  This 
second characterization involves “defining infallibility, and then characteriz[ing] 
fallibilism as the view that there are no propositions that are ‘infallible’ so 
understood.”62  Hookway thus explains:
“When we describe a judgement or belief as ‘infallible’, we identify it as 
belonging to an epistemic kind of which, of necessity, all members are 
true … This assignment to a kind identifies a metaphysical feature of the 
judgement or belief that guarantees its truth.”63
57 See Matilal (1986) 32
58 In Hookway (2007); the same material is also presented in Hookway (2008)
59 Hookway (2007) 10
60 Hookway (2007) 10
61 Hookway (2007) 10
62 Hookway (2007) 11
63 Hookway (2007) 11
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Kumārila's use of the notion of svabhāva will be investigated in order to show 
that Kumārila conceives of pramā as as epistemic kinds which have anṇ  
essential disposition to correctly apprehend some object or rational truth under 
appropriately normal conditions.  Kumārila is shown to endorse a disjunctive 
account of deliverances from epistemic sources, whereby deliverances based on 
pramā as are of necessity true, and deliverances not based on pramā as areṇ ṇ  
characterized partly in terms of reflective indiscriminability from the first class 
of deliverances.
However, as Hookway goes on to explain, in such a case, “we may be 
unconfident of our judgement because we are unsure whether it is a judgement 
of perception or, perhaps, a member of a different epistemic kind, a report of 
illusion or hallucination, for example.”64  Kumārila's response to a first possible 
view raised in the Śloka-vārttika presentation makes this same point.  Hookway 
suggests that a first possible solution is to “revise the characterization of 
infallibility to require that the belief detectably belongs to a kind which 
guarantees its truth.”65  Kumārila's discussion and a discussion by U vekaṃ  
which rejects the notion of a distinguishing feature of correct awareness argue 
that no beliefs can meet such a characterization, and thus all beliefs are fallible 
in this sense.
However, Hookway alternately suggest that “we might accept that fallibilism 
does not extend to all our judgements, recognizing the infallibility of perceptual 
ones, while also insisting that our beliefs about whether a given judgement is a 
perceptual judgement are fallible.”66  Similarly, Kumārila asserts that, whereas 
perceptual and other judgments based on pramā as are infallible in the senseṇ  
64 Hookway (2007) 11
65 Hookway (2007) 11
66 Hookway (2007) 11
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that they belong to an epistemic kind that necessitates their truth, beliefs about 
whether a judgment is based on a pramā a are fallible.  Accordingly, Kumārila'sṇ  
fallibilism concerns beliefs about whether a deliverance is of the right epistemic 
kind or not, and thus concerns something like the contemporary philosophical 
notion of judgments.  Thus for Kumārila, just as much as for Peirce, “a 
commitment to fallibilism is compatible with great confidence and certainty in 
the adequacy of most of our opinions and methods.”67  
Kumārila's fallibilism about judgments leads to his presentation of a method of 
inquiry which involves the transference of a pre-existing theoretical model 
rooted in ritual interpretation and already informing other disciplines such as 
legal interpretation and generative grammar.  This is a model of general 
operation and replacement operation.  Kumārila's model of inquiry is found to 
have an affinity with Peirce's understanding of abduction as a defeasible 
reasoning strategy that reflects the fallibility of human inquiry.
Kumārila's main claim is that “the prāmā yam of all pramā as is 'from itself'”ṇ ṇ 68. 
A full understanding of his claim will accordingly require a separate 
understanding of Kumārila's use of the three technical terms 'prāmā yam',ṇ  
'pramā a' and 'svata ' ('from itself').  Chapter Two argues for an understandingṇ ḥ  
of the term 'from itself' as a form of nomic necessitation and Chapter Three 
argues for a rendering of the term 'pramā a' as a deliverance which obtains in aṇ  
'Good Case', where the notion of 'Good Case' is borrowed from contemporary 
disjunctivism.  A reading of the term 'prāmā yam' as a capacity for epistemicṇ  
success and as a manifestation of that competence in the form of accurate 
determination of an object or fact is also argued for in Chapter Three.  As such, 
Kumārila's claim is that a capacity for epistemic success is nomically 
necessitated in Good Cases.  One way to read this idea is provided by Sosa's 
67 Hookway (2007) 13
68 TS 2811ab and ŚV 2.47ab respectively.  The language is almost identical in both 
texts.
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idea that the disposition to trust our deliverances represents the manifestation 
of a competence where it is exercised in appropriate conditions.  This means 
that epistemic success can be ascertained by the subject by ascertaining that 
conditions are appropriate, i.e. that a Good Case obtains.  Kumārila's notion of 
'non-pramā a' corresponds to the notion of a Bad Case as understood inṇ  
disjunctivism.
Although Good Case deliverances represent the manifestation of a competence 
which is an essential disposition, nevertheless, as Hookway notes, the agent 
may be unsure whether any given deliverance belong to this epistemic kind. 
Accordingly, a method of inquiry is needed, and Chapter Four examines 
Kumārila's presentation of just such a method.  Peirce is drawn on as an 
interlocutor for the understanding of Kumārila's protocol of inquiry, which is 
also rooted in the methodologies of ritual interpretation and generative 
grammar.  Kumārila's method is set out in terms of three phases, which are 
labelled instigating, prolonging and terminating inquiry.
Chapter Five considers Kumārila's anti-foundationalism, which is based on a 
regress argument against a certain conception of justification.  This regress 
argument targets inter alia the Buddhist position.  Kumārila's opposition to the 
requirement for subsequent justification supports his own claim that the agent 
satisfies a normative burden by following a protocol for inquiry.  That this 
protocol results in true belief is argued for via an explanatory induction.
The above discussion of Kumārila's doctrine has focused on the case of 
judgments that are not based on testimony from Vedic scripture, i.e. judgments 
derived from epistemic sources including perception, reasoning and ordinary 
testimony.  In the case of Vedic judgments, Kumārila holds that the scope for 
error is eliminated because there is no other possible epistemic kind which 
25
could give rise to a reflectively indiscriminable judgment.
In more detail, the chapter structure is as follows.  Chapter Two begins with 
Kumārila's gloss of 'from itself' as 'due to svabhāva' and argues that Kumārila's 
use of the term 'svabhāva' captures a notion of nomic necessity.  Primary and 
secondary literature on the term 'svabhāva' is surveyed to obtain a preliminary 
understanding of the term.  However, previous research relating to this term 
outside of a Buddhist context is limited, so the research in this chapter 
contributes to a fuller understanding of the meaning of the term 'svabhāva'. 
The term 'svabhāva' is found to equate to some form of essential disposition, 
following the contemporary literature on dispositional essentialism.  By 
endorsing the notion of a bare disposition, the chapter diverges from Arnold's 
rejection of virtus dormativa arguments such as U veka'sṃ  ontological reading 
of 'svata ' ('from itself').ḥ
The Mādhyamika Buddhist philosophers Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti rebut the 
interpretations of svabhāva as a permanent existent and as an invariably 
associated feature.  This notion relates a property to an entity, and it is found 
to cover the semantic field of the terms 'nature' and 'essence', where these are 
understood as a real component explaining necessity and as a basis for the 
individuation of an entity.
The findings of Ramkrishna Bhattacharya that the notion of svabhāva among 
the svabhāva-advocates is ambiguous between a notion involving a minimal 
form of causality and a notion denying causality are then presented.  The same 
ambiguity is shown to be inherent in Kumārila's conception of an invariably 
associated feature.  U veka's interpretation disambiguates the meaning inṃ  
favour of minimal causality.  Kumārila's use of the term 'svabhāva' is seen to 
capture a notion of nomic or natural necessity, congruent with the modality 
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implicit in Hookway's idea of “an epistemic kind of which, of necessity, all 
members are true.”69
Chapter Three begins by explicating Kumārila's use of the term 'prāmā yam' asṇ  
a capacity for epistemic success.  As per its characterization by reference to 
svabhāva, this is nomically necessitated in the case of a pramā a.  A pramā aṇ ṇ  
is shown to be a deliverance which obtains in appropriately normal conditions, 
and thus represents the manifestation of a competence which determines the 
accuracy of the belief.
Through a careful reading of passages from Kumārila's text, the dichotomy 
between pramā a and ṇ non-pramā a is shown to correspond to the dichotomyṇ  
between a Good Case and a Bad Case advocated by epistemological 
disjunctivists.  Further analysis of Kumārila's terminology shows that Kumārila's 
doctrine closely involves the disjunctivist idea that “Bad Cases [are] reflectively 
indiscriminable from Good ones”70.
Chapter Four presents Kumārila's claim as a belief protocol that captures the 
logic of inquiry of a rational agent.  The normative reading of Kumārila's 
doctrine developed here is contrasted with a phenomenological reading 
developed by Pārthasārathi and by Dan Arnold.  The terms 'utsarga' and 
'apavāda' are used by Kumārila to capture the idea of hypothesis adoption and 
hypothesis replacement.  The roots of this terminology in the grammatical and 
ritual literatures are described in order to show how Kumārila models the 
process of generating true beliefs by analogy with how linguistic units are 
correctly formed through a generative grammar.  Such a model constitutes a 
directive to the epistemic agent who aims at getting beliefs that are not merely 
69 Hookway (2007) 11
70 Sturgeon (2006) 188
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justified but are in fact true.  The instigating, prolonging and terminating of 
inquiry are all separately investigated.  Kumārila's discussion of alternatives to 
his own view is seen to support the logic of inquiry he provides.
Chapter Five examines Kumārila's anti-foundationalism.  Kumārila's 
presentation of an argument from infinite regress attacks forms of 
foundationalism including that of his Buddhist adversaries, which is accordingly 
described.  Kumārila is interpreted as an anti-foundationalist who rejects the 
idea that a secure foundation for judgments can be obtained.  However, 
whereas the reading of Kumārila's anti-foundationalism by Taber and Arnold 
means that all beliefs are equally justified or equally valid, the interpretation 
presented here is that a process of inquiry is necessary to strengthen the 
epistemic status of beliefs.  Finally, the case of the Veda as an infallible 
epistemic source is considered.
Ultimately it is found that the term 'prāmā yam' constitutes the notion of aṇ  
capacity for epistemic success, the term 'pramā a' constitutes a Good Caseṇ  
deliverance, which involves both possession and exercise of such a capacity, 
and 'svata ', or 'from itself', ḥ provides the idea that the exercise of such a 
capacity is in virtue of the intrinsic nature of the deliverance conditional on its 
identity as a Good Case deliverance, and hence not reliant on anything else. 
The notion of being 'in virtue of' represents an idea of metaphysical grounding. 
Thus Kumārila's claim is that Good Case deliverances exercise a capacity for 
epistemic success which they possess as an intrinsic disposition.  
By contrast, 'non-pramā a' constitutes a Bad Case deliverance.  Such aṇ  
deliverance is 'from something else' in the sense that its apprehension as of an 
object is due to sub-optimal epistemic conditions which are characterized as 
flaws of the belief process.  Because Bad Case deliverances are so reliant, they 
28
are vulnerable to defeat, unlike Good Case deliverances.
29
Chapter 2: Kumārila's dispositional essentialism
Section 1: Introduction
This chapter provides an examination of rival notions of svabhāva in circulation 
at the time of Kumārila, and defends the attribution to Kumārila of a form of 
dispositional essentialism involving the notion of a real causal power of an 
entity which constitutes its essence conditional on the existence of that entity. 
Kumārila's notion of svabhāva is shown to have a greater affinity with a notion 
promulgated by earlier groups of svabhāva-advocates that with the notion 
criticized by Mādhyamika Buddhists.  In the existing secondary literature, 
'svabhāva' has been translated by terms such as 'nature' and 'essence' which 
hint at a constraint on metaphysical possibility.
John Carroll remarks that “[t]he most interesting and perhaps the most 
perplexing feature of laws is their modal character.”1  In contemporary 
philosophy, Humean or Regularity theories and natural or nomic necessitation 
theories form two competing strategies to account for this modal character.  As 
Alexander Bird explains, “[t]he prevailing debates surrounding the nature of 
laws of nature have focused on the rivalry between the regularity conception of 
laws and recent nomic necessitation accounts.”2  Classical Indian discussions of 
the lawlike behaviour of the natural world also exist, and this chapter will 
provide a survey of some of these discussions.
The term 'svabhāva' is employed by groups known as svabhāva-advocates 
(svabhāva-vādins), and this notion is understood by one of these groups as 
either an essential property or an intrinsic nature of a substance which 
determines its behavioural manifestations.  This view has much in common with 
the thesis of dispositional essentialism in contemporary philosophy.  Kumārila 
appears to draw on just this idea of nomic necessitation in his epistemological 
1 Carroll (1990) 185
2 Bird (2005) 353
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claim, which is that beliefs have a real and irreducible disposition or causal 
power to provide epistemic success.  A second group of svabhāva-advocates 
uphold a thesis of lawlessness which focuses on the denial of the essentialist 
thesis.  Dharmakīrti is one of Kumārila's Buddhist contemporaries who 
formulates a broadly similar notion of svabhāva as an explanatory principle, but 
within an ultimately reductionist and anti-realist framework.  Arguments 
against a realist conception of svabhāva are provided by the Mādhyamika 
Buddhist philosophers Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti.
This chapter reviews these various conceptions of svabhāva as an explanatory 
posit for the lawlike behaviour of objects.  Firstly, a quick overview of 
dispositional essentialism is provided as a contemporary theoretical framework 
for the presentation of the Indian material.  Kumārila's own claim is then 
presented in order to motivate the discussion of powers and properties in 
general.  The views of the svabhāva-advocates are then considered by drawing 
on the work of Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya and Ramkrishna Bhattacharya.  The 
view of Dharmakīrti is considered by reference to the work of John Dunne.  The 
arguments against a realist notion are then considered with reference to 
Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti as well as relevant secondary literature.  On the 
basis of this discussion, the notion of essential property is refined to provide a 
viable conception which evades the force of these arguments.  The discussion 
then turns to Kumārila's own notion of svabhāva.  After briefly indicating the 
importance of this notion in his epistemological claim, an illustration involving a 
pot is examined.  On this basis, it is argued that Kumārila's notion of svabhāva 
amounts to that of an essential property.
This thesis as a whole provides a detailed examination of nomic necessitation 
as it figures in Kumārila's doctrine and as such provides an additional textual 
resource on which to assess the viability of the concept of svabhāva.  It can be 
seen as building on the research of Chattopadhyaya and Bhattacharya into the 
svabhāva-advocates, but with a focus on the outlying case of Kumārila, who 
was affiliated to the Mīmā sā school rather than being a self-declaredṃ  
svabhāva-advocate.  The purpose of this chapter is to use the existing primary 
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and secondary literature on svabhāva as a resource to flesh out the notion of 
svabhāva as it figures in Kumārila's claim.
Section 2: Powers and properties in the classical Indian context
Kumārila begins the presentation of his own view in both the B ha - īkā ṛ ṭ ṭ and the 
Śloka-vārttika with the claim that “the prāmā yam of all pramā as is 'fromṇ ṇ  
itself'”3.  In order to understand this claim, the terms 'prāmā yam', 'pramā a'ṇ ṇ  
and 'from itself' will need to be separately understood.  However, this opening 
statement already informs us that some kind of relation obtains between 
pramā as and prāmā yam.ṇ ṇ
Kumārila next explains that this means that “a capacity for accurate 
determination of an object belongs to them [scil. pramā as] due to theirṇ  
svabhāva”4.  According to this clarification, prāmā yam is a capacity forṇ  
accurate determination, and its relation to pramā as is 'due to svabhāva'.  Theṇ  
term 'prāmā yam' and Kumārila's notion of a capacity will be explored in moreṇ  
depth later, as well as the idea of a capacity for epistemic success.  The central 
term in Kumārila's claim, 'from itself', has been immediately glossed as 'due to 
its svabhāva'.  The investigation into Kumārila's claim will begin with an 
investigation of this expression 'due to svabhāva'.  In order to understand this 
term, it will be helpful to examine the wider usage of the theoretical term 
'svabhāva' in the classical Indian context.  This task will be undertaken in this 
chapter, before turning to the specific application to prāmā yam as a capacityṇ  
for accurate determination of an object.
The meaning of the term 'svabhāva' has been investigated in much recent 
3 TS 2811ab and ŚV 2.47ab respectively.
4 TS 2812ab
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scholarship.5  This section will provide a high-level survey of how the notion of 
svabhāva has been treated in recent literature.  Later sections of this chapter 
will provide a deeper engagement with selected pieces of primary and 
secondary literature.  By comparison of the textual evidence with the relevant 
contemporary literature, it will be argued in this section that the term svabhāva 
incorporates two dimensions, firstly as a default nature, in a sense to be 
explicated, and secondly as a real dispositional property or causal power.
Subsection 1: Svabhāva as a property
The denial of the existence of svabhāva in entities is a key Mādhyamika 
Buddhist tenet, and arguments provided against svabhāva by the Mādhyamika 
philosophers Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti will be examined below.  In the context 
of Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma Buddhism, Collett Cox explains:
“Each such primary factor, or dharma, is determined or distinguished by 
an intrinsic nature (svabhāva), or distinctive characteristic, that can be 
applied to that factor alone and to no other … The term 'intrinsic nature' 
… refers to its atemporal underlying and defining nature … ”6
In the context of Buddhist Reductionism generally, Mark Siderits focuses his 
discussion on 'intrinsic nature' and 'genuine intrinsic property' in order to 
capture the ontological dimension of the term 'svabhāva' as what is 
fundamentally real.7  Jan Westerhoff notes that the term is “often translated as 
“inherent existence” or “own-being””.8  Westerhoff himself draws a distinction 
5 See for example Siderits (2003), Dunne (2004), Ronkin (2005) and Westerhoff 
(2011)
6 Cox (1995) 139
7 See Siderits (2003) 117
8 See Westerhoff (2011) 19
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between this ontological dimension to the notion as what “exist[s] in a primary 
manner, unconstructed and independent of anything else”9 and a notion of 
essence as “something that an object cannot lose without ceasing to be that 
very object.”10  (A cognitive dimension and a notion of absolute-svabhāva are 
also discussed by Westerhoff, but will not be relevant to this study.)  In the 
context of Abhidharma Buddhism, Ronkin notes that sabhāva (the Pāli 
equivalent of svabhāva in the Abhidharma texts) has been rendered in various 
ways, “the most paramount of which are 'particular nature', 'own-nature', 'self-
existence' and 'individual essence'.”11  Ronkin makes a distinction between 
senses of nature and essence similar to that of Westerhoff.
In the context of the affirmation of svabhāva by the non-Mādhyamika Buddhist 
philosopher Dharmakīrti, John Dunne carefully distinguishes between svabhāva 
as property and svabhāva as nature.12  Dunne further explains although 
“Dharmakīrti's system does not allow de re predication”13, his notion of 
svabhāva does involve some notion of necessity, although this is not quite a 
notion of de dicto necessity either.14  Dunne further explains that the accidental/ 
essential distinction “remains vague and undeveloped”15 in Dharmakīrti's 
philosophy.
The existence of svabhāva has also been affirmed by various non-Buddhist 
groups.  Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya and Ramkrishna Bhattacharya are two 
scholars who have examined the views of groups called svabhāva-advocates. 
In the context of one group of svabhāva-advocates, Bhattacharya quotes a view 
of Joseph Needham that svabhāva “could be translated “inherent nature”, 
“innate thus-ness”, or “the essential nature of things”.”16  Bhattacharya himself 
9 Westerhoff (2011) 24
10 Westerhoff (2009) 22
11 See Ronkin (2005) 86
12 See Dunne (2004) 155-202
13 Dunne (2004) 187
14 See Dunne (2004) 187-190
15 Dunne (2004) 190
16 Bhattacharya (2012) 603
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distinguishes between two types of svabhāva-advocacy.  The first type is the 
idea that svabhāva is the cause of everything, which he labels svabhāva-as-
causality, rigid causality, embodied cause and unchanging nature.17  The second 
type is the denial of causality and of svabhāva-as-causality, which he labels 
svabhāva-as-accident or chance.18
The Mādhyamika Buddhist critique focuses on a dimension of the notion of 
svabhāva which connects with the notion of essence or nature, as indicated by 
some of the common translations within this context.  By contrast, the context 
of the svabhāva-advocates focuses a dimension which connects with some 
notion of disposition or causal power, as indicated by Bhattacharya's 
translations and discussion to be considered below.  A preliminary 
understanding of this notion can be had from a quick look at some examples of 
it.  Candrakīrti mentions the examples of heat in fire and the property that 
makes a ruby a ruby.19  Here, svabhāva refers to a property possessed by an 
entity.  Nāgārjuna explains that “a svabhāva cannot be removed/ abandoned/ 
caused to cease, such as the heat of fire, fluidity in [liquid] water [and] 
extendedness of space”20.  These brief remarks, which can be taken as 
relatively neutral and unbiased21, indicate a property that is possessed with 
some form of necessity.
In the Nyāya Kośa, a Sanskrit reference work for philosophical terms, svabhāva 
is defined as “a particular property of an entity which is not dependent on 
another cause”22 and is said to be “difficult to overcome”.23  Examples given are 
17 See Bhattacharya (2012) 599, 608 and passim.  The term “embodied cause” is 
taken from a quote from Needham
18 See Bhattacharya (2012) 599, 608 and passim
19 PP 260: “agner au ya  jñātānā  padmarāgṣṇ ṃ ṃ âdinā  padmarāgṃ âdi-svabhāvaś ca”
20 Vigrahavyāvartanī Svav tti 82: 14-15, also quoted in Westerhoff (2009) 22: “naṛ  
hi svabhāva  śakyo vinivartayitu  yathḥ ṃ âgner u atvam apā  dravatvamṣṇ ṃ  
ākāśasya nirāvara atvam|”ṇ
21 The svabhāva-advocates also provide the examples of heat in fire and coolness 
in water, as described later
22 Jhalakīkar (1996) 971: hetv-antarānapek o vastu-dharma-viśe aṣ ṣ ḥ
23 Jhalakīkar (1996) 971: duratikramaḥ
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heat in fire, coolness in water, and cool sensation in breeze, and a late 
statement of the views of the Cārvākas is referred to, which Bhattacharya 
shows the views of the svabhāva-advocates to have been conflated with.  The 
use of this expression 'difficult to overcome' to describe svabhāva is quite 
astute in that it can be construed to cover a range of cases, from the 
conceptual and metaphysical impossibility of unextended space (at least in a 
pre-modern paradigm) to the slight effort required to heat water.
By contrast, all of Nāgārjuna's three examples provide cases of determinable 
properties which are inalienable from their determinate entities and serve in 
part to individuate those entities.  Kit Fine explains that the concept of essence 
“plays not only an external role, in helping to characterize the subject, but also 
an internal role, in helping to constitute it”24 and characterizes the latter as a 
consequence of the former.25  As such, the concept is of use “in the formulation 
of metaphysical claims [and] in the definition of metaphysical concepts”26, 
including the concept of ontological dependence.  As Fine explains, a modal 
account of essence posits that “an object [has] a property essentially just in 
case it is necessary that the object has the property.”27  The fact that Fine's two 
roles are being played by the properties with respect to their entities would 
seem to motivate a loose translation of svabhāva as essence.
There are also important differences in how the properties figure in their 
determinate entities in the examples given, and the resulting ambiguity will be 
exploited in the arguments provided by Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti against 
svabhāva, which will be discussed later.  In the example of space and 
extendedness, extendedness constitutes space as a permanent given for 
experience (at least in a premodern paradigm).  In contrast, heat may be lost 
when fire is extinguished, but not without the loss of fire also.  And in the case 
of fluidity, water can lose this while continuing to exist, by turning to ice or to 
24 Fine (1994) 1
25 See Fine (1994) 1
26 Fine (1994) 2
27 Fine (1994) 3
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steam, but thereby loses its identity as water.  Coolness in water represents a 
fourth case, where water may lose the coolness it possesses at normal 
environmental temperature without losing its identity, by heating up, but only 
dependent on external conditions to provide heat.  The first three of these 
cases are reflected in a three-way distinction made by Fine concerning essence. 
Having characterized essence by the statement that “an object [has] a property 
essentially just in case it is necessary that the object has the property”28, Fine 
labels this a categorical form and provides two variants on this categorical form 
– conditional on existence, i.e. if the object exists, and conditional upon 
identity, i.e. if the object is identical to that very object.29  It can be seen that 
the case of extendedness in space satisfies the categorical form, the case of 
heat in fire satisfies the form conditional on existence, and the case of fluidity 
in water satisfies the form conditional on identity.
The fourth case, that of coolness in water, can be said to satisfy a third 
conditional form, conditional on the absence of extrinsic factors.  As such, this 
fourth case of water temperature provides a notion of an intrinsic feature rather 
than that of an essence, where an intrinsic feature is “a feature of the thing 
itself”30.  Heat in water is an accidental property rather than an essential 
property, and one which is dependent on extrinsic conditions, where these are 
understood as “the stimuli to which it may be subject or the conditions which it 
finds itself in”31.
Subsection 2: Svabhāva as a power
The svabhāva-advocates provide a wide variety of examples of svabhāva, many 
of which have been collated by Bhattacharya, including the following verses:
28 Fine (1994) 3
29 See Fine (1994) 4
30 Harré and Madden (1975) 87
31 Harré and Madden (1975) 87
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“Heat in fire, coolness in water, the sweetness of tone in a cuckoo – 
these and other things of the same kind are [due to] svabhāva and not 
something else.”32
[One] thorn of a jujube tree is sharp, [one is] straight, and one is 
curved, and the fruit is spherical.  Say, by what was this produced?33
“What makes the sharpness of thorns, the various forms of birds and 
animals, the sweetness of sugarcane and the bitterness of lime?  All this 
happens due to svabhāva.”34
Whereas the examples of heat and coolness are familiar from the above 
discussion, the other examples are more whimsical in character and suggest a 
slightly different conception of svabhāva to the four cases described above. 
Although all the examples can be construed as dispositional ascriptions, the 
example of the sweetness of a cuckoo's song stands out as a more 
paradigmatic example of a dispositional ascription, because it specifies a 
behaviour that the cuckoo is disposed to engage in.  That is, on a 
dispositionalist reading the cuckoo's song is easily construed as a display of a 
real causal power in the cuckoo, whereas the idea of heat as a dispositional 
property needs to be filled out by saying the burning, cooking, warming, 
scalding etc. constitute its displays.
The examples considered so far involve dispositions of kinds, and arguably, of 
32 SSS 2.2 quoted in Bhattacharya (2012) 602: agnair au yam apā  śaītyaṣṇ ṃ ṃ 
kokile madhurasvara  ḥ ׀ ityādyekaprakāra  syāt svabhāvo nāpara  kvacit ḥ ḥ ׀׀  The 
translation provided here follows Bhattacharya in supplying 'due to', which is 
syntactically necessary.  Note also that the dropping of the ablative termination, 
which is probably done for metrical reasons, can easily mislead the interpreter 
into reading of the svabhāva doctrine in Mādhyamika fashion, which is precisely 
the danger highlighted in this chapter.
33 Quoted in Bhattacharya (2012) 602 (my translation): badaryā  ka akastīk aḥ ṇṭ ṣṇ  
jurekaśca ku cita  ṛ ṃ ḥ ׀ phala  ca vartula  tasyā vada kena vinirmitam ṃ ṃ ׀׀
34 Quoted in Bhattacharya (2012) 602 (my translation): ka  ka akānā  prakarotiḥ ṇṭ ṃ  
taik ya  vicitrabhāva  m ga-pak i ā  ca ṣṇ ṃ ṃ ṛ ṣ ṇ ṃ ׀ mādhurya  ik o  ka utā  ca nimbeṃ ṣ ḥ ṭ ṃ  
svabhāvata  sarvamida  prav ttam ḥ ṃ ṛ ׀׀  (Strictly, the fruit mentioned is Nimb, or 
Azadirachta Indica, which is similar to lime.)
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natural kinds or kinds that resemble natural kinds.  That dispositions should be 
properties of natural kinds rather than of kinds generally or particulars is 
important to establishing the essentialist thesis.  This is because the exercise of 
the causal power is explained by reference to the fact that it is the essence of a 
natural kind.  A kind determined by social conventions would have no unified 
metaphysical essence and thus the notion of a dispositional property could do 
no explanatory work in relation to it.
By contrast, the examples of different types of thorns attribute dispositions to 
particulars.  In Ellis's terminology, the degree of sharpness of a thorn cannot 
constitute a kind essence but only a particular essence.  That is, the 
explanatory demand is for an explanation of intrinsic properties of thorns not 
constituted by their essential properties as a kind.
In this section it has been suggested that the properties seen in these examples 
can be construed as kind dispositions which are real causal powers.  In section 
four below, it will be argued that such a construal is maintained by one of two 
groups of svabhāva-advocates.
Subsection 3: Summary
To summarize, the examples of svabhāva have been analysed in respect of 
essentialist and dispositionalist dimensions in turn.  As a property, the notion of 
svabhāva has been shown to subsume a categorical notion of an essence which 
is an individuating principle and source of modal constraint, a notion of essence 
conditional on existence, a notion of essence conditional on identity, and a 
notion of intrinsic property conditional on normal extrinsic conditions.  The 
notion of a nature as an ontologically real feature overlaps with at least the 
categorical form of the notion of essence, and provides a real basis for the 
lawlike behaviour of a determinate entity.  This notion of a nature also forms 
one limb of a dichotomy between what is ontologically real and what is 
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conceptually constructed.  The existence of such variety helps to explain the 
variety of translations in recent literature that were surveyed above.
What is common to all the senses of svabhāva as essence is the idea of a 
property of an entity which, in the words of the Nyāya Kośa quoted above, is 
'difficult to overcome', where the difficulty ranges from the need for an 
intervening factor up to a conceptual and metaphysical impossibility.  A notion 
which is loose enough to allow for such a range of possibilities is the notion of a 
default intrinsic property.  This would be a property that is a feature of the 
thing itself, and a default in the sense that it is conditional on the absence of 
external factors which would interfere.  The presence of coolness in water can 
be taken as an illustrative example of a default intrinsic nature which is not an 
essential property.  Water is cool under what can be considered normal 
atmospheric conditions, but such coolness can be removed in the presence of 
an external source of heat.  Such a notion subsumes the cases of an essential 
property discussed above as well as the case of an intrinsic property that is 
contingent on normal extrinsic conditions or the absence of an extrinsic 
stimulus.
As well as this essentialist dimension, a dispositionalist dimension to svabhāva 
was also identified in this section.  Examples given by the svabhāva-advocates 
were used to flag the notion of a dispositional ascription and to distinguish a 
notion of kind essence in contrast to particular essence to which this may apply. 
The ability of cuckoos to sing can be taken as an illustrative example of a 
dispositional property which is the real essence of a natural kind, which may or 
may not manifest depending on circumstances that are extrinsic to the cuckoo. 
Although strictly speaking, cuckoo song does not individuate cuckoos as a 
natural kind, nevertheless this illustration has sufficient resemblance to a 
scientifically respectable natural kind to be illuminating.  The idea that 
dispositional ascriptions could present svabhāva as a causal power, which is 
more prominent in the presentation by one group of svabhāva-advocates, was 
also noted, and this will be examined in more detail in section four below.
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Section 3: Powers and properties in the contemporary context
Dispositional essentialism is a thesis in contemporary philosophy which is a 
conjunction of two separate claims, realism about dispositional properties and 
essentialism.35  In the contemporary context, realism about dispositions arises 
through opposition to a Humean metaphysic36 which holds that things in the 
world are passive entities which “behave as they are required to by the laws of 
nature”37, these laws being “universal regularities imposed on things whose 
identities are independent of the laws”38 and which “are contingent, not 
necessary”39.  According to a strong Humean view, such as that of David Lewis, 
laws supervene on particular matters of fact in some way.  A weaker Humean 
view, such as that of David Armstrong, would be that laws are imposed on 
passive entities from without.  Characterizing the Humean position as 
passivism, dispositionalists advocate an anti-passivism which holds that lawlike 
behaviour stems from the real causal powers or dispositional properties 
possessed by objects in the world.  
The distinguishing feature of dispositionalism is the idea that “[p]roperties are 
powerful”40 and that their powers “supply the world's necessity and possibility 
through being intrinsically modal: affording, grounding or instigating change”41 
In a version of the doctrine first canvassed by Shoemaker and favoured by 
Mumford, properties of objects “are natural clusters of, and exhausted by, 
powers”42, so that “the powers fix the identity of the property.”43  These causal 
powers are irreducible to analysis in terms of non-causal behaviour, that is, 
35 See Groff (2013) 211-217 for a discussion of these two elements within the 
context of Ellis's scientific essentialism.
36 Whether the position commonly described in the literature as Humean does in 
fact reflect Hume's own view is a question which will not be discussed here.
37 Ellis (2008) 76
38 Ellis (2008) 77
39 Ellis (2008) 77
40 Mumford (2004) 170
41 Mumford (2004) 168
42 Mumford (2004) 170
43 Mumford (2004) 171
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they do not supervene on so-called categorical properties.  The view that 
entities possess such causal powers can be traced back to Leibniz's notion of 
vis viva as a force that animates objects of nature from within.  This provides 
the first element of dispositional essentialism, which is metaphysical realism 
about dispositional properties or causal powers.
Essentialism is the view that some properties of objects or natural kinds are 
metaphysically essential to it.  Locke describes the real essence of a thing as 
“the very being of any thing, whereby it is, what it is”44 and distinguishes it 
from nominal essence, which is a function of how we choose to categorize 
things.  The Lockean real essence roughly corresponds to an Aristotelian notion 
of essence and is roughly the sense in play in contemporary essentialism.45 
Dispositional essentialism typically involves the idea that some or all properties 
of natural kinds are dispositional properties and are essential to their kinds.46 
Essentialism also provides an anti-Humean line of reasoning, in that it denies 
that lawlike behaviour is merely contingent.  As Brian Ellis explains, 
essentialism is one form of what is called a natural necessitation theory, which 
asserts that laws are necessary in some sense.47  Specifically, for essentialists, 
there is a real relation between natural kinds and essential properties which 
exerts a modal constraint on behaviour.  This modal constraint is variously 
termed natural necessity, nomic necessity, de re necessity, or metaphysical 
necessity.48  After briefly reviewing some of these terms, Ellis explains that he 
prefers the expression 'de re necessity' “which might reasonably be translated 
as “real necessity”, for this indicates the kind of grounding that essentialists 
44 An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 3.3.15.  See Jones (2013)
45 See Ellis (2001) 55: “The scientific task is to discover what makes a thing the 
kind of thing it is and hence to explain why it behaves or has the properties it 
has.  The scientific version of essentialism is therefore less concerned with 
questions of identity, and more with questions of explanation, than is the 
classical essentialism of Aristotle or the new essentialism of Kripke.  Its closest 
historical predecessor is the kind of essentialism described by Locke.”  However, 
see Leary (2009) for an alternative reading of Locke involving a trichotomy.
46 See Groff (2013) 211-217 for a discussion of the views of Ellis, Mumford and 
Bird, all labelled dispositional essentialism.
47 See Ellis (2002) 97
48 See Ellis (2002) 110 and Ellis (2001) 43 for a brief explanation of how these 
terms target the same idea
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believe natural necessities to have, namely, a grounding in reality.”49  Here, Ellis 
appeals to a notion of metaphysical grounding.  Similarly, Mumford explains 
that “[d]e re necessity means necessity in nature: in things rather than in 
words or logical form.”50  Other similar terminology is used in a similar way by 
essentialist authors.  Ellis suggests that “[t]he distinctions between causal 
powers, capacities, propensities, liabilities and so on, which appear to name 
different species of dispositions, are difficult to make, and of doubtful 
philosophical significance.”51
Harré and Madden present an early theory that combines a doctrine of causal 
powers with the idea of natural necessity, wherein “natures of the operative 
powerful particulars, the constraining or stimulating effects of conditions and so 
on are offered as the grounds for judgement that a certain effect cannot but 
happen, or cannot but fail to happen”52  As such, there is a match between this 
natural necessity, which holds between dispositions and manifested properties, 
and a conceptual necessity, which holds between predicates descriptive of 
causes and predicates descriptive of effects.53  Harré and Madden explain that 
“[t]he elements in a case of natural necessity, however, are independently 
describable even though conceptually related.  It is perfectly possible to identify 
the weight and pressure of the atmosphere without reference to water rising in 
a pump …”54
Harré and Madden prefer the term 'power' or 'causal power' over other the 
alternative terminologies, explaining that “'[p]ower' is a notion particularly 
associated with agency, with the initiation of trains of events, with activity.”55 
The proper analysis of a power ascription is that “'X has the power to A' means 
'X (will/ can) do A, in the appropriate conditions, in virtue of its intrinsic 
49 Ellis (2002) 110
50 Mumford (2004) 166
51 Ellis (2002) 65
52 Harré and Madden (1975) 20
53 See Harré and Madden (1975) 8
54 Harré and Madden (1975) 134
55 Harré and Madden (1975) 88
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nature.'”56  Harré and Madden criticise earlier literature for an emphasis on 
liabilities, that is, the disposition to be causally affected, at the expense of 
powers, or the disposition to actively cause something.  Thus “old favourites 
like 'solubility', 'inflammability', 'brittleness', etc. … were the only dispositional 
properties that were ever mentioned.  But these only have a role where the 
world is also full of things and materials with active powers.  Nothing could be 
brittle in a world where nothing could smash, nothing could be inflammable in a 
world where nothing had the power to ignite and there could be no solutes 
where there were no solvents.”57  At the same time, “[t]he concepts of power 
and liability … are the poles of a spectrum of concepts, distinguished by the 
degree to which we assign responsibility for particular behavioural 
manifestations between intrinsic conditions and extrinsic circumstances.”  Thus 
“[t]he chain saw cuts the tree and the tree dulls, to some extent, the teeth of 
the saw.”58
Harré and Madden explain that the notions of 'power', 'ability', 'nature' are 
explanatorily ineliminable and provide the most fundamental level of 
explanation59 and that “power statements … refer to genuine agencies which 
are explained but not eliminated by adverting to the general 'natures of things' 
form of explanation.”60  Thus in an example of the power and nature of a car, 
“explanations in terms of the nature of the car do not lead to the elimination of 
the notion of 'power' in the description of the car as a potent thing, since that 
power is specified in terms of an effect which is not part of the description of 
the nature in virtue of which the power is possessed.”61
Thus “what the thing or material does … is to be understood as brought about 
not just by the stimuli to which it may be subject or the conditions which it 
finds itself in, i.e. by extrinsic conditions, but in some measure by the nature or 
56 Harré and Madden (1975) 86
57 Harré and Madden (1975) 89
58 Harré and Madden (1975) 114
59 Harré and Madden (1975) 11
60 Harré and Madden (1975) 112-113
61 Harré and Madden (1975) 11
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constitution of that thing or material, i.e. by intrinsic conditions.”62  Intrinsic 
conditions are “a feature of the thing itself”63 whereas extrinsic conditions are 
such that “changes in [conditions] are not properly to be considered to be 
changes in the thing or material itself”64.  This contrasts with the notions of 
internal and external, which concerns whether they “lie within the spatial 
envelope of the thing”65.  Thus a magnetic field is intrinsic to a magnet without 
being internal to it.  Molnar's similar idea is that a power P is intrinsic to a 
bearer x “iff x's having P, and x's lacking P, are independent of the existence, 
and the non-existence, of any contingent object wholly distinct from x.”66
Harré and Madden set out four features of natural necessity which distinguish it 
from logical entailment.  Firstly, “nature is explanatory of outcome whereas 
entailment per se is not”.67  Secondly, natural necessity involves conceptual 
separability of the causal power and the causal process which is related to it. 
They explain that “[t]he elements in a case of natural necessity, however, are 
independently describable even though conceptually related.  It is perfectly 
possible to identify the weight and pressure of the atmosphere without 
reference to water rising in a pump …”68  Thirdly, natural necessity holds 
exclusively between natural kinds, constituted by “the concept of generative 
mechanisms and powerful particulars”69  Fourthly, “[n]atural necessity involves 
causal directionality as an essential element, whereas entailment as a purely 
logical relation does not.”70
Ellis's scientific essentialism represents a robust form of dispositional 
essentialism in which anti-passivism and essentialism are intimately related.  As 
Groff explains, for Ellis, anti-passivism performs three roles.  Anti-passivism 
“motivates the claim that there are two different species of property kind, one 
62 Harré and Madden (1975) 87
63 Harré and Madden (1975) 87
64 Harré and Madden (1975) 87
65 Harré and Madden (1975) 87
66 Molnar (2003) 102
67 Harré and Madden (1975) 133
68 Harré and Madden (1975) 134
69 Harré and Madden (1975) 134
70 Harré and Madden (1975) 134
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dispositional, one not”71, it “explains … the existence of process kinds”72, and it 
“accounts for the special relationship … between process kinds and kinds of 
dispositional property.”73
Ellis explains that “a causal power is a disposition to engage in a certain kind of 
process: a causal process.”74  Ellis explains that this causal process relates 
causal events to effectual events.  Both causal events and effectual events 
must belong to natural kinds so that their definition is independent of how we 
choose to classify things.  The causal relationship between these two is 
explained by the exercise of causal power by the particular, rather than as mere 
regularity, as per the regularist account, or as due to subordination to external 
agency, as per the Categorical Realist account.  In this way, for the essentialist, 
“inanimate objects of nature are genuine causal agents.”75  As such, the 
essentialist account of the modal constraint on the relation between cause and 
effect differs from any conditional account, such as Ryle's dispositionalist 
account.
Other authors have affirmed causal realism while rejecting the essentialism that 
would necessitate that causal powers be displayed by entities in given 
situations.76  As Mumford explains, the Humean argument against causal 
powers is that a causal process could fail to be followed by its characteristic 
effect in a given situation, thus refuting the necessary connection and 
supposedly the presence of the causal power too.  However, if the causal power 
is understood as a probabilistic tendency, the Humean argument can be 
dismissed.77
71 Groff (2013)213
72 Groff (2013)213
73 Groff (2013)214
74 Ellis (2002) 48
75 Ellis (2002) 3
76 See Mumford (2005), Chakravartty (2008) and Mumford (2013) for arguments 
for an anti-Humean position that involves realism about causal powers while 
rejecting essentialism.
77 See Mumford (2013) 17-19
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Section 4: A debate about natural necessity
The previous section has provided an account of dispositional essentialism as 
the conjunction of two claims, that dispositional ascriptions reflect real 
dispositional properties and that such dispositional properties are essential 
features of their objects which thus determine their lawlike behaviour with 
nomic necessity.  The present section returns to the topic of svabhāva-
advocacy, summarizing recent scholarship about two different types of 
svabhāva-advocacy.  On this basis, the views of these two groups are 
characterized as dispositional essentialism and dispositional inessentialism 
respectively.  This characterization entails two separate claims, about 
dispositions and essences.  Firstly, the claim that svabhāvas are real 
dispositional properties rather than mere dispositional ascriptions is argued for. 
Secondly, it is argued that the debate between these two groups concerns 
whether such properties are essentially distributed over entities or inessentially 
distributed.
To recap, Kumārila's claim is that “it is understood that the prāmā yam of allṇ  
pramā as is 'from itself'”ṇ 78, and this is glossed as meaning that “a capacity for 
accurate determination of an object belongs to them [scil. pramā as] due toṇ  
their svabhāva”79.  These formulations involve an ablative locution and an 
adverbial locution respectively.  The ablative locution is also found in the 
presentation of the term 'svabhāva' by the groups known as svabhāva-
advocates, who affirmed some concept of svabhāva.  In the Śloka-vārttika 
presentation, Kumārila presents a first view which Sucarita describes as being 
“svabhāva-advocacy about both [prāmā yam and its opposite]”ṇ 80, and which is 
very similar to his own view81.  This would suggest that Kumārila may have an 
affinity with svabhāva-advocacy.  Chattopadhyaya explains that “early Sāṃkhya 
78 TS 2811ab and ŚV 2.47ab respectively.
79 TS 2812ab
80 Sucarita refers to the advocates of this view as svābhāvikôbhayavādina  at K84ḥ  
under ŚV 2.36
81 At ŚV 2.34ab; This point is made in Kataoka (2011) 233-4 fn170 commenting on 
ŚV 2.34ab: “This view of svata prāmā yaḥ ṇ  is the same as Kumārila's own 
siddhānta in that it takes validity to be ontologically innate to itself.”
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was really maintaining the doctrine of natural law (svabhāva vāda)”82 and 
Bhattacharya notes that although “svabhāva turned out to be, so to say, a lance 
free and readily available for use by anyone and everyone”83, at the same time, 
“svabhāva has its own place in the Sāṃkhya tradition”.84  
By drawing on the scholarship of Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya and Ramkrishna 
Bhattacharya, the notion of svabhāva held by its advocates will be investigated 
in this section.  Correspondence will be found between the conception of one 
group of svabhāva-advocates and the contemporary theses of causal realism 
and essentialism presented in the discussion above.  This reading will be 
motivated on textual grounds, but the appeal of this reading in relation to 
Kumārila's epistemological claim will only be made evident in the next chapter.
Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya discusses the notion of svabhāva among those who 
advocate this notion, with a focus on its use in the ancient medical literature. 
Chattopadhyaya characterizes svabhāva in opposition to the idea of 
supernatural causation: 
“the emphatic claim of the ancient doctors that the action of a substance 
is determined by the substance itself leaves no scope for any 
supernatural view of the efficacy of a substance being influenced in any 
way by ad aṛṣṭ  [scil. a supernatural force] or god or any other factor like 
that … the svabhāva or the inherent nature of a substance produces its 
specific result.  In Indian terminology, this is known as svabhāva-vāda, 
literally “the doctrine of nature”, or according to the modern way of 
putting it, “the doctrine of the laws of nature”.”85  
Chattopadhyaya explains that this doctrine involves a rejection of both 
accidentalism, the view that events happen at random without cause, as well as 
82 Chattopadhyaya (2012) 394
83 Bhattacharya (2012) 610
84 Bhattacharya (2012) 610
85 Chattopadhyaya (1977) 155; Chattopadhyaya uses the translation 'laws of 
nature' in many other works, as Bhattacharya also notes.
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supernaturalism, especially the idea “that health and disease are determined 
ultimately by the actions performed by the patient in his past life”.86  Thus the 
svabhāva principle is opposed to the law of karma as well as theistic causation. 
As Chattopadhyaya explains, the doctrine of svabhāva and the rejection of both 
supernatural action and lack of causal explanation which the doctrine entails 
“cannot but be a fundamental proposition for defending the intrinsic efficacy of 
medicine.”87
In addition to this “medical view of svabhāva as “embodied cause” or 
unchanging nature”88, Bhattacharya identifies a second meaning of svabhāva as 
accident or chance, which is precisely one of the views denied by the medical 
usage.  Bhattacharya explains, “[d]enial of causality and free will then is the 
mark of one group of svabhāvavādins [in the 'ethical' domain] … while 
acceptance of svabhāva as the cause of everything is the mark of the other [in 
the 'cosmological' domain]”89  Bhattacharya explains that the group using 
svabhāva in the ethical domain advocated fatalism rather than free will.  The 
'cosmological' group use the notion of svabhāva in a similar way to its medical 
usage, as a dual rejection of both accidentalism and supernaturalism, but in 
regard to natural phenomena.  This dual use of svabhāva led to confusion or 
conflation of the two ideas in some texts “from the fourth century CE to the 
fifteenth century”90 and in subsequent scholarship.  Indeed, Bhattacharya notes 
a similar ambiguity in the English word “nature” which “could mean both 
regularity and irregularity”91.  For example, 'natural law' indicates regularity 
whereas 'natural' in other contexts could mean 'spontaneous' in the sense of 
being beyond the reach of lawlike explanation.
Bhattacharya has collated various examples of svabhāva from the svabhāva-
advocates, including the following verse, which was also quoted above:
86 Chattopadhyaya (1977) 186
87 Chattopadhyaya (1977) 155
88 Bhattacharya (2012) 608
89 Bhattacharya (2012) 602
90 Bhattacharya (2012) 610
91 Bhattacharya (2012) 598
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“What makes the sharpness of thorns, the varied nature of birds and 
animals, the sweetness of sugarcane and the bitterness of lime?  All this 
happens due to svabhāva.”92
Bhattacharya contrasts this verse with a variant version:
“What produces the sharpness of thorns [and] the varied nature of birds 
and animals?  All this happens due to svabhāva.  It is not through desire 
[of an agent].  What is the point of effort?”93
Whereas this second formulation advocates fatalism, and presents the idea of 
svabhāva as accident, or lack of causal explanation, the first formulation above 
“stops at asserting the role of svabhāva, not of any other agency or creator as 
the cause of all varieties”94 and thus presents svabhāva as causal explanation.  
In sum, there are two contrasting conceptions of svabhāva, the neo-medical 
conception which Chattopadhyaya focuses on, and a second conception 
carefully distinguished from it by Bhattacharya.  In both formulations, 'due to 
svabhāva' takes an ablative construction because it is the response to a 
question.  As in other languages, the ablative construction includes not only the 
idea of 'from' but idea of 'due to' as per the translation used here.  In response 
to a 'Why?' question, it is the idea of 'due to' which is the material sense of the 
construction.
This ablative notion of 'because', 'due to' or 'in virtue of' is also part of the 
vocabulary of metaphysical grounding.  This metaphysical reading of the 
ablative formulation coheres with the neo-medical conception of svabhāva as 
92 Quoted in Bhattacharya (2012) 602 (my translation): ka  ka akānā  prakarotiḥ ṇṭ ṃ  
taik ya  vicitrabhāva  m ga-pak i ā  ca ṣṇ ṃ ṃ ṛ ṣ ṇ ṃ ׀ mādhuryam ik o  ka utā  ca nimbeṣ ḥ ṭ ṃ  
svabhāvata  sarvamida  prav ttam ḥ ṃ ṛ ׀׀  (Strictly, the fruit mentioned is Nimb, or 
Azadirachta Indica, which is similar to lime.)
93 Quoted in Bhattacharya (2012) 602 (my translation): ka  ka akānā  prakarotiḥ ṇṭ ṃ  
taik ya  vicitrabhāva  m ga-pak i ā  ca ṣṇ ṃ ṃ ṛ ṣ ṇ ṃ ׀ svabhāvata  sarvamida  prav ttaḥ ṃ ṛ ṃ 
na kāmakāra 'sti kuta  prayatna  ḥ ḥ ׀׀
94 Bhattacharya (2012) 602
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real essence or nature rather than the conception of svabhāva as chance. 
Metaphysical grounding appears in various philosophical theses, but the basic 
idea is to provide some metaphysically significant explanation.  Thus Ellis 
explicates dispositional essentialism by appeal to this relation as per some 
quotes above.  Specifically, for Ellis, “the natural dispositions [are] simply the 
real essences of the natural kinds of processes they ground”95 and  “[a] natural 
kind of process … is a display of a dispositional property”96.
The nature of metaphysical grounding is a topic of significant debate in the 
literature, but the dominant view is that the concept of grounding is primitive 
and not susceptible to analysis.97  Fine considers that metaphysical grounding 
provides a distinct kind of explanation, “in which explanans and explanandum 
are connected, not through some sort of causal mechanism, but through some 
constitutive form of determination.”98  Audi holds that grounding is a relation of 
noncausal explanation, involving a relation of essential connectedness between 
the natures of two properties, such that each instance of one property grounds 
an instance of the other.99  Audi takes metaphysical grounding to be irreflexive, 
such that one distinct property grounds another distinct property.100  So for 
Ellis, a real causal power which is the real essence of a natural kind of process 
grounds an instantiation of that process.
The neo-medical conception presents svabhāva as cause of its effect and as 
explanation of its effect, both in the context of drugs and their power to cure, 
as well as in the general context of objects and their power to behave in lawlike 
ways.  Chattopadhyaya provides a quote from the medical text Caraka-sa hitā,ṃ  
which he translates as “these laws are but the laws of nature (svābhāvika) – 
just like the laws because of which fire is hot and water liquid.”101  This 
translation of the notion of svabhāva as 'laws of nature' for this group of 
95 Ellis (2001) 125
96 Ellis (2001) 124
97 See Bliss and Trogdon (2014)
98 Fine, K. (2012) 37
99 See Audi (2012) 693-695
100 See Audi (2012) 691-692
101 Chattopadhyaya (1977) 182
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svabhāva-advocates seems to capture the notion of natural or nomic necessity 
which determines a constraint on behaviour.  Indeed, the question of how the 
answer 'due to svabhāva' explains phenomena corresponds to the question of 
what kind of explanation is provided by laws of nature for the phenomena they 
purport to explain.
However, it fails to capture the characterization of svabhāva as a property of its 
entity which is metaphysically grounded in that entity.  A better correspondence 
for the neo-medical view of svabhāva is with the idea of a real and 
metaphysically necessary causal power or essential dispositional property as 
per the dispositionalist literature surveyed above, which locates the source of 
natural necessity in the entity itself.102  Chattopadhyaya's own explanation that 
svabhāva is “the inherent nature of a substance [that] produces its specific 
result”103 and that “the action of a substance is determined by the substance 
itself”104 was quoted above.  These two ideas correspond with the ideas that 
“the actions of things depend on their causal powers and other dispositional 
properties”105 and that  “dispositional properties are genuine properties, and 
intrinsic to the things that have them”106, which constitute two planks of Ellis's 
scientific essentialism, involving realism and essentialism about causal powers.
This motivates a reading of this view as not only dispositionalist but also 
essentialist.  That is, the essential natures of things determine the lawlike 
behaviour of those things due to a relation of natural or nomic necessity.  The 
explanatory demand being made in the verses quoted is a demand to account 
for the lawlike behaviour of entities in nature, and the answer that is given is 
that such behaviour is necessarily the display of a real dispositional property. 
On this essentialist reading of svabhāva, the behaviour would be determined by 
a necessary connection between the existence of the property in the entity and 
its display under the right type of circumstances, corresponding to Ellis's 
102 Cf. Ellis (2002) 97-102
103 Chattopadhyaya (1977) 155
104 Chattopadhyaya (1977) 155
105 Ellis (2008) 76
106 Ellis (2008) 76
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statements that “the natural dispositions [are] simply the real essences of the 
natural kinds of processes they ground”107 and that “[a] natural kind of process 
… is a display of a dispositional property”108 This idea of a display of an essential 
dispositional property would be consistent with the reading of svabhāva as kind 
essence described above but not with the notion of svabhāva as intrinsic 
nature.
Bhattacharya further explains that this group of svabhāva-advocates “believed 
in activism”109 and that such “activism, or faith in human endeavour or 
resoluteness”110 could be seen as a logical corollary of this notion of svabhāva-
as-causality.111  This would make sense if it is understood that the participants 
in this debate see a robust connection between the causal power of entities and 
human agency.  Interestingly, a connection between these two concepts is 
mooted by Ellis, who proposes that “human agency [may be] the exercising of 
our meta-powers to alter our own dispositions to act in one way rather than 
another”.112  However, an even stronger connection may be needed for the 
claim of the svabhāva-advocates, and it may be that they in fact made a 
conceptual equation of human agency and the causal power of entities.
The affiliation between this group of svabhāva-advocates and contemporary 
dispositionalism is also evidenced by a shared commitment to the inherent 
dynamism of the natural world and an shared opposition to the 'dead world of 
mechanism'.113  Thus Harré and Madden explain that “[w]hen we think of 
causality and action we look to such images as a springtime plant forcing its 
way upwards towards the light, as the pulsing, surging movement of the 
protoplasm within an amoeba, of a flash of radiation as a positron and an 
electron meet, of the enormous flux of electromagnetic radiation from a star, of 
107 Ellis (2001) 125
108 Ellis (2001) 124
109 Bhattacharya (2012) 603
110 Bhattacharya (2012) 599
111 See Bhattacharya (2012) 599
112 Ellis (2002) 144; see also O'Connor (2009), Bird (2013), Ellis (2013) and Groff 
(2013) for more discussion of causal power and agency
113 'The dead world of mechanism' is a phrase used by Ellis as a subheading in Ellis 
(2002) 60 and also referenced in Groff (2013) 210
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the mobility and imaginative control of his own actions exercised by a human 
being, of the potent configuration of a magnetic field.”114  Likewise for this 
group of svabhāva-advocates, there is a connection with human freedom as 
described above.  A principle of natural dynamism also seems to inform the 
examples of the svabhāva-advocates above, but is even more vivid in examples 
attributed by Śa kara to the ṃ allied Sā khya philosophersṃ 115, which include the 
images of milk flowing 'due to its svabhāva' from a mother to nourish her child, 
of water flowing 'due to its svabhāva' for the benefit of mankind, and of grass, 
herbs and water transforming themselves into milk.116  This last example seems 
to involve being digested by a cow, although it is argued that there is no 
instrumental cause, on the basis that we can neither perceive nor replicate this 
process.117  In fact, there is also a notion of teleological cause present in these 
last examples, which is not evident in the examples of the svabhāva-advocates 
given above and which is avoided in the contemporary discussion.118
That this group of svabhāva-advocates understand svabhāvas as properties 
which are no more than causal powers119 is suggested by a quote from 
Śa karānanda translated as follows by Chattopadhyaya: “By ṃ svabhāva is 
meant the inherent nature of the respective material objects, i.e. their unique 
causal efficacy.  For instance, burning in the case of fire and flowing downwards 
in the case of water.”120
The conception of the second group of svabhāva-advocates is that of svabhāva 
as accident or chance.  This conception seems to be focused on a rejection of 
the essentialist thesis rather than on the rejection of real dispositional 
114 Harré and Madden (1975) 7.  A longer version of this quote is also given in Groff 
(2013) 210
115 The evidence for the affiliation between the Sā khya philosophers and theṃ  
svabhāva-advocates will be set out later in this chapter.
116 See Chattopadhyaya (1969) 67-68 and Chattopadhyaya (2012) 393-394; the 
examples are taken from Śa kara's Brahma Sūtra Bhā ya 2.2.3 and 2.2.5ṃ ṣ
117 See Chattopadhyaya (1969) 68 and Chattopadhyaya (2012) 395
118 Cf. Ellis (2002) 13: “Aristotle's concept of final cause – that is, that for the sake 
of which a thing exists – has no role in the new essentialism.”
119 The view that properties just are powers or clusters of causal powers was 
propesed by Shoemaker: see Mumford (2004) 150 and Mumford (2011) 3
120 Chattopadhyaya (1969) 59
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properties.  Perhaps the rejection of the essentialist thesis was thought 
sufficient to motivate the fatalism that they also advocated.  Fatalism would 
then obtain regardless of whether there are real causal powers in the world, 
because there would be no necessity as to whether any causal power should 
manifest itself in any given situation.  
Whereas the view of the first group was identified with dispositional 
essentialism, the view of this group of svabhāva can thus be tentatively labelled 
dispositional inessentialism.  In the contemporary literature, this resonates with 
an aspect of a position set out by Anjan Chakravartty, that “causal powers are 
inessentially distributed”121 and that “[t]he behaviours of members of kinds may 
be a function of their causal powers, but only sometimes do powers constitute 
“essences”.”122  That is, Anjan Chakravartty maintains a position that falls short 
of full dispositional essentialism just as the first group maintain a position that 
similarly falls short of full dispositional essentialism.
The denial of natural necessity by this group is rhetorically strengthened by the 
focus on the variety of dispositional properties in nature, such as the example 
of different shapes of individual thorns, which are not easily susceptible to 
explanation in terms that reference kinds, given that every thorn is slightly 
differently constituted.  In the examples given, the demand for an explanation 
of kind essence, such as heat in fire, which necessitarian theories purport to 
provide, is blurred together with the demand for an explanation of particular 
essence, such as the shapes of individual thorns, which necessitarian theories 
do not presume to address.123  This sleight of hand lends a spurious credibility 
to the svabhāva-as-chance position.  Bhattacharya also explains that 
'inactivism' is a logical corollary of 'accidentalism'.124  This again suggests that a 
robust connection between causal power and agency is being assumed in this 
debate.
121 Chakravartty (2008) 160
122 Chakravartty (2008) 161
123 Cf. Ellis (2001) 239: “The identity of something as an individual seems to depend 
primarily on its temporal and causal history, and therefore on its extrinsic, not its 
intrinsic, properties.”
124 See Bhattacharya (2012) 599
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In summary, it has been argued that the two types of svabhāva-advocacy 
correspond to positions that can be located with respect to the contemporary 
debate.  The neo-medical conception of svabhāva presents svabhāva as a 
causal power or real disposition which grounds a notion of natural necessity. 
Although the textual evidence is not sufficient to fill out the full details of this 
grounding, it is due to a feature of the entity and thus coheres with the 
essentialist thesis within dispositional essentialism.  The chance conception of 
svabhāva denies natural necessity but seemingly without denying causal 
powers.
Section 5: Reductionism about properties
The Mādhyamika Buddhist philosophers Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti argue 
against the notion of svabhāva in what constitutes one of the most extended 
discussions of this notion in the primary literature.  The notion that they argue 
against is that of the Buddhist Reductionists, whereby “ultimately intrinsic 
properties are essential to their bearers [and] all qualitative change is of 
extrinsic properties.”125  Their discussion appears to form part of an intra-
Buddhist debate, rather than a direct challenge to the views of the svabhāva-
advocates discussed above.  Further, the notion of svabhāva as a fundamental 
substance is more important in their debate than the notion of svabhāva as 
essence that is the focus here.  Thus a full exegesis of any Buddhist notion of 
svabhāva is outside the scope of this research.  The purpose of considering 
some Buddhist discussions is only to note some helpful affinities and contrasts 
with Kumārila's notion.
In a first subsection, the Buddhist principle of reductionism, whereby svabhāvas 
are properties possessed by the most elementary constituent particles of the 
most complete scientific theory, is contrasted with the attribution of svabhāvas 
125 Siderits (2003) 119
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by the svabhāva-advocates to kinds of everyday middle-sized objects.  In a 
second subsection, a model of svabhāva and parabhāva affirmed by the 
Abhidharma Reductionist Buddhists and discussed by Candrakīrti is presented. 
Some examples are discussed in order to understand the notion of svabhāva 
involved.  It is found that this model presents the notion of a real disposition 
which is an intrinsic nature in the presence of normal extrinsic conditions.
Subsection 1: Reductionism and anti-realism
Jan Westerhoff distinguishes between two conceptions of svabhāva in 
Nāgārjuna's work, substance-svabhāva and essence-svabhāva.  Essence-
svabhāva is a primarily epistemological notion, ranging from an earlier idea of a 
“specific characterizing property of an object”126 which distinguish them from 
other objects to Candrakīrti's idea of an essential property which is “something 
that an object cannot lose without ceasing to be that very object.”127  This latter 
formulation, which coheres with Nāgārjuna's own view128, conveys an idea of 
modal necessity, as Westerhoff also indicates129.  By contrast, what Westerhoff 
terms substance-svabhāva is “a primarily ontological notion.  Rather than 
svabhāva's being seen as the opposite of shared qualities (sāmānyalak a aṣ ṇ ), it 
is contrasted with conceptually constructed or secondary (prajñaptisat) 
existents and equated with the mark of the primary ones (dravyasat).”130 
Substance-svabhāva is thus a primary existent which is an irreducible 
constituent of the empirical world, as opposed to a secondary existent, which 
would be a linguistic and mental construction, and this notion “is most 
prominent in Nāgārjuna's arguments.”131  Westerhoff explains that substance-
svabhāva refers to putative “[p]rimary existents [which] constitute the 
irreducible constituents of the empirical world [and do not] depend on linguistic 
126 Westerhoff (2009) 21
127 Westerhoff (2009) 22
128 See Westerhoff (2009) 22
129 See Westerhoff (2009) 22
130 Westerhoff (2009) 23
131 Westerhoff (2009) 24
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and mental construction for their existence.”132  
The relevant notion in Kumārila's discussion will be svabhāva as essence.  By 
contrast, as Jan Westerhoff notes, the notion of substance-svabhāva “is of 
much greater importance in the Madhyamaka debate”133, and Westerhoff's 
discussion correspondingly treats this aspect in greater depth.  Siderits's 
discussion is likewise focused on the ontological dimension of svabhāva as 
'substance-svabhāva' or 'intrinsic nature'.
As Jan Westerhoff notes, Candrakīrti highlights Nāgārjuna's statement “A 
svabhāva is not causally produced and is not dependent on something else” as 
a defining statement of svabhāva.134  This dual negation suggests that svabhāva 
can be characterized within the framework of either of two dualities, contrasted 
with what is causally produced and with what is dependent.  This dual 
framework also appears to be affirmed by the Abhidharma Buddhists discussed 
by Ronkin, who uphold the existence of svabhāva as nature and essence which 
they believe satisfies the conditions implied by both dichotomies.135
In what appears to address the first dichotomy, between svabhāva and causal 
production, Candrakīrti's method is to start with a putative distinction between 
examples of svabhāva and examples which are not svabhāva.  Candrakīrti 
explains that the heat artificially produced in water or quartz appearing as ruby 
are not generally taken to be svabhāvas.136  The first example is in fact an 
intrinsic nature in the sense of Harré and Madden, and an accidental property. 
The second example involves an erroneous judgment, so can be characterized 
as a feature of extrinsic conditions.  Candrakīrti explains that these cases are 
commonly acknowledged not to be svabhāvas because they are produced by 
132 Westerhoff (2009) 24
133 Westerhoff (2009) 23
134 Westerhoff (2009) 24-25.  The statement is “ak trima  svabhāvo hi nirapek aṛ ḥ ṣ ḥ 
paratra ca”
135 See Ronkin (2005) 99-100, 223
136 PP 260: ya  k taka  padārtha  sa loke naiva svabhāva iti vyapadiśyate tad yathāḥ ṛ ḥ ḥ  
apām au ya  dhātu-piśāca-prayatna-ni pādita  karketanādīnā  padmarāgādi-ṣṇ ṃ ṣ ḥ ṃ
bhāvaś ca|
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causes.137  We can understand that both examples are explained by reference 
to extrinsic conditions, although they differ in whether those extrinsic 
conditions result in a change in the intrinsic nature of the entity.
By contrast, Candrakīrti tells us, the heat of fire and the property of being a 
ruby in a ruby which is (correctly) known are commonly taken to be 
svabhāvas.138  These are two clear instances of essential properties, not so 
dependent on extrinsic conditions.  Candrakīrti explains the reasoning for 
attributing the svabhāva of heat to fire as follows: 
Heat is said to be the svabhāva of fire as it is invariably associated with 
that in everyday experience … then there is lack of change due to this 
invariable association, as fire is not [ever] cold.139  
The key feature here seems to be inalienability or invariable association so the 
characterization of svabhāva is as essence conditional on existence.  By 
contrast, as Candrakīrti explains: 
That same heat is not the svabhāva in water when it is found [there] 
because it is causally produced [and] because it arises from external 
conditions.140
This setup involves a dichotomy between an intrinsic nature in the presence of 
normal extrinsic conditions and an intrinsic nature in the presence of abnormal 
extrinsic conditions, as mentioned above.
Candrakīrti then notes that heat is causally dependent on the causes of fire 
137 PP 260: tad evam ak taka  svabhāva iti lokavyavahāre vyavasthiteṛ ḥ
138 PP 260: yas tv ak taka  sa svabhāvas tad yathā agner au ya  jñātānāṛ ḥ ṣṇ ṃ ṃ 
padmarāgādinā  padmarāgādi-svabhāvaś caṃ
139 PP 241: agner au ya  hi loke tad-avyabhicāritvāt svabhāva iti ucyate …ṣṇ ṃ  
tadāsyāvyabhicāritvād anyathābhāva  syād abhāva | na hy agne  śaityaḥ ḥ ḥ ṃ 
pratipadyate|
140 PP 241: tad evau yam apsūpalabhyamāna  para-pratyaya-sambhūtatvātṣṇ ṃ  
k trimatvān na svabhāva itiṛ |
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also: 
Not even the heat of fire is a svabhāva, because it is causally produced 
… the dependence of fire on causes and conditions is found [to be] due 
to the conjunction of a jewel [acting as a lens], fuel and the sun, or due 
to rubbing sticks together, and so on.  Heat does not arise without fire. 
So heat is also produced by causes and conditions.  And so [heat] is 
causally produced.  And because it is causally produced, it is not a 
svabhāva, like the heat of water …141
This contrast with causal dependence is based on the idea that to be 
fundamentally real, an entity or property would have to be permanent and 
hence not causally produced, and hence reflects a notion of substance-
svabhāva.  Thus Candrakīrti says that causal production would be redundant if 
there were svabhāvas, as they would already exist.142
Garfield explains similarly that Nāgārjuna “argues against the existence of 
causes and for the existence of a variety of kinds of conditions … [which] must 
be thought of as empty of inherent existence …”143.  Aside from the idea of 
emptiness of inherent existence, which appeals to a notion of svabhāva 
opposed to conceptual construction144, there is also the idea that there can be 
no real dispositional property which is not reducible to a set of causal 
conditions.145  
141 PP 260: vayam idānī  brūmo yad etad au ya  tad apy agne  svabhāvo naṃ ṣṇ ṃ ḥ  
bhavatīti g hyatā  k takatvāt|  iha ma īndhanāditya-samāgamād ara i-ṛ ṃ ṛ ṇ ṇ
nirgha a ādeś cāgner hetu-pratyaya-sāpek ataivopalabhyate|  na cāgni-ṣ ṇ ṣ
vyatiriktam au ya  sa bhavati|  tasmād au yam api hetu-pratyaya-janitam|ṣṇ ṃ ṃ ṣṇ  
tataśca k takam|  k takatvāc cāpām au yavat svabhāvo na bhavatīti sphutamṛ ṛ ṣṇ  
avasīyate|
142 In chapter 15 (see Sprung 152); see also chapter 1, where the same argument 
is adduced against independence: Sprung 36-37
143 Garfield (1995) 104-105
144 For this dichotomy see e.g. MMK 502-503 verses 24.16-24.18, where it is also 
suggested that ony conventional designation can preserve our commonsense 
understanding of causality
145 Cf Lusthaus (2002) 170: Buddhists “do not accept the notion of 'cause', 
especially if by this one means a 'sufficient cause.'  Buddhists instead propose a 
theory of conditionality, the precise definition of which varied from school to 
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The argument of Candrakīrti and Nāgārjuna thus amounts to the idea that a 
real dispositional property cannot be an essence conditional on existence and 
identity.  By contrast, maintaining such a distinction between a disposition and 
a causal condition is central to contemporary dispositionalism.  As Harré and 
Madden explain, in the claim that an entity has the power to do something in 
virtue of its intrinsic nature, the expression 'in virtue of' does not constitute an 
additional condition.146  Rather, the potentiality or potency of an object is about 
“what would happen, as a matter of course, if interfering conditions were 
absent or taken away.”147
Why should a property that is produced by causes not be a svabhāva?  Siderits 
attributes to the Buddhist Reductionist doctrine of intrinsic natures the claims 
that “all and ultimately real entities have intrinsic natures”148 and that “every 
property that is intrinsic to an ultimately real entity is an essential property of 
that entity.”149  This entails a denial that ultimately real entities can have 
accidental properties.  Thus Siderits explains:
“there is something deeply problematic about the idea that something 
might undergo change in any of its intrinsic properties … For to call a 
property intrinsic is to say that it is part of its bearer's nature.  And it 
sounds distinctly odd to say that a certain thing both has and lacks a 
certain nature.”150  
Siderits goes on to explain that this rules out the idea that an entity can change 
its nature151, and reinforces this with a Humean suggestion that “'potentiality' 
looks like little more than a projection of our expectations given past 
school.”  Also cf. Nagao (1989) 7 quoted in Garfield (1995) 110: “Dependent co-
arising refers to a causal relationship wherein no essence is present at any time 
in either cause or result.” 
146 See Harré and Madden (1975) 86-87
147 Harré and Madden (1975) 12
148 Siderits (2003) 117
149 Siderits (2003) 117
150 Siderits (2003) 119
151 See Siderits (2003) 119
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experience”152.
That a thing may have different intrinsic properties at different times appears 
odd only given the reductionist principle, that is, 'findability under analysis', 
shared by the Abhidharma Buddhists and the Mādhyamika Buddhists.  The 
resulting conception of svabhāva excludes by definition the possibility that 
dispositional properties could be intrinsic to things.  The real world of the 
Abhidharma Buddhist Reductionists is one which resembles the 'dead world of 
mechanism', described by Ellis as one which is “hard, cold, colourless, silent, 
and dead; a world of quantity, a world of mathematically computable motions in 
mechanical regularity”153.  By contrast, in the paradigm of dispositional 
essentialism, Ellis characterizes dispositional properties as dynamic universals 
possessed by objects which necessitate the display of the causal processes that 
they define.154  In short, “the world must have a dynamic as well as a 
substantive structure.”155
Siderits explains that the contrast with causal dependence is based on an 
argument that all varieties of causal relationship are “thoroughly intentional or 
conceptually constructed in nature”156.  Siderits considers and rejects various 
attempts to locate causal efficacy in an entity as a capacity or power157, and 
concludes that “it appears impossible for the realist to give a satisfactory 
account of a causal relation that might be said to obtain among ultimately real 
entities.”158  So “if the fire atom is to count as ultimately real, then it cannot 
originate in dependence on causes and conditions.  Thus ultimately real entities 
cannot come into existence; they must be eternal … [which] will be taken as 
evidence that the notion of an ultimately real entity is incoherent.”159  However, 
a natural necessitation approach such as dispositional essentialism is able to 
152 Siderits (2003) 119-120
153 Ellis (2008) 77: the quote is taken from E.A.Burtt (1932) The Metaphysical 
Foundations of Modern Science
154 See Ellis (2002) 67-68 and 78
155 Ellis (2002) 32
156 Siderits (2003) 126
157 See Siderits (2003) 126-131
158 Siderits (2003) 131
159 Siderits (2003) 125
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provide a more satisfying account of how there can be real change in the world 
that involves change in the observable properties of an entity than the 
counterfactual conditional account that Siderits focuses on.
This Buddhist demand that svabhāva, as what is ontologically fundamental, that 
is, Westerhoff's substance-svabhāva, be innately static is thus in striking 
contrast with the idea of an innately dynamic natural world advocated by 
contemporary essentialists and by the Indian svabhāva-advocates.  The 
quotation from Harré and Madden given earlier involved such images as “a 
springtime plant forcing its way upwards towards the light, as the pulsing, 
surging movement of the protoplasm within an amoeba”160.  Likewise the view 
of the Sā khya ṃ philosophers quoted above involved images of milk flowing 'due 
to its svabhāva' from a mother to nourish her child, of water flowing 'due to its 
svabhāva' for the benefit of mankind, and of grass, herbs and water 
transforming themselves into milk.161  
Subsection 2: Disposition as default nature
The second part of the definition above contrasts svabhāva with dependence. 
This contrast forms a dichotomy of svabhāva (or 'own-nature') and parabhāva 
(or 'other-nature'), and is illustrated by Candrakīrti with the example of one's 
own money and money that is borrowed.  This conception is treated only briefly 
by Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti, who argue that, because svabhāva as 
causelessness has already been refuted, parabhāva also stands refuted, 
“because parabhāva is the svabhāva of another thing”162.
Noa Ronkin provides a discussion of this distinction between svabhāva and 
parabhāva as was current among the Buddhist Abhidharma schools.  As Ronkin 
160 Harré and Madden (1975) 7
161 See Chattopadhyaya (1969) 67-68
162 MMK 265-266 verse 15.3 kuta  svabhāvasyābhāve parabhāvo bhavi yati|ḥ ṣ  
svabhāva  parabhāvasya parabhāvo hi kathyate||ḥ
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explains: 
“The own-nature is further explained as internal (ajjhattiko) to a stream 
of dhammas, as unshared or not held in common by them, and is likened 
to a producer (nibbatiko) and to a resident (nevāsiko).  By contrast, the 
other-nature is said to be external (bāhiro) to a stream of consciousness, 
held in common (sādhāra oṇ ) by its constitutive dhammas, and is likened 
to a receiver (pa iggāhakoṭ ) and to a visitor (āgantuko) respectively.”163  
Ronkin also explains that the own-nature is equated with the notion of specific 
cause (hetu) and the other-nature with the notion of general causal condition 
(paccaya/ pratyaya) in the Buddhist text Pe akopadesa.ṭ 164  Likewise Siderits 
describes this as a “contrast between the concepts of 'one's own' and 'borrowed 
from another'”165 and attributes this model to the Buddhist Reductionists, or 
Abhidharma schools, where it was used to determine the ultimately real 
components of experience.166  
Candrakīrti's example of heat in water as representing its transfer from fire 
when it is heated up on the fire167 and Candrakīrti's example of monies owned 
and borrowed both suggest a reading in terms of a real causal power that may 
be transferred from one entity to another.  Mumford and Anjum similarly raise 
the idea that powers can be passed around, and they illustrate this with a 
similar example: 
“You come in from the cold and sit by the fire.  You sit by the fire 
because it is hot … The fire being hot would mean nothing to you if it 
didn't mean that it had the power to heat.  Causation occurs when 
powers exercise themselves … Your body was cold and now it is hot. 
And, being hot, it now also has the power to warm some other thing, 
163 Ronkin (2005) 99
164 However, note that Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti consider svabhāva to be opposed 
to both hetu and pratyaya.  See e.g. MMK 502 verse 24.16
165 Siderits (2003) 118
166 See Siderits (2003) 118 and Siderits (2003) 14 note (a)
167 See PP 260: “apām au ya  dhātu-piśāca-prayatna-ni pādita ”ṣṇ ṃ ṣ ḥ
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such as the body of anyone who wants to come and cuddle.  And, if they 
do, the power to warm something else will be passed on to their body, 
and so on.”168
In Candrakīrti's discussion, there is a dichotomy whereby svabhāva is an 
entity's own power and parabhāva is a power which is foreign to an entity in 
some way.  Candrakīrti's examples illustrate forms of asymmetry in the 
possession of powers which is the basis for this dichotomy.  By contrast with 
what is owned, Candrakīrti explains that what is borrowed are temporarily 
available.169  The implicit contrast is with the permanent possession of one's 
own money.  Presumably the availability of the monies are also contingent on 
the loan policy of the bank and on the credit-worthiness of the borrower.  
The example of heat in water also works well as an illustration of borrowed 
nature, where again heat in water is contingent on being exposed to a power to 
heat, such as fire, and temporary, as water will gradually revert to cool 
temperature when the source of heat is removed.  The analogy of resident and 
visitor is presumably intended to capture the contrast between permanent and 
temporary, on the basis that visitors may not overstay their welcome.  Further, 
a visit is contingent on an explicit or implicit invitation by the homeowner, 
whereas staying at home is not contingent.  
The analogy of producer and receiver also fits the examples of heat and of 
money, as fires and commercial banks are sources of heat and of money in a 
more robust sense than are heated water and indebted borrowers respectively. 
Specifically, the svabhāva is a potentiality or potency of an object in the strong 
sense of Harré and Madden, which concerns “what would happen, as a matter 
of course, if interfering conditions were absent or taken away.”170  Similarly, in 
the absence of any invitations, the default situation would involve everyone 
staying at home, and thus all individuals possess resident status as essence 
conditional on default location.
168 Mumford and Anjum (2011) 5-6
169 PP 262: “tad yathā tāvat-kālikā-yācitakam asvatantra ”ṃ
170 Harré and Madden (1975) 12
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The examples of water temperature and creditor-debtor relation are formulated 
within the framework of own-nature and other-nature, and as such they provide 
a conception of svabhāva as default nature, conditional on the presence of 
normal external conditions and the absence of extrinsic interfering factors. 
Mirrorring this conception of svabhāva as default nature, parabhāva is a 
borrowed power which is possessed not by default but contingently on extrinsic 
conditions and temporarily.  Parabhāva may constitute either an intrinsic 
accidental feature, such as heat in water, or a feature of extrinsic conditions, 
such as being a visitor in one's location.
Nāgārjuna denies that the properties of an entity are caused either 'from itself' 
or 'from something else'.171  The first of these options appears to be that 
advocated by the Sā khya philosophers.ṃ 172  Nāgārjuna equates these options 
with causation by own-nature (svabhāva), that is, the nature of the entity itself, 
and causation by borrowed nature (parabhāva), which Nāgārjuna explains 
would be the own-nature of some other entity.173  The dichotomy of 'due to 
own-nature' and 'due to other-nature' thus has an affinity to Kumārila's own 
dichotomy of 'from itself' and 'from something else', which will be set out later.
The examples considered in this section suggest that, for Nāgārjuna and 
Candrakīrti, svabhāva corresponds to the idea of an intrinsic nature in the 
presence of normal extrinsic conditions, and the contrasting notion of borrowed 
nature corresponds to the idea of a temporary and contingent change in 
intrinsic nature under abnormal extrinsic conditions, where these are defined 
with respect to “the stimuli to which it may be subject or the conditions which it 
finds itself in”174.
171 See MMK 12 verse 1.1a: “na svato nāpi parato”   Nāgārjuna also denies 
causation due to both and due to neither.
172  Cf. Garfield (1995) 105: “The first view – held prominently by Samkhya 
philosophers – is that all causation is really self-causation.”  Garfield adds in a 
footnote that this is “[at] least according to Tsong Khapa's commentary on this 
verse.”
173 See MMK 78 verse 1.3cd: avidyamāne svabhāve parabhāvo na vidyate
174 Harré and Madden (1975) 87
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Section 6: Dharmakīrti and bare dispositions
The Buddhist logician Dharmakīrti, who appears to have been a contemporary 
of Kumārila, also uses the term 'svabhāva' to describe characteristics of an 
entity in virtue of which it exhibits law-like behaviour.  Dharmakīrti's conception 
of svabhāva attempts to reconcile the ultimately reductionist analysis of other 
Buddhist groups with the dynamism seen in the examples of the svabhāva-
advocates.  John Dunne has provided a detailed analysis of Dharmakīrti's notion 
of svabhāva, and the presentation in this section will be based on Dunne's 
reading of Dharmakīrti rather than on a study of primary texts.
Drawing on the work of Ernst Steinkellner, John Dunne distinguishes between 
two related notions both subsumed by Dharmakīrti under the polysemous term 
svabhāva: nature-svabhāva as the single total nature of an entity and property-
svabhāva as one of many properties that an entity could have.  For 
Dharmakīrti, nature-svabhāva is “a predicate that refers to the totality of the 
causal characteristics of the subject to which that predicate is applied.”175 
These causal characteristics include “the causes and conditions from which it 
must have arisen, and the corresponding effects that it is capable of 
producing.”176  However, these latter consist merely in potentials to engage in 
various causal complexes to produce various effects, such as the potential of a 
sesame seed to produce oil if crushed or to sprout if given appropriate 
nourishment, and not in actually being causes of products such as oil or a 
sprout.177  Strictly speaking, although “some passages in Dharmakīrti's work 
suggest a relationship between an entity's nature-svabhāva and its participation 
in a present causal complex or its arisal from a past causal complex”178, 
nevertheless “an entity's nature-svabhāva should not be equated with a causal 
175 Dunne (2004) 198
176 Dunne (2004) 161
177 See Dunne (2004) 168
178 Dunne (2004) 163
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complex, whether it be a present causal complex in which it participates or the 
past causal complex from which it arose.”179  
A similar contrast to that between nature-svabhāva and property-svabhāva is 
found in the notion of a causal power developed by O'Connor and Churchill. 
They explain that “a single property may contribute to a very wide array of 
effects, depending on the context in which it is instanced … But in ordinary 
speech, again, there is a tendency to talk of a corresponding array of powers 
being exercised, 'each' of which is identified through the effect actually 
manifested … [Instead] a basic power or disposition [should be understood] not 
in terms of this or that salient manifestation, but rather in terms of a unitary 
causal influence, something that is constant across circumstances while its 
manifestations will vary.”180
As Dunne explains, nature-svabhāva provides an explanatory basis for the 
causal powers of entities: “Veiled within Dharmakīrti's notion of svabhāva as 
nature is a strong rejection of random (ākasmika) causality and thus a strong 
commitment to the regularity of causality …  [Dharmakīrti] claims that an 
entity's causal potentials are restricted precisely because they have arisen from 
certain causes: it is impossible for an apple seed to produce certain types of 
effects because it is impossible for it to arise from certain types of causes. 
While these notions of restriction are negative in character, they amount to 
positive claims: an entity has the potentials to produce certain types of effects 
because it has arisen from certain types of causes.”181  
Dunne also explains that “the causal functionality implicit in both senses of 
svabhāva is actually reducible to the causal functionality of particulars.”182 
Dharmakīrti's idea seems to be that causal powers of entities supervene on 
causal powers of their constituent elementary particles, rather than on non-
179 Dunne (2004) 164
180 O'Connor and Churchill (2010) 45; see also Corry (2009) 173 for discussion of 
Cartwright's similar distinctions between a capacity and a disposition and of Ellis 
and Lierse's notion of a multi-track disposition
181 Dunne (2004) 162
182 Dunne (2004) 155
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causal categorical properties.  Accordingly, it would not be correct to attribute 
to Dharmakīrti an affirmation of categorical properties.  Rather, this claim 
appears to be Dharmakīrti's way of acknowledging the reductionist principle 
advocated by other Buddhist groups, whilst allowing for a dynamism to 
characterize reality at the microscopic and macroscopic levels.
Dunne describes another “principle of ontological reduction that appears to 
underlie Dharmakīrti's system.  Properties can be reduced to the nature-
svabhāva of the subject (dharmin) that they qualify.  This amounts to a 
reduction of the properties to the subject itself, since its nature-svabhāva is a 
marker for the totality of the causal characteristics that is that subject.”183  The 
idea that only causal properties are ultimately real is also reflected in 
Dharmakīrti's use of the notion of arthakriyākāritvam, or perceptible causal 
efficiency, as a criterion of what is real.  As Dunne explains, for Dharmakīrti, 
“things that produce effects are particulars (or they are reducible to 
particulars), and since only particulars are ultimately real, anything that fails to 
produce an effect is not ultimately real.”184  
With regard to the translation of the term svabhāva, Dunne cautions that “the 
notion of an “essential property” must not be allowed to introduce an 
unwarranted form of essentialism – and its attendant problems – into 
Dharmakīrti's system”185  and that “Dharmakīrti's theory … belies any such de 
re essentialism”186.  Specifically, “in a correct judgment immediately subsequent 
to a perception, the predications one makes of an individual are markedly 
conditioned by mind-dependent factors such as expectation, need, context, 
perceptual acuity, habituation and so on.  Thus, when a child who studies under 
his father sees him coming from afar, he will first conceive of that person as 
“father” rather than “teacher.””187  This explanation makes it seem that 
Dharmakīrti's notion of svabhāva corresponds to Locke's notion of a nominal 
183 Dunne (2004) 199
184 Dunne (2004) 83-84
185 Dunne (2004) 182-183
186 Dunne (2004) 184
187 Dunne (2004) 184
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essence, and, as such, Dharmakīrti would be labelled a conventionalist.  As Ellis 
explains, conventionalists “do not think there are any real (that is, de re or 
metaphysical) necessities in the world.  All necessities, they suppose, are de 
dicto, and hence derive from the conventions of language.”188  
In fact, however, no secure attribution of conventionalism can be made to 
Dharmakīrti.  This is because, as Dunne explains, Dharmakīrti's notion of 
svabhāva cannot be easily equated with a notion of de dicto necessity either, 
because of a “relationship between psychologism and ontology in his system”189 
and because of “his failure to formulate and provide adequate terminology for a 
distinction between necessary and accidental properties”190  The accidental/ 
essential distinction “remains vague and undeveloped”191 in Dharmakīrti's 
philosophy. 
The key feature of Dharmakīrti's notion of svabhāva is that it supervenes in 
some sense on the causal history and possible causal future of the entity.  In 
this way Dharmakīrti provides a causal basis for dispositional properties.  In the 
contemporary literature, dispositions that supervene on causal bases are 
contrasted with bare dispositions.  Elizabeth Prior, Robert Pargetter and Frank 
Jackson define the causal basis of a disposition by means of an example of the 
fragility of a glass.  They explain:
“[the] reason why a glass is fragile … involves a causally relevant 
property (or property complex) of the glass, which we will call the causal 
basis of the disposition.”192  
Prior et al. go on to argue it is a necessary truth that dispositions have a causal 
basis, and that this be distinct from the disposition itself, and that it is the 
causal basis of the disposition rather than the disposition itself which is the 
188 Ellis (2001) 43
189 Dunne (2004) 188
190 Dunne (2004) 188
191 Dunne (2004) 190
192 Prior, Pargetter and Jackson (1982) 251
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cause of the display of the disposition.  That is, in the case of a glass, whatever 
causes the display of fragility in the glass is fixed by reference to the facts 
about the glass that constitute its fragility rather than being fixed by reference 
to the fact that those facts constitute fragility.
One objection to the notion of a bare disposition that is commonly canvassed is 
the virtus dormitiva objection.  This objection is named from the example of 
providing 'dormative power' as an explanation of why opium causes sleep, 
which fails to provide an independent non-circular explanation of the power of 
opium to cause sleep.  As Harré explains this objection:
“If the identifying criterion for a power of a certain kind is uniquely tied 
to the effect that it has when the corresponding disposition is activated, 
then there is a vicious circularity between powers and their 
manifestations.  There would be a power for every disposition.”193
That this objection does not have force against the notion of a disposition that 
is not a bare disposition is made clear by Mumford as follows.  Although the 
explanation of 'dormative power' is trivial in answer to the question 'why does 
opium cause sleep?', it is not trivial in answer to the question, 'why does sleep 
follow whenever opium is taken?'  This is because the former question does and 
the latter question does not presuppose a causal relation between opium and 
sleep.  As such, to respond to the latter question with the answer 'dormative 
power' serves to rule out alternative possibilities, such as correlation without 
causation.  'Dormative power' thus functions as a placeholder for a fuller or 
more scientific explanation rather than as an alternative to it.  Harré and 
Madden similarly explain:
“The emptiness of the general regularity statement contrasts 
unfavourably with the promise of the power statement, which implies 
that the sleepiness is not fully explained by the fact of the ingestion of 
opium, but is to be looked for in the nature of opium.  An attribution of a 
193 Harré (2013) 129
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power opens up a certain direction of empirical investigation.  It is not an 
attribution of an occult quality, because it is not a quality-attribution at 
all.”194
The view that there could be bare dispositions and that a disposition may have 
no distinct causal basis has been advocated by Jennifer McKitrick.195  The notion 
of a bare disposition also gains support from the essentialist thesis in Ellis's 
dispositional essentialism, whereby the disposition constitutes the real essence 
of a natural kind and is a modal property defined by a way of acting.  Crucially, 
Ellis holds that the causal process which serves to define the dispositional 
property is not itself defined by reference to that process, but is defined in 
terms of the causal kind and effectual kind events it involves.196  Timothy 
O'Connor and John Ross Churchill similarly understand a causal power as “a 
power to produce or bring about some event, where this is assumed to be a 
real relation irreducible to more basic features of the world.  Our favoured 
technical terms for this is 'causal oomph'.  So understood, causation is not 
amenable to analysis in non-causal terms, but instead involves the exercise of 
ontologically primitive causal powers or capacities of particulars.”197  In sum, it 
can be said that there is no settled position in the literature about what 
dispositions consist in, and, specifically, it is not fully settled whether they are 
or are not reducible to causes or to other dispositional or categorical 
properties.198
Based on the limited textual evidence available, it is not clear whether the neo-
medical group of svabhāva-advocates also affirm bare dispositions or consider 
that dispositions supervene on other properties or facts.  However, the lack of 
any available statement of how dispositions supervene on other factors make it 
plausible that they advocated bare dispositions.  Also, as we shall see below, a 
form of supervenience concerning dispositions was advocated by the Buddhist 
194 Harré and Madden (1975) 85
195 See McKitrick (2003) and McKitrick (2009)
196 See Ellis (2002) 47-50
197 O'Connor and Churchill (2010) 44
198 See also the various papers in Kistler and Gnassounou (2007)
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Dharmakīrti, so the opposition between Sā khya philosophers aligned with thisṃ  
group and Buddhists may also suggest that this group advocated bare 
dispositions.  If this were the case, it would also explain the confusion between 
this group and the second group of svabhāva-advocates, whose anti-
necessitarian view would entail lack of such supervenience.
By contrast, the intellectual pessimism of one group of svabhāva-advocates in 
appealing to chance seems to entail the denial of distinct causal bases for 
distinct dispositions.  The other group who affirmed a neo-medical conception 
of svabhāva also failed to specify any causal basis for dispositions, although 
their view is not technically inconsistent with the idea that dispositions should 
have a causal basis, based on the limited textual evidence available.
Section 7: Kumārila's notion of svabhāva
The foregoing discussion has identified dispositionalist and essentialist 
dimensions to the notion of svabhāva.  Dispositionally, svabhāva constitutes a 
real causal power which is an embodied cause.  In terms of essence, three 
conceptions of particular interest have been identified.  These include Fine's two 
notions of essence conditional on existence and essence conditional on identity. 
The third is the notion of a default intrinsic nature conditional on the absence of 
extrinsic factors.  The notion of intrinsicality is that of Harré and Madden, which 
is that it is “a feature of the thing itself”199, and the notion of a default refers to 
the presence of normal conditions and the absence of extrinsic factors.  As 
such, an intrinsic feature is capable of metaphysically grounding some 
explanandum.  In the next chapter, Kumārila's claim that “it is understood that 
the prāmā yam of all pramā as is 'from itself'”ṇ ṇ 200 will be investigated with 
respect to these conceptions.  This section will provide a preliminary analysis of 
dispositionalism and essentialism in Kumārila's notion of svabhāva by 
199 Harré and Madden (1975) 87
200 TS 2811ab and ŚV 2.47ab respectively.
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considering Kumārila's analogy with the case of water being carried in a pot.
Kumārila provides an example of his notion of svabhāva using the illustration of 
a disposition of a pot to carry water:
TS 2850: In being produced, a pot depends on a lump of clay, a 
[potter's] stick, a [potter's] wheel etc., …
… but [the pot's] dependency on those things is not present in the 
extraction of water.
The translation of the term 'āharaṇa' as 'extraction' diverges from previous 
translations of this verse.  Thus Jha provides the translation 'the action of 
containing water'.  Taber, Arnold and Kataoka similarly translates this term as 
'carrying water' or 'to carry water'.201  However, 'containing' water does not 
really fit with the meaning of 'āharaṇa', and, although 'carrying' picks up on one 
set of meanings provided by Monier-Williams as “taking, seizing, bringing, 
fetching”202, nevertheless it is the carrier and not the pot which plays the 
significant instrumental role when water is transferred from one place from 
another.  Further, on this reading, it is not clear why the dynamic functioning of 
delivered content in bringing about beliefs that are true should be like the static 
functioning of a pot in holding water while it is carried.203
Monier-Williams provides the following additional meanings for this term: 
“taking away, robbing … extracting, removing …”204.  The notion of extracting 
water seems to better capture the idea of a dynamic process.   Specifically, in 
setting processes, such as when milk is set to make yoghurt, or hot liquidy 
ghee is set to make solid ghee, there is a dynamic process, where the porosity 
201 See Taber (1992b) 211, Arnold (2001) 655 fn.42, Arnold (2005) 242 fn.38, 
Kataoka (2011) 254 fn.210
202 Monier-Williams (1956) 162
203 Jayanta also expresses some misgivings about this analogy: see NM 424
204 Monier-Williams (1956) 162
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of an earthenware pot may be thought to play some role in this extraction 
process.  Although this revision of previous translations brings the analogy to 
life in a way that previous translations do not, the discussion below could 
alternatively be read in terms of a pot containing water or somehow being 
involved when water is carried.
The behaviour of the pot in facilitating the extraction of water constitutes the 
display of a capacity which is a real dispositional property or causal power. 
Similarly, Kataoka explains that “Kumārila has his own well-defined notion of 
capacity and uses the term consistently.”205  Kataoka observes:
“Ontologically, a capacity belongs to an entity … It is … “hypothetically” 
postulated from a seen result … it exists objectively as a real entity.”206
Kataoka's explanation highlights the affinity between Kumārila's notion of 
capacity and the notion of disposition discussed above.  Specifically, the 
capacity is real and belongs to an entity, so corresponds to the general idea of a 
real property.  The idea that a capacity is postulated from a seen result 
corresponds to Ellis's idea that a dispositional property which is the real 
essence of a natural kind is defined in terms of its display or manifestation.207
The capacity to facilitate extraction plays a real causal role which explains its 
manner of display in terms of the extraction of water.  Thus the capacity is a 
real property of its entity which has a causal role in determining the behaviour 
of that entity.  Kataoka similarly notes that 'due to svabhāva' is a paraphrase of 
'from itself' with a specifically ontological connotation.208  This is also evident 
from the medical analogy, where the svabhāva of a drug was said to be 
responsible for its curative effect.
205 Kataoka (2011) 247
206 Kataoka (2011) 247-248
207 See Ellis (2001) 124 and Ellis (2002) 49
208 See Kataoka (2011) 84, 86
75
Kumārila also claims that the capacity does not supervene on the causal 
conditions that are responsible for the particular essence of the pot.  This 
contrasts with Dharmakīrti's understanding of svabhāva described above. 
Kumārila's capacity is a property which is a kind essence rather than a 
particular essence.  It is a dispositional property which does not supervene on 
any causal basis.  The verse makes explicit that a capacity does not supervene 
on the causal history or material cause of its entity.  Thus, although the 
conception of a bare disposition and debates about it in contemporary 
philosophy are in flux, Kumārila's notion of a capacity can be tentatively 
equated with the notion of a bare disposition.  The notion of a bare disposition 
was also tentatively equated with the neo-medical use of svabhāva above.
In addition to this dispositionalist dimension to Kumārila's notion of svabhāva, 
there is also an essentialist dimension.  It was described above how Dunne 
cautions that “Dharmakīrti's theory … belies any such de re essentialism”209 and 
asserts that the accidental/ essential distinction “remains vague and 
undeveloped”210 in Dharmakīrti's philosophy.  Dunne's call for caution would 
prima facie apply in the case of Kumārila also.  However, whereas Dharmakīrti 
emphasizes how correct judgments are “conditioned by mind-dependent factors 
such as expectation, need, context, perceptual acuity, habituation and so on”211, 
Kumārila's analogy with the case of a pot emphasizes rather the independence 
of the correct judgment from its causal factors, as bare disposition.  As such, 
Fine's two conditional notions of essence, as conditional on existence and as 
conditional on identity, provide a sufficiently sophisticated notion of essence, 
which when properly applied does not “introduce an unwarranted form of 
essentialism”212 into Kumārila's doctrine.  The notion of an intrinsic feature 
conditional on normal extrinsic conditions, i.e. the absence of external 
interference, is also relevant.  The idea of disappearing together with its entity 
209 Dunne (2004) 184
210 Dunne (2004) 190
211 Dunne (2004) 184
212 Dunne (2004) 182-183
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corresponds to Fine's idea of an essence conditional on existence.  Kataoka 
similarly observes that a capacity “disappears if its locus is destroyed”213  
Relating this essentialist strand to the pot analogy, pots in general would be 
capable of facilitating extraction.  However, this is conditional on normal 
conditions and the absence of extrinsic factors.  For example, a person could 
smash or crack the pot, causing it to leak.  As such, the ability to facilitate 
extraction is an intrinsic nature of the pot conditional on absence of 
interference.
There is now a disjunction between the case of an undamaged and a damaged 
pot.  If something constitutes an undamaged pot, it will necessarily be able to 
facilitate extraction.  As such, the ability to facilitate extraction is an essence 
conditional on identity as an undamaged pot, and is essentially distributed over 
undamaged pots.  Specifically, it would be a kind essence, or essential property 
of a kind.  That is, a pot is the type of thing that by its essential kind nature 
holds water.  It would be possible for an individual pot to be destroyed along 
with its disposition to hold water, and also for a pot to be damaged, retaining its 
individual identity whilst losing its disposition to facilitate extraction.  The lack 
of the ability to facilitate extraction in a pot is due to external interference.  As 
some damaged pots may yet possess such ability, this ability is inessentially 
distributed over damaged pots.  The significance of these observations will 
become clearer in the next chapter, where the notion of svabhāva is applied to 
the case of the relation between 'pramā a' and 'prāmā yam'.ṇ ṇ
213 Kataoka (2011) 248
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Chapter 3: Kumārila's disjunctive epistemology
Section 1: Introduction
The claim under examination in this thesis is that “the prāmā yam of allṇ  
pramā as is 'from itself'”ṇ 1.  In the previous chapter, Kumārila's terms 'from 
itself' and 'due to svabhāva' were explicated in terms of a metaphysic of causal 
powers, and the ramifications of such a metaphysic will be developed in this 
chapter.  This requires an investigation of Kumārila's use of the terms 'pramā a'ṇ  
and 'prāmā yam' in establishing his epistemological claim.  Kumārila's use ofṇ  
these two related terms is indebted to a general understanding of them 
common to a diverse selection of different Indian philosophers.  As such, a 
certain amount of general discussion of these terms will be necessary. 
However, a comprehensive investigation of these two terms would require an 
examination of other thinkers in their own right, which is outside the scope of 
this thesis.
Sosa's virtue epistemology (VE) approach has itself been presented as a 
dispositional thesis consistent with a general metaphysics of causal powers. 
Sosa considers that human faculties such as eyesight are the intellectual virtues 
which are powers that bring about one's believing the truth under normal 
circumstances.  It is suggested that Kumārila's approach contributes to VE by 
demonstrating how Sosa's claim harmonizes with the metaphysical picture of 
dispositional essentialism.
This chapter begins with an examination of the key terms in Kumārila's 
epistemic vocabulary, which are 'pramā a' and 'prāmā yam', based on existingṇ ṇ  
secondary literature.  The work of Dan Arnold and John Taber on the meaning 
of the claim “the prāmā yam of all pramā as is 'from itself'”ṇ ṇ 2 is then examined. 
1 TS 2811ab and ŚV 2.47ab respectively.
2 TS 2811ab and ŚV 2.47ab respectively.
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Following this, the thesis argues for a reading of Kumārila's claim as a 
metaphysical claim that deliverances have an essential disposition to make an 
accurate determination.  Such a reading constitutes an ontological 
interpretation falling into a general type which is rejected by Arnold, and as 
such, the objections of Arnold to this type of reading are addressed.
This metaphysical interpretation is supported firstly by arguing for an initial 
understanding of Kumārila's term 'pramā a' as a deliverance ṇ from an epistemic 
source.  Such deliverances manifest their causal power when conditions are 
appropriately normal, and fail to do so when conditions are abnormal.  As such, 
Kumārila's distinction between pramā a and non-pramā a represents aṇ ṇ  
distinction between a Good Case deliverance and a Bad Case deliverance 
respectively, where the Good Case deliverance is considered a paradigm case.
Section 2: Knowledge and its value
No single term in Kumārila's discussion clearly corresponds to the term 
'knowledge'.  Kumārila's expression meya-bodha more closely equates to the 
idea of veridical awareness, accurate determination, or true belief.  The 
synonymous terms pramā and pramiti in classical Indian philosophy are terms 
with debated epistemic status, but are frequently used in the sense of true 
belief.3  Although they do not occur in this discussion, these terms would 
arguably denote some conception of knowledge for Kumārila.  This is because 
Kumārila's notion of prāmā yam, which is etymologically related to theseṇ  
terms, involves the idea of a causal power and thereby does concern an 
epistemic performance and an epistemic achievement.  It will be argued in this 
chapter that prāmā yamṇ  involves the idea of accuracy and the exercise of a 
competence, thereby establishing a clear contrast with accidentally true belief, 
which is not an epistemic achievement in a robust sense.  In this way, 
3 See for example MK Part 5 2772: pramātva  ca yathârthânubhavatvam|  Seeṃ  
also Potter (1977) 155: “Pramā is a term designating a true judgment”
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Kumārila's doctrine comes to engage with some conception of knowledge.  More 
widely, the classical Indian debate recognizes an epistemic status which is more 
valuable than mere true belief because it invests the agent with confidence in 
that true belief.    As such, there is a strong connection with discussions of 
knowledge and of the value of knowledge in Western philosophy generally.
Duncan Pritchard explains that recent work in epistemology has focused on 
questions about the value of knowledge.4  Pritchard describes the precedent for 
this discussion set by Plato's discussion in the Meno as to why knowledge is 
more valuable than true belief.  Here, Plato suggests that knowledge is “"tied 
down" to the truth, like the mythical tethered statues of Daedalus which were 
so lifelike that they were tied to the ground to ensure that they did not run 
away.”5  Pritchard suggests that this amounts to the idea that “knowledge, 
unlike mere true belief, gives one a confidence that is not easily lost”6. 
Pritchard suggests that mere true belief about the way to Larissa may be lost if 
the road seems to be going in the wrong direction, because one may lose 
confidence, whereas a person with knowledge “will in all likelihood press on 
regardless (and thereby have one's confidence rewarded by getting where one 
needs to go).”7  
It is interesting to note that Plato's example of the traveller to Larissa focuses 
on the predicament of the individual knower, and specifically that the need for 
confidence suggests conditions that must be satisfied by the epistemic agent 
for herself.  Such conditions would then themselves have to be accessible to the 
epistemic agent in some sense.  Contemporary accounts in the analysis of 
knowledge seem to focus on a more abstract higher-level perspective from 
which a determination about the agent's epistemic status should be made 
according to a normative threshold for knowledge.  Although subtle, this shift in 
perspective means that the confidence of the epistemic agent in acting on her 
beliefs is no longer centre stage, but is replaced with the confidence of the 
4 Pritchard (2007)
5 Pritchard (2007) 86
6 Pritchard (2007) 86
7 Pritchard (2007) 86
80
philosopher in making a determination as to whether the traveller should be 
said to possess knowledge.
The motivation for considering the value of knowledge in the classical Indian 
context is illustrated by Jayanta in his discussion of this topic.  Jayanta explains 
that Vedic rituals involve “labours including the giving of countless amounts of 
wealth”8.  A prudent person would not take such action were the unseen 
benefits of such actions not ascertained.9  By contrast, Jayanta suggests, 
everyday actions can be motivated by empirical beliefs even if their truth has 
not been fully ascertained.10
Jayanta himself follows the lead of Buddhists such as Śāntarak itaṣ 11 in 
suggesting that the need for ascertainment represents a further separable 
condition for knowledge beyond the need for true belief.12  By contrast, 
Kumārila denies that the need for ascertainment represents a separable 
condition.  However, there is a general consensus that something beyond true 
belief is needed in order to give the agent confidence to act on her beliefs. 
There is thus a parallel with the idea that knowledge gives one the confidence 
to press on even in the face of initially unpromising results.  The classical 
Indian debate thus shares with Plato's discussion a focus on the perspective of 
the knower, who is to gain sufficient confidence in the truth of her belief in 
order to act with conviction, thereby raising the epistemic status of the belief to 
a level that can aptly be termed knowledge.  It could thus be said that 
knowledge requires true belief plus confidence, where this means that the 
epistemic agent must satisfy for herself certain conditions that would provide a 
type of confidence that is adequate in degree and in kind.
The alternative idea proposed by Kumārila is that the epistemic agent can gain 
8 NM 436: “aga ita-dravi a-vitara ādi-kleśa-sādhye u”ṇ ṇ ṇ ṣ
9 See NM 436: “prek āvatā  pravartanam anucitam”ṣ ṃ
10 See NM 436: “pratyak ādi u d ārthe u pramā e u prāmā ya-niścayamṣ ṣ ṛṣṭ ṣ ṇ ṣ ṇ  
antare aiva vyavahāra-siddhe  … tatra śreyān anir aya eva”ṇ ḥ ṇ
11 See esp. TS 2974-2978
12 See NM 436: “na tāvat svayam eva prāmā ya-graha am upapannamṇ ṇ  
aprāmā ikatvāt”ṇ
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the needed confidence in her beliefs without such definitive ascertainment.  His 
approach contrasts with the idea of a normative threshold or criterion to be met 
by a belief which is present among other classical Indian thinkers.  Kumārila 
provides an alternative means for the epistemic agent to gain the required 
confidence in her beliefs.  Kumārila provides a belief protocol for the agent to 
obtain beliefs in which she may justly place her confidence.
Accordingly, rather than a factorizable analysis of knowledge, Kumārila provides 
a modal metaphysics of beliefs together with a belief protocol addressed to the 
individual knower.  The present chapter examines Kumārila's metaphysics of 
beliefs, whilst the next chapter examines Kumārila's belief protocol.
Section 3: Terminological issues in the existing literature
B.K. Matilal explains:
“In the Western tradition, epistemology is the name given to that branch 
of philosophy which concerns itself with the theory of knowledge … The 
function of what is called the pramā a-śāstraṇ  in Indian philosophic 
tradition coincides to a great extent with this activity.”13  
The terms pramā a and prāmā yam thus form part of a range of etymologicallyṇ ṇ  
connected epistemic vocabulary.  These two terms are central in Kumārila's 
main claim that “the prāmā yam of all pramā as is 'from itself'”ṇ ṇ 14.
The term 'pramā aṇ ' refers to a type of 'jñāna'.  In the similar context of Nyāya, 
J.N.Mohanty writes:
“Jñāna is not an activity but a product … each person's … jñāna is 
13 Matilal (1986) 22
14 TS 2811ab and ŚV 2.47ab respectively.
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directly perceivable by himself and by none else … it is an occurrent, i.e. 
to say, arises in time and is replaced by others … epistemologically it 
refers beyond itself to its object … if I am conscious of anything in 
whatsoever mode it may be, in the Nyāya terminology I may be said to 
have a jñāna of it”15.  
The term 'thought' is sometimes used in the contemporary context to capture 
the similar notion of a propositional mental event.16  
Kataoka explains that “in the Mīmā sā tradition, it is also well established thatṃ  
jñāna can be interpreted in two ways: cognition and a means of cognition 
(jñāyate 'nena).”17  The notion of a cognition in turn subsumes notions of an 
occurrent judgment and an occurrent awareness.  A full analysis of this 
dimension of the term's meaning is outside the scope of this thesis, and the 
terms 'cognition', 'judgment', '(epistemic) deliverance', 'belief' and 'awareness' 
will alternately feature as translations depending on context.  In particular, 
whilst being entirely consistent in his thinking, Kumārila's perspective often 
shift between that of means and that of product, and the translation of the term 
'jñāna' as 'deliverance' and as 'judgment' will be used to capture these two 
perspectives.
The term 'deliverance' is used in Sosa's sense.  Sosa explains: 
“Traditionally our knowledge is said to have “sources” such as 
perception, memory, and inference.  Epistemic sources issue 
15 Mohanty (1989) 23-26
16 See Sawyer (1998) 523 fn.2: “The term 'thought' as I use it should not be 
understood as a Fregean thought.  Rather, 'thought' should be understood as a 
synonym for 'propositional mental event'.  Hence, two subjects cannot have the 
same thought, but can have thoughts with the same content.  Similarly, a 
subject cannot be said to have the same thought at different times, but can have 
two thoughts with the same content at different times.”
17 Kataoka (2011) 204 fn.113
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“deliverances” that we may or may not accept … Deliverances thus 
conceived make up a realm of the ostensible: ostensible perceptions, 
ostensible memories, ostensible intuitions, and the like … Examples of 
deliverances are test results, indicator readings, eyewitness reports, 
media reports, perceptual reports, perceptual appearances, and even 
rational intuitions and ostensible conclusions.  Contents are delivered by 
each such source.”18  
The focus of Kumārila's discussion will be on the potential of an accurate 
judgment to accurately determine an object as a result, and accordingly 
Kumārila's use of the term 'jñāna' will be found to have an affinity with Sosa's 
notion of a deliverance.  Interestingly, Sosa chooses to use a single term, 
deliverance, to refer to both the act of delivering by the epistemic source and 
the content that is delivered.19  These two senses of the term 'jñāna', act of 
delivering and delivered content, also correspond to the means and product 
perspectives.
The term 'jñāna' additionally subsumes both 'pramā a' and 'non-pramā a'.ṇ ṇ  
Accordingly, the same ambiguity is found at this sub-level.  Thus Dan Arnold 
explains that pramā a ṇ “alternately refer[s] to a reliable means of knowing, and 
to an episode of veridical awareness such as results from the exercise 
thereof.”20  It will be argued that the term 'pramā a' denotes an epistemicṇ  
performance which achieves a particular outcome, which is accurate 
determination, and thus constitutes a successful deliverance.  As an abstract 
property of such successful deliverances, the term 'prāmā yam' reflects aṇ  
notion of epistemic success.  These senses can be grammatically parsed as 
follows – 
18 Sosa (2007) 101-103
19 See Sosa (2007) 103 fn.5
20 Arnold (2001) 590
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• pramā a = pramā-kara aṇ ṇ 21 = a successful act of deliverance
• pramā aṇ  = pramā = successfully delivered content
Corresponding to these are also two senses of prāmā yam.ṇ 22  In some 
presentations, ambiguity is only attributed to this term, as the second sense of 
pramā aṇ  can be disambiguated by the term 'pramā'.23  Based on the capacity 
reading of prāmā yam developed in the previous chapter, these will beṇ  
understood as follows:
• prāmā yam = pramā-kara a-tvam = a capacity for epistemic successṇ ṇ
• prāmā yam = pramā-tvam = epistemic successṇ
Kumārila's notion of prāmā yam will be equatedṇ  with the notion of pramā-
kara a, or a capacity for epistemic success.  ṇ However, it will also be found that 
most of Kumārila's claims can be formulated with respect to the epistemic 
success which results from the exercise of such a capacity.  As such, the two 
notions of a capacity for epistemic success and epistemic success itself 
represent the two perspectives of means and product.
Ryle explains how success verbs, which signify achievements24, are frequently 
used to refer to processes properly denoted by hunt verbs.  Ryle writes, “we 
very often borrow achievement verbs to signify the performance of the 
corresponding task activities, where the hope of success is good.  A runner may 
be described as winning his race from the start, despite the fact that he may 
21 Cf. MK Part 5 2773: pramā atva  pramākara atvam|ṇ ṃ ṇ
22 Cf. Arnold (2001) 590: “Prāmā yaṇ  then refers to that abstract quality in virtue 
of which a pramā aṇ  has whatever status it has.”
23 See Mohanty (1989) 2 quoted below; see also Potter (1977) 155: “Pramā is a 
term designating a true judgment; pramātva is the universal property shared by 
all true judgments.  Frequently this property is referred to by another word, 
prāmā yaṇ , which is, however, ambiguous, as Mohanty demonstrates.  The truth 
of a judgment is grounded in what is called a pramā aṇ , an instrument of (true) 
knowledge … The property which all such instruments have in common is also 
called prāmā yaṇ  – thus providing a source of confusion.”  
24 See Ryle (1976) 125-126
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not win it in the end; and a doctor may boast that he is curing his patient's 
pneumonia, when his treatment does not in fact result in the anticipated 
recovery.”25  A similar ambiguity sometimes obtains in the case of the Indian 
terminology.  Thus Jayanta for example at one point uses the expression 
'yathārthêtara-pramiti' to denote correct or incorrect judgments.26  
Subsection 1: P  ramā a ṇ as instrument or outcome  
Regarding the former sense, Potter calls pramā a “ṇ an instrument of (true) 
knowledge”27.  Jha explains that it is a 'Means of Cognition', seemingly 
bracketing the question of epistemic status.28  Matilal explains that pramā aṇ  
“means simply various instrumental causes leading to true cognition.”29 and also 
writes, “What is a pramā aṇ ?  Roughly the answer is: A pramā aṇ  is the means 
leading to a knowledge-episode (pramā) as its end.”30  Surendranath Dasgupta 
explains that pramā a “signifies the means and the movement by whichṇ  
knowledge is acquired”31 and, in the context of Nyāya and Vaiśe ika philosophy,ṣ  
writes that “[t]hat collocation (sāmagrī) which produced knowledge involved 
certain non-intelligent as well as intelligent elements … this collocation is thus 
called pramā a or the determining cause of the origin of knowledge”ṇ 32.  Arnold 
quotes a definition from the Nyāyabhāṣya that “[a] pramā a ṇ is that by means of 
which one knows an object”33 and states that “I prefer to render pramā aṇ  in 
this sense as “reliable warrant”, though William Alston’s term doxastic practice 
… would also do nicely.”34.  It is not clear from this if Arnold wishes to attribute 
25 Ryle (1976) 143
26 See NM 431
27 Potter (1977) 155
28 See Jha (1939) 1271 unnumbered footnote: “The dual sense of the form 
'Pramā aṇ ' as Cognition and Means of Cognition is brought out clearly in the 
Commentary on Text 2813 …”
29 Matilal (1985) 203
30 Matilal (1986) 22
31 Dasgupta (1969) 406
32 Dasgupta (1969) 330
33 Arnold (2001) 650-651; the quoted definition is “sa yenārtha  prami oti tatṃ ṇ  
pramā am”ṇ
34 Arnold (2001) 651; cf. Arnold (2005) 60
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a reliabilist aspect to Kumārila's doctrine.  
Kumārila discusses the term 'pramā a' in the 'determination of perception'ṇ  
chapter of the Śloka-vārttika.  John Taber has provided a translation of this 
chapter together with a detailed analytic commentary.35  In his introduction to 
the text, Taber explains that pramā a has a general meaning of “ṇ that which 
functions as the means or instrument in an act of cognition … To ask, What is 
the pramā aṇ  perception? then, is to ask, What is the thing that functions 
instrumentally in the act of perception?”36  In this discussion, then, Kumārila is 
considering the 'hunt' aspect of pramā a as act of delivering,ṇ  without regard for 
the fact that that deliverance has positive epistemic status.
Taber explains that a variety of theories were discussed by Kumārila's 
contemporaries.  The following table quotes some options from Taber's 
enumeration37 of interpretations of the idea that the pramā a is “ṇ the means of 
knowledge perception”38 and its result is “the cognition of an object”39.
Option Pramā a (means of knowingṇ 40) Result
T1 the sense faculty cognition of the object
T2
the connection of sense faculty and 
object
cognition of the object
T3
the connection between sense faculty 
and mind
cognition of the object
T4
all of these connections taken 
together
cognition of the object
35 Taber (2005)
36 Taber (2005) 18-19
37 See Taber (2005) 19; T for Taber has been added to the option labels
38 Taber (2005) 19
39 Taber (2005) 19
40 Cf. Taber (2006) 6: “Now the word pramā aṇ  … literally means … 'a means of 
knowing'.”
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The following table of options presents some options from Taber's 
enumeration41 of interpretations of the idea that the pramā a is “ṇ the cognition 
of the object”42 and its result is “some other kind of cognition”43 –
Option Pramā aṇ Result
T5
a cognition of a qualifying 
feature of an object, such as the 
colour blue
an awareness of that same object 
as qualified by that feature, for 
example, “The pot is blue”
T6
a nonconceptualized perception 
of the qualifying feature
a conceptualized awareness of it
T7
an awareness of the qualified 
object
an awareness of it as desirable, 
undesirable, or neither
These two broad styles of approach are also distinguished by Kamalaśīla44 and 
by Jayanta.45  Taber notes46 that in the chapter on perception, Kumārila shows a 
preference for the latter family of views, whereby the pramā aṇ  is an awareness, 
yet is amenable to any view that characterizes the pramā a as something thatṇ  
makes contact with an external object, i.e. any view other than the view 
espoused by Buddhists like Dharmakīrti.  Taber explains that “Kumārila, 
interestingly, proceeds [in the chapter on perception] to defend all of the 
theories that accept some kind of interaction between sense faculty and object 
as viable options – against the various criticisms raised by Di nāga … Evenṅ  
theories that hold the cognition of the object to be the means of knowledge, 
41 See Taber (2005) 20; T for Taber has been added to the option labels
42 Taber (2005) 19
43 Taber (2005) 19
44 P on TS 2812
45 Jayanta also discusses and rejects a third interpretation, that pramā a refers toṇ  
one element in the causal aggregate which produces the cognition.
46 See above footnote.  See also ŚV 2.80, which provides a kind of definition of a 
pramā a, and which characterizes it as a type of cognition.ṇ
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with which Kumārila's own is to be grouped, can be shown to be coherent.”47
As Taber explains, although Kumārila runs through all the possible views 
considering their various merits, the crucial point for Kumārila is simply that a 
distinction is made between pramā a and its effect.  Whatever definition isṇ  
chosen, “perception will still be something that occurs only when there is an 
existing connection of sense-faculty and object.”48  Kumārila's opposition to the 
Buddhist idea that pramā a and its effect are identical seems to be that toṇ  
accept it would vitiate the explanatory model in which pramā a is on the side ofṇ  
the explanans and its effect is something with positive epistemic status which is 
the explanandum.  As Taber explains, “It is a basic tenet of Mīmā sā (and allṃ  
other realist schools of Indian philosophy) that means and end must always be 
distinct – an axe used to fell a tree is one thing, the felling of the tree another 
…”49
Taber also considers that “it appears that Kumārila favors the view that the 
cognition itself is the pramā a”ṇ 50.  As for the effect of the pramā a, Taberṇ  
notes: 
“Kumārila's own view is that the result of knowing is, not another 
cognition, but the knownness (jñātatā) or manifestation (prāka yaṭ ) of 
the object.”51  
This supposition is reinforced by Kumārila's presentation under discussion here, 
47 Taber (2005) 19-20
48 Taber (2005) 70
49 Taber (2005) 79
50 Taber (2005) 71
51 Taber (2005) 169 fn.67
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as the argument that a pramā a is a type of deliverance corresponds to Taber'sṇ  
equation of pramā a with the cognition itself.  Further, Kumārila's idea that “aṇ  
capacity for accurate determination of an object belongs to them [scil. 
pramā as] due to their svabhāva”ṇ 52 indicates that accurate determination, i.e. 
knownness or manifestation of a fact or object, is the effect of the exercise of a 
capacity.  Also, in TS 2910, Kumārila likens the way in which the eye can 
cognize to the way in which a pramā a can cognize, suggesting that the two areṇ  
not equivalent.
The term 'pramā a' can also refer to this effect or outcome of the deliverance.ṇ  
Arnold explains:
“In the present context [viz. Kumārila's discussion] … the word [scil. 
pramā aṇ ] very often has the latter sense, and thus I will generally 
translate it as veridical awareness.”53  
Potter provides 'true judgement' for this latter 'pramā' sense54 and also notes 
that “[t]he Buddhists define truth as avisa vāditvaṃ  – nondeviance …”55 
Dasgupta explains that pramā is “the result of pramā a – right knowledge”ṇ 56. 
The Mīmā sā-kośa similarly provides the expression 'correct experience' as theṃ  
meaning of 'pramā'.57
Subsection 2: P  rāmā yam ṇ as instrumentality or as outcome  
As abstract properties derived from the two senses of pramā a above, Mohantyṇ  
explains that 'prāmā yam' “may mean either the property of being instrumentalṇ  
in bringing about true knowledge (pramākara aṇ tva), or simply the truth of a 
52 TS 2812ab
53 Arnold (2001) 590
54 Potter (1977) 155: “Pramā is a term designating a true judgment”
55 Potter (1977) 156
56 Dasgupta (1969) 406
57 MK Part 5 2772: “pramātva  ca yathârthânubhavatvam”ṃ
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knowledge (pramātva).  In the former sense, prāmā yaṇ  belongs to the various 
instrumental causes of true knowledge.  In the latter sense, it characterizes a 
knowledge [i.e. a veridical awareness] itself.”58  
Mohanty translates prāmā ya ṇ as truth, explaining that “[t]he theories of 
prāmā ya … ṇ are concerned with prāmā ya ṇ in the second sense, i.e. with the 
truth of a knowledge.”59  Similarly, Matilal writes that “I shall often use 'truth' to 
translate the Sanskrit pramātva, which is one of the two senses of prāmā yaṇ  
and in this I shall follow J.N.Mohanty.”60
A translation as 'validity' for this latter sense is also frequently used, both in the 
context of Kumārila's doctrine and in general.61  It is difficult to find any positive 
argument for such a translation which references the meaning of this term, 
based either on a dictionary definition or on its use in any specialized 
philosophical context.  Dan Arnold favours this term for what it does not imply, 
explaining that it is “important to render the word in such a way as to avoid 
prejudging the question of truth”62.  However, John Dunne argues against a 
translation as validity, on the grounds that it wrongly “equates veridicality with 
prāmā yaṇ ”63 and that it creates confusion with the notion of validity as 
preservation of truth in argument structure.64
Jha interestingly uses the terms 'authoritativeness', 'authority' and 'validity'65, 
the first two of which seem to convey the idea of a normative claim being made 
on the agent.  Dasgupta states that “[v]alidity (prāmā yaṇ ) with Mīmā sāṃ  
meant the capacity that knowledge has to goad us to practical action in 
58 Mohanty (1989) 2
59 Mohanty (1989) 2
60 Matilal (1985) 203
61 See Jha (1939), Taber (1992b), Arnold (2001), Arnold (2005) and Kataoka 
(2011) Part 2 for the translation as validity in the specific context of Kumārila's 
discussion; see for example Dasgupta (1969) for the translation as validity in a 
general context
62 Arnold (2005) 62; Arnold (2001) 592
63 Dunne (2004) 227
64 See Dunne (2004) 227
65 See Jha (1907) 26 ff. and Jha (1939) 1270 ff.
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accordance with it, but with Vedānta it meant correctness to facts and want of 
contradiction.”66  The second alternative captures a notion of accuracy, but 
Dasgupta's first option would introduce a novel element.
John Dunne provides a perspicacious discussion of the significance of the term 
'prāmā yam',ṇ  in which he coins the expression 'instrumentality' as his preferred 
translation, corresponding to the notion of a pramā a as “instrumentalṇ  
cognition.”67  Dunne argues that this would appropriately stress the connection 
with the grammatical instrumentality68 and that the unfamiliarity of this term as 
compared with 'truth' or 'validity' allows “new possibilities for working through 
old problems”69.  Dunne also construes instrumentality in terms of purpose, 
writing that “part of what one means by instrumentality is that an instrument of 
knowledge must be “good for something””70, and thus this notion of 
instrumentality is a feature of pramā as, here, deliverances, relative to someṇ  
goal to be specified.
Given the current state of research, translation for the terms 'pramā a',ṇ  
'prāmā atā' and 'prṇ āmā yam'ṇ  in this thesis will have a necessarily provisional 
status, both in general and in relation to Kumārila's conception.  The term 
'pramā a' will be understood as a successful deliverance in relation to aṇ  
disjunction with the term 'non-pramā a' or unsuccessful deliverance.ṇ  
Kumārila's explication of the term 'prāmā yam' ṇ has already been shown to 
involve the notion of a capacity for accurate determination actually exercised 
under appropriately normal conditions which is also an essential disposition of 
those beliefs which are pramā as or successful deliverances.  ṇ
Like Dharmakīrti, and perhaps in contrast with the later commentators, 
Kumārila's concern seems to be with prāmā yam ṇ as a feature of deliverances 
which Dunne conveys by the term 'instrumentality', rather than the feature of 
66 Dasgupta (1969) 485
67 Dunne (2004) 255
68 See Dunne (2004) 223-225
69 Dunne (2004) 225
70 Dunne (2004) 229-230
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accuracy pertaining to the delivered content.  The notion of instrumentality 
towards some epistemically successful end is substantially equivalent to the 
attainment of such an end.  However, Dunne's term 'instrumentality' seems to 
place the leading emphasis on process, by constituting a 'hunt' term rather than 
a 'success' term.  Thus, even if it were to be understood as instrumentality 
towards some epistemically successful end, the fact that an instrumentally 
successful outcome is not merely targeted but must in fact be achieved for the 
use of the term to be apt is obscured.  An optimal expression would emphasize 
the requirement for success, without being too specific about the nature of the 
successful outcome.  Accordingly, a notion of epistemic success will be 
employed.  The advantage of this expression is that the notion of success 
conveys not merely a final state but that state construed in relation to a 
process of which it is an outcome.  Further, as a means to such an outcome, 
prāmā yam will be understood as the exercise of a capacity for epistemicṇ  
success.  At the same time, Dunne's locution whereby a deliverance is said to 
be instrumental to an outcome will also be helpful in representing Kumārila's 
views.
Kumārila's main claim is that all pramā as have ṇ prāmā yam 'from itself'.ṇ 71 
Kumārila glosses this main claim with the statement that a pramā a has aṇ  
capacity for accurate determination of an object.72  This capacity is likewise 
glossed by Kamalaśīla as a capacity to accurately determine an object and as a 
capacity to produce a correct awareness.73  Śāntarak ita likewise understandsṣ  
that prāmā yam “has the defining characteristic of [involving] a capacity”ṇ 74 in 
his discussion of Kumārila's verses.  Kamalaśīla similarly provides his own 
separate explanation of prāmā yam as a capacity of an initial ṇ awareness to give 
rise to a later awareness of a further result in his commentary on Śāntarak ita'sṣ  
accuracy-based definition above.75  Accordingly, we must understand that the 
71 TS 2811ab and ŚV 2.47ab
72 See TS 2812ab
73 Kamalaśīla's gloss is as 'prameya-paricchede śakti ' ḥ and as “yathârtha-jñāna-
janane śakti ”, ḥ both at P 746 under TS 2812
74 TS 2838: “śakti-lak a am … ida  prāmā yam”ṣ ṇ ṃ ṇ
75 P 771 under TS 2958-2961: “tasya tat-prāpa a-śakti .”  ṇ ḥ Kamalaśīla rather 
defines pramā a as correct awareness (see P ṇ 778: avisa vādi-jñānam)ṃ
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term 'prāmā yamṇ ' also refers either directly to a capacity for accurate 
determination or something which is characterized by such a capacity.76
Subsection 3: S  vataḥ   as intrinsic 
Kumārila's claim that “the prāmā yam of all pramā as is 'from itself'”ṇ ṇ 77 states 
the doctrine of 'svata -prāmā yam' or 'prḥ ṇ āmā yam from itself'.  ṇ The Sanskrit 
term 'svata ', which is here being translated literally as 'from itself',ḥ 78 is also 
frequently translated as 'intrinsic' in the secondary literature.79  Dasgupta 
however talks of “[t]he doctrine of the self-validity of knowledge 
(svata prāmā yaḥ ṇ ) … Validity means the certitude of truth.”80  Monier Monier-
Williams provides various meanings for 'svata ' including “'from one's ownḥ  
share' … 'of one's own self', 'of one's own accord … by nature …”81.  Jha mainly 
uses the expression 'due to the conception itself' when translating the Śloka-
vārttika82 and uses the terms 'inherent' and 'self-sufficient' when translating the 
Tattva-saṅgraha.83  It is not clear whether Jha has a positive consideration in 
mind when choosing these terms.  
Taber provides a purely negative consideration:
“I prefer to translate svataḥ ambiguously as 'intrinsic' or 'intrinsically' 
instead of literally as 'of itself', in order to allow for the possibility that it 
means something other than, strictly, 'of/from [the cognition] itself' … 
76 Śāntarak ita's term 'lak a am' at TS 2838 especially indicates the idea of anṣ ṣ ṇ  
essential characteristic
77 TS 2811ab and ŚV 2.47ab
78 This is following the lead of Kataoka (2011); see also Taber (1992b) 207: 
“svata   literally means 'of itself' or 'from itself'.”ḥ
79 See for example Potter (1977) 156-160, Taber (1992b) 211 and passim, Arnold 
(2001) 597 and passim 
80 Dasgupta (1969) 372
81 Monier-Williams (1956) 1275
82 See Jha (1907) 26 ff.
83 See Jha (1939) 1270 ff.
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Umbeka interprets it in a nonliteral way.”84  
Dan Arnold similarly writes: “I will render [svata -prāmā yam as] “intrinsicḥ ṇ  
validity.””85  Kataoka (2011) alternately uses both 'from itself' and 'intrinsic'.86 
This thesis will use the literal translation 'from itself' and also argue that this 
engages with ideas of essence and intrinsic nature in ways to be specified.
What is the philosophical significance of the term 'svata 'ḥ ?  Taber and Arnold 
both approach this question through a consideration of the two competing 
interpretations by U veka and ṃ Pārthasārathi about what 'sva-' (itself) refer to. 
The views of Arnold and Taber will be considered in turn.  As previously noted, 
however, discussion of the views of U veka and Pārthasārathi are not withinṃ  
the scope of this research.  On the basis of a cursory survey of the original 
works, the accuracy of Taber and Arnold in representing their views is accepted, 
and in particular, the position advocated by Arnold is taken to represent a 
homogenous Pārthasārathi-Arnold view.
Arnold explains that “the word svataḥ … is often rendered adverbially 
(“intrinsically”), in which case, its reflexive sense is obscured.”87.  Arnold 
focuses on Pārthasārathi's work Nyāya-ratna-mālā, where Pārthasārathi 
considers whether “sva- is reflexive only to all veridical awarenesses (i.e., only 
to pramā asṇ )”88 before arguing instead that “we must take the reflexive sva- … 
as reflexive to all awarenesses – i.e., even those that turn out not to be 
veridical.”89  Strongly endorsing Pārthasārathi's interpretation, Arnold explains 
that we should “understand the prāmā yaṇ  debate to concern nothing more than 
prima facie justification.”90  Thus “what is intrinsic is simply the fact that 
awareness confers prima facie justification.”91  
84 Taber (1992b) 207 fn.21; square brackets are in the original
85 Arnold (2001) 590; cf. Arnold (2005) 62, 74 and passim
86 See Kataoka (2011) Part 2 63, 64 and passim
87 Arnold (2005) 74; cf. Arnold (2001) 603
88 Arnold (2001) 628
89 Arnold (2001) 628; cf. Arnold (2005) 96
90 Arnold (2001) 641
91 Arnold (2001) 592
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Arnold also argues forcefully against the contrary idea that 'from itself' is 
reflexive to veridical awarenesses only and the allied reading of prāmā yam asṇ  
truth.  Kumārila's claim would then be read as the claim that only veridical 
awareness possess truth.  Arnold writes that “in this case, we would seem to be 
faced with a truism; for “validity” intrinsically obtains with respect to all “valid 
awarenesses” simply by definition.  On this account, then, the “intrinsic-ness” 
of validity obtains, as it were, simply de dicto.”92  This rejected reading involves 
the idea that “the “capacity” for producing validity (the capacity which, if not 
already existent, can’t be brought about by anything else) is something like an 
occult “power” or metaphysical property that is intrinsically possessed by 
pramā asṇ , which therefore intrinsically and objectively “bear” the means of 
producing the state of affairs which makes them valid … svata  prāmā yaḥ ṇ  [is] 
something like the intrinsic truth of pramā asṇ .”93  Arnold claims that this type of 
occult power would function like a virtus dormitiva, as it “is not an explanation, 
it is simply a restatement of what requires explanation.”94  Thus Arnold argues 
that ““truth” is a tendentious and misleading rendering of prāmā yaṇ  which I 
think is much more appropriately rendered as validity.”95  
Like Arnold, Taber also seems to endorse Pārthasārathi's reading, telling us that 
“Pārthasārathi appears to interpret the ŚV correctly”96, that “the second theory, 
that championed by Pārthasārathi, affords a better interpretation [than 
U vekaṃ 's]”97, and that “Pārthasārathi offers a much more coherent reading of 
Kumārila's text than Umbeka”98.  Taber explains that Pārthasārathi holds that:
“whenever a cognition occurs it presents itself as true … This does not 
mean that it is known definitively to be true, but only that it "is manifest" 
as such.  Even false cognitions manifest themselves as true.  All 
92 Arnold (2001) 604
93 Arnold (2001) 605
94 Arnold (2001) 605
95 Arnold (2001) 591
96 Taber (1992b) 212
97 Taber (1992b) 208
98 Taber (1992b) 211
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cognitions, not just true cognitions, have intrinsic validity, according to 
Parthasarathi … every cognition has a certain inherent force of 
conviction.”99  
Thus “Kumārila never claims that intrinsic validity entails validity … 
Pārthasārathi in particular stresses that intrinsic validity is common to true and 
false cognitions alike.”100  However, Taber's endorsement of Pārthasārathi's 
interpretation seems more nuanced than that of Arnold.  Taber asks if 
Kumārila's position is “that since we can never establish the validity of cognition 
extrinsically, we must rest content with intrinsic validity, even though it is only 
subjective and may ultimately mislead us? that intrinsic validity, though not the 
same as real validity, is the best we can do?”101  Contrary to Arnold (and 
seemingly Pārthasārathi), Taber answers in the negative.  Specifically, what 
Taber highlights is a process aspect to Kumārila's epistemology, the 
epistemological significance of which is downplayed in Arnold's exposition, as 
will be discussed later.  Thus Taber writes:
“one becomes aware of the falsehood of a particular cognition only by 
ascertaining some other fact … if no evidence of the falsehood of a 
cognition emerges … we may suppose that the situation that would give 
rise to such evidence – an actual state of affairs that conflicts with its 
truth – does not exist, hence that the cognition really is true”102
In this way, Taber finds in Kumārila's account the resources for something like a 
conventional analysis of knowledge.  Specifically, the concern shown by U vekaṃ  
that the subject be able to distinguish true beliefs from false beliefs is 
addressed in Taber's exposition.  Taber writes: 
“The difference between true and false cognitions is that the latter are 
always eventually overturned by other cognitions, whereas the former 
99 Taber (1992b) 210
100 Taber (1992b) 214
101 Taber (1992b) 215
102 Taber (1992b) 215
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retain their intrinsic validity indefinitely.  In short, every cognition has a 
certain inherent force of conviction.  We are inclined to believe that it 
represents matters as they really are, as soon as it occurs.  True 
cognitions retain this force of conviction, but false ones eventually lose 
it.”103  
In this way, one is justified in believing that one's cognitions are not just 
seemingly true, but actually true, and “[a]lthough that is not as good as 
knowing it is true extrinsically, via a pramā aṇ  – which however would be futile, 
since that would lead to a regress – it is almost as good.”104    Both Taber105 and 
Arnold106 also find evidence for a Pārthasārathi-type interpretation in Kumārila's 
verse ŚV 2.53.  This verse and its proper interpretation will be discussed in the 
next chapter.
Kataoka systematically analyses how Kumārila uses verbs with three different 
viewpoints to talk about pramā a andṇ  prāmā yam, which Kataoka labels theṇ  
ontological, epistemological and operational viewpoints.107  The terminological 
distinction of ontological, operational and epistemological viewpoints employed 
in contemporary scholarship on Kumārila's doctrine seems to hark back to the 
description of four levels of structure presented by Gillon and Love as 
“underlying the subject-matter of the Nyāyapraveśa”108 and maintained to be 
the structure “which underlies Indian logic, at least as it is expounded in the 
texts of Buddhism and Nyāyavaiśe ika.”ṣ 109  These four levels of structure are an 
ontic level, an epistemic level, a dialectic level and a forensic level.  In a more 
recent article, Gillon distinguishes between four perspectives on reasoning, 
where “seek[ing] to distinguish good reasoning from bad” involves “seek[ing] 
to identify the general conditions under which what one concludes is true, 
103 Taber (1992b) 210
104 Taber (1992b) 216
105 See Taber (1992b) 212
106 See Arnold (2001) 607, 622-624; Arnold (2005) 90-91
107 Kataoka (2011) Part 2 64-76
108 Gillon and Love (1980) 351
109 Gillon and Love (1980) 351
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having taken other things to be true.”110  These four perspectives are an ontic 
perspective, an epistemic perspective, a dialectic perspective and a forensic 
perspective.  
Prāmā yam is said to arise, to exist, and to be cognized.  It seems clear thatṇ  
the dominant aspect of prāmā yam in these roles is that of accurateṇ  
determination, although it is consistent with the idea that such accurate 
determination has arisen etc. as a result of a disposition.  This is particularly 
clear in the quasi-definitional statement that “an awareness which has arisen … 
should be considered a pramā a”,ṇ 111 albeit that refers to pramā a and notṇ  
prāmā yam.ṇ
Section 4: Kumārila's disjunction between pramā a and non-pramā aṇ ṇ
Kumārila provides what Kataoka describes as an operational aspect in verses 
2.48 to 2.51.  In verse 2.48, Kumārila writes:
ŚV 2.48: To explain, entities would depend on causes in order to obtain 
their existence.  But the functioning in performing their own activities of 
[entities which] have obtained their existence [is] just independent.
In verse 2.48 “Kumārila presupposes [that] “a valid cognition operates of itself” 
(pramāṇa  ṃ svata  ḥ pravartate)”112, and in verses 2.49-2.51, which will be 
discussed below, “Kumārila denies the opposite view, “a valid cognition 
operates through something else” (pramāṇa  ṃ svata  ḥ pravartate), because it 
110 Gillon (2011)
111 ŚV 2.80
112 See Kataoka (2011) Part 2 70
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would lead to the fault of infinite regress (anavasthā).”113  This operational 
aspect seems to capture what Ellis refers to as a natural kind of process.  Pots 
engage in a natural kind of process to facilitate extraction on the basis of a real 
causal power to engage in such a process, which is the real essence of that 
process.  Similarly, pramā as, as Good Case deliverances, engage in a naturalṇ  
kind of process to accurately judge, based on a real causal power to engage in 
such a process, which is the real essence of that process.  Kataoka observes 
that this operational aspect features again in verse 2.83, which will also be 
examined below.114  
Subsection 1: Good and Bad Cases
The theory of disjunctivism has been developed primarily in relation to 
perceptual awareness.  As M.G.F. Martin explains: 
“Disjunctivism about perceptual appearances, as I conceive of it, is a 
theory which seeks to preserve a naive realist conception of veridical 
perception in the light of the challenge from the argument from 
hallucination.”115  
In particular, no conception of hallucination as relations to non-physical objects 
of awareness or as seeming relations to objects “challenges our conception of 
veridical perceptions as relations to mind-independent objects.”116  The view is 
disjunctive in the sense that it denies that veridical perceptions and 
hallucinations have some common property.  As J.M. Hinton explains: 
“the illusion of seeing a flash of light is the disjunction of Cases that are 
not, but to the subject are like, seeing a flash of light … The reality of 
113 See Kataoka (2011) Part 2 70-71
114 See Kataoka (2011) Part 2 71
115 Martin (2006) 354
116 Martin (2006) 354
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seeing a flash of light is the disjunction of Cases of seeing a flash of 
light.”117   
Based on this general idea, a distinction between Good Cases and Bad Cases is 
standardly drawn in the literature.  The terminology of Good and Bad Cases was 
developed by Timothy Williamson.  Williamson writes, “A case is a possible total 
state of a system, the system consisting of an agent at a time paired with an 
external environment …”118  Williamson further explains:
“In the good case, things appear generally as they ordinarily do, and are 
that way; one believes some proposition p (for example, that one has 
hands), and p is true … In the bad case, things still appear generally as 
they ordinarily do, but are some other way; one still believes p, but p is 
false … ”119  
Sturgeon explains:
“There are three types of visual experience: veridical perception, illusion 
and hallucination.  They have portrayal and perceptual sides; and the 
former can be grounded in the latter to various degrees … We shall 
simply speak—to simplify things—of Good and Bad experiences, Good 
and Bad episodes, Good and Bad cases.”120  
The disjunctivist goes further by making the claim that the character of the 
experience is different in each of the two cases.  As such, what justifies the 
experience is different in each case.  As Hinton explains, in a case where you 
appear to see a flash, you do not know a proposition from which you infer that 
either a flash took place or you experienced the illusion of a flash.  Rather, 
Hinton explains:
117 Hinton (1967) 218-219
118 Williamson (2000) 52
119 Williamson (2000) 165
120 Sturgeon (2006) 186-187
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“When what happens is that you see a photic flash, you are justified by 
this, irrespective of whether you know that this is what is happening; 
and when what happens is that you have an illusion of one, you are 
justified by this, irrespective of whether you know that this is what is 
happening.”121
In this way, the criterion of justification is pulled apart from the criterion of 
distinguishability or discrimination.  This approach marks a radical break with 
the traditional internalist conception of justification, which holds that 
justification is solely a function of what is introspectively discriminable by the 
agent.122  The helpfulness of the disjunctive framework stems not from this 
particular claim that is being made being made but rather from the setup of a 
disjunction of awareness states through which this claim is motivated.
This general framework of disjunctivism has an affinity with the contrast set up 
by Kumārila between the terms prāmā yam and ṇ pramā aṇ  and their opposite 
terms non-prāmā yam andṇ  non-pramā a.  In a defining statement in the ṇ Śloka-
vārttika, Kumārila tells us:
ŚV 2.54: Non-prāmā yam is divided into three types according to [theṇ  
three cases, i.e.] erroneous beliefs, non-awareness and doubt.  Of these 
[three], [only] two [i.e. erroneous beliefs and doubts] are able [to arise] 
from a flawed cause, because they are real [whereas a non-awareness is 
not]
This statement constitutes an indirect response to a suggestion mooted earlier 
that non-prāmā yam is not a real entity.ṇ 123  The suggestion there is that the 
121 Hinton (1967) 223
122 See Goldman (1976) 772: “a person is said to know that p just in case he 
distinguishes or discriminates the truth of p from relevant alternatives.”
123 ŚV 2.39a
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prefix 'non-' would denote a mere lack, so that non-prāmā yam would denote aṇ  
simple lack of capacity.  Instead, Kumārila wishes to assert here that non-
prāmā yam involves ṇ some real basis, or at least, in two of the three cases it 
does, viz. doubt and error.  Accordingly, we must understand that non-
prāmā yam ṇ denotes some kind of real analogue of the capacity, which results in 
doubt or error.
The verse explains that non-prāmā yam results when the constitution of theṇ  
deliverance is somehow defective.  At another point, Kumārila likewise tells us 
that “being a non-pramā a [i.e. non-prāmā yam] is due to a flaw.”ṇ ṇ 124  This 
verse seems to be a direct answer to an opposed view canvassed earlier that 
“non-prāmā yam could not be due to a flaw in the cause”.ṇ 125  Kumārila provides 
the example of a visual perceptual belief formed in a dark environment126 as a 
case where doubt may occur.  Similarly, U veka supplies the exampleṃ  
“defective sense-faculties e.g. due to cataracts”127 as a flaw.  Jayanta also gives 
the example of cataracts as a flaw in regard to vision128 and the example of 
clarity of vision as a putative good feature.129  
These putative good and bad features are properties of the causes of the 
deliverance, which correspond to the first set of items labelled T1 to T4 in the 
above table.  Thus, rather than affecting the pramā a directly, i.e. the deliveredṇ  
content or the cognition, Kumārila's view is that bad features vitiate the cause 
to prevent the proper formation of a pramā a.  What is formed instead is aṇ  
non-pramā a.  Kumārila himself uses such terms as “cause”ṇ 130 and “cause of 
124 ŚV 2.56ab; pramā atvam and ṇ non-pramā atvam can have the sense ofṇ  
prāmā yam and ṇ non-prāmā yam respectivelyṇ
125 ŚV 2.39ab
126 See TS 2878a
127 U veka presents this in his discussion of the third view: see T  46 under ŚVṃ Ṭ  
2.42bcd (“du atvād indriyâdīnā  timirâdi-do ai ”) and T  47 under ŚV 2.43cdṣṭ ṃ ṣ ḥ Ṭ  
(“yadā timirâdi-do a-du āni kāra āni bhavanti …”).  This example is also givenṣ ṣṭ ṇ  
by later authors including Jayanta: see NM 423 and NM 448, where it is given as 
part of a list of various sub-optimal epistemic conditions
128 In presenting the Kumārila-type view: NM 423: “timirāde ”ḥ
129 In presenting the Kumārila-type view: NM 423: “locanâde  nairmalya-ḥ
vyapadeśa ”ḥ
130 ŚV 2.39b: “kāra a” ṇ etc.
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the capacity for epistemic success of a deliverance”131.  Putative good or bad 
features are features not of the pramā a but of these causal factors.  Suchṇ  
causes correspond to Sosa's idea of the human faculties which constitute 
sources for deliverances.
This can be understood in terms of the pot analogy, whereby flaws can affect 
the making of a pot, thereby preventing the production of a well-formed pot. 
Once a pot has been well-formed, however, its facilitating extraction is a natural 
kind of process which is metaphysically grounded in a real causal power or 
disposition to facilitate extraction.  Similarly, epistemic success is an outcome of 
a natural kind of process to accurately determine a fact or object which is 
metaphysically grounded in a real causal power.  As such, pramā a isṇ  
constituted by an awareness conditional on the lack of bad features.
The above verse also explains that the relevant cases of non-pramā a includeṇ  
not all false propositions, subsumed in cases of non-awareness, but only false 
beliefs which have actually arisen for some subject.  This coheres with the 
disjunctivist idea of Bad Cases, which include perceptions and hallucinations 
rather than all false propositions, even though the cases of doubt and error 
provide a rather different emphasis.
Thus the earlier quote explains that doubt and error are forms of non-veridical 
awareness which are explained by a flaw, presumably because this flaw vitiates 
the operation of the capacity.  Continuing the medical analogy of the last 
chapter, this can be compared to the situation where the capacity of a drug to 
heal is neutralized by some extraneous factor.  
Pritchard draws a distinction between Good and Bad Cases as follows: 
“A ‘good’ case … is a case in which the agent’s veridical perception takes 
place in epistemically advantageous conditions, and consequently results 
131 ŚV 2.44b: “jñāna-prāmā ya-kāra am”ṇ ṇ
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in knowledge (and, thereby, justified belief).  In contrast, the 
corresponding ‘bad’ case is a scenario which (i) is indiscriminable to the 
subject from the good case, (ii) is such that the subject’s perception is 
non-veridical, and (iii) takes place in epistemically disadvantageous 
conditions.”132  
The notion of non-pramā a presented by Kumārila appears to cohere withṇ  
conditions (ii) and (iii).  The reflective indiscriminability of Good and Bad Cases 
that satisfies condition (i) will be discussed below.  Satisfaction of condition (ii) 
is due to the specification of doubt and error.  Satisfaction of condition (iii) is 
suggested by Kumārila's example of darkness causing doubt in a visual 
perceptual case, and by the example of cataracts.
Kumārila's notion of non-pramā a corresponds to the Bad ṇ Case, with two 
caveats.  Firstly, it includes all cases of erroneous and doubtful perception, 
rather than only hallucinations, or only hallucinations and illusions, as is the 
case in much literature on disjunctivism.  Secondly, the dichotomy of pramā aṇ  
and non-pramā a is meant to apply to all belief processes and not merelyṇ  
perception.  However, as with disjunctivism, which has also been extended 
beyond application to perception, the theory is easiest to grasp in relation to 
perceptual beliefs.133
In the same way, pramā a represents the typical case of an epistemicṇ  
performance that does result in a successful outcome consisting in an accurate 
determination, whereas non-pramā a represents the deviant case that will not.ṇ  
Whereas Ryle believes that achievement verbs are used to “describe people 
and, sometimes with qualms, animals”,134 Sosa extends such vocabulary to a 
wider sphere, explaining that “[a] heartbeat succeeds if it helps pump blood, 
132 Pritchard (2011) 243.  In Pritchard (2012), this is characterized as the distinction 
between an objectively epistemically Good Case and an objectively epistemically 
Bad Case.
133 Cf. Taber (2006) 165 fn.27: “The question of what is the means of knowledge 
[i.e. the pramā a]ṇ  becomes even more complicated in the case of inference.”
134 Ryle (1976) 125
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even absent any intentional aim”,135 and also suggests that “[m]aybe all 
performances have an aim, even those superficially aimless, such as ostensibly 
aimless rambling.”136  Ryle explains that success verbs have corresponding 
verbs of failure.  Ryle provides examples of such pairs including spell/ misspell 
and calculate/ miscalculate.137  Ryle explains that the sense of 'can' in 'can spell' 
and 'can calculate' is quite different from its sense in 'can misspell' and 'can 
miscalculate'.  The one is a competence, the other is not another competence 
but a liability.”138
Kumārila's claims that “the prāmā yam of all pramā as is 'from itself'”ṇ ṇ 139 and 
that “a capacity for accurate determination of an object belongs to them [scil. 
pramā as] due to their svabhāva”ṇ 140 both involve ablative formulations which 
the previous chapter linked with metaphysical explanation and metaphysical 
grounding.  The epistemic success of a judgment which consists in accurate 
determination of an object or fact is metaphysically grounded in the judgment 
itself.
Accordingly, the term 'pramā a' is used to denote aṇ  deliverance which would 
typically be a Good Case deliverance.  Conversely, non-prāmā yamṇ  can be 
understood as a liability for an awareness to be either erroneous or doubtful, 
that is, non-veridical.  Such liability terminology conveys the implication of a 
failure of an epistemic performance implied by Kumārila's success vocabulary 
and his presentation of non-pramā a as doubt and error owing to a flawṇ  
affecting the performance.  The deliverance which suffers such a flaw would 
constitute a non-pramā a.ṇ
Similarly, Sosa presents a disjunctive account of reliably operating faculties and 
their erring equivalents.  Sosa provides the example of memory and perception 
135 Sosa (2007) 23
136 Sosa (2007) 23
137 See Ryle (1976) 125
138 Ryle (1976) 125-126
139 TS 2811ab and ŚV 2.47ab respectively.
140 TS 2812ab
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as follows:
“Possession of an excellent transmissive memory is yet compatible with 
frequent error in one's ostensible memories.  Someone might have an 
excellent ability to retain beliefs once acquired, and yet suffer from a 
terrible propensity to believe new things out of the blue which come as 
apparent memories, as beliefs from the past.”141
“[Consider] someone with excellent sight subject besides to frequent 
hallucinations.  His ostensible visual perceptions are thus highly error-
prone but that should not cancel the virtue of his faculty of sight so long 
as both erring intuition and erring memory retain their status.”142
As such, for both Kumārila and Sosa, the existence of real dispositions in the 
sources of deliverances such as perception etc. to make accurate determination 
is consistent with the fact of erroneous judgment.  
Subsection 2: Reflective indiscriminability
One aspect of disjunctivism involves the idea that Bad Cases are reflectively 
indiscriminable from Good ones.143  Kumārila's statement that “a non-pramā aṇ  
also [is established] in its own form, just like a pramā a”ṇ 144 suggests that the 
agent would not be able to subjectively discriminate between Good and Bad 
Cases.  Similarly, U veka explains that awareness as such is common to bothṃ  
veridical and non-veridical awarenesses, so something further is needed in the 
141 Sosa (1991) 226
142 Sosa (1991) 226-227
143 See Sturgeon (2006) 188, where this is discussed within the context of reflective 
disjunctivism.
144 TS 2911ab; cf. ŚV 2.85 which is discussed below
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case of veridical awarenesses.145
Does this indicate that Bad character is characterized by reflective 
indiscriminability from Good character?  Kumārila's setup of the disjunction 
between an epistemic status and an opposed epistemic status which has a 
negative particle attached would suggest so.  Thus Kumārila specifically 
considers whether negation implies absence or difference by contrasting his 
own understanding of non-pramā aṇ  with an alternative view.  According to the 
alternative, non-prāmā yam is not a real entityṇ 146, so epistemic failure is the 
mere absence of success.  Kumārila's rejection of this idea involves arguing that 
negation of success would be mere lack of belief, whereas erroneous and 
doubtful beliefs are a negation which are not a mere lack in this way, but have 
some positive status.147  Thus a positive account of these two types of non-
prāmā yamṇ  is needed.  That is, the opposition between prāmā yamṇ  and these 
types of non-prāmā yamṇ  follows a model of conflict between two incompatible 
properties such as blue and yellow.   Thus, according to Kumārila's view, 
prāmā yam is a real entity, ṇ or 'vastu'.148
These two possibilities cover some of the options discussed by the grammarian 
Ko a-bha a, who provides six meanings of negation in total: similarityṇḍ ṭṭ  
(sād śya), absence (abhāva), being different/ mutual absence (tadanyatvam),ṛ  
smallness (tadalpatā), impropriety or unfitness (aprāśastya), and contrariety 
(virodha).149  Kumārila's own view opposes the notion of negation as absence, 
and instead posits a model of difference and contrariety.  Kumārila's argument 
here complements his general understanding of negation.  Kumārila thus 
states, following Jha's translation, that “[t]he negative particle, occurring in 
conjunction with a noun or a verbal root, does not possess the actual 
negativing faculty.  For the words “non-Brāhma a” and “non-Virtue” only signifyṇ  
such other other positive entities as are contrary to those … all negations 
145 See T  4Ṭ 5: “prāmā ya  tu svâlambanâvyabhicāritvam; na bodhakatvam, tasyaṇ ṃ  
pramā êtara-sādhāra atvāt”ṇ ṇ
146 See ŚV 2.39a
147 See ŚV 2.54
148 See ŚV 2.54c
149 See Joshi (1990) 288
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(Apoha) would rest in positive entities.”150  Here Kumārila denies outright 
something like Ko a-bha a's conception of negation as absence.ṇḍ ṭṭ   As Taber 
similarly explains, Kumārila “held non-being (abhāva) to be a real thing 
(vastu), i.e., a real aspect (a śṃ a) of that which is present.”151
In the apohavāda chapter of the Śloka-vārttika, Kumārila considers how 
addition of a negative particle serves to modify the meaning of a term, taking 
up the example of the term 'Brahmin' and its negation 'non-Brahmin'.  Indeed, 
this pair may have constituted something of a paradigm example in such 
discussions in early India, as it also appears in an interesting discussion of 
negation in the Nyāyānusāra152, as well as in the discussions by Patañjali and 
Bhart hari discussed below, and in grammarians such as Kaiya a and ṛ ṭ Ko a-ṇḍ
bha a.ṭṭ 153  Kumārila denies that any negative term refers by reference to any 
extensional or intensional definition of that negative term.  Thus Kumārila 
rejects the idea that the term 'non-jar' refers to all things that are not jars, on 
the basis that we are not familiar with all the items included in that class.154 
Further, Kumārila also rejects the idea that the term 'non-Brahmin' refers to 
some common feature of all such individuals.155  Rather, the negative term 
gains its reference as a function of its connection with the non-negated 
equivalent.  Following Jha's translation, in a first reading, “the Class “Manhood” 
common to all the four castes, is precluded by means of the negative particle 
(in the word “non-Brāhma a”), from all non-Brāhma as, - and as such, theṇ ṇ  
class “non-Brāhma ahood (signifying ṇ manhood precluded from Brāhma asṇ ) is 
cognized as a positive entity”156.  In a second alternative accepted by Kumārila, 
following Jha's translation, “we may accept similarity alone as being the object 
of denotation.  And this is based upon a similarity of parts.  In fact, it is also in 
the absence of any such (similarity of parts) that the similarity is perceived.”157
150 Jha (1907) 301
151 Taber (2001) 72
152 See Cox (1988) 56
153 See Joshi (1990) 288-289
154 See Jha (1907) 298
155 See Jha (1907) 298
156 Jha (1907) 298
157 Jha (1907) 300-301
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Whereas the first suggestion is of negation as difference, Kumārila's second 
alternative ties in with Ko a-bha a's notion of negation as similarity.  Similarṇḍ ṭṭ  
usage of the negative particle can be observed in contemporary English, for 
example, in the advertising by various companies which offer non-paper 
destruction.  It is understood by the client that the advertising company will 
destroy not any item whatsoever which is not comprised of paper, but only 
items that have a resemblance to paper in some respect or another, e.g. 
electronic media which contain information which would otherwise be kept on 
paper, office equipment such as printers which would typically be used 
alongside paper, etc.  Returning to the Indian context, only the primary sense is 
strictly correct, and the secondary sense is explained with reference to the 
functioning of doubt or misinformation.  However, that is not to say that the 
term non-Brahmin is used when the agent is in doubt or error, but rather that 
the term non-Brahmin gets its reference by appeal to those situations where an 
agent is in doubt based on similarity or error based on misinformation.
Kumārila's understanding of negation as similarity seems to hark back to the 
linguistic investigations made by Patañjali in his commentary on Pā ini's single-ṇ
word aphorism 'negation'.158  Patañjali's view is that the term Brahmin has two 
ranges of possible application, firstly on the basis of caste, and secondly to one 
who may superficially resemble a Brahmin in appearance, habits etc. or who 
one wrongly surmises to be a Brahmin based on what one has been 
informed.159  However, the second range of application is said to be based on 
doubt or misinformation.  The later commentator Kaiya a terms these theṭ  
primary and secondary senses respectively of the term 'Brahmin'.  This 
secondary sense is based on similarity to the primary sense of Brahmin.  The 
function of the negative particle according to Patañjali is not to positively 
identify the range subsuming every item which falls outside the class 'Brahmin'. 
Rather, it functions as an indicator that the secondary sense of the term 
158 2.2.6: nañ.  See Joshi and Roodbergen (1973) 70-117 for a translation and 
commentary on Patañjali's discussion.
159 In fact, Patañjali also discusses a second model of negation, for situations such 
as where one who is quite clearly a non-Brahmin is being described.  That model 
is not relevant to this discussion.
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'Brahmin' is in play, which is similarity to an actual Brahmin.
Patañjali expresses the two possible views, that negation functions to identify a 
range and that negation functions merely as an indicator, as 'language-
dependent' (vācanakī) and 'natural' (svābhāvika) respectively.160  This 
terminological dichotomy is also seen elsewhere, such as in Patañjali's 
discussion of whether grammatical number and grammatical gender are 
'language-dependent' or 'innate'.161
Bhart hari's development of this 'non-Brahmin' model of negation is discussedṛ  
by Radhika Herzberger in her book, 'Bhart hari and the Buddhists'.ṛ 162  For 
Bhart hari, the term 'ṛ non-Brahmin' contains its reference via analytic content 
from the term 'Brahmin', which analytically contains the notion of a learned 
person, and antonymic content from the term 'non-' which contains the notion 
of some other branch within the category 'learned person'.  As Bhart hariṛ  
explains, the term is thus appropriately applied not to anything that is not a 
Brahmin, such as a clod of earth, but rather to a learned person who happens 
not to be a Brahmin.163  As Herzberger explains, whereas earlier thinkers had 
explained how terms gained their reference from qualities, such as learnedness 
etc. in the case of 'non-Brahmin', “the analytic content of names was organized 
by Bhart hari into a hierarchical structure”ṛ 164.
As a result, Bhart hari's account involves appeal to ṛ the analytic and antonymic 
content of names.  As Herzberger explains, “The content defined by compatible 
co-inherence is the analytic content of a word; the content defined by 
incompatible co-inherence is the antonymic content.  The former is given by the 
elements which lie along its ancestral lines; the latter is given by an element's 
siblings.”165  To adapt a stock example, a term such as 'oak' would analytically 
160 MB on P2.2.6: “yadā puna  asya padārtha  nivartate kim svābhāvikī niv ttiḥ ḥ ṛ ḥ 
āhosvit vācanikī”
161 See Joshi and Roodbergen (1973) 84
162 Herzberger (1986)
163 See Herzberger (1986) 39
164 Herzberger (1986) 14
165 Herzberger (1986) 36
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contain the term 'tree' and antonymically contain the terms 'pine', 'birch' etc.166
It is possible that Kumārila sets up the problem of epistemic status in terms of 
success and its antonym in order to be able to similarly appeal to the analytic 
and antonymic content of the capacity for epistemic success.  Just as the 
concept 'oak' analytically contains the concept 'tree' and antonymically contains 
the concepts 'pine' etc., or the concept 'Brahmin' analytically contains the 
concept 'learned person' and antonymically contains the concept 'other learned 
person' (at least in the presentation of writers like Bhart hari), similarly theṛ  
concept of a Good Case deliverance analytically contains the concept of a 
deliverance and antonymically contains the concept of a Bad Case deliverance.
Analytic 
content
Antonymic content Absence
Oak Tree Pine, birch etc. Non-tree
Brahmin
Learned 
person
Other learned person Unlearned person
Accurate 
determination
Determination
Doubtful and 
erroneous 
determinations
Lack of determination
Indeed, it seems that the example 'Brahmin' is a better fit than the example of 
oak, because it seems to take 'Brahmin' as a paradigm case of a learned 
person, which sets a normative standard which certain others are able to 
apparently meet dependent on their educational attainment.  In the same way, 
an accurate determination constitutes a paradigm case of a determination and 
an inaccurate or doubtful determination can perhaps arise.  In this way, 
Kumārila's setup in terms of prāmā yam/ pramā a and non-ṇ ṇ prāmā yam/ non-ṇ
pramā aṇ  seems to gain leverage from this pre-existing debate about negation.
166 However, for reasons Herzberger discusses, Bhart hari himself avoids addressingṛ  
this example, and illustrates his theory using other examples, including the term 
'non-Brahmin', which Herzberger focuses on.
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Section 5: Kumārila's notion of 'from itself'
The above section has argued that pramā a and non-prṇ amā a form aṇ  
metaphysical disjunction between Good Case deliverances, involving the 
manifestation of a disposition, and Bad Case deliverances, where the disposition 
is corrupted by a flaw, respectively.  This section argues that the disjunction is 
also in part a modal disjunction.  The Good Case deliverance not only has 
positive epistemic status but also accurately determines an object with 
necessity.  Conversely, the Bad Case deliverance has a form of contingency, 
whereby it determines an object in a manner that is fortuitous or haphazard.
The above literature review indicated a common translation of 'svata ' asḥ  
'intrinsic' and a more literal translation as 'from itself', meaning 'from the 
judgment itself'.  Kataoka similarly explains that 'from itself' refers either to the 
cognition or to prāmā yam.ṇ 167  However, in this section, it will be argued that 
the idea of intrinsicality as reflexivity captures a peculiarly Buddhist 
understanding of this term, but is misleading as far as Kumārila's use of this 
term is concerned.
Thus Taber is led to the view that “if a cognition were unable to determine its 
object itself, it could not receive such a capacity from something else … [so] 
every cognition must involve an awareness of its own truth.”168  Similarly, 
Arnold urges that, following Pārthasārathi, we “understand svataḥ as reflexive 
to any awareness whose status as a pramā a is in questionṇ .”  Kumārila's own 
verses will be examined in order to argue that, rather than a notion of reflexive 
awareness, Kumārila's own conception of 'from itself' involves in part the notion 
167 See Kataoka (2011) 63-64: “It is also not clear what [Kumārila] really means by 
“itself” (sva) and “something else” (para) … Whether it is cognition (jñāna) or 
validity (pramā atvaṇ ) that is considered “itself” … All of the above seem possible 
in certain contexts.”
168 Taber (1992b) 211
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of embodied cause.  At an ontological level, 'from itself' indicates that epistemic 
success results from the exercise of a capacity for epistemic success which is an 
essential disposition and epistemic kind, thus 'due to svabhāva'.  For the 
individual believer, 'from itself' indicates that epistemic success arises 'as a 
result of the process of inquiry'.
The previous chapter provided three essentialist notions that were relevant to a 
general understanding of svabhāva, and applied these to Kumārila's example of 
a pot with a capacity to facilitate extraction of water in a setting process 
involving yoghurt, ghee etc.  These were Fine's conceptions of essence 
conditional on existence and essence conditional on identity, and the notion of 
an intrinsic feature conditional on absence of extrinsic factors.  Through a close 
reading of Kumārila's canvassing of four possible views in the Śloka-vārttika 
presentation, it will now be argued that Kumārila's understanding of 'from itself' 
appeals to these notions, and explained exactly how these notions feature in his 
discussion.
Subsection  1  :  Kumārila's four possible views  
Whereas the B ha - īkā is focused on articulating and defending Kumārila's ownṛ ṭ ṭ  
view, Kumārila pursues a very different argumentative approach in the Śloka-
vārttika presentation.  Here, Kumārila presents his own view as one of four 
possible views, and successively eliminates three of these before elaborating on 
and defending his own view in what amounts to either a concise or an 
underdeveloped version of the B ha - īkā presentation.ṛ ṭ ṭ   In the Śloka-vārttika 
presentation, the terms 'from itself' and its antonym 'from something else' are 
mapped onto a dichotomy of prāmā yamṇ  and non-prāmā yam, or pramā aṇ ṇ  and 
non-pramā a.ṇ   Kumārila thus introduces the topic by writing:
ŚV 2.33: First of all, with regard to the content of all judgments, this 
should be investigated: are the fact of being a pramā aṇ  and the fact of 
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being a non-pramā aṇ  'from itself' or 'from something else'?
Understanding the fact of being a pramā a and the fact of being a non-pramā aṇ ṇ  
in terms of Goodness of Case and Badness of Case, as per the above discussion 
of disjunctivism, this results in four combinations which can be presented as 
follows:
• view one: Goodness of Case is from itself and Badness of Case is from 
itself
• view two: Goodness of Case is from something else and Badness of Case 
is from something else
• view three: Goodness of Case is from something else and Badness of 
Case is from itself
• view four: Goodness of Case is from itself and Badness of Case is from 
something else
Later authors also list out these four possible views, but by glossing Kumārila's 
expressions 'the fact of being a pramā a' ('pramā atvam') and 'the fact ofṇ ṇ  
being a non-pramā a' ('apramā atvam') as 'prāmā yam' and 'non-ṇ ṇ ṇ
prāmā yam'.ṇ 169  Kumārila himself also sometimes uses the expression 'svata -ḥ
prāmā yam' or 'epistemic success from itself'.ṇ
Kataoka explains that Kumārila's presentation displays “a hierarchic sequence 
among the four views: the first and second views … are refuted by the third 
view … [which] is refuted by the final, fourth view”170.  Each of these four views 
agrees in part with two other views, so we may expect to find some common 
169 Kamalaśīla and Jayanta both set out this schema at P 745 under TS 2810 and at 
NM 420 respectively.  Kumārila himself discussed the first three of these 
possibilities before setting out his own view, which equates to the fourth view 
here.
170 Kataoka (2011) 122
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ground or argumentative overlap in the discussions.  Schematically, the third 
and fourth views are fashioned by recombining the two halves of the first and 
second views, as follows:
Badness of Case from 
itself
Badness of Case from 
something else
Goodness of Case 
from itself
First view Fourth view
Goodness of Case 
from something else
Third view Second view
The 14th century text sarva-darśana-sa graha attributes the four views toṅ  
different groups of philosophers – the first to the Sā khyas, the second to theṃ  
Naiyāyikas, the third to the Buddhists and the fourth to the Mīmā sakas.ṃ 171 
Later texts including the 17th century text Mānameyodaya172 and the 20th 
century Mīmā sā-kośaṃ 173 repeat this classification.  However, Kumārila himself 
does not specify the names of any groups who held these views, and there is 
little contemporaneous evidence for these attributions.  Thus Kataoka instead 
suggests that “Kumārila's classification is quite mechanical and looks highly 
hypothetical.  It is unlikely that Kumārila has a particular opponent in mind 
…”.174  Building on Kataoka's suggestion, consideration of the four views will be 
treated as an integral part of Kumārila's methodology.  In this chapter and 
again in the next chapter, the three alternative views will be discussed in terms 
of what they contribute to an understanding of Kumārila's own doctrine, which 
features as the fourth view, and, as such, they will be introduced in an order 
relevant to the discussion here.
171 See Hattori (1997)
172 See Hattori (1997)
173 Part 5 2856
174 Kataoka (2011) 233 fn 169
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Subs  ection 2:  Deliverances must possess a svabhāva  
The second view considered by Kumārila is one in which neither prāmā yamṇ  
nor non-prāmā yam is 'from itself'.  ṇ Kumārila presents the view as follows:
ŚV 2.34cd: Others [say that both Goodness of Case and Badness of Case 
are] dependent on the determination of good and bad features produced 
in the causes [of the deliverance].
According to the second view, deliverances would constitute Good or Bad Cases 
in virtue of real positive features which are separable from the belief itself. 
Good Cases would be due to the nature of the good feature and Bad Cases 
would be due to the nature of the bad feature.  That Goodness and Badness of 
Case are due to these features and not the deliverance itself is indicated by 
Kumārila's argument against the second view.  Kumārila writes:
ŚV 2.35cd: In that way, the deliverance per se would be without a 
svabhāva.
ŚV 2.36cd: And of what nature would that [deliverance] be without 
either svabhāva?
Although the second view does not deny that every deliverance does in fact 
possess either good or bad features, and thus is in fact successful or 
unsuccessful in correctly apprehending an object, nevertheless Kumārila objects 
on grounds of lack of svabhāva.  Kumārila indicates again the connection of the 
expression 'from itself' with the idea of 'due to svabhāva'.  This contrasts with a 
reflexive understanding of 'from itself' attributed above to Buddhist 
philosophers such as Śākyabuddhi.
Kumārila's idea is that svabhāva must comprise a feature which is not merely 
accidental or contingent.  As mentioned in the previous chapter, such putative 
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good and bad features would be things like clarity of vision and cataracts 
respectively in regard to visual perceptual beliefs.  Kumārila characterizes the 
contingency and separability of these features by the expression 'from 
something else'.  As Kataoka notes, there is an ambiguity in this expression, 
such that it may refer to “good qualities (gu aṇ ) and bad qualities (do aṣ ) of the 
causes of the cognition … [or] their cognition … [or] (a cognition of) agreement 
(sa gatiṃ ) or an invalidating cognition (bādhaka)”.175  
Rather, epistemic acts of deliverance must play a role of metaphysically 
grounding either positive or negative epistemic status through an essential 
connectedness with that epistemic nature.  Consideration of the first view will 
indicate that all deliverances must possess one or other epistemic status as a 
default intrinsic nature, in a sense to be explicated.
Subsection 3: An epistemic capacity   must be restricted to deliverances 
Kumārila's first canvassed view is one in which both prāmā yam and non-ṇ
prāmā yam are 'from itself'.  As noted above, the first half of this claim is theṇ  
same as the first half of Kumārila's own claim.  Kumārila presents the first view 
as follows:
ŚV 2.34ab: Some say both [Goodness and Badness of Case] are 'from 
itself', because what is not 'from itself' cannot be established [by 
separable means].
This presentation involves a general form of argument applied to the specific 
case of Good and Bad Cases, which are concluded to be “both 'from itself'”. 
Sucarita labels this first view as belonging to the svabhāva-advocates about 
both epistemic success and failure176 and also attributes this view to the 
175 Kataoka (2011) 63
176 Sucarita refers to the advocates of this view as svābhāvikôbhayavādina  (Kāśikāḥ  
on ŚV 2.36: K 84)
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satkāryavādins.177  The most prominent advocates of the satkāryavāda doctrine 
during this period appear to have been the Sā khya philosophers.ṃ 178  Although 
the development of Sā khya philosophy during this period is not well-ṃ
understood, we know that its ideas were taken seriously and vigorously 
debated by the thinkers of this period.179  Sucarita's equation of 'due to 
svabhāva' and 'from itself' reinforces the reading of Kumārila's notion of 'from 
itself' in terms of 'due to svabhāva'.  The first view, agreeing with Kumārila's 
objection to the second view, and, as will be seen, like Kumārila's own view, 
thus endorses the idea that epistemic status should be possessed as a 
svabhāva.
In his discussion of this first view, Sucarita explains that svabhāva is posited to 
explain the restriction on production by external causes in regard to properties 
of an entity: if what does not have existence could be produced, then anything, 
including fictional entities, could be produced from anything.180  Were 
production of a given nature such as fragrance in flowers by external causes 
possible, then those same external causes should be capable of producing such 
a nature in any context, such as producing fragrance in fire or oil in sand. 
Instead, “there is a restriction”181 of entities to their own material causes, such 
that “a pot is only made of clay, a grass mat is made only from vetiver 
grass”182.   The core elements of this reasoning already appear in the early 
Sā khya literatureṃ 183, which demonstrates that this notion of a restrictive 
177 See Kāśikā on ŚV 2.34 and on ŚV 2.35 passim, and in particular: 
“satkāryavādino hi sarvam eva kārya-jāta  sad utpadyata iti manyamānāṃ ḥ 
prāmā yâprāmā yâtmakam api dvaya  svata evâsthi ata” (K 80); “itiṇ ṇ ṃ ṣ  
satkāryavādinā  siddhānta ” (K 82).ṃ ḥ
178 See the extensive discussion of their satkāryavāda views in Ch 1 of TS
179 See Larson and Bhattacharya (1987) 22-23: “it can be reasonably asserted that 
the commentorial tradition on the [Sā khya] Kārikā extends from about theṃ  
beginning of the sixth century … through the ninth or tenth century … We know 
that other systems of Indian philosophy … were undergoing vigorous 
development, and one part of that development in each case involved polemical 
encouter with Sā khya philosophy …” .  ṃ The authors tentatively ascribe the 
Yuktidīpikā and Jayama galā to the seventh and eighth centuries respectively.ṅ
180 K80: “asattvâviśe e a hi sarva  sarvasmāt utpadyeta”ṣ ṇ ṃ
181 K80: “niyamo d śyate”ṛ
182 K80: “m d eva gha asya ka asya vīra am iti”ṛ ṭ ṭ ṇ
183 See Sā khya-kārikā verse 9: “because not everything can be produced (sarva-ṃ
sambhavâbhāvāt)”.  See also the SS commentary on that: “If (yadi) the effect 
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capacity long precedes its appearance in Kumārila's debate.
U veka similarly explains that “there is a restriction on which products can beṃ  
produced”184.  U veka provides the following illustrative examplesṃ : “For it is not 
possible to bring about [qualities like] fragrance etc. in fire or oil etc. in 
sand.”185   U veka's second example is part of a stock example from theṃ  
discussion of cause and effect.  The full example contrasts sesame with sand: 
only the former can yield oil.186  U veka's choice of examples remind us of theṃ  
discussions of svabhāva seen in the svabhāva advocates' doctrine187, where it 
could mean explanation by reference to the nature of the entity, either as 
causal basis, e.g. a fire's heat is caused by the fire, or locational basis, e.g. oil's 
production from sesame is causally explained by its location in sesame.
The notion of svabhāva has been equated to a real causal power which is the 
real essence of a natural kind that metaphysically grounds a process or 
outcome.  The physical examples provided by Sucarita and U veka sṃ upport this 
equation.  Thus Audi explains that grounding is a form of determination, which, 
among other things, means for one thing “to bring about or be responsible 
for”188 another thing.  Further, grounding is closely related to explanation. 
Further, “[d]etermination is a worldly, as opposed to conceptual, affair. 
Whether two things stand in a relation of determination does not depend on 
how we conceive them.”189  Taber likewise notes that “[w]hat is meant by 
(kāryam) does not exist (nâsti) in the cause (kāra e), then (tadā) anythingṇ  
(sarvam) would produce (utpādayet) anything (sarvam).”
184 T  48 under ŚV 2.47: “Ṭ kāryôtpāda-niyamāt”; U veka's discussion of a restrictionṃ  
is presented as an alternative interpretation of Kumārila's own fourth view, which 
further emphasizes the similarity of Kumārila's view with the first canvassed 
view.
185 T  43 under ŚV 2.34ab: “na hy agnau gandhâdi sikatāsu vā tailâdi śakyateṬ  
sādhayitum iti”
186 This example is given in numerous Sā khya texts, such as the SS – cṃ ommentary 
on SK verse 9.  The example is also given by Jayanta in his discussion of 
satkāryavāda in NM Ch8.
187 See Bhattacharya (2012) 602 where two examples of this doctrine are given, 
one from the SS
188 Audi (2012) 691
189 Audi (2012) 692
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'potency', śakti, it seems, is a dynamic property that is characteristic of a thing 
and makes it what it is, like that of burning in the case of fire.”190  
The examples above such as the ability of sesame but not sand to yield oil are 
similarly worldly rather than conceptual affairs.  The nature of sesame is 
responsible for the fact that oil is produced through a grinding process.  Audi 
provides the similar example that “the fact that my shirt is maroon grounds the 
fact that it is red.”191  Another example provided by Audi is “[i]n virtue of being 
spherical, this ball is disposed to roll down inclined planes.”192  Audi holds that 
grounding is a relation of noncausal explanation, involving a relation of 
essential connectedness between the natures of two properties, such that each 
instance of one property grounds an instance of the other.193  Audi writes:
“some pairs of properties fail to be essentially connected in the required 
way … It is metaphysically impossible that something be red in virtue of 
being loud, or morally wrong in virtue of being pointy, or prime in virtue 
of having a mass of 10kg.  The properties in these pairs are simply too 
disparate.”194
Similarly, pairs such as (fire, fragrance) and (sand, oil) are too disparate for 
there to be a grounding relation between terms.  This would indicate that the 
grounding for the restriction in the epistemic status of deliverances is also a 
worldly affair and a real feature of the deliverance.  In the discussion of the pot 
analogy above, it was suggested that Kumārila's understands prāmā yam as aṇ  
bare disposition of the deliverance.  As such, there is a modal feature of 
Kumārila's claim, whereby it involves a de re rather than de dicto necessity. 
Specifically, it will be argued, it is a restrictive necessity, whereby certain 
features are restricted to certain entities.  Such metaphysical necessity is a 
190 Taber (1992b) 211
191 Audi (2012) 693
192 Audi (2012) 687
193 See Audi (2012) 693-695
194 Audi (2012) 694
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feature of grounding.  Thus U veka's claim is not that fragrance is necessarilyṃ  
produced in flowers or oil necessarily in sesame.  This is because the production 
of these things could be somehow obstructed or prevented, e.g. if the flower or 
sesame seed is flawed in some way.  Thus the necessity must be formulated 
negatively, whereby fragrance must not occur in entities such as fire or oil in 
substances such as sand.  Similarly, the idea shared by Kumārila's view and the 
first view is that the capacity for epistemic success is restricted to appear in 
deliverances.  It may not appear outside deliverances.
By positing that both Good and Bad Cases are 'from itself', the first view can 
thus be understood as the view that both accurate and inaccurate 
determinations are due to capacities which are restricted to deliverances. 
However, this raises the question of how such capacities are distributed across 
deliverances.  If all deliverances simultaneously possess both capacities, there 
would be conflict.  Kumārila expresses his objection to the first view with the 
following very terse formulations:
ŚV 2.35ab: Firstly, both [Goodness and Badness of Case] are not 'from 
itself', due to conflict … 
ŚV 2.36ab: To explain, how can [a deliverance] which does not depend 
on something else have conflicting natures?
The objection centres on the single term 'virodhāt', which has been translated 
as 'due to conflict'.195  Bandyopadhyay explains that “[t]he Sanskrit term 
‘virodha’ covers the two types of opposition, namely, contradiction and 
contrariety as they are defined and differentiated in Western logic … What is 
common between contradiction and contrariety is that p and q cannot both be 
true at the same time and place … in contradiction both p and q can neither be 
195 See ŚV 2.35b: virodhāt.  Although Kumārila sums up this criticism in this single 
word, U veka explains that it refers to conflict in the case of a single cognition:ṃ  
“… ekasyā  tāvat nâsti, iti virodhād ity āha.”  Sucarita glosses this term asṃ  
svabhāva-virodhāt, i.e. conflict in the svabhāvas of epistemic success and 
failure.
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simultaneously true nor be false, while in contrariety, though both cannot be 
true, both can be false.”196  
Kumārila's criticism appeals to Audi's notion of essential connectedness 
between natures.  Specifically, an act of deliverance is a process which must 
have a nature which is essentially connected with some epistemic nature, and 
which metaphysically grounds that epistemic nature.
Specifically, conflict is an opposition between ontologically incompatible 
natures, and Kumārila thus seems to appeal to Fine's notion of essence 
conditional on the existence of a deliverance.  The idea is that deliverances 
cannot have two conflicting essences conditional only on their existence.  So 
the first view would construe 'from itself' as 'based on being the essence of 
deliverances as an epistemic kind'.  This is the conception of svabhāva that is 
being rejected by Kumārila's criticism.  This argument also supports the 
construal of good and bad features in terms of separability, despite their 
engagement with the cause of the deliverance.
According to U veka, Kumārila's next remarks are directed against anṃ  
alternative reading of the first view which may initially seem more attractive. 
U veka ṃ explains that the above statement can be understood in either or two 
ways:
Goodness of Case and Badness of Case would either be in each token 
judgment or due to the difference between token judgments.197  
Thus a situation of conflict would only arise if both prāmā yam and itsṇ  
conflicting opposite were ascribed to every awareness.  In what can be taken as 
a canvassing of U vekaṃ 's latter reading, and a rebuttal of that, Kumārila 
196 Bandyopadhyay (1988) 241-243 note 1
197 T  43 under ŚV 2.35ab: “tarhy ekasyā  vā vijñāna-vyaktau syāt vijñāna-vyakti-Ṭ ṃ
bhedena vā?”
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introduces the alternative reading as follows:
ŚV 2.37ab: “If it is said that there is no conflict because the token 
judgments are different, …”
As support for the idea of both being 'from itself', this indicates that certain 
token deliverances have Goodness of Case 'from itself' and certain token 
deliverances have Badness of Case 'from itself'.  There are thus two epistemic 
categories of deliverance with two opposed epistemic statuses.  As such, this 
strategy appeals to a notion of essence conditional on the identity of a 
deliverance as a Good Case or a Bad Case deliverance.  So 'from itself' 
alternately indicates 'based on being the essence of Good Cases as an 
epistemic kind' and 'based on being the essence of Bad Cases as an epistemic 
kind'.
Kumārila's rebuttal of the modification is as follows:
ŚV 2.37cd: “… [then] even so, it cannot be determined which [of 
Goodness of Case and Badness of Case] is where [i.e. in which 
deliverance], because they do not depend on any other thing.”
Kumārila's criticism parallels the remarks of Hookway above, that even given 
that Good Case deliverances do constitute an epistemic kind, “we may be 
unconfident of our judgement because we are unsure whether it is a judgement 
of perception or, perhaps, a member of a different epistemic kind, a report of 
illusion or hallucination, for example.”198  Thus it is of no help to be informed 
merely that Good and Bad Cases do constitute epistemic kinds.  The 
problematic is that, as described above, Bad Case deliverances are reflectively 
indiscriminable from Good Case deliverances.  This reflective indiscriminability 
presents the epistemic agent with a problem of belief formation.  What is 
additionally required is an independent definition of epistemic success against 
which Cases can be assessed as Good or Bad.
198 Hookway (2007) 11
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The upshot of this discussion is that svabhāva cannot be located in deliverances 
at the level of Good Case or Bad Case deliverances, owing to the 'which is 
where?' critique of the revised first view.  Yet, as indicated by the critique of the 
second view, svabhāva must be possessed by deliverances in general. 
However, the 'conflict' critique indicates that capacities cannot be possessed by 
deliverances as an inalienable essence.  Capacities must be restricted to 
deliverances, yet their manifestation in deliverances is not guaranteed. 
Kumārila also holds that although there are two epistemic outcomes, only one 
epistemic capacity may be posited of all deliverances.  As such, the other 
epistemic outcome must be construed as a failure of exercise of the epistemic 
capacity.
This reasoning leads to the formulation of the third and fourth views.  According 
to Kumārila's own view, which comprises the fourth view in this schema, all 
deliverances constitute Good Cases as a default nature, yet this nature is 
vitiated by the aforementioned bad features.  The term 'vitiating' is chosen to 
indicate an erosion of an ordinarily functional state.  Alternatively, according to 
the third view canvassed, all deliverances constitute Bad Cases as a default 
nature, and this nature is revamped by the aforementioned good features.  The 
term 'revamping' is chosen to indicate the overcoming of an ordinarily impotent 
state.  The dichotomy between the exercise of the deliverance as default 
outcome and the vitiation or revamping as extrinsically caused outcome taps 
into the Abhidharma conception of own nature and other nature discussed in 
the previous chapter, where the examples of credit and debit, and of cool and 
hot water were described.
Thus in explaining the rejection of these first two views, Sucarita brings up the 
example of coolness in water which was discussed above in the context of 
Abhidharma Buddhism.  Sucarita writes, “one svabhāva is overcome due to the 
juxtaposed presence of a different superimposed form, like coldness in water [is 
overcome] in contact with fire [i.e. when heated] …”199  This analogy seems to 
199 See K84 on ŚV 2.36ab: “ekas tu svabhāva upādhy-antara-sannidhānād 
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confirm the understanding of svabhāva as a default state which may be 
overcome by external factors.  Sucarita likens erroneous perceptions in 
Kumārila's own view to hot water, in that they occur due to vitiation by extrinsic 
factors.200  Just as water has a default state of coolness, so deliverances yield 
accurate determination as a default outcome.  Just as heat in water is due to 
the effect of fire, which has an intrinsic nature of heat, so Badness in 
deliverances is due to bad features, which has an innate nature of Badness. 
The third view would be the reverse of this as regards the role of the effect of 
fire.  
These views can be presented as follows:
Sucarita's 
analogy
Water Fire Heat Coolness
Third view Deliverance Goodness Goodness Badness
Kumārila's 
(fourth) 
view
Deliverance Badness Badness Goodness
Subsection 4: O  bstruction of capacity  
Kumārila's discussion of the pot example involved the idea that the disposition 
to facilitate extraction is a bare disposition in the sense that it does not causally 
supervene on the causes of the pot, but functions independently once the pot 
comes into being.  Similarly, the capacity for epistemic success requires no 
positive feature over and above the properly formed deliverance.  The pot 
analogy thus supports Kumārila's claim: 
abhibhūto bhavati, apsv ivâgni-sa yoge śaityam”ṃ
200 See K84 under ŚV 2.36ab: “tad-apek aṣ ś ca tāsv au ya-bhrama ”ṣṇ ḥ
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ŚV 2.48ab: [Entities which] have obtained their existence function in 
their own activities just independently201.  
In this way, though constituting a real causal power, the capacity for epistemic 
success is not due to any separable feature of the deliverance.
As such, all deliverances possess the capacity for epistemic success by default, 
in the sense that this occurs by virtue of the fact of judgment absent any bad 
feature.  However, Kumārila indicates that a Bad Case deliverance is due to “the 
judgment that there is a bad feature in the cause.”202  As such, the capacity 
may be vitiated by a bad feature, such as cataracts, insufficient light etc. in the 
case of visual perceptual beliefs.  Absent such bad features, the deliverance 
constitutes a Good Case deliverance.  Sosa similarly holds that intellectual 
virtues are powers or abilities which “make one such that, normally at least, in 
one's ordinary habitat, or at least in one's ordinary circumstances when making 
judgments, one would believe what is true and not believe what is false, 
concerning matters in that field.”203  Sosa explains that “[t]he perceptual faculty 
of sight, for example, generates beliefs about the colours and shapes of 
surfaces seen fully, within a range, and in adequate light.”204  
Accordingly, Kumārila's own view is one in which deliverances have a capacity 
to make nothing other than an accurate determination when not obstructed, i.e. 
under appropriately normal epistemic conditions.  By analytically categorizing 
those deliverances which are not obstructed as pramā as, or Good Caseṇ  
deliverances, this class of deliverances involves the necessity that they do in 
fact make an accurate determination.  However, this is not an analytic 
201 TS 2847cd and ŚV 2.48
202 ŚV 2.53cd; cf. similar statements at 2.43 and 2.45 (against this view), 2.52, 
2.55, 2.56, 2.59, 2.60, 2.62, 2.63
203 Sosa (1991) 274
204 Sosa (1991) 227
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necessity, as it is based on the fact that they possess an epistemic capacity as a 
real causal power, which is not obstructed.  As such, an independent ground is 
provided for identifying deliverances as Good Cases.
Accordingly, Kumārila's argument is read as one in which the capacity for 
epistemic success is a restrictive capacity which precludes the failure of Good 
Case deliverances.  As such, the capacity for epistemic success is a real causal 
power which is a kind essence of a Good Case deliverance conditional on its 
identity as a Good Case deliverance.  Such identity is contingent on non-
vitiation in the process of judgment formation.  This is analogous to the way in 
which a pot in good nick has a real causal power to facilitate extraction 
conditional on good nick.  By contrast, by lacking any equivalent capacity, Bad 
Case deliverance are not precluded from being epistemically successful. 
Further, such lack is due to a positive act of vitiation by a bad feature.  Based 
on the example of cataracts etc. provided by Kumārila, such bad feature 
consists in some sub-optimal feature of the situation of judgment formation. 
This parallels the way in which a pot in bad nick may yet facilitate extraction.
This reading is supported by consideration of the remarkable parallel between 
Kumārila's notion of prāmā yam and that developed by the Buddhistṇ  
philosophers Dharmakīrti and Devendrabuddhi, who would have been working 
at around the same time as Kumārila.  Dunne explains that Dharmakīrti's 
“Brahminical counterparts [including Kumārila] consider [a successful 
deliverance] to be instrumental relative primarily to the act of knowing”205.  By 
contrast, Dharmakīrti himself considers a successful deliverance instrumental to 
“another resulting action, namely, the perceiver's activity”206.  However, within 
two differing frameworks, both Kumārila and the Buddhist authors make a 
strikingly similar appeal to the notion of a capacity.  By drawing on recent 
scholarship by John Dunne, some details of the Buddhist theoretical work will 
now be investigated in order to support the above reading of Kumārila's view.
205 Dunne (2004) 262-263
206 Dunne (2004) 263
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Dunne explains that Devendrabuddhi “find[s] himself in such a muddle”207 by 
articulating two different conceptions of the 'trustworthiness' of an awareness. 
Initially, Devendrabuddhi adheres closely to Dharmakīrti's text in presenting a 
confirmation-model, as described above, whereby “the trustworthiness of [an] 
instrumental cognition consists of the fact that it leads to another instrumental 
cognition whose content is the desired telic function, i.e., the achievement of 
one's goal.”208
Later, however, Devendrabuddhi goes on to redefine an instrumental cognition 
“in terms just of the capacity to result in the achievement of one's goal”209. 
This redefinition occurs in response to an objection based on obstructed action. 
Specifically, a correct judgment may not lead to successful activity if 
subsequent action is obstructed.  Thus, Dunne provides an example where “if I 
have correctly identified fresh water from a distance and yet my attempt to 
reach it fails”210.  Devendrabuddhi accordingly makes “a tactical retreat”211 from 
the position that a correct judgment necessarily leads to successful result to the 
position that a correct judgment cannot lead to an unsuccessful result.
As Dunne explains, “Devendrabuddhi's above-cited answer is to place the 
restriction not upon the obtainment, but upon the object.”212  This strategy 
involves a modal idea, whereby an instrumental cognition necessarily leads to 
no other result.  This can be expressed in terms of the idea that there cannot 
be a false positive.  By contrast, both true positive and false positive are 
possible in the case of doubt.  As Dunne explains, “a doubtful perception might 
lead me to water, but in other cases I will find only the hot sand of a mirage.”213 
Devendrabuddhi utilises the notion of a capacity to convey the idea of necessity 
of restriction rather than necessity of result, whereby “what distinguishes an 
instrumental cognition is not that it necessarily leads one to the result, but 
207 Dunne (2004) 287
208 Dunne (2004) 287
209 Dunne (2004) 286
210 Dunne (2004) 287
211 Dunne (2004) 287
212 Dunne (2004) 286
213 Dunne (2004) 286-287
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rather that it has the capacity to lead one to that result if all other conditions 
are in place.”214  In Dunne's example of perceiving water at a distance, what 
distinguishes a successful deliverance from an unsuccessful one is thus that the 
former will lead to “attain[ing] an object with the desired or expected telic 
function”215 if one has the chance to move towards the perceived water without 
hindrance.
Similarly, as the examples of Sucarita and U veka indicate,ṃ  Kumārila's capacity 
is restricted to deliverances and this capacity is necessarily exercised in cases 
where it is not obstructed.  Dharmakīrti's notion of a goal-oriented activity such 
as heading for water corresponds to Kumārila's notion of epistemic deliverances 
as a goal-oriented process.  Dharmakīrti's conception of an awareness of telic 
function as goal corresponds to Kumārila's conception of accurate determination 
as result.  Further, Dharmakīrti's notion of hindrance corresponds to Kumārila's 
notion of a bad feature.  Extending the analogy to consider how the views 
canvassed by Kumārila correspond to the process of seeking water can yield 
some insight into the nature of Kumārila's reasoning.  There must be some fact 
of the matter as to whether a given route does or does not lead to water.  As 
such, the route itself is ascribed some capacity as an intrinsic feature. 
Kumārila's own supposition is that this is a capacity to lead to water.  However, 
individual deliverances correspond in this analogy to attempts to pursue this 
path and ultimately reach water.  Certain attempts succeed and others fail.  
The second view is equivalent to the idea that whether or not an attempt 
succeeds or fails is entirely due to assistance or obstruction.  However, this 
overlooks the role of the route itself in leading to water.  The first view denies 
the roles of both assistance and obstruction.  However, without either such 
notion, there is no account of why some attempts are successful in reaching 
water and other are unsuccessful.  As such, Kumārila's position is equivalent to 
maintaining that the route itself is responsible for successful outcomes, 
whereas obstruction of the route is responsible for unsuccessful outcomes.  As 
214 Dunne (2004) 287
215 Dunne (2004) 289
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such, it is necessary that attempts to follow the route lead to water when not 
obstructed.  This has been expressed technically as the idea that the capacity 
for success is both the intrinsic nature of attempts to follow the route, as well 
as the essence of unobstructed attempts to follow the route conditional on their 
identity as unobstructed attempts to follow the route.
Kumārila distinguishes between Good Case deliverances and Bad Case 
deliverances as follows216:
ŚV 2.83: A pramā a which is independent in its functioning, enduringṇ  
only (eva) by its own nature before being apprehended [as being a 
pramā a rather than a non-pramā aṇ ṇ ], is apprehended by means of 
another awareness.
ŚV 2.85: However, it could be (syāt) that a non-pramā a apprehendsṇ  
its own object due to its own nature.  It would not cease until falsity is 
apprehended by a further [awareness].
A pramā a is a natural kind of process which results in accurate determination,ṇ  
and metaphysically grounds this outcome.  By contrast, a non-pramā a isṇ  
dependent on bad features in functioning to apprehend its object, and thus it 
would cease operating when the bad features on which it depends are removed, 
in a sense that will be explicated in the next chapter.  This provides a 
metaphysically disjunctive conception of pramā a and non-pramā a.  ṇ ṇ Pramā aṇ  
is a process which is metaphysically grounded in a real causal power which is a 
real disposition and real nature of the kind of process of forming an accurate 
judgment.  By contrast, non-pramā a ṇ is a process of erring in judgment which 
is metaphysically grounded in a bad feature of the cause.
Kumārila's idea was clarified by U veka.ṃ   As Kataoka explains:
216 In the Śloka-vārttika; see TS 2909 and TS 2912 for the equivalent verses in the 
B ha - īkā.ṛ ṭ ṭ
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“Umbeka … clarifies Kumārila's intention that even an erroneous 
cognition seems to have correctly grasped its own object, just as a valid 
cognition does.  An invalid cognition, though it is erroneous, is 
nonetheless “the agent of grasping” with regard to its object, just as a 
valid one is ... ”217
This explanation captures the way in which non-pramā as are reflectivelyṇ  
indiscriminable from pramā as.  ṇ Successful deliverances must not accurately 
determine something other than their object, whereas doubts, classified as 
unsuccessful deliverances, may or may not yield an accurate determination. 
This is equivalent to the idea that only successful deliverances produce no false 
positives.  However, in order to constitute a successful deliverance, thus being 
guaranteed to produce a true positive, other conditions must be satisfied, which 
in Devendrabuddhi's case consists in a 'no obstruction' condition and in 
Kumārila's case requires appropriately normal epistemic conditions, as 
described above.  By contrast, unsuccessful deliverances may produce a false 
positive.  This corresponds to the idea that an unsuccessful attempt to reach 
water may at first seem as though it will be successful.
Both Devendrabuddhi and Kumārila utilise the notion of capacity to convey 
these ideas.  Kataoka explains that for Kumārila a capacity “is made manifest 
by a vyañjaka and enables its substratum-entity to bring about a particular 
result (kārya).”218  However, does this mean that the capacity exists in all 
deliverances and is only exercised in Good Case deliverances?  It is true that all 
deliverances are in principle capable of succeeding if not vitiated by bad 
features.  However, such bad features, consisting in cataracts etc., affect the 
constitution of the cause itself.  As such, only Good Case deliverances possess 
the capacity in fact.  The possession of the capacity by a deliverance entails its 
exercise, and no separate stimulus is required.
217 Kataoka (2011) Part 2 295-296 fn.293
218 Kataoka (2011) 248
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This is consistent with the notion of a bare disposition discussed above, where 
the possession of a disposition to facilitate extraction automatically results in 
the process of extraction, and a severely damaged pot possesses no such 
disposition.  In the contemporary dispositionalist literature, Mumford and 
Anjum similarly reject the idea that a separate stimulus is needed for the 
manifestation of a power, instead allowing that powers necessitate their own 
manifestation.  No ontological distinction can be made between powers and 
stimuli.219  They provide the example of radioactive decay as a 'lonely' power 
which manifests itself spontaneously.220  Cases where powers fail to manifest 
are analysed as cases where there is “an unknown, hidden, or just taken-for-
granted countervailing power”221 or “an obstacle in the way of the 
manifestation”222 of the power.  Mumford and Anjum explain that a power that 
needs a mutual manifestation partner “needs its partner in order to operate.  It 
is not exercising otherwise.”223  Kumārila's notion of independence seems to 
liken the case of epistemic deliverances to the case of radioactive decay, where 
no mutual manifestation partner is required.  Although possession of the 
deliverance by an agent is necessary for the exercise of the capacity, the pot 
analogy suggests that this is a background fact about the deliverance rather 
than a stimulus for its exercise.
Epistemic reflexivity to the individual judgment better reflects the Buddhist 
doctrine than Kumārila's view.  As Kataoka explains: 
“the lack of … [the formulation] “validity is cognized through itself” … 
cannot be explained without assuming that Kumārila does not favour the 
idea.  And in fact Kumārila confirms this assumption … from the 
epistemological viewpoint it is supposed that a capacity is grasped from 
219 See Mumford (2013) 16
220 See Mumford and Anjum (2011) 34-38
221 Mumford and Anjum (2011) 36
222 Mumford and Anjum (2011) 37
223 Mumford and Anjum (2011) 38
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its result … Therefore it is theoretically consistent for Kumārila to say 
that validity is cognized “by something else” and not “through itself”.”224 
By contrast, Śākyabuddhi endorses just such an epistemological conception of 
'from itself' as reflexive awareness for a certain class of perceptions which are 
those involving telic function, which will be discussed in more detail below. 
Śākyabuddhi writes:
“Therefore, because a perception whose content has the capacity for 
telic function is without the causes of error, it is determined by 
reflexive awareness as being nothing other than a pramā a ṇ just due 
to svabhāva.”225
The notion of reflexive awareness ('rang rig' or 'svasaṃvedana') is a distinctly 
Buddhistic notion226, and by adopting Śākyabuddhi's conception, Pārthasārathi 
is forced into the unenviable situation of having to explain that awareness 
provides reflexive awareness of its own epistemic goodness but not of itself!227 
It thus seems that Pārthasārathi may have adopted a reflexive conception of 
'from itself' from Śākyabuddhi.
Section 6: Kumārila as Virtue Epistemologist
The term 'virtue epistemology' (VE) is used to label a diverse range of different 
approaches in a fast-developing field of epistemology, including so-called 
reliabilist and responsibilist approaches.  Linda Zagzebski and Abrol Fairweather 
explain that, in the aftermath of the Gettier literature, Sosa “introduced the 
224 Kataoka (2011) 72-73
225 PV  Ṭ nye 75A: “de'i phyir don byed par nus pa'i yul can gyi mngon sum ni 'khrul 
pa'i rgyu mtshan med pa'i phyir tshad ma nyid kyi bdag nyid du gyur pas rang 
rig pas yongs su bcad pa yin no|”; cf. Dunne (2004) 292-293
226 Cf. Yao (2005) 18 ff.
227 See Taber (1992b) 213-214
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term “intellectual virtue” into the contemporary epistemological literature. 
What Sosa meant by an intellectual virtue was a reliable belief-forming faculty, 
and so virtue epistemology (VE) began as a species of reliabilism.”228  By 
contrast, responsibilist approaches model virtue as conscientiousness or 
responsibility as a parallel to virtue ethics.229  Greco contrasts the Aristotelian, 
responsibilist form of VE with the reliabilist approach as follows:
“If we do not make Aristotle's account of moral virtue definitional of the 
concept of virtue in general, then we can see that Sosa, Goldman and 
Zagzebski are members of an important camp; one appropriately labeled 
"virtue epistemology.”  The defining characteristic of virtue epistemology, 
in this sense, is that it makes the normative properties of persons 
conceptually prior to the normative properties of beliefs.”230
Fairweather similarly explains:
“The Aristotelian conception of virtue as an excellence of character has 
dominated work in virtue ethics … There are other plausible accounts 
available; virtue can be defined as a skill or a mere power …”231  
Ernest Sosa's VE presents a dispositional understanding of epistemic virtues, as 
causal powers of agents.  Sosa writes:
“Epistemic virtues or competences are abilities.  These are a special sort 
of dispositions, familiar examples of which are fragility and solubility.”232  
As Jesper Kallestrup and Duncan Pritchard explain, Sosa's virtue epistemology: 
“explicitly understands epistemic virtue in terms of the manifestation of a 
228 Zagzebski and Fairweather (2001) 3
229 See Zagzebski and Fairweather (2001) 3
230 Greco (2000) 181
231 Fairweather (2001) 63
232 Sosa (2011) 80-81
135
cognitive disposition, or power, where these cognitive dispositions have a 
physical basis resident in [the] cognitive subject … Sosa's virtue 
epistemology thus trades on a broader metaphysical picture of 
dispositions and powers, where the manifestation of a cognitive power 
mirrors the manifestation of dispositions and powers more generally.”233. 
John Greco similarly states that “[a]ccording to Sosa, an intellectual virtue is a 
reliable cognitive ability or power.”234  For Sosa, virtues are “powers or abilities 
[which] enable a subject to achieve knowledge or at least epistemic 
justification”235.  It is this notion of virtue as skill or power which has an affinity 
with Kumārila's notion of prāmā yam as a capacity or real causal power.ṇ  
Kallestrup and Pritchard explain that Sosa's account contrasts with Greco's 
presentation of an otherwise similar form of VE, which involves “think[ing] of 
the “because of” relation in play here precisely in terms of the kind of causal 
explanatory lines that Sosa rejects.”236  In light of the discussion of dispositions 
in the previous chapter, we may liken Sosa's position to the idea of a bare 
disposition which is causally irreducible, in contrast to Greco's causally reducible 
position.  Sosa's VE thus represents one way in which the causal power 
metaphysic can be transferred into the domain of epistemology, whereby “the 
accuracy [of a belief] manifests a cognitive power on the part of the subject.”237 
Sosa holds in particular that human faculties are themselves intellectual 
virtues.  Sosa writes:
“it may be one's faculty of sight operating in good light that generates 
one's belief in the whiteness and roundness of a facing snowball.  Is 
possession of such a faculty a “virtue”?  Not in the narrow Aristotelian 
sense, of course, since it is no disposition to make deliberate choices. 
But there is a broader sense of “virtue,” still Greek, in which anything 
233 Kallestrup and Pritchard (2013) 250
234 Greco (2002) 293
235 Sosa (1991) 274
236 Kallestrup and Pritchard (2013) 265 fn.4
237 Kallestrup and Pritchard (2013) 250
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with a function – natural or artificial – does have virtues.  The eye does, 
after all, have its virtues, and so does a knife.  And if we include 
grasping the truth about one's environment among the proper ends of a 
human being, then the faculty of sight would seem in a broad sense a 
virtue in human beings …”
Sosa's claim that faculties such as reason, memory and perception are 
themselves the intellectual virtues which “enable a subject to achieve 
knowledge or at least epistemic justification”238 has an affinity with Kumārila's 
claim that prāmā yam is 'from itself'.  The review of Kumārila's canvassedṇ  
alternative views indicated that this claim amounted to the rejection of the idea 
that accurate determination is due to separable good features.  Rather, the 
unflawed causes of the deliverance, which are the pure faculties, is responsible 
for accurate determination, and thus these unflawed causes constitute 
intellectual virtues in Sosa's sense.
Sosa's characterisation of human faculties as intellectual virtues has been 
disputed by Zagzebski, and defended by Greco.239  Zagzebski writes that “it is 
quite obvious that sight, hearing, and memory are faculties … the Greeks 
identified virtues, not with faculties themselves, but with the excellence of 
faculties.”240  This disagreement concerns the question of whether virtues are 
eyesight etc. or separable good features of deliverances.  As such, Kumārila is 
allied with Sosa, because of their common rejection of good features over and 
above the normal exercise of the sense-faculties etc.  By contrast, Zagzebski's 
understanding of excellences as faculties is allied with the third view canvassed 
by Kumārila, according to which the capacity for accurate determination is due 
to contingent good features of the cause, such as clarity of vision, which is a 
property of sight.
Sosa separately considers both generative faculties, such as external perception 
and intuitive reason, and transmissive faculties, such as memory and deductive 
238 Sosa (1991) 274
239 See Greco (2000)
240 Zagzebski, Virtues of the Mind: 10, quoted in Greco (2000) 180
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reason.  Considering an example of the latter, Sosa writes: 
“The perceptual faculty of sight, for example, generates beliefs about the 
colours and shapes of surfaces seen fully, within a range, and in 
adequate light.  Such beliefs issue from visual impressions derived in 
turn from the seen objects.”
Sosa considers that the case of a subject whose “ostensible visual perceptions 
are … highly error-prone”241, holding that “that should not cancel the virtue of 
his faculty of sight so long as both erring intuition and erring memory retain 
their status.”242  This presents a disjunctive analysis of types of perception, 
contrasting with the idea that “what makes a belief perceptual is its basis in 
experience as if P, leaving it open whether or not the belief derives from a 
perceptual process originating in a fact corresponding to the object of the belief, 
namely, P.”243  
In the case of external perception, because this is understood in terms of an 
experience-belief mechanism, fallibility is due to “the occasional failure of an 
experience to reflect what experience of that sort normally reflects.”  In the 
case of faculties such as introspection, memory, intuition and deduction, it is 
not clear what can play an analogous role to experience, as a “belief-guiding 
pre-belief appearance in [their] operation.”244  In the case of memory, “how 
then do we understand the lineage required for legitimacy as memory while still 
allowing for the possibility of error due to the misoperation of memory (and not 
to flaws in the original inputs)?”  As such, Sosa suggests, “[w]hy not conceive 
of such faculties as infallible?”245  Although it outside the scope of this thesis to 
defend this claim, similar reasoning seems to be behind the claim of the 
Buddhist philosophers that inferential reasoning is always 'from itself'.
241 Sosa (1991) 227
242 Sosa (1991) 227
243 Sosa (1991) 227
244 Sosa (1991) 230
245 Sosa (1991) 231
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A metaphysical claim seems to be suggested by Sosa's VE.  Kallestrup and 
Pritchard explain:
“Sosa's virtue epistemology thus trades on a broader metaphysical 
picture of dispositions and powers, where the manifestation of a 
cognitive power mirrors the manifestation of dispositions and powers 
more generally.”246  
Kumārila's characterisation of prāmā yam as a real causal power or dispositionṇ  
seems to contribute to filling out this idea of VE as a metaphysical thesis. 
Kumārila's use of the expression 'from itself' (svata ) seems to cohere with aḥ  
notion of 'due to svabhāva' (svabhāvata ) that is of more general applicabilityḥ  
in metaphysical speculation.
246 Kallestrup and Pritchard (2013) 250
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Chapter 4: Kumārila's belief protocol
Section 1: Introduction
This chapter presents Kumārila's claim as a protocol for belief adoption and 
revision with normative force for the epistemic agent.  The chapter begins by 
surveying some existing secondary literature, and in particular the reading of 
Dan Arnold, based on the commentary by Pārthasārathi.  The chapter then 
develops an alternative reading of Kumārila's doctrine as a normative protocol 
which captures the logic of inquiry of the rational agent.  This reading is 
motivated by examining the origins of some of Kumārila's terminology in the 
existing grammatical and ritual material.  Kumārila's epistemology is presented 
as generative in the sense in which Pā ini's grammar is generative: it providesṇ  
a procedure which can be followed to generate true beliefs about the world. 
Kumārila's belief protocol is then presented in some detail, considering the 
beginning, middle and end of the process of inquiry.  The ramifications of three 
alternative views in the Śloka-vārttika for a viable logic of inquiry are 
considered.
Kumārila writes that “a capacity to cognize something etc. belongs to them as a 
svabhāva.”1  On the basis of a consideration of the meaning of the term 
svabhāva and Kumārila's use of it, the argument of the previous chapters is 
that the claim that epistemic success is 'from itself' amounts to the idea that 
deliverances under appropriately normal conditions constitute Good Case 
deliverances, and they are true because they are the manifestation of an 
essential disposition.
The chapter begins by considering the arguments by Taber and Arnold in favour 
1 TS 2812ab
140
of a reading of prāmā yam in terms of 'ṇ prima facie justification'2 or 'force of 
conviction'3, which build on the interpretation of the philosopher Pārthasārathi, 
as well as the findings of Kataoka in regard to this.  It is argued that what is 
missing from the Pārthasārathi-Arnold interpretation is the idea that Kumārila 
considers the attribution of prāmā yam as a stage in a ṇ normative process. 
Kumārila's own thinking thus involves the notion of a hypothesis.  That the logic 
of inquiry is distinct from the psychology of belief formation is a point 
emphasized by Charles Peirce, and Peirce will accordingly be treated as an 
interlocutor for understanding Kumārila's claim.  Whereas Arnold's account 
allows no scope for an understanding of Kumārila's doctrine as a normative 
account, it will be argued that normativity plays a key role in Kumārila's 
account.  Some points of agreement between this interpretation and that of 
Arnold will be noted.
This chapter will accordingly provide an interpretation of Kumārila's doctrine as 
goal-oriented and purposive.  On this basis, the more straightforward reading of 
Kumārila's verse ŚV 2.47 , whereby only pramā as have the feature of 'intrinsicṇ  
validity', is supported.  In order to substantiate this claim about Kumārila's 
normative thinking, the origins of some of the vocabulary used by Kumārila in 
the grammatical and ritual literatures will be examined.  The purposive and 
goal-orientated theoretical framework of the original context of these terms will 
be highlighted in order to motivate the claim that Kumārila deployed just such a 
purposive and goal-orientated model in the new context of epistemology.  After 
that, a reading of Kumārila's verses TS 2861 and ŚV 2.53 as providing a 
protocol for belief formation and revision will be set out.  It is argued that this 
protocol is rooted in the ritual interpretation literature and in the Indian 
grammatical literature.  Specifically, it will be argued that Kumārila's 
epistemology involves a rule or procedure analogous to these rules of ritual 
interpretation and the rules of Pāṇini's generative grammar.  Such an approach 
contrasts with the specification of necessary and sufficient conditions in some 
post-Gettier epistemology, in that it is process-orientated.  This idea will be 
2 See e.g. Arnold (2001) 641; Arnold (2005) 61
3 See e.g. Taber (1992b) 210
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further developed by characterizing Kumārila's description of an epistemic 
process as a logic of inquiry.  The beginning, middle and end of inquiry will be 
considered in turn.  Inquiry is begun through instigation by means of adoption 
of a working hypothesis.  Inquiry is prolonged through search for defeaters, 
motivated by a genuine doubt.  Inquiry is terminated when defeaters fail to 
appear, on partly epistemic grounds and partly pragmatic grounds.  These 
stages of inquiry will be investigated in successive sections.
Section 2: Apparent truth or ascribed truth?
Kumārila's verse ŚV 2.53 has been taken by John Taber and Dan Arnold as 
definitive support for Pārthasārathi's interpretation of Kumārila's doctrine, 
whereby prāmā yam “concern[s] nothing more than ṇ prima facie justification”4 
and “is common to true and false cognitions alike.”5  This section presents an 
alternative reading of Kumārila's verse ŚV 2.53 and its analogue TS 2861 in the 
B ha - īkāṛ ṭ ṭ  in order to argue that prāmā yam constitutes a notion of truth.ṇ  
Specifically, it is argued that the verse specifies a two-part procedure, of truth-
ascription and 'erasing the excess'.  This procedure is executed by the agent 
through the single operational instruction to exercise repeatedly his default 
competence to host and accept dispositions.
Subsection 1: The   Pārthasārathi-Arnold line of interpretation 
Taber identifies a distinction between two competing interpretations of 
Kumārila's claim, 'svata  sarva-pramā āna  prāmā yaḥ ṇ ṃ ṇ m', which emerges to 
full clarity in later literature.  These two interpretations are 'from utpatti' and 
'from jñapti'.  Taber explains that “[t]he positions of Umbeka and Pārthasārathi 
4 Arnold (2001) 641; cf. Arnold (2005) 61
5 Taber (1992b) 214
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came to be known in subsequent literature as svata  prāmā yaḥ ṇ m utpattitaḥ and 
svata  prāmā yamḥ ṇ  jñaptitaḥ, respectively … They themselves do not use these 
expressions.”6  However, the beginnings of such a distinction between utpatti-
prāmā yam and niścaya-prāmā yam seems to be present already in the workṇ ṇ  
of Buddhist philosophers working around the time of Kumārila.  Indeed, this 
distinction is particularly relevant to the Buddhist position, which provides 
accounts of the two which diverge in respect of unfamiliar awarenesses, though 
not of other types of awareness.  Thus expressions such as 'tshad ma 'jug pa' 
and 'tshad ma nges pa' are found in the Tibetan translations of the discussion 
of this topic by Devendrabuddhi and Śākyabuddhi.  Further research would be 
needed to trace the evolution of this distinction in detail.
Translating the above claim as “[t]he validity of all pramā asṇ  should be 
accepted as intrinsic”7, Arnold finds that “there are some interpretative 
difficulties in [this passage]”.  These difficulties are resolved by Pārthasārathi by 
reinterpreting this statement to be reflexive to all awarenesses, so that it is 
read as the claim that “whenever a cognition occurs it presents itself as true.”8 
Taber and Arnold both prefer this revised interpretation, where all true or false 
awarenesses are 'intrinsically valid'.
Taber claims that “[i]f intrinsic validity were an actual correspondence between 
cognition and object that arose in a cognition from its causes, then it certainly 
would not belong to false cognitions; yet Kumārila clearly says that it does.”9 
Taber seems to base this on Kumārila's half-verse ŚV 2.53ab, which Taber 
translates: 
ŚV 2.53ab: Thus, the validity of a cognition, due to its having the nature 
of knowledge, …10.  
6 Taber (1992b) 208 fn.24
7 Arnold (2005) 70
8 Taber (1992b) 210
9 Taber (1992b) 214
10 Taber (1992b) 212
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Taber states that this “says that a cognition is intrinsically valid by virtue of 
being a bodha, that is, a knowledge of its object … [which] is to say that it is 
intrinsically valid insofar as it presents itself as true.”11  Taber bases his 
endorsement of Pārthasārathi on this point, and also on the next half-verse ŚV 
2.53cd, which “says that the intrinsic validity of false cognitions is annulled 
upon disconfirming the cognition.”12  If 'intrinsic validity' amounted to truth, 
Taber explains, it could not “initially belong to a cognition and then be 
removed.”13
Arnold likewise bases his support for Pārthasārathi largely on a reading of 
Kumārila's half-verse ŚV 2.53ab.   Arnold translates the same line as:
ŚV 2.53ab: the validity of awareness obtains simply by virtue of the fact 
that it is awareness (bodhātmakatvena)14  
Arnold suggests that this verse provides “something like a definitive statement 
regarding prāmā yaṇ ”15.  Arnold also sets out and endorses Pārthasārathi's own 
argument in the Nyāya-ratna-mālā against an U veka-type approach.  There,ṃ  
Pārthasārathi explains that the view would be that “the prāmā yamṇ  of a 
cognition produced from itself is later exceptionally cancelled”16 and argues that 
“that is not right, because it is already a non-pramā aṇ  when it arises.”17  That 
is, if prāmā yam is truth, then belief revision cannot alter the truth-status of aṇ  
belief.  As Arnold paraphrases this, for the U veka-type approach, beliefṃ  
revision would have to “consist in the actual transformation of the initial 
cognitive event … the subsequent, overriding awareness actually renders 
untrue what had (really, ontologically) been true.”18
11 Taber (1992b) 212
12 Taber (1992b) 212
13 Taber (1992b) 212
14 Arnold (2001) 622; essentially the same translation is also given at Arnold 
(2005) 91
15 Arnold (2001) 607
16 NRM 46: “buddhe  svato jāta  prāmā ya  paścād apodyata iti”ḥ ṃ ṇ ṃ
17 NRM 46: “tac câyuktam| utpattāv evâpramā atvāt|”ṇ
18 Arnold (2001) 623
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Taber concludes rather pessimistically that, despite offering “a much more 
coherent reading of Kumārila's text than Umbeka”19, nevertheless 
Pārthasārathi's interpretation “appears to provide no better defense of the 
authority of the Veda than Umbeka's … svata  prāmā yaḥ ṇ  is something 
essentially subjective for Pārthasārathi; it is a cognition's initial appearance or 
manifestation of validity.”20  By contrast, Arnold finds Pārthasārathi's 
interpretation more philosophically appealing.  Finding an affinity with “the 
argument that William Alston develops in Perceiving God”21, Arnold develops an 
understanding of Kumārila's epistemology as having a largely phenomenological 
significance.  Thus “Alston's procedure is to show that the subjects of religious 
experience are prima facie justified in thinking that their experience is the 
experience it seems, phenomenologically, to be; and, if one is thus justified, 
then the experience can, ipso facto, be taken as genuinely an experience of 
what seems to be experienced.”22
It is not really clear that the notion of justification can be used in a way which 
divorces it from meta-level concerns about the correctness of one's beliefs.  As 
Velleman explains: 
“Something is subject to justification only if it is subject to a jus, or norm 
of correctness … a belief can be justified only because it can be correct 
or incorrect by virtue of being true or false.”23  
Similarly, Sosa writes: 
“According to my dictionary, to justify is “to prove or show to be just, 
right, or reasonable,” in a way that implies “appeal to a standard or 
precedent.””24
19 Taber (1992b) 211
20 Taber (1992b) 212
21 Arnold (2005) 61; Arnold (2005) 81
22 Arnold (2005) 87
23 Velleman (2000) 15
24 Sosa (1991) 253
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However, Arnold introduces an epistemic notion of truth, whereby “truth 
consists in the means of justification”25.  Thus, quoting Alston, Arnold explains: 
“the truth of a truth bearer consists not in its relation to some 
'transcendent' state of affairs, but in the epistemic virtues the former 
displays within our thought, experience, and discourse.  Truth value is a 
matter of whether, or the extent to which, a belief is justified, warranted, 
rational, well-grounded, or the like …”26  
This contrasts with a realist notion of truth, which is “a conception of “truth” as 
obtaining independently of what any knowing subjects believe to be the case.”27 
Arnold contrasts the interpretations of U veka ṃ and Pārthasārathi in terms of 
their notion of truth.  Whereas Pārthasārathi's account “involves a realist 
conception of truth”28, “U veka ends up supporting an ultimately epistemicṃ  
notion of truth”29.  Specifically, Pārthasārathi “thinks of the justification 
defended by his account as conducive to the realization of truth, understood in 
realist terms – here, in terms of something like correspondence … The point is 
simply that we are justified in finding such correspondence to obtain whenever 
“the validity of cognition that obtains simply by virtue of the fact that it is 
cognition” is not falsified by any subsequent overriding cognition.”30
Arnold notes that Buddhist philosophers including Dignāga and Dharmakīrti 
“espoused a fundamentally causal epistemology”31 whereby “a subject’s 
awarenesses are simply among the effects produced by that object (together, of 
course, with the proper conditions in the subject)”32.  Arnold argues that it is 
precisely this causal epistemology which is disputed by Pārthasārathi, who 
25 Arnold (2005) 50
26 Arnold (2005) 51
27 Arnold (2005) 78
28 Arnold (2005) 94
29 Arnold (2005) 81
30 Arnold (2005) 95
31 Arnold (2001) 632; cf. Arnold (2001) 636
32 Arnold (2001) 633
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instead formulates a doxastic epistemology33, which “starts from the 
presumption of justification, takes us as entitled to consider ourselves justified 
in thinking ourselves to experience, in fact, what we seem to ourselves to 
experience.  Such justification is, on this view, all that is required for us to be 
justified in claiming to hold true beliefs.”34  Nevertheless, it is “not incompatible 
with strong truth-claims.”35  Arnold characterizes U veka's reading of Kumārilaṃ  
as a causal account36 whereby:
“validity, on this causal account, is the resultant effect of the causes that 
are veridical awarenesses, and the real task is simply to determine, by 
appeal to causes, which are and which are not veridical awarenesses. 
This is why U veka can take it as an unwanted consequence ofṃ  
Kumārila's interpretation that validity ends up being predicated of 
awarenesses that are not pramā asṇ  … “truth” turns out, in fact, to be a 
plausible rendering of prāmā yaṇ  – and it would indeed sound absurd to 
speak of something’s being prima facie true.”37
Arnold contrasts two different understandings of how prāmā yaṇ m figures in the 
epistemic process: “Pārthasārathi disagrees with Uṃveka regarding whether 
validity is found at the outcome of the epistemic process, or at the beginning”38. 
Uṃveka construes prāmā yaṇ m as the outcome of the epistemic process, so that 
““truth” turns out … to be a plausible rendering of prāmā yaṇ ”39  By contrast, the 
Pārthasārathi-Arnold view renders prāmā yaṇ m in terms of subjective 
justification40, prima facie justification41, prima facie validity42 etc. and refers to 
“awarenesses that are prima facie credited with validity”.43  This “prima facie 
judgment of validity merely begins the process, which is subject to revision 
33 See in particular Arnold (2001) 615, 626-630, 644-645; cf. Arnold (2005) 89 ff.
34 Arnold (2001) 644
35 Arnold (2001) 644
36 See Arnold (2001) 607-612
37 Arnold (2001) 612
38 Arnold (2001) 625
39 See Arnold (2001) 612
40 See Arnold (2001) 608
41 See Arnold (2001) 619
42 See Arnold (2001) 619
43 Arnold (2001) 625
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(subject, that is, to falsification) in light of subsequent, overriding 
awarenesses.”44  In this way, Arnold is able to find an affinity with William 
Alston's discussion in Perceiving God, which “defend[s] the claim that putative 
experiences of God are significantly akin to perceptual experiences … Alston 
here eschews a normative-explanatory approach in favor of a strictly 
phenomenological characterization.”45  Arnold thus construes prāmā yaṇ m “not 
as truth (not as the outcome of the epistemic process), but as prima facie 
justification (hence, as the basis for the epistemic process)”46.
Arnold goes on to assimilate the accounts of Kumārila's doctrine given by both 
B.K. Matilal and J.N. Mohanty to the same type of causal epistemology he 
attributes to U veka.  Arnold writes:ṃ
“Matilal’s presupposition of a causal epistemology has led him to see 
prāmā yaṇ  precisely as this kind of “effect,” such that its resulting from 
causes can be likened to a mango’s resulting from conditions of growth. 
It is, I suggest, fundamentally this notion of prāmā yaṇ  as the 
culmination of the epistemic process that has Matilal render it as 
“truth.””47  
Likewise, Arnold writes:
“Mohanty, in thinking that the svata  prāmā yaḥ ṇ  of all awarenesses 
absurdly entails the “truth” of erroneous awarenesses, assumes that 
prāmā yaṇ  must be the end result of the epistemic process, the “effect” 
that is caused by pramā asṇ .”48  
In sum, for Arnold, “Matilal and Mohanty are guilty of misrepresenting the 
44 Arnold (2001) 625
45 Arnold (2001) 612-613
46 Arnold (2001) 626
47 See Arnold (2001) 641
48 See Arnold (2001) 642
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position”49 and “are on shaky philosophical ground”50 because “the target of the 
whole Mīmā sakaṃ  project … [is] the idea that some particular pramā asṇ  (some 
special kinds of awareness) have privileged access to the world.”51 
Subsection 2:  D  rawbacks of the Pārthasārathi-Arnold interpretation  
Taber considers that Pārthasārathi's interpretation appears theoretically 
unsatisfying.  Taber writes:
“Clearly, the appearance or idea of truth is not the same as truth. 
Pārthasārathi himself admits, even emphasizes, that cognitions that are 
in fact false have intrinsic validity, that is, they initially manifest 
themselves as true.  This … is the problem that most of those outside 
Mīmā sāṃ  have seen in the doctrine of svata  prāmā yaḥ ṇ .”52  
By contrast, Arnold's adducing of Alston is intended to demonstrate that 
Pārthasārathi's notion of subjective justification or prima facie validity is in fact 
compatible with a robust or realist conception of truth.53 
In either case, it seems that no scope is allowed for Kumārila's account of the 
epistemic process to be purposive or goal-orientated in any sense.  This 
characterization of prāmā yam leads to its disconnection from the process ofṇ  
inquiry.  What is missing is the idea that our beliefs are susceptible to 
normative assessment.  Arnold in fact considers it a virtue that Alston “eschews 
a normative-explanatory approach in favor of a strictly phenomenological 
49 See Arnold (2001) 642
50 See Arnold (2001) 642
51 See Arnold (2001) 643
52 Taber (1992b) 212
53 See Arnold (2001) 620; Arnold (2005) 94-97
149
characterization”54.  However, this way the process of belief revision amounts to 
simply one disconnected belief after another, rather than constituting any kind 
of epistemic ascent.  By denying that one can entertain doubts about what is 
phenomenologically secure, the agent seems to be denied any motivation to 
undertake inquiry starting from a position of settled belief.  Further, even if 
external forces compel belief revision, such belief revision would not constitute 
an epistemic advantage.  Rather, change in belief would be no more 
epistemically noteworthy than the entertaining of one thought followed by a 
different one.  Indeed, the endorsement by Arnold of an epistemic process 
without epistemic culmination seems rather to acquiesce in a Buddhist notion of 
process devoid of normativity.
This interpretation seems particularly odd given that the intensity of inquiry of 
Mīmā sā ṃ authors including Kumārila in their interpretative enterprise seems to 
be the diametric opposite of the type of intellectual apathy that would follow 
from the view that finds no intrinsic epistemic value in inquiry.  Further, as 
Lingat explains, “[t]he Mīmā sā ṃ has as its primary object the study of the 
injunction.  It determined and examined the different forms under which it 
could present itself in the Vedic texts and undertook to define their respective 
scope of application.”55  Specifically, Lingat explains that “[t]he Mīmā sāṃ  
(“investigation”) is a method of exegesis which was originally confined to the 
Vedic texts.”56  However, “one of the essential tasks of interpretation 
distinguishes it completely from literary exegesis.  It is the search from 
amongst the rules of sm tiṛ , for that which ought to be held for an obligatory 
rule of conduct.”57  Thus “the Mīmā sā ṃ propounds rules which enable the 
scholar to recognise a true injunction and to determine its sense and 
significance.”58
54 Arnold (2005) 82
55 Lingat (1973) 153; cf. also Verpoorten (1987) 37, where 'vidhi' or 'injunction' is 
described as “the chief mīmā sakaṃ  concept”
56 Lingat (1973) 148-149
57 Lingat (1973) 148
58 Lingat (1973) 149
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That the Mīmā sā approach to philosophy emerged from this tradition ofṃ  
exegesis of normative statements is a point made by Halbfass, who describes 
how “[a] genuinely and originally exegetic and text-oriented tradition [i.e. 
Mīmā sā] opens itself increasingly to epistemology and logic”ṃ 59 leading to a 
“concurrent amalgamation of philosophy and exegesis.”60  Thus “[s]uch 
concepts as bhāvanā, vidhi, and niyoga all deal primarily with the causal and 
motivating power of the Vedic word … but they also refer to problems 
concerning ethics, the causality of human actions, and the motivating power of 
language in a far more general sense.”61  Ganeri likewise tells us that 
“[a]lthough it has its origins in a particular context, the Mīmā sāṃ  theory is 
clearly a theory of practical reason, a method for deciding what properly is to 
be done.”62  Such a notion of what is to be done can be adapted from the ritual 
domain not only to the ethical domain but also to the epistemological domain. 
If in the context of ritual, action leads to liberation, then in the epistemic 
context, Mīmā sā thinkers might be expected to specifyṃ  actions leading to 
some ultimate epistemic good such as knowledge or true belief.  That this is in 
fact precisely Kumārila's strategy will be argued in this chapter.
As Francavilla explains, “[t]he Mīmā sā's peculiarity may be found in theṃ  
context of Vedic ritualism and in the capacity of diffusion of ritual thought.”63 
Thus a robust notion of justification as conforming to an external standard of 
correctness may be expected in the context of Mīmā sāṃ .  McClymond explains 
that “[t]he ability to identify ritual errors assumes that general standards for 
correct and incorrect ritual action exist, grounded in some authority beyond the 
realm of the ritual arena itself.”64  McClymond discusses the large body of 
prāyaścitta material in the Vedic corpus, which describes expiatory rites which 
are to be performed as corrective activity for mistakes made in the 
performance of rituals.65  Such material may have formed the background for 
59 Halbfass (1992) 29
60 Halbfass (1992) 30
61 Halbfass (1992) 32
62 Ganeri (2004) 211
63 Francavilla (2006) 13
64 McClymond (2012) 203
65 McClymond (2012)
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Kumārila's epistemological theorizing, whereby belief correction is a process 
aiming at a standard of correctness external to the belief formation process 
itself.   Indeed, the idea of an external norm would be expected in other 
intellectual disciplines involving a rule-governed system, such as generative 
grammar and legal hermeneutics.  Thus Francavilla describes how “the 
Mīmā sā … has many connections with the grammarians' schools … it isṃ  
remarkable that key Mīmā sā terms are key terms in grammatical scienceṃ  
also.”66  Further, Mīmā sā is connected with Dharmaṃ śāstra, which Francavilla 
describes as “a kind of jurisprudential system”67 the texts of which have “an 
interpretative character”.68  Francavilla further explains:
“[t]he mīmā sāṃ  is strictly linked to the dharmaśāstra and their origins 
should be searched for in the same context of learning … while 
dharmaśāstra is meant to teach about dharma, the Mīmā sā, as a moreṃ  
theoretical science, is concerned with the epistemological investigation 
into the nature of dharma and the ways to know it.”69
Such normative concerns were seemingly not shared by contemporaneous and 
subsequent Buddhist philosophers, who were not rooted in the traditions of 
Vedic exegesis.  As such, it may be that the contextual framework of Mīmā sāṃ  
hermeneutics from within which Kumārila's thinking arose would over time have 
become obscured by the more analytic-reductionist framework within which 
Buddhist philosophers formulated their own views.  Thus later commentators on 
Kumārila may also have read Kumārila without sufficient attention to Kumārila's 
own notion of process, but in a context shaped by the need to respond to 
Buddhism.  Thus, discussing the same stretch of history, Herzberger explains:
“Texts fell into obscurity rapidly.  When Vācaspati Miśra, who wrote not 
much more than two hundred years after Uddyotakara, compared his 
66 Francavilla (2006) 12-13
67 Francavilla (2006) 7
68 Francavilla (2006) 7
69 Francavilla (2006) 8
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work of commenting on Uddyotakara's Nyāyāvārttika to the efforts 
involved in rescuing an old cow deeply sunk in mire, what he was 
expressing was a lack of communication.”70
Arnold has reduced the interpretative question to the question of whether the 
right interpretation is that of U veka or that of Pārthasārathi, and thus movesṃ  
too quickly in assimilating the views of Matilal and Mohanty to that of U veka.ṃ  
The notion of an epistemic process that culminates in an epistemically 
advantageous situation certainly does involve an analogy with causal process 
such as a mango ripening, in the sense that prāmā yam is an outcome, but itṇ  
need not be a causal epistemology in any sense that requires the agent to 
determine the sufficiency of the causal conditions from which the awareness 
has arisen.  Indeed, it will be argued that Kumārila considers and rejects just 
such a possibility.  
Rather, the epistemic process may be a purposive and goal-orientated process 
in the same way as is a mango's ripening.  This is not to deny that awareness 
“becomes true or false depending upon the causal conditions from which it 
arises”71, if this is understood as a statement relating to the goal at which the 
process aims.  The reading developed here allows for a provisional attribution of 
prāmā yam to a belief that serves as “ṇ the basis for the epistemic process”72 and 
also the idea that this epistemic process is a culminating process which ends in 
one's beliefs coinciding with the truth, as per its translation by Matilal and by 
Mohanty.  That there is an idea of directive action or goal-orientation, so that 
the actions of the agent constitute a process that moves towards and ultimately 
results in believing propositions that are in fact objectively true, is argued here. 
Thus Kumārila's epistemology is seen to involve also a normative directive to 
the epistemic agent.  Without such normativity, it would be difficult to articulate 
any systematic logic of inquiry, that is, to explain what drives the process of 
70 Herzberger (1986) 4
71 Arnold (2001) 642 quoting Matilal
72 Arnold (2001) 626
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inquiry forward not merely from a psychological perspective but from a rational 
perspective.  Key terms used by Kumārila to convey this sense of directionality 
are prāptā, utsarga and apavāda, which will be discussed in the next section.
Subsection 3:  Towards a   re-evaluation of the   Pārthasārathi  -Arnold   
interpretation
The reading of Kataoka differs somewhat from Arnold in that the term 'prāptā' 
is understood as 'ascribed' or 'presupposed', rather than as 'obtained'. 
Contrasting an 'ontological' reading with an 'epistemological' reading, Kataoka 
explains: 
“prāptā must be understood in an epistemological sense … it should 
mean “be wrongly ascribed” so that the validity of an erroneous 
cognition will be epistemologically cancelled.  And prāptā is often used in 
the sense “has resulted”, “is [tentatively and often wrongly] 
concluded””73.  
Kataoka contrasts this term 'prāptā' with another of Kumārila's terms, 'ātta ',ḥ  
as “was unconsciously presupposed wrongly”74 and “was unconsciously 
presupposed correctly”75 respectively.  Kataoka considers that “Pārthasārathi … 
does not fail to incorporate his own view into this passage … which, with a 
subtle, clever modification, then supports his view”76 and that “Pārthasārathi's 
interpretation is not acceptable in taking … prāptā as avagatā”77.  
Kataoka translates the Śloka-vārttika verse discussed above as follows:
73 Kataoka (2011) 75
74 Kataoka (2011) 76
75 Kataoka (2011) 76
76 Kataoka (2011) 257 fn217
77 Kataoka (2011) 257 fn217
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ŚV 2.53: Therefore the validity of a cognition which has resulted from 
its being a cognition is exceptionally cancelled [only] when [one] finds 
that the object [of the cognition] is otherwise [than the way it was 
cognized] or that there are bad qualities in [its] cause.78 (bold font not in 
original)
The interpretation of Kataoka differs from that of Arnold in that, whereas Arnold 
reads the claim that 'prāmā yam' is 'prāptā' as 'justification obtains', Kataokaṇ  
understands that an 'ontological' feature of the belief which Kataoka terms 
'validity' is '[wrongly] ascribed' or '[wrongly] presupposed'.  Thus what is at 
issue is not an ontological transformation but rather a revision of attributed 
ontological status.  The contrast between these two readings lies in the fact 
that the Kataoka-type ascription reading allows that the agent's propositional 
attitude can be assessed as 'right' or 'wrong', and thus that Kumārila's 
epistemology involves a normative dimension.  However, Kataoka does not 
build on this by finding in Kumārila's discussion any account of normativity or 
normative process.  Kataoka only observes that “Kumārila's use of the word 
bodhātmakatvena as if he refers to a condition or reason of validity 
(pramā atāṇ ) is problematic.  However, he probably intends neither a causal nor 
a logical relationship in a rigid sense …”79
The criticism made by Pārthasārathi and Arnold was that U veka'sṃ  ontological 
understanding of prāmā yam as truth would lead to belief revision beingṇ  
characterized as an ontological transformation.  This was premised on the idea 
that prāmā yam is obtained in the case of every awareness, whether true orṇ  
false.  On the revised understanding that prāptā denotes ascription, it can be 
comprehended how the ascription of a real ontological feature such as truth to 
a belief ascribed by an agent can be revised without any transformation in the 
ontology of the belief.
Although this then allows that ascription can be normatively assessed, and that 
78 See Kataoka (2011) 257-259; bold font not in original
79 Kataoka (2011) 259
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inquiry can aim at the normative goal of true belief, U veka himself does notṃ  
go on to give any account of this, leaving a rather impoverished account of 
Kumārila's doctrine.  Thus while identifying a real weakness in U veka'sṃ  
analysis, the Pārthasārathi-Arnold interpretation goes too far in reducing the 
basis of prāmā yam to a phenomenological claim.  Arnold tells us that “ṇ on 
Pārthasārathi's account  … we are justified in forming beliefs about whatever 
appears in that cognition … this epistemological claim thus turns on a basically 
phenomenological point about how cognitions appear”80.  At the same time, 
Arnold holds that this “is nevertheless compatible with a realist conception of 
truth”81.  Arnold's characterization of prāmā yam asṇ  prima facie justification is 
thus intended to support a doxastic account of justification.
The 'ascription' reading of verse ŚV 2.53 allows the possibility of the more 
natural construal of ŚV 2.47, according to which prāmā yam is a feature of allṇ  
pramā as, i.e. that only accurate determinations are in fact predicated with aṇ  
feature which necessitates their being true, although at intermediate stages of 
inquiry, the epistemic agent may falsely ascribe such a feature to 
determinations which are not in fact accurate.  As such, what is ascribed 
constitutes a hypothesis.
Previous chapters have examined aspects of the ontology of beliefs as true or 
false, by discussing the idea of a capacity for accurate determination which 
features as an essential disposition in the case of pramā as, and setting out anṇ  
ontological disjunction between pramā as and non-pramā as.  It may beṇ ṇ  
surmised that U veka ṃ would be in agreement with much of this discussion. 
However, in this chapter and the next, it is argued that Kumārila's primary 
concern in setting out this topic is not to provide a 'comprehensive 
epistemology', as Arnold suggests82, but rather to uncover a normative logic of 
inquiry of the individual epistemic agent.  Thus a procedural aspect to the belief 
80 See Arnold (2001) 620; Arnold (2005) 94-97
81 See Arnold (2001) 620; Arnold (2005) 94-97
82 See Arnold (2005) 66: “It is therefore to be expected that Kumārila found in 
Śabara's discussion of codanā the need for better elaborating and defending 
a comprehensive epistemological doctrine.”
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process will be identified in Kumārila's presentation, which is missing in the 
discussions of U veka andṃ  Pārthasārathi.
Section 3: The grammatical and ritual origins of Kumārila's terminology
The previous section discussed existing scholarship on a key verse in the Śloka-
vārttika, which can now be translated as follows:
ŚV 2.53: Therefore [the hypothesis] that a judgment [is based on] a 
Good Case deliverance, which has been ascribed (prāptā) from the fact 
of its being a judgment, is replaced (apodyate) [only] by a deliverance 
that the object [of the judgment] is otherwise [than the way it was 
originally judged] or by the deliverance that there is a flaw in how the 
belief was formed.
The equivalent verse in the B ha - īkā ṛ ṭ ṭ is as follows:
TS 2861: So Goodness of Case [being] the essence of an epistemic kind 
remains the general operation (autsargikam) in all cases, [and] it is 
replaced (apodyate) either by a defeating deliverance or by the 
deliverance that there is a flaw in how the belief was formed.83
Before making a full examination of what the substance of this verse amounts 
to, it will be helpful to examine the sources of the technical terminology used 
by Kumārila in the grammatical and ritual literatures, and thereby to 
understand the explanatory models that he draws on.  Louis Renou was 
perhaps the first modern scholar to describe how “Indian philosophy follows the 
grammatical method and makes a massive use of grammatical concepts”84. 
More specifically, Elisa Freschi writes that “[l]inguistic analysis and 
83 TS 2861; the reading of Kataoka  (2011) 259 as 'apodyate' has been followed
84 K.Bhattacharya (1985) 7
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epistemology are always closely linked in Mīmā sā.”ṃ 85  
Doniger explains:
“Concepts that seem at first to be mutually contradictory often turn out, 
on closer examination, merely to constitute a general principle and a 
series of exceptions to it.  This is … a method whose most extreme form 
was already achieved in the grammatical treatise of Pāṇini, which set the 
paradigm for all kinds of scientific inquiry in India: state one general 
rule, to which the whole of the subsequent treatise constitutes nothing 
but a series of increasingly specific exceptions.  Ritual texts have 
archetypes and ectypes, rules and exceptions, just like Pāṇini.”86  
Doniger here presents a model of general principle and exceptions as an 
organizational methodology present in Pāṇini's grammar and also used in ritual 
interpretation and legal codification.  This thesis will find that this methodology 
was also used by Kumārila in the specification of a protocol for belief.  Doniger 
also presents this methodology as a solution to a problem of apparent 
contradiction.  It will be found that Kumārila makes the same move in 
motivating his model of inquiry by a problem of apparent conflict.  
Through a consideration of Kumārila's use of technical vocabulary, it will be 
argued that Kumārila's strategy involves an appeal to a generative paradigm 
that was developed in the earlier grammatical and linguistics literature.  This 
paradigm involves firstly the identification of a natural relation, which is natural 
in the sense allied to the notion of natural necessity, and secondly, a stage of 
'erasing the excess', whereby an initial over-extension of the relation of natural 
necessity is reversed.  This results in a normative protocol for believing 
constituted by the instruction to host and accept deliverances as per the agent's 
default competence.
85 Freschi (2012) 60
86 Doniger (1991) liv-lv; also quoted in part in Francavilla (2006) 187
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The Śloka-vārttika verse provides a pairing of the terms 'ascribed' (prāptā) and 
'replaced' (apodyate), which Kataoka translates as 'ascribed' and 'exceptionally 
cancelled' respectively, and which are flagged in bold font above.  The B ha -ṛ ṭ
īkā verse provides a similar pairing of 'general operation' (utsarga)ṭ 87 and 
'replaced' (apodyate)88, also flagged in bold font.  Similarly, at ŚV 2.65, 
Kumārila talks about a 'general operation' (utsarga) which is not subsequently 
replaced (anapodita).  All of these terms are technical terms borrowed from the 
grammatical literature to describe the operation of a grammatical rule. 
Kumārila's use of these terms indicate that he is seeking to understand the 
nature of epistemic success in part through the interpretative framework of 
general and specific rules.  In particular, this suggests that his account of 
epistemic status involves in part a protocol for belief adoption analogous to 
Pā iniṇ 's protocol for word formation.  An investigation of the origins of the 
terms 'defeat' (bādha), 'ascribed' (prāptā), 'general operation' (utsarga) and 
'replacement operation' (apavāda), from which 'replaced' (apodyate) is derived, 
in the grammatical and ritual interpretation literatures will thus illuminate 
Kumārila's intention in the present epistemological context.
87 See also TS 2861, Kamalaśīla's commentary below TS 2862, TS 2865 and TS 
2869  where a similar term 'apoh-' is used.  This term may be a wrong reading 
for 'apod-'. 
88 There is some confusion between the terms 'replaced' (apodyate) and 'excluded' 
(apohyate).  In devanāgarī script, it would be difficult to see the difference so 
there is potential for scribal error.  Both editions of TS uses the terminology of 
apoh- ('exclusion') at TS 2861 and throughout the texts of Śāntarak ita andṣ  
Kamalaśīla.  By contrast, Kataoka (2011) 259 quotes 'apodyate' for TS 2862. 
Accordingly,'replacement' rather than 'exclusion' has been assumed throughout, 
as this also makes more sense.  A wrong reading as 'apohyate' could have been 
introduced by later copyists, who were conflating Kumārila's ideas with the 
Buddhist apoha-theory.  The substantive issue addressed here is strengthened 
by the 'replacement' reading but does not absolutely depend on it.  In any case, 
the terminology of defeat and exclusion is used rather loosely, at least in the 
edited texts.  Kamalaśīla glosses 'dependence on a replacement operation' as 
'dependence on a defeater' at TS 2866.
159
Subsection 1: 'General operation' and 'replacement operation'
Referring to a rule given in Mīmā sā ṃ Sūtra 6.5.54, Renou explains, “il s'agit de 
l'application d'un principe grammatical bien connu, aux termes duquel la règle 
générale (utsarga, nyāya, sāmānya) cède le pas à la règle particulière 
(apavāda, viśe aṣ )”89.  Kahrs similarly describes a substitution model which is “a 
well-developed methodological procedure in Pā inian grammar and in the ritualṇ  
Sūtras”90.  In the grammatical context, “the linguistic derivational process are 
accounted for by saying 'Y occurs in the place of X' as opposed to 'X becomes 
Y'.”91  Kahrs explains that the substitution model was extended from its use in 
ritual interpretation to the new use in grammar.  Kahrs writes: 
“In other words, something automatically applies (prāpnoti) unless there 
is some specific instruction, ādeśa, to overrule it.  In practice this comes 
down to 'substitute', and the usage of the term ādeśa in grammar is 
accordingly nothing more than a special application of its liturgical use.”92 
In the above Śloka-vārttika verse, Kumārila's uses the term 'prāptā' to signify 
that a truth-ascription is automatic, and uses the term apodyate instead of 
ādeśa to indicate a special instruction.  Likewise in the B ha - īkā verse, utsargaṛ ṭ ṭ  
has the sense of a general operation which automatically applies.
Herzberger also discusses the transference of a ritual model into grammatical 
analysis.  In the original ritual context, Herzberger surmises that its motivation 
may have been as follows:
“The problem of finding substitutes for materials prescribed in the 
context of certain rituals must have become acute as the Indo-European 
tribes migrated east.  The problem was two-fold: to find substitutes and 
to justify their substitution, ensuring that the Vedic injunction prescribing 
89 Renou (1941) 118
90 Kahrs (1998) 176
91 Kahrs (1998) 176
92 Kahrs (1998) 182
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the ritual is not violated.”93
Herzberger notes the teleological nature of this model, such that “rituals were 
conceived of teleologically; they were performed in order to bring about certain 
ends … Grammarians found an analogy between this description of ritual and, 
within the context of sentences, the roles of nouns and the principal verb.” 
Kumārila's further transference of this model into epistemology suggests that 
he conceived of the process of inquiry as normatively constrained by the pursuit 
of an externally defined goal, constituted by some positive epistemic status.
In the context of grammar, the linguist Pā ini provides a system of rules whichṇ  
constitute a generative grammar of the Sanskrit language.  Correctly forming a 
word from its verbal root and obtaining the correct inflection requires 
performing a sequence of grammatical operations on the verbal root in the 
stipulated order.  Thus generative grammar involves a normative aspect in that 
it specifies the rules to be followed in order to achieve a correct description of 
language.94  In this context, too, Renou explains:
On sait que Pā ini a disséminé dans l'A hṇ ṣṭ ādhyāyī, et surtout dans le 
premier pāda, des sūtra qui constituent des axiomes à valeur générale, 
“illuminant comme une lampe la grammaire entiére” (Pradīpa ad M. I 49 
vt. 4) et que la tradition appelle des paribhā āsūtra.ṣ 95
Cardona describes a particular linguistic debate about how negative particles 
function within Pā ini's rules, ṇ which are understood as grammatical 
operations.96  In order to simplify the presentation, instead of taking an 
example from Pā ini's rules, the example 'i before e but not after c' ṇ can be 
used.  This is a rule that concerns the spelling of words.  The first part of this 
rule stipulates the operation of placing the letter i before the letter e.  The 
93 Herzberger (1986) 18-19
94 cf. Staal (1962) 70 fn.1: “Though modern linguistics aims at being descriptive 
and not prescriptive, it is possible to formulate general rules prescribing how to 
arrive at a set of rules which together constitute a description of a language.”
95 Renou (1941) 116
96 See Cardona (1967)
161
second part tells us that in restricted cases 'i before e' is not done.  The two 
possible interpretations of the negative injunction in this second rule involve 
interpreting the negative particle in either of two ways, which Cardona terms 
'limitation(al negation)' and 'negation (subsequent to tentatively applying)'.97
On the first interpretation, the formulation 'not after c' restricts the scope of the 
'i before e' to the remaining 25 letters.  The whole rule is thus a more 
economical way of saying 'i before e after a, after b, after d, after e, etc.' 
Specifying what falls outside the scope of the rule serves to indicate what falls 
within its scope.  On the second interpretation, the formulation 'not after c' 
constitutes a second operation to be performed subsequent to the first part, 
which backs out the effect of the first part, so that i is moved before e to yield a 
tentative result then moved back to its previous place after e to yield the final 
result.98  The grammatical end result is the same in either case, so it is a 
theoretical debate between rival linguistic models.99  On the first interpretation, 
negation serves to exclude a positive operation from acting in a domain, 
whereas on the second interpretation, negation fails to restrict the positive 
operation but involves subsequent cancellation of that positive operation and 
replacement by a different operation within a more limited domain.100
If we look at the operation element of each part of the rule in isolation from 
context, there is an apparent conflict between 'place i before e' and 'place e 
before i'.  This conflict is merely apparent, however, either because the rules 
are restricted to mutually exclusive domains on the first interpretation, or 
because they are to be considered serially on the second interpretation.  In 
either case, the restriction in scope involves distinguishing between generally 
applicable and specifically applicable rules.  As Cardona tells us, “[a] rule 
providing a general operation is called an utsarga(vākya), one which provides a 
97 See Cardona (1967) 34
98 The analogy is slightly imperfect at this point, because the example rule is not 
part of a larger system of operations in the way that Pā ini's rules are,ṇ  so the 
notion of a previous place is rather shaky.
99 See Joshi and Roodbergen (1981) 44-45 for a discussion of this debate
100 Strictly speaking, it involves cancellation and replacement by a different positive 
operation.  Mere cancellation is modelled by a similar dichotomy between vidhi 
and prati edha.ṣ
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specific operation is called an apavāda(vākya)”101  A very similar dichotomy is 
between vidhi, or positive operation, which operates in an unrestricted domain, 
and prati edha, or cancellation, which operates in a restricted domain.  Asṣ  
Cardona explains, “The essential difference between prati edhaṣ  and apavāda is 
that while the latter counters an utsarga by providing another positive 
operation … a prati edhaṣ  counters a vidhi by providing its absence.”102  It is on 
this basis that the term 'replacement operation' has been chosen here.
These same considerations about the distinction between negation as exclusion 
from a domain and as replacement are also found in the literature on ritual 
interpretation, which is developed by a series of thinkers which includes 
Kumārila.  This is a specifically normative context, so the interpretation of the 
negation becomes a normative question.  Staal discusses the differing analyses 
of negation of both verbs and nouns as either a positive injunction through 
exclusion (paryudāsa) or a negative injunction through prohibition 
(prati edha).ṣ 103  Staal contrasts the ritual injunctions 'he shall not look' and 'he 
shall not eat'.  As instructions within the contexts of particular rituals, the 
former “positively enjoins something opposed to looking”104, thus involves 
exclusion, whereas the latter “does not enjoin … any definite action different 
from eating, but it prohibits eating”105, thus involves prohibition.  A similar 
distinction obtains in the case of nouns also.  Staal provides the single example 
of the instruction 'not at the after-sacrifices does he say ye-yajamahe', where 
“the context shows that … it means … 'at sacrifices other than the after-
sacrifices he shall say ye-yajamahe'.”106  Here, negation applies to the term 
'after-sacrifices', and the type of negation is exclusion, as it results in a positive 
injunction.
The notion of 'apoha' or 'exclusion' may also be related to the notion of 
'apavāda' or replacement operation.  Thus variant readings as 'apohyate' and 
101 Cardona (1967) 35
102 Cardona (1967) 40
103 See Staal (1962)
104 Staal (1962) 59
105 Staal (1962) 57
106 Staal (1962) 59
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'apodyate' are seen in different edited texts.107  In any case, there is an affinity 
between the way these two terms denote very similar ideas of an operation that 
negates and replaces a procedure.  In her discussion of the debate between the 
philosophers Bhart hari and Dignāga, Herzberger explains that Dignāga “wasṛ  
forced to concede the consequences that Bhart hari had drawn from this view:ṛ  
that the occasioning ground for names is in excess of the spatio-temporal 
bearers.”108  However, Dignāga provided an account of apoha as an operation 
“to erase this excess … and to restitute the rights of Kātyāyana's aphorism on 
names.”109  Although there are various negational aspects to Dignāga's apoha 
operation, the key feature is that “[t]he apoha-operation is restricted to that 
part of the name-giving sentence which designates its object indirectly through 
universals …  those elements … alone are subject to the apoha-operation which 
are in excess of their spatio-temporal bearers …”110
In Chapter Two above, it was seen how Bhattacharya explains that “svabhāva 
turned out to be, so to say, a lance free and readily available for use by anyone 
and everyone”111.  The use of the terms apoha and apavāda by different writers 
for different purposes suggests that they similarly constitute another 
terminological resource which could be flexibly employed.  Indeed, just as this 
research notes the parallels in the grammatical literature in regard to the notion 
of apavāda, Herzberger also suggests, “[m]odels for Dignāga's apoha 
operation, I think, are to be found in the deleting procedures used by 
grammarians, in Bhart hari's view that universals abandon their number whenṛ  
they become associated with individuals … and in Bhart hari's idea of ṛ apoha.”112
107 Both editions of TS use the terminology of apoh- ('exclusion') at TS 2862 and 
throughout the texts of Śāntarak ita and Kamalaśīla.  By contrast, Kataokaṣ  
(2011) 259 quotes 'apodyate' for TS 2862.
108 Herzberger (1986) 124
109 Herzberger (1986) 125
110 Herzberger (1986) 124-125
111 Bhattacharya (2012) 610
112 Herzberger (1986) 125
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Subsection 2  : More on exceptions  
Tantra-yuktis are interpretative devices employed in various Indian intellectual 
disciplines.  As Helmut Scharfe explains in relation to the early political text 
Artha-śāstra, “Among the tantra-yukti-s listed in XV 1,3 there are logical 
(upamāna, arthâpatti, sa śṃ aya, vikalpa, ūhya) and interpretative (uddeśa, 
nirdeśa, upadeśa, apadeśa, atideśa, etc.) terms that are also known from the 
Mahābhāṣya …”113  Such devices can be seen to constitute a meta-level set of 
terminology in which the logic of the underlying arguments can be classified or 
analysed.
Scharfe tells us that “[t]he elaboration of the thirty-two tantra-yukti-s “text-
fittings” is the only topic in the last book of the Arthaśāstra (book XV) … the 
relation of this book with the text is found only in the illustrations; the list of 
terms and their definitions are absolutely neutral and might as well be taken 
from another source, e.g. a philosophical text.  There are, in fact, indications 
that the tantra-yuktis have an extraneous source.”114  Scharfe goes on to 
discuss the presence of similar final tantra-yukti sections in the medical texts 
Caraka-sa hitṃ ā and Suśruta-sa hitṃ ā, and similar tantra-yukti listings or 
discussions in the Tamil grammar Tolkāppiyam, the Tamil grammar Nannūl and 
in the Sā khya text Yuktidīpikṃ ā.115  Scharfe suggests that several of these texts 
“can be dated in the first few centuries A.D.”116  As a “system of establishing 
rules and procedures”117, it might be expected that Mīmā sā would contain justṃ  
such tantra-yuktis, even if not explicitly documented.  
One of the technical devices listed in the Artha-śāstra is apavarga, which is 
substantially equivalent to the notion of an exception also captured by the term 
'apavāda'.  As Scharfe explains, “[t]he interplay of the general rule and its 
exception is an essential feature of Pāṇini's grammar; the Mahābhā ya uses theṣ  
113 Scharfe (1993) 265-266
114 Scharfe (1993) 265-266
115 See Scharfe (1993) 268-270
116 Scharfe (1993) 271
117 Taber (2012) 146
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terms utsarga and apavāda for these two classes of rules.  In the Arthaśāstra 
the relation of general rule and exception turns up frequently in the 
presentation of legal facts.”118  Scharfe refers to a rule providing for divorce, 
where this is possible under given circumstances, but then a final caveat 'But 
not when they have begotten children' constitutes “a clearly marked exception 
to the general rule.”119  Scharfe's second example involves a fine on a 
breadwinner who refuses to provide for his familial dependents.120  In this 
example, “we find not only an exception to the rule, but also an exception to 
the exception”121.  That those familial dependents who have been cast out of 
society due to wrongdoing need not be provided for constitutes a first 
exception; that one must provide for one's own mother constitutes an 
exception to that exception.122
Subsection 3: 'Exhortation'
The term 'vidhi' is translated as 'injunction' or as 'prescription'.  As Freschi 
explains, “vidhi denotes both a prescriptive sentence and its exhortative core … 
I distinguish the two aspects by calling the former “prescription” and the latter 
“prescriptive force”.”123  Above the notion of vidhi was compared to the notion of 
utsarga or general operation.  Freschi also explains that prescriptive force is 
connected with use of the optative grammatical ending by the Mīmā sāṃ  
theorists.124
Although Kumārila does not use the term 'vidhi' in this discussion, the general 
notion of exhortation to inquiry appears to be in the background of his 
discussion.  Thus Kumārila's discussion of this topic is provided as part of a 
118 Scharfe (1993) 271
119 Scharfe (1993) 272
120 See Scharfe (1993) 272
121 Scharfe (1993) 272
122 See Scharfe (1993) 272
123 Freschi (2012) 19
124 Freschi (2012) 20
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commentary on a Mīmā sāṃ  Sūtra that concerns codanā or Vedic injunction.125 
In the rules of exegesis, vidhi is a positive injunction which contrasts with 
ni edha/ prati edha or prohibition.ṣ ṣ 126  Lingat describes a range of injunctions 
defined in the Mīmā sā ṃ literature, including “the primary injunction pure and 
simple (utpatti-vidhi) … the injunction of employment (prayoga-vidhi) which 
fixes the order in which the different parts of the rite should be performed … 
and the injunction of exclusive specification (parisa khyā-vidhiṃ , which operates 
as a prohibition) …”127  
Similarly, Francavilla explains that “[g]enerally, the term “vidhi” denotes a 
positive prescription, while the terms niṣedha and pratiṣedha make reference to 
a prescription having a negative content … The terms codanā and vidhi are 
equivalent in many contexts.”128
Subsection 4: 'Conflict'
Conflict (virodha) is also one of various forms of negation that have been 
identified in the grammatical literature129  and it constitutes a technical term in 
that literature.  Patañjali explains that a 'general operation' is 'defeated' by a 
'replacement operation'.130  However, the later linguist Kaiya a describes anṭ  
interesting divergence of opinion between Kātyāyana and Patañjali on the 
circumstances under which this happens.  Kātyāyana holds that defeat can only 
happen when there is conflict between the operations, whereas Patañjali holds 
that defeat can occur even when there is no such conflict.131  As Joshi and 
Roodbergen explain, for the grammarians, the term 'defeat' is used as 
125 Cf. Kataoka (2011) 160-161
126 See Kataoka (2011) 159-160
127 Lingat (1973) 153
128 Francavilla (2006) 101
129 See for example the discussion by Ko a-bha a at Joshi (1990) 288 andṇḍ ṭṭ  
referenced below
130 See e.g. MB 2.1.24: “apavādai  utsargā  bādhyante”.  See also Joshi (1969) 158ḥ ḥ
131 See Joshi and Roodbergen (1973) 18-19 and Joshi and Roodbergen (1976) 15
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something that holds between two grammatical operations, whereas conflict 
(virodha) and sameness of result (ekaphalatva) are terms applied to the 
outcomes of applying the rules.132  Joshi and Roodbergen also explain that 
defeat cannot hold between two general operations, but only between a general 
operation and a replacement operation and that conflict (viprati edha) “isṣ  
assumed to occur between two rules, if both are of equal force; if both are 
applicable to the same example, and if they cannot be applied together.”133
Renou explains: 
“Le terme viprati edhaṣ  apparaît aussi dans le rituel en concurrance avec 
virodha (qui le glose chez M.) et, isolement, avec vibādhamāna … qui 
montre un cas … de la racine bādh- dite de regles qui s'entravent”134.
Renou describes the rule 'in case of conflict, the later [operation] ought to be 
performed'135 as one of the most significant general operations of Pā ini'sṇ  
grammar.  Renou also explains: 
“Les philosophes du rituel ont emprunté cette paribhāṣā ; les Mī. XII 4 37 
donnent la formule viprati edhe paramṣ , infléchie d'ailleurs vers une 
valeur différente “lorsqu'il y a prohibition mutuelle (entre ce qui est en 
vue du rite et ce qui est en vue de l'homme), c'est l'autre (i.e. ce qui est 
en vue du rite) qui est à effectuer”.”136  
If the Mīmā sā philosophers were able to adapt the meaning of this rule in theṃ  
context of ritual, one may expect also a further adaptation to the context of 
epistemology.
A key discussion in the Mīmā sā-sūtra involves various aspects of meaningṃ  
132 Joshi and Roodbergen (1973) 19 fn.68
133 Joshi and Roodbergen (1969) 159
134 Renou (1941) 117 fn.1
135 A hṣṭ ādhyāyī 1.4.2: 'viprati edhe para  kāryam'ṣ ṃ
136 Renou (1941) 117
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roughly corresponding to the ideas of denotation, connotation, contextual 
meaning etc.  The discussion of this by Śabara and Kumārila begins by 
considering whether a statement should be taken according to its denotation or 
its connotation.  In the chosen example, “The Gārhapatya [fire] should be 
worshipped with the [verse] to Indra”137, the denotation is that the fire is to be 
worshipped whereas the connotation is that Indra is to be worshipped.  There 
are in fact four possible meanings of the verse, because it is additionally 
possible to suppose that both should be jointly worshipped or that either one 
could be freely selected for worship.  Here denotation is the general rule 
(utsarga) and connotation is the exception (apavāda).138
A later sūtra presents six aspects of meaning in order from strongest to 
weakest.  The structure of the discussion by both Śabara and Kumārila is then 
to examine each of the five adjacent pairs to confirm that they do indeed stand 
in the relation of stronger to weaker.  As such, the structure of this discussion 
very closely resembles that used by Kau ilya in the Arthaśāstra to assess theṭ  
relative gravity of various different types of political crisis that can occur.
In their discussions of how the various elements of meaning play a role, both 
Śabara and Kumārila himself begin by confirming that there is indeed conflict 
(virodha) between such elements, which means that there are numerous 
possible interpretations of any one statement.139  
Interestingly, the literature on conflict was still in continuing development by 
Buddhist philosophers of Kumārila's time and later.  Dharmakīrti distinguishes 
between two varieties of conflict, which I shall translate as 'mutually scope-
restricting' and 'mutually displacing'.140  This distinction has been discussed in 
recent scholarship, sometimes using the translations 'conceptual 
137 Aindryā gārhapatyam upati hateṣṭ
138 cf. Tantra Vārttika 755 ad 3.2.5: ata  param etad vicāryate ka utsargasyaḥ  
vi aya  ko 'pavādasyêtiṣ ḥ
139 See their commentaries ad Mīmā sā ṃ Sūtra 3.2.3, 3.2.5 and 3.3.14
140 That is, these terms can be used to translate Dharmakīrti's terms 
sahānavasthāna-virodha and paraspara-sthiti-lak a a-virodha/ṣ ṇ  paraspara-
parihāra-sthita-lak a aṣ ṇ -virodha respectively
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incompatibility' and 'factual incompatibility'141.
Dharmakīrti's former case, 'mutually scope-restricting', holds between a 
property and its negation, as illustrated by the conflict between blue and not-
blue.  As Kyuma discusses142, the later Buddhist philosopher Jñānaśrīmitra 
explains that blue and not-blue are a case of mere difference when in separate 
loci, but become a case of conflict when ascribed to the same locus.  It is on 
this basis that they are termed 'mutually scope-restricting'.  Further, 
Dharmottara argues that cases such as blue and yellow, which do not feature 
excluded middle, are a variant of this general case of 'mutually scope-
restricting'.  As Woo explains, “parasparasthitilak a avirodhaṣ ṇ  ['mutually scope-
restricting'] … can be understood as a kind of identical relation between 
properties in the logical world.”143  The absence of one property is invariably 
associated with the presence of the other.  Whether this invariable association 
is founded in either logical or metaphysical necessity, or is merely an empirical 
correlation is a question which I will not address.
Mutually scope-restricting properties are thus those such as colour that are 
inalienable from their loci, as they are held to be partly constitutive of their loci, 
and, due to the concomitant causal restriction, serve to define their entities. 
We should perhaps imagine different types of flowers such as bluebells and 
buttercups, or different types of minerals, such as lapis lazuli and gold, whose 
colour may be taken as innate to their classification as such.  This type of 
conflict is between properties which are in part constitutive of the entity.
By contrast, Dharmakīrti's latter case, 'mutually displacing' “occurs between 
two opposed facts (vastu, d os pa), such as light and darkness (ālokāndhakāra)ṅ  
or the sensation of heat and that of coldness (sīto asparśa).”  ṣṇ These are states 
of affairs which can exist in a single locus at different times, because they are 
not constitutive properties of their loci.144  These examples are presumably 
141 See Bandyopadhyay (1988), Kyuma (1997), Woo (2001)
142 Kyuma (1997) 26
143 Woo (2001) 424
144 Woo (2001) 423
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chosen because changes of a single entity or location in temperature and 
brightness are commonplace phenomena.  This model allows properties to be 
alienable from their substratum, so that a single locus can non-concurrently 
possess two contradictory properties such as light and dark or heat and cold. 
Similarly, a thought can non-concurrently possess both prāmā yamṇ  and non-
prāmā yamṇ .  As Woo explains: 
“When two facts in sahānavasthānavirodha ['mutually displacing'] 
contact each other in a place, the following three progressions occur: 1) 
They are ready to impede each other’s existence in that place; 2) The 
one with strong causal effectiveness (arthakriyākāritva) nullifies the 
other with less effectiveness; and 3) Only the former can exist while the 
latter ceases to exist in that place.  So, the two facts described in this 
‘incompatibility’ are in a relationship of the impeded and the impeder 
(nivartyanivartakabhāva).”145  
Specifically, two mutually exclusive or opposite properties are merely different 
when in different loci but in conflict when in the same locus.146  As Sucarita 
elaborates, “So, just as a single fire cannot be both cold and hot, in the same 
way a single thought cannot be both pramā a and non-pramā a.”ṇ ṇ 147  Kyuma's 
explanation, “While S [mutual displacement] occurs between two opposed 
facts, e.g., the sensation of heat and that of coldness, P [mutual scope-
restriction] stands between a property and its negation, e.g. 'blue' and 'non-
blue'”148 seems to resonate with Sucarita's example.
145 Woo (2001) 424
146 See Kyuma (1997) 26
147 ata  yathā naîkasyâgne  na śītô atvam evam jñānasya na pramā âpramā amḥ ḥ ṣṇ ṇ ṇ  
iti
148 Kyuma (1997) 1019
171
Section 4: Kumārila's logic of inquiry
The above section has provided some resources that can usefully be employed 
in understanding Kumārila's doctrine.  A large part of Kumārila's discussion in 
both the B ha - īkā and theṛ ṭ ṭ  Śloka-vārttika concerns the case of beliefs formed 
via non-Vedic sources, including beliefs formed on the basis of perception, 
reasoning and non-Vedic testimony.  The following sections will identify a 
normative protocol for belief adoption and revision that captures the logic of 
inquiry, initially through a careful examination of Kumārila's verse ŚV 2.53 in 
the Śloka-vārttika.  This protocol is especially relevant in the case of non-Vedic 
beliefs.
Kumārila's verse ŚV 2.53 has now been translated as follows:
ŚV 2.53: Therefore [the hypothesis] that a judgment [is based on] a 
Good Case deliverance, which has been ascribed (prāptā) from the fact 
of its being a judgment, …
… is replaced (apodyate) [only] by a deliverance that the object 
[of the judgment] is otherwise [than the way it was originally judged] or 
by the deliverance that there is a flaw in how the belief was formed.
The equivalent verse in the B ha - īkā has been translatedṛ ṭ ṭ  as follows:
TS 2861: So Goodness of Case [being] the essence of an epistemic kind 
remains the general operation (autsargikam) in all cases, [and] it is 
replaced (apodyate) either by a defeating deliverance or by the 
deliverance that there is a flaw in how the belief was formed.
Each of these two verses presents a two-step procedure, explained either in 
terms of 'being ascribed' and 'being replaced' or in terms of 'general operation' 
and 'replacement'.  The terminology used in these statements is the normative 
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terminology associated with generative grammar or exegesis of ritual 
instructions described above.  The ascription is of a capacity for accurate 
determination which is the essential disposition of an epistemic kind, as 
discussed in previous chapters.
Kumārila's logic of inquiry will accordingly now be examined in terms of stages 
of a normative protocol followed by a rational epistemic agent.  These stages 
are the instigating of inquiry, the prolonging of inquiry, and the termination of 
inquiry.
Kumārila's protocol can be likened, first of all, to Goldman's notion of a doxastic 
decision principle, or DDP.  Goldman explains, “We may represent a DDP as a 
function whose inputs are certain conditions of a cognizer -e.g., his beliefs, 
perceptual field, and ostensible memories-and whose outputs are prescriptions 
to adopt (or retain) this or that doxastic attitude-e.g., believing p, suspending 
judgment with respect to p, or having a particular subjective probability vis-à-
vis p.”149  Goldman notes that whether a subject is justified in believing depends 
partly on some unique DDP being correct, but assuming that this is the case, 
“Then S is justified in believing p at t if and only if the right DDP, when applied 
to the relevant conditions that characterize S at t, yields as output the 
prescription “believe p”.”150  This notion of a DDP captures a regulative function 
of justification principles, which Goldman distinguishes from theoretical 
functions of justification principles.151  Goldman writes, “It may well be 
suggested that a cognizer is justified in believing something just in case the 
rules of proper epistemic procedure prescribe that belief.  Principles that make 
such doxastic prescriptions might thereby “double as principles of 
justification.”152  This would perform a regulative function.  By contrast, a 
theoretical function is served by a theory which “considers an already formed 
belief of a cognizer and says what features are necessary and sufficient for that 
149 Goldman (1980) 29
150 Goldman (1980) 30
151 Goldman (1980)
152 Goldman (1980) 27
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belief to count as justified.”153  
A pragmatics of inquiry involving three conceptual stages in the process of 
inquiry will now be identified in Kumārila's discussion.  This stagewise process 
constitutes a pragmatics of inquiry in the Peircean sense of a belief-habit.  As 
Burks explains, “As a pragmatist Peirce held that a belief is a conscious habit of 
action … Peirce calls the activity of resolving genuine doubt and arriving at 
stable belief-habits inquiry … Peirce conceived of the three kinds of reasoning 
(abduction, deduction, and induction) as three stages of inquiry.”154  Kumārila's 
belief protocol can similarly be understood in terms of a belief-habit of the 
agent who seeks to arrive at stable beliefs.  Like that of Peirce, Kumārila's 
protocol would “lead to the avoidance of all surprise and to the establishment of 
a habit of positive expectation that shall not be disappointed”155.
Kumārila's canvassing of three alternatives to his own view was discussed 
above.  It will be suggested that Kumārila's critique of the second view serves 
to buttress his conception of how inquiry is instigated, Kumārila's critique of the 
first view serves to buttress his conception of how inquiry is prolonged, and 
Kumārila's critique of the third view serves to buttress Kumārila's conception of 
how inquiry is terminated.
Section 5: The instigating of inquiry
By rebutting the second view, discussed above, according to which neither 
epistemic success nor epistemic failure constitute the default intrinsic nature of 
deliverances, Kumārila is able to set up a presumption that one or the other is 
in fact the default intrinsic nature of deliverances.  As such, the epistemic agent 
must also default to accepting one or other status for his judgments. 
Kumārila's own view was that epistemic success must be ascribed to judgments 
153 Goldman (1980) 29
154 Burks (1946) 303
155 CP 5.197 quoted in Burks (1946) 303
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by default.  As a result, the agent must affirm or deny the propositional content 
of an awareness, but may not suspend belief as to the truth of a judgment in 
the way that Śāntarak ita willṣ  advocate.  Thus Kumārila's universe of 
propositional attitudes for inquiry includes belief, denial, and, as we shall see, 
genuine doubt, but not suspension of belief.  Kumārila's claim is that the 
process of inquiry begins with acceptance of propositional content as true, 
mirroring the psychological fact that we are willing to believe on first 
impressions.
This claim is supported by employing terminology from the normative 
disciplines as described above.  The notion of a general operation involves the 
idea of an initial prescription which is rationally justified by its role in instigating 
a normative process, here the process of inquiry.  Similarly, the notion of 
'ascription' indicates a first stage in the process of inquiry, subject to later 
revision.
The first part of the verses under examination, as set out above, run as follows, 
in the B ha - īkā ṛ ṭ ṭ and the Śloka-vārttika respectively:
TS 2861ab: So Goodness of Case [being] the essence of an epistemic 
kind remains the general operation (autsargikam) in all cases, …
ŚV 2.53ab: Therefore [the hypothesis] that a judgment [is based on] a 
Good Case deliverance, which has been ascribed (prāptā) from the fact 
of its being a judgment, …
In the B ha - īkā ṛ ṭ ṭ presentation, Kumārila clarifies the procedure of a defeasible 
general operation potentially followed by replacement operation.  Kumārila's 
use of the term 'ascribed' in the Śloka-vārttika presentation similarly serves to 
introduce the feature of prāmā yam into the epistemic process ṇ through an 
initial operation.  As per the discussion of the previous chapter, what is ascribed 
is a capacity for epistemic success which is a real dispositional property, and by 
extension epistemic success itself.  This attribution involves a transition from 
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the fact that an awareness has been produced to the fact that this awareness is 
veridical, i.e. that a belief has been formed which accurately determines its 
object.  Thus the term 'ascribed' introduces a truth-claim which is provisionally 
attributed on the basis that it would account for the awareness that has arisen. 
Such a notion accords well with Charles Peirce's notion of a hypothesis and its 
role in abductive inference.  Peirce tells us: 
“By a hypothesis, I mean … any … supposed truth from which would 
result such facts as have been observed”156  
Kumārila's term 'prāptā' or 'ascribed' can thus be seen as a way of introducing 
a claim that functions in the same way as a hypothesis functions for Peirce. 
Specifically, the fact that p constitutes a hypothesis that would account for the 
awareness as of p.  In the terms of Kumārila's gloss, the fact that a capacity to 
accurately determine an object has operated constitutes a hypothesis that 
would account for the awareness as of an accurately determined object.
Further, the structure of Kumārila's argument in the first half of each of the 
above verses parallels the structure of Peirce's abductive inference.  There are 
numerous interpretative difficulties concerning Peirce's views on abduction, but 
affinities can be found at a high level.  As Fann explains, already in his earlier 
papers, Peirce considers abduction as an evidencing process, whereby: 
“we pass from the observation of certain facts to the supposition of a 
general principle to account for the facts … abduction is an inference 
from a body of data to an explaining hypothesis, or from effect to cause 
…”157  
In Kumārila's argument, the idea that an accurate determination has been 
made and the awareness as of an accurately determined object likewise stand 
156 CP 6.525 quoted in Frankfurt (1958) 596
157 Fann (1970) 10
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in the relation of explaining hypothesis to data and in the relation of effect to 
cause.
Like Peirce, Kumārila's use of inference is to move from the explanatory value 
of the proposition to attributing truth to the proposition.  However, Peirce treats 
abductive inference within the context of scientific discovery, with its 
multiplicity of observation about each of which many hypotheses can be made. 
By contrast, Kumārila applies a similar form of reasoning to the single question 
of the epistemic status of an occurrent judgment, where only two possible 
hypotheses are available, that it is accurate or erroneous.  In this way, the 
question of hypothesis construction does not feature.  Only the question of 
hypothesis selection is a live question.  At this stage, Kumārila's discussion is 
focused on the case on ordinary beliefs rather than beliefs formed on the basis 
of Vedic scripture.
Frankfurt contrasts the way in which “abduction leads us to adopt hypotheses 
as working hypotheses, as worthy of investigation and verification”158 with 
induction, which “leads us to adopt hypotheses as true or as verified”159. 
Abduction thus leads us to hypotheses which, in the expression used by Fann, 
are adopted 'on probation'.  Similarly, Kumārila's presentation involves 
assuming the accuracy of any given perceptual, rational or testimonial 
awareness as a working hypothesis or hypothesis on probation.
Fann adds that abduction is an ampliative form of inference, where the 
conclusion amplifies rather than explicates what is stated in the premises, and 
so does not follow from the premises with necessity.160  As such, it is “the only 
kind of reasoning that introduces new ideas into our store of reasoning.”161 
There is an affinity with the way in which “being a source of new information is 
an important characteristic of pramā aṇ  … for Kumārila”162.
158 Frankfurt (1958) 595
159 Frankfurt (1958) 595
160 See Fann (1970) 7-8
161 Fann (1970) 7-8
162 Kataoka (2003) 89
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Kumārila's idea is thus that the application of the general operation results in 
rational belief in its propositional content rather than just suspension of belief in 
that propositional content pending some further determination.  As Kataoka 
notes, such dependence on some further determination is one reading of the 
'from something else' position opposed to Kumārila's own 'from itself' 
position.163
In the Śloka-vārttika, Kumārila begins to set out his own view as follows – 
ŚV 2.47: It should be understood that the validity of all pramā as isṇ  
independent, for a capacity not existing by itself cannot be produced by 
something else.
Kumārila's argument for independent validity appears prima facie to be the 
same as the argument of the 'both independent' advocate for the first view of 
independent validity discussed above164.  That is, both Kumārila's own view and 
the first view reason from the fact of awareness (bodhakatvam) to prāmā yam.ṇ  
However, as described above, the advocate of the first view engaged in forward 
reasoning from the fact of awareness to a deductively valid conclusion.  By 
contrast, Kumārila's 'ascription' terminology suggests that Kumārila engages in 
backward reasoning from the fact of awareness to a hypothetical explanation 
which locates prāmā yam as a feature in the awareness, i.e. posits that anṇ  
accurate determination has been made.
In order to get the process of inquiry started, then, a general rule must be 
applied, which is to attribute truth to a belief on a basis that purports to be 
modally necessary due to the metaphysical nature of beliefs.  That is, the belief 
is individuated as a true belief on the assumption that all relevant facts that 
could compromise the truth of the belief are known.  This step can be 
163 See Kataoka (2011) 63
164 This point is made in Kataoka (2011) 233-4 fn170 commenting on ŚV 2.34ab: 
“This view of svata prāmā yaḥ ṇ  is the same as Kumārila's own siddhānta in that it 
takes validity to be ontologically innate to itself.”
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considered quasi-analytic in nature because truth is analytically entailed when 
conditions are appropriately normal, i.e. by Good Case deliverances.  That is, 
when the subject's cognitive faculties and the environmental conditions are 
sufficiently good, then the belief that is formed is guaranteed to be true due to 
the possession of a causal power which manifests itself under such 
circumstances.  Similarly, Fann explains that abduction “is the only logical 
operation which introduces any new ideas; for induction does nothing but 
determine a value, and deduction merely evolves the necessary consequences 
of a pure hypothesis”165.  
This step yields an intermediate result.  The terms 'utsarga' and 'prāptā' in the 
above verses thus build on their significance in the earlier contexts by 
suggesting that an apparent awareness should be treated as a working 
hypothesis.  Prakken similarly explains that “a general rational principle people 
employ is: assume as much as possible that things are normal; under this 
assumption conclusions can be drawn which have to be retracted only in 
unusual circumstances.”166
It can now be seen that the strength of Pārthasārathi's interpretation is that it 
captures how the process of inquiry gets going.  We must act as though validity 
is in fact produced in the case of all awarenesses, whether true or false.  As 
Arnold explains, Pārthasārathi's interpretation is based on “what Uṃveka saw 
as an unwanted consequence: that all cognitions must be assumed intrinsically 
to confer prima facie justification.”167  However, whereas for the Pārthasārathi-
Arnold reading, this idea is “the whole doctrine of intrinsic validity”168, in the 
present interpretation this is considered merely an instigating stage within a 
larger normative process of inquiry, with further stages to be described next.
165 CP 5.171, quoted in Fann (1970) 10
166 Prakken (1997) 67
167 Arnold (2005) 92
168 Arnold (2005) 92
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Section 6: The prolonging of inquiry
It has been argued in the previous section that Kumārila's line ŚV 2.53ab 
involves a Peircean abductive inference to the truth of the belief, that is, to the 
hypothesis that the occurrent awareness has made an accurate determination. 
It will now be argued that the second half of the above verse, line ŚV 2.53cd, 
presents a subsequent stage of inquiry whereby the hypotheses can be 
replaced by a contrary hypothesis under certain circumstances.  Together, the 
two parts of the verse constitute the protocol for the epistemic agent which 
capture the logic of belief adoption and revision.
The second part of the verses under examination, as set out above, run as 
follows, in the Śloka-vārttika and the B ha - īkā respectively:ṛ ṭ ṭ
ŚV 2.53cd: [the hypothesis] … is replaced (apodyate) [only] by a 
deliverance that the object [of the judgment] is otherwise [than the way 
it was originally judged] or by the deliverance that there is a flaw in how 
the belief was formed.
TS 2861cd: [the hypothesis] … is replaced (apodyate) either by a 
defeating deliverance or by the deliverance that there is a flaw in how 
the belief was formed.
The Śloka-vārttika verse above explains that replacement is based on (an 
awareness of) either the object being other than what was originally believed, 
or the belief forming process having gone wrong in some way.  The second 
possibility is expressed in terms of the causal factors of awareness being 
defective.  The B ha - īkā verse ṛ ṭ ṭ similarly explains that replacement is based on 
a defeater or on the belief forming process having gone wrong in some way. 
The B ha - īkāṛ ṭ ṭ  verse appears to draw a distinction between a defeater and a 
faulty belief-forming process.  However, the Śloka-varttika clarifies that both 
are cases involving defeat, as the latter case is one where 'defeat has been 
180
indirectly ascribed'169, and Kamalaśīla also makes the same point.170
In these verses, Kumārila presents a process of defeat as causing belief 
revision, thereby moving forward the process of inquiry.  By focusing on the 
role of the defeating awareness, Kumārila's protocol involves a notion of mental 
state defeater.  Indeed, Kumārila provides no independent discussion of 
propositional defeaters, indicating that his sole concern is to provide a protocol 
executable from the perspective of the individual knower.  Goldman likewise 
explains that the inputs to a DDP should be current cognitive states rather than 
states of the world such as truth and falsity.  This is because:
“If a DDP is to be actually usable for making deliberate decisions, the 
conditions that serve as inputs must be accessible or available to the 
decision-maker at the time of decision.”171  
The notion of 'bādha' or 'defeat' is also seen in the ritual interpretation 
literature.  Francavilla explains:
“in case of conflict [between various types of sources] … the preceding 
source prevails on the following.  This is seen as a case of bādha, that is 
to say, exclusion, which is a general way to organise normative 
complexity that applies also, for instance, to methods of 
interpretation.”172
Kahrs' identification of a model of substitution as “a well-developed 
methodological procedure in Pā inian grammar and in the ritual Sūtras”ṇ 173 was 
discussed above.  In her discussion of Kahrs' findings, Candotti tentatively 
concludes that “a substitution model was, by the time of Pā ini, ṇ at the disposal 
169 See ŚV 2.58
170 See P under TS 2862: “bādhā  – arthānyathātvâvadhāra a  kāra a-du a-ḥ ṇ ṃ ṇ ṣṭ
jñāna  ṃ ca”
171 Goldman (1980) 30
172 Francavilla (2006) 189
173 Kahrs (1998) 176
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of all schools with an hermeneutic background and aim.”174  Kumārila's notion of 
defeat likewise seems to tie into this idea of substitution derived from the ritual 
context.  Thus Kumārila writes:
ŚV 2.58: On the other hand, in the case of an awareness that the cause 
is defective, although a different object is established, defeat is ascribed 
indirectly, having the same object, like the milk-pail etc.
Jayanta explains this example more fully, as follows:
'[Water] should be carried [towards the east] using a milk-pail [for the 
sake] of one who desires cattle' - here, because of the reference to 
cattle as the desired object, the milk-pail is for the sake of humans, so, 
even though [they] thus deal with different [things] due to [their being 
used] for the sake of ritual and for the sake of humans, there is a single 
effect of the wooden bowl and milk-pail called 'carrying', so when that 
[carrying water] by the milk-pail is being accomplished, the wooden 
bowl ceases [to be applicable].175
The example concerns a situation where the general form of the ritual is 
modified by substituting a milk-pail for a wooden bowl.  This modification is 
made to reflect the fact that the patron of the ritual acts from a desire for 
cattle, i.e. a human purpose, rather than out of a duty to maintain the 
performance of the ritual, i.e. a ritual purpose.  By raising this example, 
Kumārila is suggesting that a defeater acts to replace a belief.  That an 
overriding defeater conforms to such a model, by pushing out the old belief, 
might be evident, but Kumārila here emphasizes that an undercutting defeater 
acts in this way, because the original belief is replaced by a belief in the 
opposite proposition.
174 Candotti (2012) 35
175 NM 432: “godohanena paśu-kāmasya pra ayed iti kāmyamāna-paśu-nirdeśātṇ  
puru ārtha  godohanṣ ṃ am ity eva  krtvartha-puru ārthatayā bhinna-vi ayatve 'piṃ ṣ ṣ  
camasa-godohanayo  pra ayanâkya  kāryam ekam iti godohanena nirv tteḥ ṇ ṃ ṛ  
tasmi ś camaso nivartate|”ṃ
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As Kahrs explains, one mode of substitution is 'ceasing', as for example, “when 
one says 'Bitter herb medicine in the case of phlegm', one means that the 
phlegm is removed when the medicine is taken”176.  In a similar way, for 
Kumārila, defeat of a belief involves ceasing to ascribe a positive epistemic 
status to a belief not through mere cancellation of that status, but by 
substituting an opposed status.  In terms of the feature-placing model 
discussed above, whereby conflicting features may alternately be posited of a 
single substratum, Kumārila's conception seems to be that defeat can only 
occur when one feature is substituted for another at a later point in time. 
Kumārila's term 'defeat' (bādh-) thus constitutes something like an antonym for 
his term 'ascribe' (prāp-).  In Kahrs' description of the substitution model in 
grammar, “stages in the linguistic derivational process are accounted for by 
saying 'Y occurs in the place of X' as opposed to 'X becomes Y'.”177  Similarly, in 
Kumārila's epistemology, an ascription of positive epistemic status can be 
overturned not by mere cancellation but only by a positive act of substitution 
for an alternative epistemic status.  This again connects with Kumārila's 
endorsement of negation as difference and conflict rather than absence.
In the modern context, Claudia Blöser traces the notion of defeasibility back to 
an article, 'The Ascription of Responsibility and Rights' by H.L.A Hart.  There 
Hart notes that “it is usually not possible to define a legal concept such as 
“trespass” or “contract” by specifying the necessary and sufficient conditions for 
its application.”178  For such legal concepts, the word 'unless' is indispensable, 
as it indicates how a contract, for example, can be defeated, even when the 
ordinarily sufficient conditions have been satisfied.179  Hart explains that he will 
“borrow and extend”180 the word 'defeasible', which was previously being “used 
of a legal interest in property which is subject to termination or 'defeat' in a 
number of different contingencies but remains intact if no such contingencies 
176 Kahrs (1998) 249
177 Kahrs (1998) 176
178 Hart (1949) 174
179 See Hart (1949) 174-175
180 Hart (1949) 175
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mature.”181  Hart thus identifies such concepts as both ascriptive, such that they 
“ascribe responsibility for actions”182 and defeasible.  Fascinatingly, as Blöser 
explains, Hart “identifies a defeasible structure … also for concepts traditionally 
designated as “mental elements” in criminal law, such as mens rea, 
intentionality or voluntariness”183.  Hart explains that, although jurists have 
striven to identify some positive definition of such concepts, nevertheless, their 
content is in fact given by the absence of any defeater.  Hart writes:
“the word “voluntary” in fact serves to exclude a heterogeneous range of 
cases such as physical compulsion, coercion by threats, accidents, 
mistakes, etc., and not to designate a mental element or state ; nor does 
“involuntary” signify the absence of this mental element or state.”184
Hart's notion of ascription seems to parallel that of Kumārila, in as much as to 
ascribe prāmā yam is to make a normative judgment that appropriately normalṇ  
causal conditions are responsible for the arising of a belief.  Further, Hart's 
defeasible structure parallels that of Kumārila, inasmuch as Kumārila's 
stipulation involves the idea that the end of inquiry results in prāmā yam beingṇ  
ascribed not on the basis of some positive definition.  Rather, what Hart says 
about certain legal concepts, that “in order to determine … how their presence 
and absence are established it is necessary to refer back to the various 
defences [i.e. possible defeaters]”185 can also be said about Kumārila's notion of 
prāmā yam.ṇ
This also ties in with a pattern of ritual structure where an action is to be 
performed in cases where no stated exception holds.  Kahrs  analyses passage 
24.8 from the paribhā ā section of the pre-common era text the Baudhāyanaṣ  
Śrautasūtra as an example of general case and exceptions and summarizes its 
structure and purport as follows:
181 Hart (1949) 175, also quoted in Blöser (2013) 131
182 Hart (1949) 171
183 Blöser (2013) 132
184 Hart (1949) 180, also quoted in Blöser (2013) 132
185 Hart (1949) 181
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“the default case is that one sacrifices on the Āhavanīya fire;
unless there is a specific instruction, the sacrifice must be made by the 
Adhvaryu priest; 
unless there is a specific instruction, the sacrifice must be made by 
means of a Sruc ladle; 
unless there is a specific instruction, the sacrifice must be made only 
after the fire has received the kindling.
Otherwise a specific instruction (ādeśa) would tell you to substitute that 
for the general instruction.”186
In this passage, there is no positive specification of sufficient conditions for 
sacrificing on the Āhavanīya fire.  Rather, such an instruction obtains in the 
absence of a specific exclusion.  Similarly mens rea in Hart's analysis, and 
prāmā yam in Kumārila's analysis, areṇ  both ascribed, to the defendant and to 
the judgment respectively, in the absence of a contrary instruction.
From this beginning, defeasibility has come to feature in epistemology and 
other areas of philosophy.  Similarly in the Indian context, it appears that 
Kumārila makes a parallel move by transferring a notion from the context of 
legal and ritual interpretation and generative grammar into epistemology. 
Indeed, this should be unsurprising given the position of Mīmā sā as aṃ  
theoretical resource for legal reasoning in classical India.187  Thus both 
Mīmā sā ṃ reasoning functioning in the context of legal and ritual interpretation 
in classical India, as well as contemporary legal reasoning, involve forms of 
defeasible, case-based reasoning or informal logic.  As such, it should not be a 
surprise that Kumārila here presents a reasoning strategy which does not 
conform to a deductively valid schema but rather to a defeasible, informal logic 
which has much in common with contemporary legal reasoning.
In contemporary epistemology, the notion of a defeater seems to have been 
186 Kahrs (1998) 183; the quoted sentence has been broken out onto separate lines 
for clarity
187 Cf. Sarkar (1909), Lingat (1973), Francavilla (2006)
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developed in the context of literature on “defeasibility conditions”, which 
represented one response to the Gettier problem, according to which 
knowledge was analysed as undefeated justified true belief.188  As Shope 
explains, “Certain modifications of a standard analysis of knowing involve what 
are commonly called “defeasibility conditions,” but there is no agreement about 
the definition of that technical label.”189  In the literature, defeat is considered to 
apply to the justification for a belief or to the reason for holding the belief, 
rather than to the belief itself.  Michael Bergmann distinguishes between 
“'propositional' defeaters (which are propositions) and 'mental state' defeaters 
(which are either propositional attitudes or experiences or combinations 
thereof).”190  According to Bergmann, in a defeasibility account of knowledge, 
“the mere truth of [a defeater for a belief] prevents [that belief] from counting 
as knowledge.”191  By contrast, a mental state defeater is internal to the 
believer and is constituted by whatever would cause a belief to be justified.192 
Moving between the two notions of defeat corresponding to these two types of 
defeater, Goldman explains that “an indefeasibility theory would say that S's 
justification j for believing that p is defeated if and only if there is some true 
proposition q such that the conjunction of q and j does not justify S in believing 
that p.  In slightly different terms, S's justification j is defeated just in case p 
would no longer be evident for S if q were evident for S.”193
Arnold importantly observes that defeat is just by another cognition and not by 
some special falsifying cognition.194  The conclusion drawn from this by Arnold is 
that there is no more to the process of one cognition overriding another than 
what is phenomenologically given.  Characterizing defeat in terms of overriding 
rather than undercutting, Arnold writes: “a cognition can present itself as 
falsifying a previous one just insofar as it is the subsequent one that seems 
more credible.  And if that is not how it seems, then it will not appear, 
188 See Shope (1983) 45-74 for a survey of the literature on defeasibility in the 
context of additions to the JTB analysis of knowledge.
189 Shope (1983) 45
190 Bergmann (2005) 422; see also Bergmann (2006) 154-159
191 Bergmann (2005) 422
192 See Bergmann (2005) 422
193 Goldman (1976) 774
194 See Arnold (2005) 73
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phenomenologically, as an overriding cognition!”195  
The above verse links the objective fact that the belief formation process was 
flawed with the psychological fact that the belief is destabilized.  Kumārila's 
notion of flaw again suggests that the belief process and thus the epistemic 
status of the belief produced can be normatively evaluated.  Further, this 
normatively evaluable status is linked with the psychological process of 
destabilization of beliefs in a way that allows the subject to move away from a 
normatively sub-optimal situation.  Specifically, Kumārila's account involves two 
bases for belief revision.  Firstly, further inspection may show the nature of a 
distal object to be something other that what was initially believed.  Here, 
Kumārila recognizes the Peircean point that beliefs can be revised based on a 
“return to the object of their disquiet, namely the particular thing not known.”196 
Secondly, Kumārila provides an alternative non-Peircean method of belief 
revision, whereby instead of returning to the distal object, one re-considers the 
circumstances of belief formation.  If these are sub-optimal, this fact will 
destabilize the settled belief which was formed under such circumstances.
This distinction between two types of defeaters roughly corresponds to the 
distinction between overriding and undercutting defeaters in contemporary 
epistemology.  As Janvid explains, “[a]n overriding defeater to a knowledge-
claim P provides justification for non-P, while an undermining defeater to P 
defeats the justification provided for P.  In the latter case, no justification has 
thereby been provided for non-P.”197  Janvid provides the example of a printed 
flight itinerary, where an overriding defeater may be contrary information on 
the airport departure board, and an undermining defeater might be the 
discovery of a misprint in the itinerary.198  However, whereas Janvid clarifies 
that defeat occurs only when “the evidence for non-P is stronger than the 
evidence for P”199, so, in the airport example, presumably the departure board 
195 Arnold (2005) 73
196 Wiggins (2004) 94
197 Janvid (2008) 47
198 See Janvid (2008) 47
199 See Janvid (2008) 47
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information is presumed to have greater authority than a printed itinerary, 
Kumārila does not make this feature of defeat explicit.
The previous chapter presented an operational disjunction between pramā aṇ  
and non-pramā a, whereby the former functions independently whereas theṇ  
latter functions dependently and thereby ceases.  It can now be seen that non-
pramā a ceases when undercutting and overriding defeaters effect the removalṇ  
of bad features.  The undercutting defeater removes the bad feature by 
identifying its presence in the process of belief formation, whereas the 
overriding defeater removes the bad feature despite not specifically identifying 
it in the cause.  In one case, the vitiation is apprehended, and in the other 
case, the vitiation is supplanted.  By contrast, the functioning of a pramā a inṇ  
apprehending a distal object does not depend on any separable feature, but is 
simply due to the nature of awareness itself.  As such, nothing can cause the 
apprehension of a distal object by a pramā a to cease.  ṇ
In order to understand better the significance of the defeat process, Kumārila's 
discussion in the B ha - īkā will now be examined.  This ṛ ṭ ṭ constitutes a “more 
refined and sophisticated”200 discussion than that in the Śloka-vārttika, and a 
close reading of a core section of this text will illuminate the role of defeat in 
this belief protocol.  Kumārila starts by linking replacement with the arising of a 
mental state defeater in the ordinary process of belief formation as indicated. 
Kumārila writes:
TS 2865: The mental state defeater is just the determination that the 
object is different [from how it was originally cognized].  It excludes the 
earlier deliverance because it has a success of deliverances that is 
independent.
Kumārila next considers the status of the revised belief that has replaced an 
original belief:
200 Kataoka (2011) 46
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TS 2866: Although in respect of those [defeaters] there may again be 
dependence on replacement operation, in some cases, nevertheless, for 
a person who has developed a genuine doubt due to the earlier 
awareness, that [dependence] however will easily come to an end.
The first part of this verse characterizes the possibility of repeated defeat in 
terms of dependence on replacement operation.
The second part of this verse allows for the entertainment of doubt, so that the 
universe of propositional attitudes includes scope for doubting one's occurrent 
awarenesses and determinations.  Kumārila is here considering the case of an 
either/ or situation, where defeat of one possibility has nevertheless caused 
some element of residual doubt, as clarified in the next verse.  Kumārila 
recognizes that a believer may entertain a legitimate doubt even when her 
current phenomenological awareness is unproblematic, as in this case when she 
wonders if she was right to revise her belief.  The acknowledgement that the 
believer can exercise such doubt, so that the possibility of defeat can be 
entertained in respect of an awareness that is as yet phenomenologically 
secure, seems to tell against Arnold's reading, whereby phenomenological 
security is the entire basis for epistemic justification and for Arnold's conception 
of truth.  Rather, what is provided by the belief is not theoretical justification 
but Goldman's regulatory justification, merely justifying the holding of that 
belief at the relevant stage of inquiry.
Kumārila's paradigm inquirer in the above verse is the person who has a 
genuine doubt.  By linking the process of inquiry with the possession of genuine 
doubt, Kumārila endorses a belief-doubt model of a general type found by Isaac 
Levi in the work of the great American pragmatists, Charles Peirce, John Dewey 
and William James.  In his book, 'Pragmatism and Inquiry', Levi discusses how 
these thinkers characterized epistemology in terms of problem-solving inquiry. 
Levi explains: 
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“Inquiry according to Peirce is a struggle to replace doubt by true belief. 
As such, inquiry calls for a transformation of one state of belief (a state 
of suspense or doubt in some respect) to a state where the doubt is 
alleviated.”201  
A similar transformation is discernible in the above verse, where the doubter is 
able to allay her doubt.  Kumārila also links such doubt with the idea that 
replacement is dependent, thereby accepting that the first stage of belief 
revision cannot be guaranteed to bring the process of inquiry to an end.  Thus 
Kumārila next explains how a misleading defeater can in turn be defeated if and 
when the subject comes to form further beliefs, leaving her original belief 
intact:
TS 2867: If another defeater of this [second belief], being further sought 
for, is produced, then by the defeat of the middle [second] belief, the 
first alone has prāmā yam.ṇ 202
Thus, as described above, the process of inquiry may continue to toggle 
between two opposed beliefs, each supplanting the other through replacement, 
acting as a mental state defeater of the other.  We can again compare with the 
grammatical context, where some exceptions themselves have exceptions 
which restore the original rule.203  The case of a fine on a breadwinner in a legal 
context was also discussed above as involving an exception to an exception. 
Kumārila's protocol for belief change can be depicted as follows, where token 
deliverances from epistemic sources are represented on the left hand side.  In 
the case of an overriding defeater:
p  B(p)→
¬p  B(¬p)→
p  B(p)→
¬p  B(¬p) etc.→
201 Levi (2012) 1
202 See ŚV 2.59 for the equivalent verse in the Śloka-vārttika
203 See Joshi and Roodbergen (1969) 26-27
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This schema is based on a toggle model, as per verse TS 2867 above, in which 
the difference between not believing p and believing that not-p is disregarded. 
Successive lines show temporally successive changes in belief in response to 
successive changes in deliverances.  In the case of an undercutting defeater, 
the dependence on appropriately normal epistemic conditions, which can be 
represented as p|q, becomes explicit, as follows:
p|q  B(p)→
¬q  ¬B(p)→
However, in the continued absence of a defeater, we have no motive to 
disbelieve the proposition.  Kumārila writes:
TS 2868: And if, when it has been correctly sought by appropriate effort, 
a defeater of the defeater would not be known as it has no basis, …
TS 2869: … then due to [the defeater's] greater strength (balīyasā), 
because it has not been cancelled, the first [belief] will be blocked by 
[the defeater], [and] the prāmā yam of that [first belief] will beṇ  
cancelled.
Kumārila here clarifies that seeking for a potential defeater plays a role in 
allaying doubt, and mandates the agent to seek out a defeater, in this case one 
that might defeat the first defeater.  This notion of defeat has roots in the 
interpretative techniques of Mīmā sāṃ 204, and it was discussed in great detail by 
Jayanta.205  As Sarkar explains, in one type of defeat, “where two contradictory 
texts or contradictory matters are both of equal force, there only is 
contradiction proper (Virodha).  But if one of them possesses greater force than 
the other, then the former supersedes the latter, and this is called Bâdha.”206
204 See Sarkar (1909) 213-220 for details
205 See NM 452 ff.
206 Sarkar (1909) 219
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Arnold's description of prima facie justification presented the mere fact of 
awareness as sufficient for a robust truth-claim.  Arnold rightly observes that 
“justification regarding the truth of beliefs is all that we get here in this 
sublunary world”207 and goes on to say that “[i]t is precisely the point of 
Pārthasārathi's interpretation … that one cannot know anything more about the 
truth of one's belief than one already knows in being justified.”208  Whilst the 
Pārthasārathi-Arnold reading eloquently acknowledges that justification is the 
only means to approach truth, by holding that Kumārila's “epistemological claim 
thus turns on a basically phenomenological point about how cognitions 
appear”209, it fails to capitalize on the additional resources in Kumārila's 
presentation, which demonstrate that justification is not an all-or-nothing 
matter.  Rather, justification can be strengthened over time, and indeed 
Kumārila advises that appropriate effort must be made in order to achieve such 
strengthening.  Thus acquiring sufficient justification is a purposive and goal-
oriented activity by the agent.
Further, Kumārila here also claims that defeat is due to the greater strength of 
the defeater.  The notion of relative strength is again one with roots in ritual 
and grammar, where the rule 'the replacement operation is stronger than the 
default case'210 occurs in the Āśvalāyana Śrauta Sūtra.  Discussing this, Renou 
writes that “la maxime … reparaît dans la grammaire et indirectement dans les 
Mī. Sū.”211
This terminology implies that the agent moves from a weaker epistemic 
position to a stronger one.  Kumārila presents us with a hierarchy of 
justification, whereby stronger awarenesses replaces weaker ones.  Kumārila 
also allies the sensation of doubt with the idea that one's level of justification 
can be appraised as strong or weak, and the idea that this can provide a motive 
to continue with inquiry.  This indicates that mere phenomenal appearance is 
207 Arnold (2005) 97
208 Arnold (2005) 107
209 Arnold (2005) 96
210 'prasa gṅ ād apavādo balīyan'
211 Renou (1941) 121
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not sufficient for the removal of genuine doubt.  Rather, Kumārila's process of 
inquiry is a hysteresis process, whereby the present epistemic state of the 
agent is a function of his past history of inquiry.  Thus, the fact that it appears 
to the agent as if x is the case does not by itself indicate whether or not the 
agent is justified in that judgment.  Rather, this turns on whether this judgment 
does or does not represent the (pragmatically determined) end of inquiry. 
Kumārila's notion of strengthening justification has an affinity with a discussion 
about strengthening justification in contemporary epistemology.  Janvid 
describes how epistemic contextualism is associated with a “rising standards of 
justification model”212 which involves the idea “that challenging a knowledge-
claim always raises the original standards of justification”213.  Janvid makes a 
similar point about how the notion of strengthening involves an external 
standard, writing that “the metric of strength itself, where the marks of 
correctness are placed, constitutes an invariant feature of the dialectic of 
justification. (The standards could not be classified as higher or lower 
otherwise).”214
As we have seen, even a belief that has been revised may be susceptible to 
future revision.  Thus Kumārila seeks to bring the process of doubting and also 
the possibility of defeat to an end by distinguishing between genuine doubt and 
spurious conjecture.  Kumārila writes:
TS 2870: Thus the inquirer does not go beyond the third judgment, and 
so a further defeater is not suspected as no defeater has arisen.
Kumārila here affirms a link between the psychological sensation of 'suspecting 
a defeater', i.e. having doubt about one's current beliefs, and the process of 
inquiry which involves the search for a defeater.  By telling us that at a certain 
stage of inquiry, a defeater is no longer suspected, Kumārila again implies that 
one may entertain doubts about one's currently phenomenologically secure 
212 Janvid (2008) 46
213 Janvid (2008) 45
214 Janvid (2008) 46
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beliefs up to a point.
Kumārila here articulates another element of what was characterized above as 
a belief-doubt model, whereby one only needs to change one's belief if there 
are grounds for suspicion of a possible defeater.  Thus Levi explains, “Peirce, as 
I understand and admire him, was a fan of the principle of doxastic inertia 
according to which there is no need to justify current beliefs (i.e. doxastic 
commitments) but only changes in belief (doxastic commitments)”215
Kumārila next writes:
TS 2871: For he who, having a doubting nature in all his everyday 
activities, conjectures [a defeater] through delusion even when no 
defeater has arisen will perish.
TS 2872: And so being a compulsive doubter is censured by Vāsudeva – 
“O, Kaunteya, neither this world nor the next is for a compulsive 
doubter.”216
In contrast to the paradigm inquirer discussed above, the person who has 
developed a genuine doubt ('jātāśa ka'), Kumārila now depicts the case of aṅ  
compulsive doubter ('sa śayātmā') whose doubt amounts to mere conjectureṃ  
('utprek ā').ṣ   This contrast also has an equivalent in the pragmatist literature. 
As Levi explains, for the American pragmatists, “justification for changes in 
belief ought to be grounded in the methods and information currently free of 
living doubt.”217  Burks explains that Peirce:
“held that genuine doubt comes about when an actually functioning habit 
is interrupted … Once a belief-habit is interrupted the aim is to arrive at 
a new belief-habit which will prove to be stable, that is, one that would 
“lead to the avoidance of all surprise and to the establishment of a habit 
215 Levi (2012) 32
216 Here Kumārila quotes a variant on line 4.40cd from the Bhagavad Gītā
217 Levi (2012) 5
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of positive expectation that shall not be disappointed" (5.197).  Peirce 
calls the activity of resolving genuine doubt and arriving at stable belief-
habits inquiry.”218  
Kumārila expresses a similar thought in the Śloka-vārttika as follows:
ŚV 2.60cd: But when awareness of a bad feature has not arisen, [there 
can be] no doubt which is not based on some successful deliverance.
Kumārila's distinction between doubt which is and is not based on a successful 
deliverance corresponds to the distinction between a living doubt and a mere 
paper doubt, and this distinction plays a similar role in determining the extent 
of legitimate inquiry.
A consideration of uberty is also discernible in these verses.  As Fann explains, 
the term 'uberty' is used by Peirce to denote the 'value in productiveness' of 
adopting a hypothesis.219  That is, uberty refers to something like fruitfulness in 
generating new ideas or new content.  Uberty contrasts with security, which is 
the 'approach to certainty' made by the hypothesis.  Fann explains that “from 
deduction to induction and to abduction the security decreases greatly, while 
the uberty increases greatly.”220  Kumārila's stark warnings against excessive 
doubt seem likewise to advert to the fact that failure to invest sufficient 
confidence in one's beliefs would not be a productive attitude.
Kumārila next presents a series of verses which, according to Kamalaśīla, 
answer the question 'how much replacement is possible and where?'.221 
Kamalaśīla's introduction indicates that a replacement operation can only occur 
in limited situations, conforming to the model of 'erasing the excess' described 
above.  Kamalaśīla's use of such terminology also suggests that Kamalaśīla may 
218 Burks (1946) 303
219 See Fann (1970) 8; see CP 8.384 for Peirce's original presentation
220 Fann (1970) 8
221 See P above TS 2875: “kutra kiyān apavāda  sambhāvyata ity etad darśayannḥ  
āha”
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be alive to the operational aspect of Kumārila's epistemology in a way that 
much later thinkers such as Pārthasārathi may not be.
Kumārila begins by stating: 
TS 2875: Due to meeting with variations in place, time, person, [and] 
state, the seeker of defeaters determines those [beliefs] which are 
dependent in whichever respect.
Kumārila here again acknowledges a requirement to seek for defeaters, but 
restricts this requirement by indexing it to these four parameters.  The process 
of inquiry thus displays a tendency to return to a stable trajectory which is a 
feature of a homeorhetic mechanism.  Specifically, the stable trajectory to 
which the agent aims as an ideal is the continual formation of correct 
judgments, and the agent veers away from this trajectory through the 
formation of erroneous judgments.  However, by the very fact of forming 
erroneous judgments, the agent strengthens the tendency for those beliefs to 
be defeated by subsequent judgments, thus returing her to the stable 
trajectory of true judgments.
An example is now provided of something seen far away, which may be 
suspected to be something other than what it is, “just until one has come 
close.”222  It appears Kumārila intends this as a case of 'time', where error is 
resolved with passage of time.  Kumārila here connects the disquiet produced 
by doubt with a perceived need to return to the distal object.  Kumārila next 
states:
TS 2877: [Entertaining the possibility of] replacement operation 
(apavāda) terminates in respect of time, man and state, and the 
possibility [of replacement] is not entertained other than in regard to 
222 TS 2876d
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[those things], like an awareness of a mirage etc.
Kumārila here restates the three cases, time, man and state, but now adds that 
doubt terminates in each of the three cases.223  Kumārila goes on to illustrate 
each of these cases and its termination in the next three verses.  In the first 
case:
TS 2878: Where there is error or ascertainment such as a doubt about 
being a cow or a horse at a time of great darkness, in that case, 
[inquiry] terminates when [the object] is manifested.
The idea seems to be that error is here caused by a lack of appropriately 
normal conditions for belief formation, such as insufficient light.  This 
constitutes a case of time in that the error is 'terminated' when epistemic 
conditions revert to normal, e.g. more light is provided, the agent moves closer 
to the object etc.  By indexing error to conditions which are transient, the scope 
for error is restricted in time, and the case is termed one of 'time'.
Secondly: 
TS 2879: In cases of confusion about the moon [or about] direction, the 
letters and accents of the Vedas etc., [there is] a determination to the 
contrary due to asking another person.
Here, error is indexed to conditions which are localized to a single individual, 
and the case is termed one of 'person'.  Error is here terminated by deferring to 
the testimony of another person.  This example also seems to indicate that 
what is at stake is objective truth rather than subjective certitude.  However, 
deferring to the judgment of another is preferred over a return to the object 
itself.
Finally, Kumārila writes: 
223 The case of 'place' is perhaps unintentionally missed
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TS 2880: In the case of a bad judgment due to senses imparied by 
passion, aversion, intoxication, madness, hunger, thirst etc., [then] in 
the absence of those, there is awareness of an object to the contrary.
Kumārila here recognizes that error can be indexed to features of the agent's 
internal state.  Error terminates when such features are not present.  However, 
it is not clear why termination of states such as hunger and thirst would not 
constitute a case of 'time', and it is also not clear that states such as madness 
need terminate at all.  Kumārila's expression 'in the absence of those' may 
indicate that beliefs must be formed by an agent with an optimal state, and 
that we should simply give up on mad agents.
Sosa similarly considers the difference between Mr. Magoo, who is “extremely 
nearsighted but totally unaware of his condition”224 and an ordinary myopic, 
who is “well aware of his limits”225.  Sosa writes:
“The big difference between Magoo and the ordinary myopic is a 
difference in self-knowledge with a corresponding difference in self-
imposed limits for the use of one's eyes.  The ordinary myopic and 
Magoo are equally deficient beyond arm's length, but the former knows 
his limits and proceeds accordingly.”226
Kumārila's discussion suggests that error arises when the agent acts like Mr. 
Magoo, not imposing appropriate limits for making judgements.  However, 
importantly, Kumārila's solution is not to hold the agent epistemically 
blameworthy for his beliefs.  Rather, acting like Mr. Magoo can be consistent 
with Kumārila's protocol, as improperly formed beliefs will in due course be 
defeated.  In this way, like Mr. Magoo, Kumārila's agent will find that every 
problematic situation ultimately rights itself.
224 Sosa (1991) 286
225 Sosa (1991) 286
226 Sosa (1991) 286
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Section 7: Metarules for prolonging inquiry
Kumārila's doctrine has been characterized above as a logic of inquiry, based on 
a multi-stage process.  This suggestion is supported by consideration of 
Kumārila's critique of the first view, discussed above.  Kumārila's objection 'due 
to conflict' seems to understand the first view in terms of a dual exhortation 
addressed to the believer to ascribe both prāmā yam and non-prṇ āmā yam toṇ  
beliefs.  The surface contradiction is analogous to that between conflicting Vedic 
normative statements, and Kumārila brings the pre-existing interpretative 
apparatus to bear on this problem.  Francavilla describes a variety of 
interpretative techniques devised to resolve contradiction, including the 
following technique described by Kumārila in his Tantra-Vārttika:
“it is just possible that the suspected contradiction could be explained 
and set aside … even when they do treat of the same subject, as there 
would be no contradiction, if one could be explained as a General 
Injunction, and the other as the prohibition of a particular phase of it”227
Francavilla distinguishes between two well-known types of negation, paryudāsa, 
which is “a restricted or qualified prohibition that must be considered an 
exception”228 and pratiṣedha, which is “a general prohibition of what is first 
prescribed”.229  These were also discussed above with reference to the ritual 
injunctions 'he shall not look' and 'he shall not eat'.  Francavilla explains that 
the above type of resolution “occurs when there is a conflict between a positive 
injunction and a negative one … interpreters could solve apparent conflict by 
showing that the negative injunction is a paryudāsa.”230  Kumārila thus seems to 
set up the first view in order to present his own view as emerging from a 
227 Tantra Vārttika 1.3.2, quoted in translation from Francavilla (2006) 185-186
228 Francavilla (2006) 186
229 Francavilla (2006) 186
230 Francavilla (2006) 186
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resolution of the apparent conflict between exhortations concerning what to 
believe.  This resolution is effected by organizing our belief process in terms of 
a general rule to form beliefs followed by specific exceptions constituted by 
cases of subsequent defeat.
Similarly, Francavilla explains that “[t]he Sanskrit term for conflict is virodha. 
This term has a wide semantic scope and is suitable to denote any kind of 
conflict … the conflict between normative sentences is connected to the conflict 
between the actions they lay down as dutiful.”231  Francavilla describes how the 
mass of apparent contradictions between different Vedic statements led the 
Mīmā sā ṃ thinkers to develop principles of interpretation to resolve such 
conflict.232  A similar motivation is evident in the contemporary development of 
similar legal principles.  As Prakken explains: 
“Regulations come into being and cease to exist in complex ways … all 
this can easily give rise to inconsistencies, involving different authorities 
at different times in different places … lawyers have developed ways of 
anticipating such conflicts based on the same structural features of legal 
systems by which the conflicts are caused.”233
The problem faced by both versions of the first view described above is that 
they provide no basis on which the agent can prolong inquiry.  It is not 
coherent to entertain both belief and disbelief with respect to a single 
proposition, and it is not helpful to know that some propositions are true and 
others false if there is no further instruction as to which epistemic status is 
where.  Consideration of this view helps to motivate Kumārila's idea that the 
logic of inquiry requires specification in terms of a multi-stage process rather 
than a single instruction.  This is because no feature of the awareness itself 
which is accessible to the subject is sufficient to identify it as accurate.
U veka ṃ makes this point very clear in a separate discussion of another 
231 Francavilla (2006) 181
232 See Francavilla (2006) 177-204
233 Prakken (1997) 67
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proposed view.  U veka describes this view as follows:ṃ
“Prāmā yam is not merely the nature of awareness; that deviates;ṇ  
rather, a pramā a has a cognitive distinguishing feature whichṇ  
[provides] the absence of doubt – 'this is a hand'.”234
This view acknowledges the difficulty of forming accurate beliefs, but attempts 
to find some special accessible feature by which one would know it as accurate. 
However, U veka considers and rejects various candidate features that wouldṃ  
satisfy such a condition, viz. clarity, lacking shakiness, or lack of invalidating 
cognition.235
Kumārila's protocol also displays an affinity with the contemporary legal 
principle of 'Lex Specialis Derogat Legi Generali'.  Prakken describes this as a 
type of legal collision rule, provided to deal with “conflicts between norms”236. 
Prakken explains that “[t]he general idea is, instead of introducing a new 
operator into the language of a logical system, to augment an existing logical 
system with a metaprinciple to restore consistency if a contradiction has been 
derived.”237  Kumārila's rule that a stronger belief defeats a weaker belief 
constitutes a collision rule which acts as a metarule to the rule to form beliefs.
Kumārila's protocol thus seems to constitute a metarule exhorting the agent to 
form beliefs, together with a metarule on that metarule to the effect that a 
replacement operation is stronger than the general operation.  In this way, the 
problem of epistemic fallibility becomes a short-term problem.  The 
individuating role of svabhāva is compromised by the existence of bad beliefs 
234 T  50Ṭ : “nanu na bodhâtmakatva-mātra  prāmā yam; tad vyabhicarati;ṃ ṇ  
nirvicikitsas tu bodha-viśe a  pramā am – hasto 'yam iti”ṣ ḥ ṇ
235 Jayanta also provides a discussion which is very similar to that of U veka.ṃ  
However, note that Kumārila also claims that there is a distinguishing feature 
present in waking awarenesses that distinguishes them from dream-state 
awarenesses in Śloka-varttika 5.28ab: “jāgra-jñāne viśe o 'yaṣ ṃ 
supariniścaya ”.  This claim occurs in the Nirḥ ālambanavāda discussion and 
requires further investigation.
236 Prakken (1997) 204
237 Prakken (1997) 44
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which are subjectively indiscriminable.  However, this compromised status 
proves to be a temporary phenomenon, because further information is available 
at a later time which will defeat these beliefs.  In this way, the postulated 
correct apprehension is able to play the role of individuating beliefs, and 
subsequent lack of defeat confirms the correctness of the apprehension.
Doniger similarly explains in the context of a general Indian theoretical model:
“A metarule on metarules states that the distinctiveness of the particular 
overrides the general application of the metarule.  Thus, 'A specific 
injunction is stronger than a general one.'  Manu, like the Vedic texts it 
so faithfully follows in this, posits a few general principles and then a 
host of exceptions.”238
Kumārila's protocol can be expressed in the single operational instruction 
“Believe beliefs!” although it falls into two theoretical stages.  The first stage 
involves postulation of the capacity in a belief in virtue of which it would be a 
good belief.239  That is, when forming a belief, we should assume that the belief 
has apprehended its object.  The second stage involves forming further beliefs. 
In cases where the belief was incorrectly postulated, the belief will be defeated.
There is again a parallel with the case of ritual, where as McClymond explains, 
“if certain life difficulties arise, a householder may suspect that his sacrificial 
fires have become ritually useless … In response he can reestablish the ritual 
fires, starting afresh to correct the problem.”240  McClymond explains that 
problems can also occur when sacrificial utensils are manipulated improperly241, 
mirroring the case where the epistemic faculties are manipulated improperly in 
receiving a deliverance.
Does the agent thus exercise his epistemic duty simply by continuing to form 
238 Doniger (1991) lv; also quoted in part in Francavilla (2006) 187
239 See TS 2839
240 McClymond (2012) 197
241 See McClymond (2012) 197
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beliefs, or is there any specific epistemic responsibility for the avoidance of 
error?  Does the agent fall short in his duty given that in some cases the 
general operation will yield to a subsequent replacement operation, and thus 
some beliefs will turn out to be false?  The semantic connection between the 
term apavāda and the term 'āpaddharma' may suggest so.  In the 
Mahābhārata, the term apavāda is used in the context of describing 
āpaddharma or deviation from ethical norms in times of difficulty.  In 
circumstances of distress, a suspension of ethical norms is mandated which is 
to be rectified at a later time when conditions become normal.  In the story of 
Viśvamitra and the dog cooker, Viśvamitra chooses to steal and eat dog meat in 
order to avoid starvation, thereby transgressing ethical norms ordinarily 
applicable to him as a Brahmin.242  Similarly, forming incorrect judgments would 
constitute an āpaddharma, that is, a sanctioned activity in epistemically sub-
optimal conditions.
Nevertheless, that the agent remains epistemically blameless is suggested by a 
Mīmā sā ṃ discussion which considers an individual who follows the general rule 
without specific regard to the problem of exceptions.  As Sarkar explains, “is a 
violation of an exception also to be visited with a penance?  Some [Mīmā sāṃ  
writers] answer, no.  Because to observe an exception is by itself no duty.”243 
Sarkar provides the example of a man who performs a mandated ritual, but 
during the night, contrary to a stipulated time restriction.  “The effect is that he 
gets no benefit from the performance of the Srâdh [ritual].  But he commits no 
positive sin.”244  One can extrapolate from this the idea that to form an 
erroneous belief, by initially failing to observe the exception mandated by the 
replacement operation, involves neither epistemic praise nor blame.
242 See the āpaddharma-parvan in Mahābhārata Book 12 (Śānti-Parvan)
243 See Sarkar (1909) 333
244 See Sarkar (1909) 333-334 (page 334 is misnumbered as 234)
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Section 8: The terminating of inquiry
In the B ha - īkā,ṛ ṭ ṭ  Kumārila argues for a 'limit' or 'termination' (avadhi) to 
entertaining the possibility of defeat, i.e. to further inquiry concerning the truth 
of any existing belief.245  Kumārila indexes error to specific circumstances, so 
that entertaining this possibility comes to an end when the specified conditions 
are found not to obtain.  Kumārila also places this limit within the context of the 
process of inquiry, where it constitutes an end of inquiry, or an end to the 
epistemic process.  In the B ha - īkā, ṛ ṭ ṭ as described above, Kumārila writes:
TS 2870: Thus the inquirer does not go beyond the third judgment, and 
so a further defeater is not suspected as no defeater has arisen.
Similarly, in the Śloka-vārttika, Kumārila tells us:
ŚV 2.61: “In this way, when three or four judgments have been 
produced, no more judgments are required.  Just in this case one 
[judgment] enjoys prāmā yam ṇ from itself.”
In the Śloka-vārttika verse, Kumārila asserts that a judgment which remains 
undefeated will enjoy prāmā yam.  Whereas the initial judgment was ascribedṇ  
with prāmā yam as a hypothesis, the belief held after a period of inquiry hasṇ  
gained in strength due either to defeating an earlier belief or itself becoming 
stronger by resisting defeat.  That the belief held at this mature stage of inquiry 
accordingly enjoys greater security in its epistemic status seems to be the 
implication of Kumārila's notion of enjoying prāmā yam.ṇ
The specification of either three or 'three or four' judgments appears somewhat 
arbitrary, but the general idea is clear.  Kumārila appears here to make broadly 
the same claim as Peirce, and accordingly to face broadly the same difficulty. 
Peirce holds that inquiry “is bound in the long run to iron out every error”.246 
245 See TS 2877
246 Wiggins (2004) 89
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Kumārila is rather more ambitious in allowing only three (or four) tokens of 
checking or revision, presumably intended to happen within a very limited 
timespan.  Kumārila's setting of such an arbitrary limit to inquiry appears 
questionable at first.  However, Kumārila also makes an analogy with court 
proceedings, where judgment is given on the basis of a strictly limited number 
of statements taken, two from the plaintiff and one from the defendant.247  This 
analogy might suggest that termination of the epistemic process is a feature of 
the pragmatics of inquiry and not of the epistemology of inquiry.
Kumārila's epistemological model of a process of individual acts of inquiry thus 
seems also to be rooted in a paradigm of ritual action, the analysis of which is 
focused on the combinatorics of individual ritual acts.  Thus Kumārila seems to 
construe occurrent judgments as acts of the agent.248  As Govardhan Bhatt 
explains, “all commentators and independent writers of [Kumārila's] Bhā aṭṭ  
school are unanimous in holding that cognition is an act”249, although Kumārila's 
own statements on this are somewhat ambiguous.  Bhatt also criticizes 
Kumārila and his commentators for holding that “cognition … is essentially an 
activity of the subject in relation to some object.”250  Bhatt suggests that these 
thinkers “were misled by the word 'activity' which in common usage is 
predicated of 'knowing' as well as of such physical activities as 'cooking' etc.”251 
However, an alternative understanding has been developed in this thesis, 
whereby an epistemology informed by the theory of ritual interpretation is able 
to illuminate the logic of inquiry in terms of purposive and normative acts by 
the epistemic agent.
By thinking again in terms of an informal logic of operations, Kumārila's 
strategy here seems to owe something to the style of reasoning in the maxims 
(nyāyas) of Mīmā sā.  ṃ Thus as Sarkar explains, “[b]y the Apaccheda (losing 
hold) maxim when two different effects are respectively attached to two events 
247 TS 2881-2882
248 I would like to thank Dr Shalini Sinha for drawing my attention to this connection
249 Bhatt (1989) 17
250 Bhatt (1989) 65
251 Bhatt (1989) 66
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alternately, if both happen simultaneously, either effect may be attached 
optionally; but, if one event follows the other, the result will be in accordance 
with the event that happens last.”252  Sarkar illustrates this rule with an 
example commented on by Śabara, involving a potential mishap in a ritual 
when a priest holding the tail-end of the robe of the preceding happens to lose 
his grip.253  The compensatory burden on the sacrificer, i.e. the patron of the 
ritual, is different dependent on which type of priest loses his grip.  Sarkar first 
asks: “If both the priests … lose hold simultaneously, what is to be done?”254 
The answer is that “the case becomes one of direct conflict, and therefore, 
option results.”255  But if one priest should lose hold successively, “the result will 
be in accordance with what happens last.”256  Sarkar's quoting of Jimutvahana's 
example of Apaccheda is even more pertinent: 
“in respect of the precepts enjoining the votary to bestow his wealth as a 
gratuity in one instance and no gratuity in the other … [those instances 
being] if either the priest doing the functions of Udgatri or the one 
performing the office of Pratistotri, singly stumble … but, if both these 
priests stumble at the same time, neither injunction would be applicable; 
for that would be a variableness in the precept.”257  
From this angle, the first view appears to be such a case where conflict would 
result in neither the injunction to attribute prāmā yam nor the injunction toṇ  
attribute non-prāmā yam being applicable.  Kumārila's own view is one whereṇ  
the defeat functions as overrider or replacement operation due to its occurring 
later.
The use of terms from Pāṇini's generative grammar motivates the idea that a 
general operation yields a hypothesis which has provisional status at first, but 
252 Sarkar (1909) 334 (the page is misnumbered as 234)
253 See Sarkar (1909) 334-335 (page 334 is misnumbered as 234)
254 Sarkar (1909) 334 (the page is misnumbered as 234)
255 Sarkar (1909) 335
256 Sarkar (1909) 335
257 Sarkar (1909) 402
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the failure to be defeated leaves it with definitive status.  However, in the 
Pāṇinian case, this is because the grammar has been explicitly constructed to 
include all necessary exceptions within the scope of a finite number of rules. 
Accordingly, it may be considered that the generative model of reasoning found 
in grammar is an inappropriate model to capture the logic of generating beliefs 
from a world of open-ended possibilities.  Whilst it is outside the scope of this 
thesis to actually defend Kumārila's epistemology, it may be noted in his favour 
that both contexts share some noteworthy common features.  Specifically, 
Pāṇini's generative grammar is intended to systematize the logic of word-
formation rather than to reflect the psychology of language learning.  Similarly, 
Kumārila aims to present the logical aspect of belief formation rather than its 
psychology.  Further, whereas the extension of a language such as Sanskrit is 
potentially unlimited, Pāṇini's generative grammar indicates that its underlying 
logic can be captured in terms of a finite normative protocol.  Similarly, the 
case of belief formation presents us with a situation where there is a potentially 
unlimited number of truths to be known, but the articulation of a logic of inquiry 
requires that there be a finite procedure in which this can be captured.
Hookway explains that the epistemology of Peirce and James: 
“rejected the Cartesian focus upon the importance of defeating 
skepticism while endorsing the fallibilist view that any of our beliefs and 
methods could, in principle, turn out to be flawed.  This was tied to the 
study of the normative standards we should adopt when carrying out 
inquiries, when trying to find things out.”258  
The above presentation of Kumārila's three stages of inquiry displays these 
same elements of a pragmatist epistemology.  Kumārila's admonishment of the 
compulsive doubter reflects a rejection of the Cartesian method of doubt, 
whereby existing beliefs need to be justified against skeptical challenges. 
Rather, as Levi explains, “the concern ought to be focused on justifying changes 
258 Hookway (2013)
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in belief”259 and “[t]he burden is on the skeptic to justify why one should cease 
being certain”260.  At the same time, Kumārila's backing for the person with a 
genuine doubt indicates the recognition that the believer is situated at an 
intermediate stage in an epistemic process which may lead to defeat or to 
strengthening of her belief.  Kumārila's recommendation to end inquiry after 
three or four checks may at first be considered a somewhat dogmatic and anti-
Peircean block to inquiry, but should ultimately be seen in terms of the 
pragmatics of inquiry, warning against excessive questioning rather than 
against maintaining openness to new evidence.
There is also some uncertainty about the nature of Peirce's fallibilism.  It was 
previously explained how Hookway understands Peirce's view in terms of the 
denial of an epistemic kind which necessitates truth, rather than the denial of 
everyday claims to certainty, thereby leaving such claims unaffected.
Levi similarly presents Peirce's view in terms of preservation of everyday 
certainty, but by characterizing Peirce as a corrigibilist rather than a fallibilist. 
Levi explains that “[a] fallibilist denies that inquirers should be absolutely 
certain of any current extralogical beliefs.”261  By contrast, corrigibilism is a 
“vulnerability to being modifed”262 which allows me to maintain absolute 
certainty in my beliefs due to the absence of any living doubt, whilst allowing 
me to acknowledge that in the future new considerations may cause such a 
doubt to arise or cause my belief to be defeated.263  Thus corrigibilists “can 
coherently acknowledge a distinction between conjectures or potential answers 
that might be true or false and settled assumptions, free from doubt.”  Whereas 
“settled assumptions are … all maximally certain”264, “[o]ne may coherently 
distinguish between conjectures with respect to probability.”265  By contrast, 
fallibilists “must think of the distinction between conjectures and settled 
259 Levi (2012) 5
260 Levi (2012) 31
261 Levi (2012) 4
262 Levi (2012) 184
263 See Levi (2012) 4
264 Levi (2012) 192
265 Levi (2012) 191
208
assumptions as matters of degree.”266  Levi considers that Peirce's belief-doubt 
model combines epistemological infallibilism with corrigibilism, indicating by this 
something like what Hookway means by his second characterization of 
fallibilism.
Kumārila acknowledges that the believer should exercise a degree of effort to 
question her beliefs, and that any genuine doubt that arises from a new 
deliverance should be treated with appropriate gravity as regards the resulting 
need for revision of existing beliefs.  However, Kumārila's stipulation that “the 
self-concerned investigator should establish [his perception as accurate] by not 
continuing to conjecture”267 scenarios for defeat and that “one [judgment] 
enjoys epistemic success 'from itself'”268 indicate that the believer is right to 
invest those beliefs which have resisted a certain degree of challenge with 
certainty, and that this is the final meaning of prāmā yam 'from itself'.   Asṇ  
such, Kumārila's protocol for inquiry similarly combines vulnerability to being 
modified with certainty in one's settled beliefs which is the mark of 
corrigibilism.  As indicated above, the basis of Kumārila's corrigibilism is the 
fact that epistemic success in the form of accurate judgment is essentially 
distributed over the epistemic kind consisting in pramā as or successfulṇ  
deliverances.
266 Levi (2012) 192
267 TS 2874cd
268 ŚV 2.61cd
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Chapter 5: Kumārila's anti-foundationalism
Section 1: Introduction
This chapter will present Kumārila's doctrine as a form of anti-foundationalism 
which has much in common with that of pragmatism.  Levi explains that 
“[f]oundationalism in epistemology imposes two demands on the beliefs of 
intelligent inquirers: (1) that current beliefs be justified and (2) that there be 
foundational premises and principles of reasoning that are self-certifying on the 
basis of which the merits of other current beliefs and principles may be derived. 
Many antifoundationalists give up (2) but not (1) … Pragmatists belong among 
those who give up both (2) and (1).”1  In this chapter, it will be argued that 
Kumārila's presentation indicates the rejection of both the demands above.  As 
such, Kumārila is an anti-foundationalism in the same vein as the pragmatists.
The chapter begins by reviewing existing literature which seems to suggest a 
Reidean form of anti-foundationalism.  An argument from infinite regress which 
motivates Kumārila's anti-foundationalism is then examined.  It is shown that 
this argument targets what Sosa terms an organon conception of justification, 
whereby one thing serves as rule or instrument for acquiring justification for 
another thing.  Sosa accordingly suggests that aptness is a more promising 
notion than justification, and a loose affinity is found between Kumārila's 
doctrine and Sosa's Virtue Epistemology.  As Arnold explains, Kumārila's 
consideration of the argument from infinite regress serves to reject the notion 
of foundational beliefs in Levi's first demand, such a view being explicitly set up 
as a third alternative view in the Śloka-vārttika.  However, it will be argued 
here that Kumārila's doctrine involves a rejection of Levi's demand (1) in what 
amounts to a parallel move to Peirce.
1 Levi (2007) 30; a similar formulation can be found in Sosa (1991) 178
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In the following section, a Buddhist epistemology is sketched out, and it is 
shown how the Buddhist position is under threat from this infinite regress 
argument.  Finally, it is shown how Kumārila's anti-foundationalism comes to 
bear on the case of knowledge derived from the testimony of the Vedas.  In this 
case, knowledge from other epistemic sources does not bear on the epistemic 
status of testimony from Vedic texts.
Section 2: Existing literature on Kumārila's anti-foundationalism
Taber explains that:
“Bhāṭṭa Mīmā sāṃ  is not a form of epistemological foundationalism, which 
conceives of human knowledge as hierarchically structured, with the 
mass of what we know resting upon a few cognitions of special status.”2  
This statement attributes a rejection of Levi's second demand above to 
Kumārila.  Taber also holds that Kumārila's doctrine is:
“closer to the common sense empiricism of the eighteenth-century 
Scottish philosopher Thomas Reid, which stresses that almost all our 
perceptions have initial authority.”  
Thus:
“we find at the basis of both the foundationalist and the Mīmā sāṃ  
(Reidean) proposals the same insight: there must occur cognitions which 
present themselves as true … The search for evidence must come to an 
end – either at the very start, or after a finite process – in a kind of 
2 Taber (1992b) 217
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knowledge for which the concern for evidence does not arise.”3  
Taber thus seems to commit Kumārila to Levi's first demand above. 
Specifically, current beliefs are justified by their initial appearance of authority. 
Taber thus explains: 
“Given that a cognition initially appears as true, one remains justified in 
believing that it is true until concrete evidence of its falsehood presents 
itself.”4
Taber also tells us that:
“Opposed to this [foundationalist] answer would be any form of 
coherentism which says that truth is merely a matter of corroboration by 
further evidence that is not, in turn, ultimately anchored in some self-
validating form of awareness.  It is interesting that although such 
theories have been extensively developed in Western thought – e.g., in 
pragmatism – Indian philosophers have shied away from them.”5
Taber's statement above is somewhat ambiguous between a coherence theory 
of truth, which concerns the truth of propositions, and a coherence theory of 
justification, which concerns what it is for a belief to be justified, and is typically 
understood in terms of corroboration by further evidence.
Arnold similarly explains that “the Mīmā saṃ ka doctrine of svata  prāmā yaḥ ṇ  
represents a compelling critique of foundationalist epistemologies”6.  However, 
according to Arnold:
“many philosophers (both traditional and modern) persist in 
understanding the doctrine in terms of the foundationalist 
3 Taber (1992b) 218
4 Taber (1992b) 207
5 Taber (1992b) 218
6 Arnold (2001) 591
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presuppositions that are precisely what this doctrine means to call into 
question.”7  
Arnold includes B.K. Matilal among such philosophers8 and considers that only 
Pārthasārathi has correctly understood Kumārila's anti-foundationalism.  Arnold 
explains that foundationalist approaches are “intended … to indicate the 
uniquely indubitable sorts of knowledge that … are suitably regarded as 
foundational for the rest of our beliefs.”9  Thus Arnold similarly presents 
foundationalists as rejecting Levi's demand (2) above.  
Arnold's preferred reading of Kumārila involves:
“a phenomenological sort of epistemology – where “phenomenological” 
here characterizes a basically descriptive approach, the “bracketing” of 
normative commitments … A project in phenomenological epistemology 
might thus aim to describe, for example, what must be the case … in 
order that there can develop such knowledge as we generally believe 
ourselves already to be justified in claiming”10.  
Arnold here presents Kumārila's doctrine in terms of a bracketing of Levi's 
demand (1).  However, elsewhere Arnold renders Kumārila's doctrine using the 
expression 'prima facie justification', which would seem to indicate an 
acceptance of Levi's thesis (1).  Further, it is not clear how, on Arnold's 
construal, Kumārila's doctrine could substantively engage with any research 
programme in philosophy.
Arnold contrasts Pārthasārathi's approach with:
“a foundationalist approach, which would seek to ground justification in a 
causal story that takes the perceived object indubitably to have caused 
7 Arnold (2001) 591
8 See Arnold (2001) 591
9 Arnold (2005) 123
10 Arnold (2005) 123-124
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the perception – which, that is, withholds the judgment that one “knows” 
something until it has first been ascertained that the “something” in 
question is in fact present as the cause of the cognition under review. 
But the problem, of course, is that the latter can only be ascertained by 
adducing “other things one knows or justifiably believes,” which we can, 
in turn, only be justified in knowing based on the very same epistemic 
instruments now available to us as we seek to ascertain the presence of 
a cause.”11
Arnold here sets out the foundationalist position and alludes to the argument 
from infinite regress which features in contemporary articulations of the 
foundationalist position.12  However, whereas the threat of such regress is often 
presented as an argument for some beliefs to be properly foundational, Arnold's 
argument is that there is no properly basic class of beliefs which would not be 
vulnerable to further regress.  Arnold's use of the regress argument here 
corresponds rather to the way it features in an argument presented by Kumārila 
both in the B ha - īkā, and in the Śloka-vārttika, where it functions asṛ ṭ ṭ  
Kumārila's objection to a third canvassed view.  
Arnold immediately goes on to assert:
“this is, finally, U veka’s problem, too.  For U veka wants an account ofṃ ṃ  
svata  prāmā yaḥ ṇ  according to which we can be certain that, for example, 
we will only ever credit with prāmā ya ṇ an awareness of silver that was 
really caused by silver.”13  
However, U veka’s problem ṃ is only a problem of inquiry.  As Arnold agrees, 
U veka’s ṃ notion of prāmā ya constitutes a notion of truth, which we canṇ  
certainly “ground … in a causal story that takes the perceived object indubitably 
11 Arnold (2001) 619
12 See e.g. Steup (2014) and Fumerton and Hasan (2010) for the contemporary 
argument in the context of foundationalism
13 Arnold (2001) 619
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to have caused the perception”.14  Indeed, such a story was developed in the 
earlier chapters of this thesis.  U veka’s problem ṃ thus concerns not acquiring 
true beliefs but rather acquiring justification for them, i.e. being able to credit 
them with truth.  Arnold's hope is that Pārthasārathi's reading can provide a 
non-foundationalist theory of justification by rooting a robust conception of 
truth in the prima facie justification which is provided phenomenologically by 
the mere fact of awareness.
Arnold frequently uses the notion of 'crediting' an awareness with validity.15 
Although such a notion seems at first similar to the notion of ascription driving 
the present interpretation, whereby a process of inquiry may be built on 
correcting an ascription, Arnold quickly shuts down this construal, by insisting 
that we are always 'justified' or 'entitled' to credit our initial awarenesses with 
such validity.  Although, as mentioned above, there seems to be some tension 
between use of such notions as justification and entitlement and Arnold's claim 
that normative concerns have been bracketed, nevertheless Arnold ends up in a 
similar place to Taber, whereby all beliefs are justified by the phenomenological 
fact of mere awareness, thus answering to Levi's demand (1) above.  So both 
Arnold and Taber read Kumārila as setting up the initial awareness as a 
complete phenomenological basis for some form of justification, and, in Arnold's 
case, also for truth.
Notwithstanding this, Kumārila's view is well taken by both Arnold and Taber as 
what amounts to a rejection of Levi's demand (2).  The idea seems to be that 
inquiry is needed to discriminate correct judgments from incorrect judgments, 
yet the process of inquiry must be one that can be brought to an end.  One 
strategy would be to bring this to an end in some foundational class of beliefs. 
However, the privileging of any particular class of beliefs would be arbitrary, so 
the process of inquiry should be stopped through the ascription of epistemic 
success to the initial belief.  As per the above discussion, this is a defeasible 
assumption made on pragmatic grounds.
14 Arnold (2001) 619
15 See e.g. Arnold (2001) 619, 625; Arnold (2005) 69, 101
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Section 3: Kumārila's argument against organon justification
Kumārila presents an argument from infinite regress in favour of his own view, 
in both the B ha - īkā andṛ ṭ ṭ  the Śloka-vārttika.  Whereas it is a free-standing 
argument in the B ha - īkā, in the Śloka-vārttika it targets a third viewṛ ṭ ṭ  
canvassed in opposition to Kumārila's own.  It was described above how the 
third canvassed view is structurally the reverse of Kumārila's own view. 
Whereas Kumārila's claim is that pramā yam is 'from itself' and non-ṇ
prāmā yam is 'from something else', the third view holds that pramā yam isṇ ṇ  
'from something else' and non-prāmā yam is 'from itself'.  Kumārila's ownṇ  
claim has been construed as the claim that all deliverances constitute Good 
Cases as a default nature, yet this nature is vitiated by bad features. 
Conversely, according to the third view, all deliverances constitute Bad Cases as 
a default nature, and this nature is revamped by the aforementioned good 
features.  Kumārila presents the third canvassed view as follows:
ŚV 2.38abc: Therefore the Badness of Case of those [Bad Case 
deliverances] (apramā atvam) should be accepted as being due toṇ  
svabhāva (svābhāvikam), and the capacity for epistemic success [of 
Good Case deliverances] (prāmā yam) [as being] dependent onṇ  
something else.
Whereas Bad Cases are 'due to svabhāva', epistemic success is 'dependent on 
something else'.  Kumārila tells us that, in this view, this something else is a 
good feature.  Kumārila writes:
ŚV 2.39cd: A capacity for epistemic success (prāmā yṇ am) is produced 
by the good features of those [causal factors of the deliverance], 
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because it is a real entity.
By contrast:
ŚV 2.39ab: Epistemic failure (aprāmā yam) could not be due to a badṇ  
feature of the cause [of the deliverance], because it is not a real entity.
The role of the bad feature in this argument supports the reading of the second 
view discussed in Chapter Three above, whereby putative good and bad 
features would be responsible for deliverances constituting Good and Bad Cases 
respectively.  In this argument, epistemic failure is characterised by a mere lack 
or absence of Goodness, and thus not due to a positive vitiating nature of a 
positive feature.  The argument is that epistemic failure is a not a real property 
or nature of a process, so cannot be metaphysically grounded in a separable 
(bad) feature.  By contrast, accurate judgment is real, so can be metaphysically 
grounded in a separable (good) feature, which revamps erroneous judgment. 
This argument thus supports the third view.
Kumārila later provides a rebuttal of that argument.  Kumārila writes:
ŚV 2.54: “Epistemic failure (aprāmā yam) is divided into three typesṇ  
according to [the three cases, i.e.] erroneous judgment, lack of 
judgment and doubtful judgments.  Of these [three], [only] two [i.e. 
erroneous judgments and doubtful judgments] are able [to arise] from a 
bad cause, because they are real [whereas lack of judgment is not].
Here, Kumārila observes that there are various types of Bad deliverances in 
order to assert that Bad Cases constitute some real nature which is 
metaphysically grounded in some separable feature of deliverances, which is a 
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positive vitiating feature.  Kumārila however must clarify that this argument 
applies only to two of the three types of Bad Case.  Kumārila writes:
ŚV 2.55: “As for lack of judgment, the operation of bad qualities [in that 
case] is not postulated.  According to us, however, it [viz. lack of 
judgment] takes place only through the absence of causes as you have 
said yourself [in verse 2.41].”
In Kumārila's own view, epistemic failure is a real nature which arises from bad 
features of the cause, such as cataracts etc. and thus the agent is mandated to 
seek out an undercutting or rebutting defeater.  Epistemic success is also a real 
nature, but one which is metaphysically grounded in the intrinsic nature of 
deliverances when unvitiated.  This provides a point of asymmetry between 
Kumārila's own view and his third canvassed view.
In the third view, epistemic success arises from good features of the cause, 
seemingly such as clarity of vision etc.  It is not clear if the agent would be 
required to ascertain the presence of such features in the belief formation 
process, in which case, justification would be dependent on such corroborating 
factors.  Thus Kataoka notes that it is not clear whether 'something else' refers 
to “good qualities (gu aṇ ) and bad qualities (do aṣ ) of the causes of the cognition 
… [or] their cognition … [or] (a cognition of) agreement (sa gatiṃ ) or an 
invalidating cognition (bādhaka)”.16  As the third view amounts to a form of 
foundationalism, whereby justification is dependent on some externalist 
foundation, which constitute the good features, or some internalist foundation, 
comprising awareness of some factors.  However, as noted in Chapter Four 
above, U veka considers and rejects various candidate features that wouldṃ  
provide such a foundation, such as clarity and lacking shakiness, on the basis 
that these are consistent with erroneous judgment.17
16 Kataoka (2011) 63
17 Jayanta also provides a discussion which is very similar to that of U veka.ṃ  
However, note that Kumārila also claims that there is a distinguishing feature 
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Kumārila himself provides a regress argument against this third view.  Kumārila 
writes:
ŚV 2.49: If an object is not determined even when a judgment has been 
made, as long as purity of cause is not apprehended from a different 
successful deliverance, …
ŚV 2.50: … then it would be necessary to make another judgment based 
on a different cause, because the purity [of the cause of the first 
judgment] is effectively non-existent as long as [that purity is] not 
correctly ascertained.
ŚV 2.51: When there is purity of the cause of that [second judgment] 
too, the judgment of that [first purity] would be a Good Case 
deliverance.  And this would also be so of that [third judgment] also, so 
in this way, there is no foundation.
Kumārila here appeals to an asymmetry between affirmation and denial in 
order to advantage his own view over the inverted alternative.  In terms of the 
Peircean reading of the previous chapter, denial is capable of eliminating an 
abductive hypothesis that has been affirmed, whereas affirmation is not capable 
of introducing a hypothesis that has not first been introduced in some way.  
Arnold characterizes this argument in terms of an infinite regress of 
justification, whereby “the subsequent, justifying cognition would, as itself a 
cognition, similarly require justification, and so on.”18  Thus on the 
Pārthasārathi-Arnold reading, the idea that no corroborating awareness is 
needed is because phenomenological content provides sufficient justification. 
present in waking awarenesses that distinguishes them from dream-state 
awarenesses in Śloka-varttika 5.28ab: “jāgra-jñāne viśe o 'yaṣ ṃ 
supariniścaya ”.  This claim occurs in the Nirḥ ālambanavāda discussion and 
requires further investigation.
18 Arnold (2005) 69
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Arnold thus considers that “it is an essentially phenomenological point being 
made … that is, doesn't Kumārila effectively credit overriding cognitions with a 
capacity for stopping the epistemic process such as he does not allow for the 
initial cognitions thus overridden …?”19  Arnold contrasts Kumārila's doctrine 
with Popper on the grounds that Kumārila allows for epistemic termination, 
which is provided for through the fact that an awareness phenomenologically 
appears to provide termination.  By contrast, the argument of the above 
chapter was that such termination is made on pragmatic rather than epistemic 
grounds.
Sosa again provides an illuminating parallel to Kumārila's discussion.  Sosa 
describes an how an organon account of justification leads to an infinite 
regress.  Sosa describes an organon as a “manual of practical methodology”20 
or “an instrument for acquiring knowledge”21.  Sosa writes:
“According to methodism the only way one could acquire such 
justification is through a further appropriate application of an adequate 
organon.  But that application in turn requires the appropriate following 
of rules, which in turn requires that one justifiedly consider oneself to be 
in the conditions required for the application of these rules.  And so on.”22
Sosa proposes that we abandon this organon conception of justification, and, 
with it, the term 'justification' itself.   Sosa suggests we replace a requirement 
for justifed belief with a requirement for apt belief, where justification may be 
one way to achieve aptness.  In general, Sosa explains:
“The “aptness” of a belief B relative to an environment E requires that B 
derive from what relative to E is an intellectual virtue, i.e. a way of 
arriving at belief that yields an appropriate preponderance of truth over 
19 Arnold (2005) 72
20 Sosa (1991) 245
21 Sosa (1991) 245
22 Sosa (1991) 249
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error …”23
In Chapter Three, Kumārila's claim that prāmā yam or epistemic success is dueṇ  
to the unflawed faculties themselves as causes of awareness was equated with 
Sosa's idea that the human faculties such as perception are themselves the 
intellectual virtues.  As such, Sosa's conception of aptness as resulting from 
intellectual virtues would seem to have a close affinity with Kumārila's 
conception of epistemic success.  Kumārila motivates the idea that epistemic 
success is 'from itself' by arguing that this avoids an infinite regress of 
justification.  Sosa similarly motivates a notion of aptness as a criterion for 
knowledge by rejecting various conceptions of justification focused around the 
notion of an organon, and thus the term 'justification' itself.  Thus part of 
Kumārila's main claim is to reject the notion of justification as the application of 
a methodological rule for determining true belief.  However, whereas Sosa 
equates the organon conception of justification with the idea that epistemology 
is founded on a methodology,24 Kumārila distinguishes between these ideas, 
retaining some aspect of methodology for arriving at the truth.  Specifically, 
Kumārila rejects the idea that the method of epistemology involves applying a 
rule for justifying beliefs, in favour of the idea of a culminating process, as 
described in Chapter Four.
Following Pārthasārathi, Arnold considers that this argument leads Kumārila to 
the idea, “why not simply allow this [viz. justification] with respect to the initial 
moment?”25  Arnold thus arrives at his notion of prima facie justification. 
However, as Sosa notes, “to justify is “to prove or show to be just, right, or 
reasonable,” in a way that implies “appeal to a standard or precedent.””26  As 
such, it is not clear that the term 'justification' can be retained by Arnold and 
Alston, whose usage he follows.
More generally, Arnold is correct to take Kumārila's discussion as a rejection of 
23 Sosa (1991) 289
24 See Sosa (1991) 250
25 Arnold (2005) 70
26 Sosa (1991) 253
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an organon conception of justification.  The previous chapters have argued that 
Kumārila does nevertheless endorse the idea of an external standard or norm 
against which beliefs must be assessed.  However, this argument from infinite 
regress stands opposed to what Sosa terms an organon conception of 
justification.  As such, Kumārila has rejected the idea that beliefs can be 
justified by following a rule, on pain of infinite regress, without rejecting the 
idea that there is a normative burden on the agent to attain only true beliefs. 
The regress argument has established that the normative burden cannot be 
discharged by measuring the beliefs against some external standard in the 
manner of the third canvassed view.  Rather, the protocol for inquiry set out in 
the previous chapter discharges the normative burden as it represents a 
culminating process resulting in true beliefs, despite not providing direct 
justification.  
That protocol involved the strengthening of the epistemic status of beliefs 
through what was characterized as an appropriate level of investigation.  It was 
claimed that the beliefs which are not defeated through a certain amount of 
checking activity will as a result provide the agent with a sufficient level of 
epistemic confidence.  However, all beliefs are fallible in the sense that the 
evidence for them is consistent with their falsity, given the possibility of more or 
less radical sceptical scenarios.  As such, why should Kumārila's protocol lead to 
actual true beliefs rather than merely beliefs held with a high degree of 
confidence?
Śāntarak ita notes that Kumārila's view is that the existence of a capacity isṣ  
established through arthāpatti, or postulation.  Śāntarak ita refers back to anṣ  
earlier statement by Kumārila as follows:
“The capacities of all things are established through postulating [them] 
based on their effects.”27
27 TS 1588ab quoted again at TS 2839ab: “śaktaya  sarva-bhāvānāḥ ṃ 
kāryârthāpatti-sādhanā ”ḥ
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Referring to the abductive logic of Charles Peirce, Shida makes a general 
observation that “in the Indian philosophical context, the valid means of 
cognition referred to as arthāpatti is similar to abduction.”28  In abduction, Fann 
explains, “we pass from the observation of certain facts to the supposition of a 
general principle to account for the facts … abduction is an inference from a 
body of data to an explaining hypothesis, or from effect to cause”29.  This 
contrasts with induction, which is “an inference from a sample to a whole, or 
from particulars to a general law”30.  Kumārila's explanation is thus that the 
existence of a capacity for accurate determination and its exercise constitutes 
an explaining hypothesis for the arising of undefeated awareness.  This account 
of how beliefs are justified agrees with Sosa's idea of an explanatory inference. 
Sosa writes:
“the deeper, reflective justification of the beliefs ostensibly yielded by a 
certain faculty derives from an explanatory inference that attributes 
those beliefs to the faculties from which they ostensibly derive.”31  
Considering the case of memory, where “sometimes the ostensible memory is 
merely ostensible”32, Sosa elaborates as follows:
“What justifies accepting one's ostensible memory m in such cases is, I 
suggest, a meta-belief in the virtue of one's memory which delivers m. 
One's justification hence derives from an explanatory induction applied 
to oneself and one's pertinent faculties.”33
28 Shida (2011) 514
29 Fann (1970) 10
30 Fann (1970) 10
31 Sosa (1991) 280
32 Sosa (1991) 280
33 Sosa (1991) 280
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Sosa describes meta-epistemic foundationalism as follows:
“Meta-epistemic foundationalism is the view that there must be 
foundational epistemic beliefs: beliefs about epistemic justification that 
do not derive all of their justification from coherence or some other 
relation to other beliefs of the subject, but rather derive some of their 
justification from intrinsic plausibility or from factors external to the 
system of belief.”34
Kumārila's idea that the capacity is postulated thus seems to be equivalent to 
Sosa's idea of an explanatory inference that attributes the deliverance to 
faculties that operate correctly.  This explanatory inference plays a meta-level 
role in justifying beliefs.  As such, a meta-epistemic foundationalism in Sosa's 
sense can be attributed to Kumārila.  
The previous chapter presented an operational disjunction between pramā aṇ  
and non-pramā a, whereby the former functions independently whereas theṇ  
latter functions dependently and thereby ceases.  It can now be seen that non-
pramā a ceases when undercutting and rebutting defeaters effect the removalṇ  
of bad features.  The undercutting defeater removes the bad feature by 
identifying its presence in the process of belief formation, whereas the 
rebutting defeater removes the bad feature despite not specifically identifying it 
in the cause.  In one case, the vitiation is apprehended, and in the other case, 
the vitiation is supplanted.
By contrast, the functioning of a pramā a in apprehending a distal object doesṇ  
not depend on any separable feature, but is simply due to the nature of 
awareness itself.  As such, nothing can cause the apprehension of a distal 
object by a pramā a to cease.  This asymmetry between the way in whichṇ  
pramā a and non-pramā a function leads to an asymmetrical significance toṇ ṇ  
34 Sosa (1991) 157-158
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the findings of subsequent investigation.  In the case of non-pramā a, asṇ  
described above, subsequent disconfirmation has an instrumental role in regard 
to the functioning of the non-pramā a, inasmuch as it terminates theṇ  
functioning by removing the enabling support.  By contrast, the findings of 
subsequent investigation do not play any instrumental role in respect of a 
pramā a.  Thus Kumārila explains:ṇ
ŚV 2.84: So the fact that [the pramā a itself] is known does notṇ  
contribute to [its] epistemic success.  To explain, the experience of the 
object is obtained only from the earlier [deliverance].
This feature of Kumārila's view, that subsequent investigation plays no role in 
respect of the functioning of the pramā a in making an accurate determination,ṇ  
is perhaps taken by Pārthasārathi and Arnold as support for the idea that 
subsequent investigation plays no role in strengthening the justification of the 
agent.  On that reading, in every instance of crediting a belief with prāmā yam,ṇ  
the agent is fully 'entitled' or 'justified', and thus that such prāmā yamṇ  
amounts to a notion of 'validity' or 'prima facie justification', which provides a 
basis for an epistemic process involving possible belief revision.  This would 
suggest a Reidean interpretation of Kumārila of the type explicitly endorsed by 
Taber.  However, other remarks by Arnold about a bracketing of normative 
commitments suggest this may not be the case.
The present discussion argues that this is not the case.  Rather, following 
Hookway, we can distinguish between the idea that a judgment “belong[s] to 
an epistemic kind of which, of necessity, all members are true”35 and the idea 
that “we may be unconfident of our judgement because we are unsure whether 
it is a judgement of perception or, perhaps, a member of a different epistemic 
kind, a report of illusion or hallucination, for example.”36  Kumārila's discussion 
of an operational aspect concerns the idea that the capacity of Good Case 
35 Hookway (2007) 11
36 Hookway (2007) 11
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deliverances to accurately determine objects is a real causal power which is not 
dependent on some extrinsic feature.   It does not concern the ability of the 
agent to determine that a judgment constitutes a Good Case deliverance.  In 
order to determine that, the agent must exercise appropriate doubt.  Such a 
determination also rests on the meta-belief that one's undefeated judgments 
arise from the exercise of a real causal power of Good Case deliverances to 
make an accurate determination.
However, Kumārila allows that accuracy of judgment must be postulated at the 
outset of investigation.  Kumārila writes:
TS 2859: So having considered for a long time, it certainly has to be 
postulated that the epistemic success of some [deliverance] is 'from 
itself'.  This being the case it is best established in the first [cognition].
Here, Kumārila uses the term 'postulated'.  This term has an affinity with the 
term 'prāptā' or 'ascribed' which was previously discussed, inasmuch as both 
terms allow that the question of whether prāmā yam is present in the belief isṇ  
separable from the question of whether it has been postulated or ascribed at a 
particular stage of inquiry, and thus allow for the possibility that the agent can 
normatively assess her own ascription or postulation through additional inquiry. 
What is postulated is that the deliverance has arisen from causes that are not 
flawed.
Accordingly, although the agent is justified in the sense of possessing 
regulatory justification, viz. a level of justification appropriate to the stage of 
inquiry, the agent is also allowed scope for genuine doubt about a 
phenomenologically secure belief, and mandated to exercise appropriate effort 
in corroborating the belief.  Accordingly, the agent is able to strengthen her 
level of regulatory justification through inquiry by aiming at an ultimate goal of 
inquiry which is possessing beliefs that are objectively true.  Kumārila rejects 
Levi's first demand in the same way that Peirce does, by focusing on 
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justification for belief change rather than on justification for belief per se.
Accuracy of judgment can only be postulated with a sufficient degree of 
epistemic confidence at the end of investigation.  Kumārila thus provides the 
following statements:
TS 2851ab: Epistemic success 'from itself' is like that [pot analogy], and 
it is certainly just in the final [judgment]
Kamalaśīla clarifies that the word 'final' refers to 'the last judgment of all'.37 
Similarly in the Śloka-vārttika presentation, Kumārila writes:
ŚV 2.61: In this way, when three or four deliverances have been 
produced, no more deliverances are required.  Just in this case one 
[deliverance] enjoys epistemic success 'from itself'.
Thus Kumārila's account involves an increase in epistemic confidence by the 
agent to a final outcome of inquiry involving a situation where the believer 
possesses only beliefs that are true in virtue of their arising from a successful 
deliverance.
Section 4: Kumārila's opposition to Buddhist foundationalism
Kumārila's strategy is also opposed to the foundationalist strategy of the 
Buddhist thinkers referenced in Chapter Three above.  Śākyabuddhi 
characterizes 'familiar'38 perceptual judgments, judgments of telic function, and 
inferential judgments as 'from itself' and 'unfamiliar' perceptual judgments as 
'from something else'.  Regarding perceptual judgments, Śākyabuddhi writes:
37 See P under TS 2852: anta iti sarva-paścime jñāna ity arthaḥ
38 Dunne (2004) translates this term as 'habituated'
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“Activity based on perception is said to be of two types, viz. 'unfamiliar' 
and 'familiar'.  Of those, because a very familiar and clear perception is 
produced as that which possesses familiarity, involving the elimination of 
cause of error, its production is accurately determined in accordance 
with the familiar type, and therefore an ascertainment is produced 
involving the later manifestation of what exists, so a person acts on the 
basis of that.”39
About judgments of telic function, Śākyabuddhi appeals to the notion of 
svabhāva as a guarantee of error-freedom.  Śākyabuddhi writes:
“Therefore, because a perception whose content has the capacity for 
telic function is without the causes of error, it is determined by reflexive 
awareness as being nothing other than a pramā a ṇ just due to 
svabhāva.”40
According to this Buddhist picture, entities are defined in terms of their telic 
function, so that fire just is what has the effect of burning and cooking etc.  As 
such, a familiar case is one where one accurately determines the object in the 
context of a familiar process.  An unfamiliar case is one where one gains 
confidence in one's judgment only when the awareness of telic function is 
attained.  Devendrabuddhi thus explains that the later awareness of telic 
function enables the agent to discriminate accurate judgments from their 
reflectively indiscriminable counterparts.  Devendrabuddhi appeals to what 
Dunne terms a confirmation-model, in order to discriminate correct from 
incorrect judgments.  Dunne explains:
39 PV  Ṭ nye 72A: “brjod pa mngon sum gyi rten can gyi 'jug pa ni rnam pa gnyis te 
dang po nyid dang goms pa can no|  de la goms pa dang ldan pa gang yin pa de 
la shin tu goms pa gsal ba can gyi mngon sum skyes pa na ji lta ba bzhin tu 
goms pa'i rnam par 'khrul pa'i rgyu mtshan spangs pa can nyid kyis yongs su 
bcad nas skye ba dang|  de lta bur gyur pa'i phyis 'byung ba'i nges pa skyed par 
byed pa'i phyir de la skyes bu 'jug par byed do|”
40 PV  Ṭ nye 75A: “de'i phyir don byed par nus pa'i yul can gyi mngon sum ni 'khrul 
pa'i rgyu mtshan med pa'i phyir tshad ma nyid kyi bdag nyid du gyur pas rang 
rig pas yongs su bcad pa yin no|”; cf. Dunne (2004) 292-293
228
“On this model, the trustworthiness of that instrumental cognition 
consists of the fact that it leads to another instrumental cognition whose 
content is the desired telic function, i.e., the achievement of one's 
goal.”41  
This research will adopt Dunne's translation of the term 'arthakriyā' or 'don 
byed pa' as 'telic function'.  Interestingly, the notion of arthakriyā, which Dunne 
translates as 'telic function', also engages with a pragmatist maxim, that which 
holds that only what can make a practical difference can normatively regulate 
our beliefs.  This seems to explain a common alternative translation of 
arthakriyā as 'pragmatic efficacy'.42   As Śākyabuddhi explains, “a perception 
whose content has the capacity for telic function is without the causes of 
error”.43  This represents a strategy of epistemological foundationalism, 
whereby certain classes of beliefs are foundational of the remainder.  However, 
this foundationalist label should be caveated by the remark that it does not fully 
reflect the mind-dependent aspect of the Buddhist theory.   As Dunne explains, 
Dharmakīrti's “relentless pursuit of certainty (niścaya) suggests an intriguing 
form of foundationalism that is nevertheless relativist.”44  Thus, although 
Dharmakīrti's “thought appears to rest on a kind of internalist foundationalism, 
where knowledge is ultimately rooted in the indubitability of habituated 
perceptions”,45 nevertheless “the “nature” of the object in question is in 
significant ways reflective of the mind in which that object is being perceived.” 
It may seem that “Dharmakīrti is resorting to an internalist foundationalism 
rooted in irrefragable and private sense data, but in fact, Dharmakīrti clearly 
rejects the ultimate reliability of such data.”46
However, in terms of the everyday level of activity, a two-tier foundationalist 
model does reflect the Buddhist theory.  For Śākyabuddhi, as for Kamalaśīla, 
41 Dunne (2004) 287
42 Cf. Arnold (2005) 99
43 PV  Ṭ nye 75A: “don byed par nus pa'i yul can gyi mngon sum ni 'khrul pa'i rgyu 
mtshan med pa”; cf. Dunne (2004) 292-293
44 Dunne (2004) 3 fn.6
45 Dunne (2004) 323
46 Dunne (2004) 323-324
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inferential judgments and habitual perceptual judgments are considered to be 
foundational, thus 'from itself', whereas novel perceptual judgments are not, 
and thus 'from something else', in the sense that their justification is based on 
subsequent confirmation.  This Buddhist theory thus constitutes a confirmation 
model in which beliefs are justified either immediately because they are telic 
function judgments, or involve familiar processes leading to telic function 
judgments, or are justified at a later point when they involve unfamiliar 
processes when those processes do in fact yield successful outcomes.  In this 
way, awareness of telic function is foundational for judgments involving 
previously unfamiliar processes.  
This Buddhist epistemology has much in common with what Sosa terms super-
radical skepticism.  About this, Sosa writes:
“such skepticism does allow that one is reasonable in believing at least 
what is present to one's mind as intrinsically obvious per se … 
Justification in that case need not derive from any process of justifying 
that one or anyone need have carried out, but rather derives from one's 
satisfaction of certain conditions …”47
For the Buddhist philosophers, judgments concerning familiar processes and 
telic function judgments represent awarenesses present to the agent's mind as 
intrinsically obvious, and on this basis are considered to be justified.
Due to the foundationalism of telic function and familiar judgments, the 
Buddhist theory answers to Levi's second demand above.  Due to the need to 
justify unfamiliar perceptions, Levi's first demand above is acknowledged, 
though in a qualified way.  Specifically, unfamiliar judgements need not be 
immediately justified, but can be acted on without justification, and justification 
will be achieved later through confirmation by a telic function judgement.  This 
qualified acknowledgement of Levi's first demand leads to a delay model which 
47 Sosa (1991) 248
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was further developed by the later Buddhist philosopher Śāntarak ita.ṣ 48
Śāntarak ita defends the Dharmakīrti-inspired model of epistemic successṣ  
against that of Kumārila.  Thus Śāntarak ita begins by accepting Kumārila'sṣ  
claim that the fact that the source is trustworthy guarantees the truth of a 
token belief.  Śāntarak ita writes: ṣ
“And as for [the reading of Kumārila's proposal whereby] a capacity is 
produced from the pramāṇas' own causes, rather than being added by 
other things after they [viz. the valid cognitions] have been produced 
from their own causes, then in this case we have no disagreement.”49
In this verse, Śāntarak ita agrees that the capacity for accurate determinationṣ  
is not separable from the pramā as' own causes, i.e. from the appropriatenessṇ  
of the epistemic conditions of belief formation, and thus agrees that truth is 
achievable based on an essential disposition of beliefs.  However, this does not 
mean that Śāntarak ita is fully in agreementṣ  with Kumārila.  In order to clarify 
their difference, Kamalaśīla asks:
“It could be [objected:] if you do not disagree, then why do you adopt 
[the view of] prāmā yam ṇ 'from something else'?”50  
This question introduces Śāntarak itaṣ 's statement:
“although this [capacity] is present in a belief, it cannot be ascertained 
independently in some cases.”51  
Śāntarak ita ṣ here distinguishes between the fact that a belief is true and the 
48 See esp. TS & P 2836-2841 and TS & P 2958-2962
49 TS 2826 – 2827a: “atha śakti  svahetubhya  pramā ānā  prajāyate|  jātānāḥ ḥ ṇ ṃ ṃ 
tu svahetubhyo nânyair ādhīyate puna  || tad atra na vivādo na  ko hyḥ ḥ  
ana śasya vastuna |”ṃ ḥ
50 P 750 immediately above TS 2832: “syād etat – yadī bhavatā  na vivādo kathaṃ ṃ 
tarhi parata -prāmā yam abhyupagatam iti”ḥ ṇ
51 TS 2832cd: “jñāne kvacit sthitā 'py e ā na boddhu  śakyate svata |”ṣ ṃ ḥ
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fact that the truth of the belief has been ascertained in some sense by the 
agent.  Śāntarak ita ṣ alludes to Śākyabuddhi's distinction between unfamiliar 
perceptual judgments and other kinds of judgments, as Kamalaśīla later 
clarifies.52  Śāntarak ita's critique challenges Kumārila's epistemology on theṣ  
grounds that it would account for mere true belief rather than some greater 
epistemic good which allows the agent some degree of epistemic confidence 
and which could appropriately be termed knowledge.
Śāntarak ita thusṣ  agrees with Kumārila that, ontologically, successful 
judgments determine their object, but argues that the agent is left with no 
confidence as to whether any given token judgment has in fact been 
successful.53  This also seems to be the understanding of Taber, who observes in 
rejecting U veka's viewṃ  that “[v]alidity may always arise intrinsically, but it will 
have to be determined extrinsically.”54  This Buddhist position thus addresses 
the challenge presented by Hookway, referred to above, such that we can 
“recogniz[e] the infallibility of perceptual ones, while also insisting that our 
beliefs about whether a given judgement is a perceptual judgement are 
fallible.”55  It does so by presenting a factorizable analysis of the epistemic goal.
The introduction of a further ascertainment requirement engages with the third 
of the perspectives identified by Kataoka, the 'epistemological' or 'cognizing' 
perspective.  Indeed, Jayanta discusses this perspective specifically in terms of 
'ascertainment' (niścaya).  Reflecting the fact that Śāntarak ita's critique ofṣ  
Kumārila involves only a concern with the subject's ascertaining the truth and 
not with the subject's possessing the truth, Shida explains that Śāntarak ita'sṣ  
“theory is argued mainly at the epistemological level”56 and that “Śāntarak itaṣ  
mainly shows the third theory [i.e. endorses the idea that prāmā yam is notṇ  
'from itself'] regarding the epistemological aspect.”57
52 See P 775 under TS 2844
53 See TS & P 2826-2827 and TS & P 2832-2835
54 Taber (1992b) 209
55 Hookway (2007) 11
56 Shida (2007) 1060
57 Shida (2007) 1059
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Śāntarak ita ṣ writes:
So [the capacity] depends on an awareness of telic function or other 
judgment just for [its] ascertainment, but does not [depend on those 
types of judgment] to separately provide this [i.e. the capacity in the 
awareness], like poison etc.58
In this verse, Śāntarak ita does several things.  Firstly, he ṣ reaffirms that the 
truth of a belief is not dependent on any further judgment.  Rather, the agent 
requires a further judgment in order to ascertain that truth.  Secondly, 
Śāntarak ita reiterates Devendrabuddhi's view that theṣ  ascertainment 
requirement is satisfied by an awareness of telic function.  Similarly, Dunne 
explains:
“according to Devendrabuddhi … when one acts … and one then attains 
an object with the desired or expected telic function, that initial 
perception was instrumental; one was simply unable to determined the 
instrumentality of that perception at the time of the perception. 
Devendrabuddhi proposes that instrumentality in this context be 
confirmed by a subsequent instrumental cognition … in which the desired 
telic function appears.”59
Thirdly, Śāntarak itaṣ 's verse above makes a novel point about how 
ascertainment is achieved by the agent by analogy with poison and with wine. 
Śāntarak ita ṣ goes on to explain the significance of this analogy as follows:
To explain, because poison, wine etc. are observed to be similar to other 
things [in having some effect] and [yet] because the results do not 
present themselves immediately, the ascertainment of the nature of 
these [viz. poison, wine etc. happens only] when there is ascertainment 
that the results of those things has been produced [such as] fainting, 
58 TS 2835: tasmād arthakriyā-jñānam anyad vā samapek yate|  niścayāyâiva naṣ  
tv asyā ādhānāya vi âdivat||ṣ
59 Dunne (2004) 289
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sweating, slurring speech etc.  In this same way too, it is ascertained 
that the deliverance does possess the capacity.60
This analogy with poison and wine presents a delay-model of confirmation, in 
which Levi's first demand must be ultimately satisfied.  The lack of justification 
for one's beliefs regarding unfamiliar processes at the outset is no bar to being 
able to act on those beliefs.  Thus a process of inquiry is established which 
involves a search for a judgment with epistemically foundational status.  This 
contrasts with Kumārila's process of inquiry described in the previous chapter, 
which involves a search for a threshold level of epistemic confidence.
Śāntarak ita replies to an objection that it would not be possible to act if oneṣ  
doubts one's judgment as follows:
The intelligent person acts on the basis of doubt alone, and by doing 
this, his intelligence is not diminished.61
Śākyabuddhi likewise explains:
“But regarding that cause [of awareness] which operates due to an initial 
perception, when there is no apprehension [of it] as accurate, one acts 
on the basis of nothing other than doubt.”62
Similarly Jayanta writes:
“So we consider that prāmā yam is not ascertained (na niścitam) at thatṇ  
time; we take action on the basis of nothing other than doubt.”63
60 TS 2836-2837: “yathā hi vi a-madyâdes tad-anya-samatêk a āt|ṣ ṣ ṇ  
phalânantarâbhāvāc caîtad ātmā-viniścaya ||  mūrcchā-sveda-pralāpâdi-tat-ḥ
phalôtpatti-niścaye|  tādātmyam gamyate 'py evam jñāne tac-chakti-niścaya ||”ḥ
61 TS 2974: “ucyate sa śaye aîva varttate 'sau vicak a a | vaicak a ya-k itisṃ ṇ ṣ ṇ ḥ ṣ ṇ ṣ  
tasya na caîvam anu ajyate||”ṣ
62 PV  Ṭ nye 72A: “dang po nyid kyis 'jug pa gang yin pa de la yang rgyu mtshan 
nges par gzung ba med pa na the tshom nyid kyi sgo nas 'jug par byed do|” cf. 
Dunne (2004) 291
63 NM 439: tena manyāmahe na niścita  tadā prāmā ya , sa śayād evaṃ ṇ ṃ ṃ  
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As such, whereas Kumārila's presentation concerns a regulative notion of 
degree of confidence, as per Goldman's characterisation above, the Buddhist 
discussions concern what Sosa terms an ideal level of confidence, i.e. the 
degree of confidence “given the subject's epistemic position, including his total 
relevant evidence.”64  When an agent acts on the basis of a doubtful judgment, 
Kumārila's analysis is that she posits accuracy of judgment as a working 
hypothesis.  By contrast, the Buddhist analysis is that a theoretically insufficient 
level of epistemic confidence can be sufficient to motivate action.
However, Kumārila alleges that the Buddhist confirmation model is vulnerable to 
the problem of infinite regress, which was examined earlier in this chapter.  In 
the B ha - īkā presentation,ṛ ṭ ṭ  Kumārila presents the argument from infinite 
regress as follows:
TS 2852: If you claim that the success of the deliverance in the case of 
the first [deliverance] is established by a different successful 
deliverance, [then] in that case, seeking in this way, we would not find a 
foundation.
TS 2853: Just as the first deliverance depends on a deliverance which 
agrees with it, in the same way, an agreeing deliverance should again be 
sought for that agreeing deliverance also.
TS 2854: But if you accept the success of deliverances of some 
[deliverance] to be just 'from itself', [then] for what reason is there 
aversion to [saying] the same thing [i.e. it is 'from itself'] about the first 
[deliverance]?
The argument of the last verse is that no subsequent judgment can play a 
foundational role for an earlier one, on pain of infinite regress.  That this 
vyavaharāma iti
64 Sosa (2011) 36
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criticism is particularly aimed at the Buddhist confirmation model is suggested 
by the fact that Śākyabuddhi and Śāntarak itaṣ 65 both explicitly address it. 
Śākyabuddhi directly quotes these verses TS 2853 and TS 2854 and considers 
how the Buddhist can respond.66  Devendrabuddhi has explained that the 
accuracy of judgments is confirmed by reference to the later awareness of telic 
function.  However, Śākyabuddhi is forced to admit that even the awareness of 
telic function, which is supposed to play a foundational role, is subject to error, 
and thus stands in need of further justification.  Devendrabuddhi has founded a 
disjunction between Good Case and Bad Case deliverances on the outcome in 
the form of an awareness involving telic function, so that they can be 
discriminated on this basis.  Devendrabuddhi writes:
“Both would not occur when there is no real thing.  When there is 
activity based on apprehending fire with respect to what is not fire, there 
is no arising of a later awareness having content involving the functions 
of burning and cooking etc., because that [later awareness] could only 
be based on a real thing.”67
However, Śākyabuddhi realizes that this does not correctly deal with the case of 
dreams.  Śākyabuddhi considers the objection:
“According to [your] explanation, in a dream too, there would be non-
deviation regarding the goal … [so] the deliverances of dreams would 
have prāmāṇyam.”68
Śākyabuddhi replies:
65 Krasser (1992) 154 explains that “Kamalaśīla comments that this verse 
bhrantihetor etc. [TS 2972] is a response to … a verse from Kumārila's 
B ha īkā”, ṛ ṭṭ viz. TS 2855 above.
66 PV  Ṭ nye 74B; cf. Dunne (2004) 377 fn.13
67 PVP 2B: “gnyis ka dngos po med par me 'jug pa'i phyir ro|  me med pa la mi 
'dzin pa can gyi 'jug par byed pa las|  'jug pa'i sreg pa dang 'tshad pa la sogs 
pa'i yul can gyi phyis kyi shes pa skye ba yod pa ma yin te|  de ni dngos po'i 
rten can nyid yin pa'i phyir ro|”
68 PV  Ṭ nye 75A: “gal te rmi lam la yang ji skad du bshad pa'i don la mi slu ba yod 
do zhe na| … gal te rmi lam gyi shes pa tshad mar 'gyur ro zhe na …”
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“This is no fault because we accept this.”69
Śākyabuddhi next considers:
“In that case, how do [you] explain the lack of prāmāṇyam [in 
dreams]?”70
Śākyabuddhi's reply is:
“Because [one] thinks the thought 'it is an error'”71
Although Śākyabuddhi's way of dealing with the case of dreams is far from 
adequate, by admitting that there is no other basis for positing something as 
real than the phenomenology of awareness which is given equally in dreams 
and waking state, Śākyabuddhi seems to provide his support to a 
phenomenological interpretation of prāmā yam 'from itself' of just the typeṇ  
later advocated by Pārthasārathi and Arnold.  Although Śākyabuddhi maintains 
that one can later correct one's beliefs, such correction consists in nothing over 
and above the fact of belief change, just as Arnold explains that “a cognition 
can present itself as falsifying a previous one just insofar as it is the subsequent 
one that seems more credible.  And if that is not how it seems, then it will not 
appear, phenomenologically, as an overridding cognition!”72  This also reflects a 
more general Buddhist notion of process without culmination or normativity.
This problem of infinite regress should also be distinguished from its equivalent 
in the context of self-awareness.  Whereas this argument involves an infinite 
regress of ascertaining prāmā yam, that context involves ṇ an infinite regress of 
being aware of awareness.  As Zhihua Yao explains, the Sautrāntikas establish 
the reflexivity of awareness on the basis that “[i]f a consciousness is not known 
69 PV  Ṭ nye 75A: “'dod pa nyid kyi phyir skyon med do|”
70 PV  Ṭ nye 75A: “gal te 'o na ji ltar na tshad ma ma yin par bshad ce na|”
71 PV  Ṭ nye 75A: “'khrul pa yin no snyam pa'i bsam pas so|”
72 Arnold (2005) 73
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by itself, but by a separate consciousness, … there will be a fault of infinite 
regress.”73  Kumārila is aware of the threat of infinite regress to a non-reflexive 
philosophical position, but chooses to block it on pragmatic grounds rather than 
by admitting either of Levi's two foundationalist demands.  Interestingly, the 
rendering of Kumārila's verse TS 2853ab by Śākyabuddhi or his translators, 
Subhutiśrī and Dge ba'i blo gros, discussed above, involves a subtle but 
significant change, so that it reads:
“Just as the cognizedness of the first [awareness] depends on [an 
awareness] which does not deceive …”74  
By changing Kumārila's idea that the prāmā yam of the awareness depends onṇ  
a subsequent awareness, the two infinite regress arguments seem to be either 
conflated or equated.  Further, Śākyabuddhi's discussion seems to confirm that 
the earlier and later awarenesses specifically refer to the initial and telic 
function awarenesses of the Buddhist position.  By construing 'not deviating 
from that' as 'not deceiving', this formulation also seems to sharpen the 
criticism of the idea of that privileged class of awarenesses, such as the 
awarenesses of telic function, can be identified as non-deceptive.
Section 5: Kumārila's anti-foundationalist defence of the Veda
The upshot of the above discussion is that deliverances have an intrinsic 
epistemic capacity to make an accurate determination under appropriately 
normal epistemic conditions.  As such, in order to gain the requisite confidence 
in her beliefs, the agent is only required to ascertain the fact of appropriately 
normal epistemic conditions, which consists in the lack of separable bad 
features.  In the case of testimony, bad features would consist in properties of 
the informant, such as ignorance, intention to deceive etc.  As self-revealing 
73 Yao (2005) 117
74 PV  Ṭ nye 74B: “ji ltar dang po'i shes pa nyid| de mi slu la ltos 'gyur na|”
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scripture, however, the Veda has no author as such.  As Davis explains, “[t]he 
denial of any author for the Vedas liberates it from having to seek out the 
author's intentions.  Like all texts subjected to hermeneutic practice, therefore, 
the Vedas possess a “semantic autonomy.””75  Thus Kumārila writes:
ŚV 2.63cd: Bad features, lacking any basis, could not exist, because 
there is no author.76
The general protocol for belief formation described in the previous chapter 
involves a general operation of affirming one's judgments, followed by the 
search for a defeater which may result in a replacement operation.  Regarding 
beliefs based on Vedic testimony, Kumārila writes:
ŚV 2.68: As concerns the [Veda], being free of replacement [of the 
general operation] is easier, because there is no author.  Therefore, it 
does not even come to be suspected that the Veda is a non-pramā aṇ .
ŚV 2.65bcd: The absence of both kinds of epistemic failure is due to the 
lack of those [bad features].  So the general operation is not replaced.77
Here, Kumārila tells us that the tenet that the Veda has no author means that 
no prolonging of inquiry is needed, that the believer easily gains sufficient 
confidence in her beliefs.  In this way, it would seem that the instigating and 
terminating of inquiry thus coincide.  Whereas replacement is possible in the 
case of ordinary beliefs, in the case of beliefs derived from Vedic testimony, 
Kumārila tells us that the stage of replacement is not even possible. 
Kumārila's strategy may appear prima facie to be an odd and weak manner of 
defending the accuracy of Vedic testimony.  Specifically, it may seem that 
Kumārila conflates absence of evidence for the falsity of Vedic injunctions with 
evidence of such absence.  As such, the proposition that the Vedic statements 
75 Davis (2010) 48
76 ŚV 2.63cd: “vaktur abhāvena na syur do ā  nirāśrayā ”ṣ ḥ ḥ
77 ŚV 2.65d: “tad-abhāvata | aprāmā ya-dvayâsattvam tenôtsargô 'napodita |”ḥ ṇ ḥ
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are true does not appear to meet the Peircean requirement that a hypothesis 
“must be capable of being subjected to experimental testing”78.  However, 
Kumārila clarifies his intention through an illuminating analogy with gustatory 
judgments.  Kumārila writes:
ŚV 2.91: Nor, as in the case of flavour etc., would an object be absent if  
it is not apprehended by some other [sense].  For they [i.e. taste and so 
on] are indeed restricted to being grasped [only] by gustation etc.79
ŚV 2.92ab: If it is objected: [there is another] awareness of the object in 
the case of [taste], [Reply:] it will be likewise with respect to dharma.80
Judgments about the flavour of a food are obtained exclusively through the 
faculty of gustation.  Indeed, following the ideas of Śākyabuddhi about telic 
function, sweetness can be defined as the power to affect the tastebuds in 
certain ways, and so on.  As such, corroboration of a judgment of sweetness by 
audioperception and the other senses is neither possible nor necessary. 
However, Kumārila notes that a further awareness of the judgment of 
sweetness can be acquired, presumably in cases such as successive gustatory 
episodes involving a single bite of cake.  Kumārila does not clarify how this 
second judgment would bear on the original judgment, but one construal is that 
corroboration is provided through further tasting.  In this way, Kumārila would 
allow that corroboration is one way in which a judgment can gain positive 
epistemic status.
Alternatively, it could be understood that the judgment gains epistemic strength 
simply through not being defeated by subsequent judgments.  Defeat could 
occur in cases such as illness.  A second slice of cake eaten when one has 
recovered would also serve to rebut the initial judgment that the cake is sour. 
It could be objected that Kumārila overlooks the way in which gustatory 
78 Fann (1970) 43
79 ŚV 2.91: “na cānyair agrahe 'rthasya syād abhāvo rasâdivat|  te ā  jihvādibhirṣ ṃ  
yasmān niyamo graha e 'sti hi||”ṇ
80 ŚV 2.92ab: “tad dhiyaîvârthabodhaś cet tād g dharme bhavi yati|”ṛ ṣ
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judgments can be defeated by non-gustatory deliverances.  Thus a doctor's 
testimony that illness has affected one's tastebuds constitutes an undercutting 
defeater for a previous judgment of flavour.  However, in Kumārila's defence, it 
can be said that this deliverance does not undercut the phenomenology of the 
awareness as of sourness.
Kumārila's idea is that Vedic testimony provides awareness of phenomena 
within an exclusive domain in the same way as the sense of taste does.  This 
exclusive domain concerns beliefs which broadly concern moral, legal and 
ritualistic affairs, thus normative rather than factual matters.  As Halbfass 
explains, “[a]ll knowledge about dharma, the ritual norms and duties, is 
ultimately obtained from the Veda.”81
As such, it seems that the lack of replacement operation and the lack of bad 
features described above refer to judgements based on non-Vedic sources.  Just 
as a judgment of sourness can only be overturned by a later judgment of 
sweetness, so too a judgment based on a Vedic injunction can only be replaced 
by a contrary judgment based on a different Vedic injunction.  The previous 
chapter provided examples of overturning such as the ritual injunctions 'he 
shall not look' and 'he shall not eat', carrying water in a milk-pail instead of a 
wooden bowl, and sacrificing on the Āhavanīya fire as a general case.82
As such, within the sphere of Vedic judgments, it would seem that defeat of 
judgments formed on the basis of Vedic testimony is possible, and that the 
process of inquiry described in the previous chapter is applicable.  This feature 
of Kumārila's position has been recognized by Arnold, who explains that “Vedic 
practices (practices represented as executing what is enjoined by the Vedic 
texts) are subject to being overridden [but are] susceptible only to the outputs 
81 Halbfass (1992) 30
82 It may be objected that these examples are not drawn from the core sa hitṃ ā 
texts of the Vedas.  However, this is typical of the type of injunctions of interest 
to the Mīmā sā philosophersṃ .  As Taber (1989) note 7 explains, “Śabara 
sometimes cites the Śrautasūtras as if they were śruti … The paradigm of a 
Vedic injunction for Śabara, svargakāmo yajeta, is probably not a citation at 
all but a purely artificial model.”
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of the Veda itself.”83  In this statement, Arnold comes close to acknowledging 
the procedural aspect of Kumārila's thinking, albeit only in relation to the 
Vedas.  
However, Arnold nevertheless maintains that the Mīmā sakas hold that “theṃ  
Vedas are in principle unfalsifiable”84 and that “the Vedas cannot possibly be the 
source of any error”85.  Rather, falsification “tak[es] the form of essentially 
hermeneutical debates about, what, precisely, is enjoined by the Vedas in any 
case.”86  As a result, “significant authority attaches to those charged with 
interpreting the Veda – that is, the Mīmā sakas.”ṃ 87  Arnold's analysis roots the 
process of falsification in the hermeneutical practices of the Mīmā sakas.  Byṃ  
contrast, this research has argued that such hermeneutical practices reflect an 
underlying logic to the presentation of injunctions in the Veda, involving a 
model of general rule and exceptional cases.  As such, the hermeneutic process 
reflects the general method of inquiry described in the previous chapter, 
whereby the agent is advised to begin inquiry by introducing a new idea, to 
continue inquiry by searching for a defeater, and to terminate inquiry when a 
sufficient level of confidence has been obtained.  In the case of knowledge 
acquired from Vedic texts, the very fact of hearing the statements and of 
comprehending their exhortative significance is sufficient to introduce these 
statements as ideas and so begin the process of inquiry.
83 Arnold (2005) 113
84 Arnold (2005) 112
85 Arnold (2005) 112-113
86 Arnold (2005) 113
87 Arnold (2005) 113
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Chapter 6: Conclusion
Section 1: Summary of findings
By drawing out the procedural aspect of Kumārila's doctrine, an interpretation 
has been developed which diverges from the interpretations by Kumārila's 
classical commentators as well as modern scholars, whilst acknowledging that 
those interpretations capture important features of Kumārila's doctrine. 
Specifically, whilst existing interpretations present notions of justification and 
truth relevant to the process of inquiry, what is lacking is attention to the 
dynamic aspect of Kumārila's epistemology, whereby the inquirer is mandated 
to engage in an epistemic process regulated by a notion of justification but 
culminating in a state where the inquirer can have sufficient confidence that her 
beliefs coincide with the truth.  This epistemic process involves Peircean 
considerations about how to instigate, prolong and terminate inquiry, and as 
such has been characterized as a pragmatics of inquiry.
Kumārila's statement that the prāmā yam of all pramā as is 'from itself'ṇ ṇ 1 was 
identified as his central claim.  The term pramā a was shown to identify aṇ  
deliverance from an epistemic source or human faculty such as perception, 
following Sosa's terminology.  This is strictly the act of delivering, which is a 
natural kind of process to produce accurate determination, but can also be 
taken to refer to the accuracy of the delivered content.
A disjunction between pramā a and non-pramā a was characterized in terms ofṇ ṇ  
the disjunction between Good Case deliverances and Bad Case deliverances, on 
the grounds that they are reflectively indiscriminable yet arise from different 
belief processes or sets of causal conditions.  Specifically, a pramā a is a Goodṇ  
Case deliverance because it arises from epistemic sources not vitiated by flaws. 
1 TS 2811ab and ŚV 2.47ab respectively.
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Such flaws consist in features such as cataracts, which make epistemic 
conditions sub-optimal.
The notion of prāmā yam was analyzed as a capacity for epistemic success,ṇ  
based on the idea of an epistemic goal implicit in this terminology.  Based on 
Kumārila's expression 'meya-bodha-śakti', epistemic success consists in 
accurate determination of an object or fact.
The construction 'from itself' (svata ) was found to appeal to a dispositionalistḥ  
essentialist notion of capacity as metaphysical ground for the process of 
accurate determination.  A capacity is a real causal power which is a real 
essence and natural disposition of a natural kind of process.  This capacity 
metaphysically grounds the process of accurate judgment, which results in an 
accurate judgment as an outcome.  The contrast between 'from itself' and 'from 
something else' indicates a sense of non-reliance.  A non-pramā a or Bad Caseṇ  
deliverance is reliant on some vitiating feature of the belief process to cause the 
apprehension as of a particular object.  By contrast, a pramā a or Good Caseṇ  
deliverance is not reliant on anything external to itself.
Accordingly, Kumārila's claim above is that a Good Case deliverance, which 
arises from epistemic sources that are not vitiated by flaws, exercises a 
capacity to determine an object due to that capacity being a real causal power 
which is an essence conditional on its identity as a Good Case deliverance.  All 
deliverances possess such a capacity as an intrinsic nature contingent on lack of 
vitiation, but the vitiation in the case of Bad Case deliverances means that their 
intrinsic nature is overpowered, in the same way that the intrinsic nature of 
water to be cool is held to be overpowered by the proximity of fire.
Thus a Good Case deliverance is one which arises from a human faculty which 
constitutes an intellectual virtue in the sense that it is “a way of arriving at 
belief that yields an appropriate preponderance of truth over error”2.  This Good 
Case deliverance has positive epistemic status by virtue of being an apt belief, 
2 Sosa (1991) 289
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i.e. by virtue of deriving from that intellectual virtue.  In this way, the reflexive 
sense of 'itself' is construed as reflexivity to the intellectual virtue that the 
deliverance amounts to.  The interpretation of this thesis thus contrasts with 
that of Pārthasārathi, Arnold and Taber, whereby prāmā yam is a property ofṇ  
both veridical and non-veridical awarenesses.  
However, given the reflective indiscriminability of Bad Case deliverances, it still 
remains to be explained how the agent can have sufficient confidence that her 
beliefs arise from Good Case deliverances.  This problem cannot be solved by 
appeal to some external standard of justification, on pain of infinite regress. 
Rather, Kumārila lays out a protocol for inquiry based on the asymmetry 
between Good Case and Bad Case deliverances.  Bad Case deliverances rely on 
some vitiating feature whereby they are vulnerable to subsequent defeat, either 
by undercutting or overridding defeaters.  By contrast, a Good Case deliverance 
lacks any such reliance and so display no such vulnerability to defeat.  As such, 
a process of checking one's beliefs will result in the defeat of Bad Case 
deliverances and the withstanding of defeat by Good Case deliverances.
Although such a checking process could potentially be continued indefinitely, it 
should be brought to an end on pragmatic grounds, just as a judge brings the 
potentially open-ended process of hearing evidence in a trial to an end. 
Although reflective indiscriminability means that judgments that withstand 
defeat are logically not incompatible with their falsity, nevertheless Kumārila 
considers that the agent attains not merely a high degree of epistemic 
confidence but actual possession of only true beliefs.  This is based on an 
explanatory induction to the view that beliefs that withstand defeat do so 
because they are due to a real causal power which is a capacity to determine 
an object.
This dynamic conception contrasts with the static conception of Arnold, whereby 
the initial appearance provides a 'validity' which constitutes an epistemically 
complete outcome.  This reading is defended through consideration of 
Kumārila's use of the notion of svabhāva, the negative particle, and ritual and 
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grammatical terminology.  On this basis, affinities are found with Peirce's 
pragmatics of inquiry and with Sosa's Virtue Epistemology.
Kumārila's presentation of an argument from infinite regress is shown to target 
a conception of organon justification, whereby one belief is justified by some 
further instrument or rule.  As such, Kumārila is an anti-foundationalist who 
rejects the idea that a secure foundation for judgments can be obtained. 
However, whereas the reading of Kumārila's anti-foundationalism by Taber and 
Arnold means that all beliefs are equally justified or equally valid, the 
interpretation presented here is that a process of inquiry is necessary to 
strengthen the epistemic status of beliefs.  It is thus tentatively suggested that 
Kumārila's doctrine be understood with reference to Sosa's more general notion 
of aptness, rather than the narrower notion of justification.
The title of this thesis, 'Generative Knowledge', is intended to resonate with the 
idea of theory-generating methods in general, including Peirce's conception of 
abduction, but also has particular reference to the example of Pāṇini's 
generative grammar.  A reading has been made in line with what Ganeri 
identifies as a Mīmā sāṃ  model of ritual reason involving processes of 
substitution and adaptation which is also a general model for practical 
deliberation.3  Kumārila's protocol has an affinity with legal reasoning, which is 
similarly adaptive.  As Prakken explains, legal reasoning has a “rule-guided 
rather than rule-governed nature”4 whereby “legal rules are … often subject to 
exceptions which are not explicitly stated in legislation, and this calls for ways 
of representing the provisional or 'defeasible' character of legal rules.”5 
Kumārila's doctrine of inquiry represents a similarly pragmatic response to “the 
open, unpredictable nature of the world”6 faced by jurists, ritualists and 
epistemologists.
3 See Ganeri (2004) 207
4 Prakken (1997) 33
5 Prakken (1997) 33
6 Prakken (1997) 33
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Section 2: Suggestions for future research
This research has suggested connections with various themes in contemporary 
philosophy.  These are the literature on metaphysical grounding, the thesis of 
dispositional essentialism, the pragmatism of Charles Peirce, and the Virtue 
Reliabilism of Ernest Sosa.  However, the development of these connections has 
only been partial.  Further research may strengthen the claim of Kumārila's 
affinity with these themes.  In particular, it is likely that the general notion of 
pramā a can be helpfully illuminated with regard to aspects of Virtueṇ  
Epistemology including anti-luck conditions for knowledge such as Sosa's modal 
notions of tracking and safety, as well as ability conditions for knowledge such 
as Sosa's notion of aptness, which Sosa has continued to develop in recent 
work.  Further, the notion of a metaphysical ground is a topic of renewed 
philosophical interest, and research into the notion of svabhāva could contribute 
to the articulation of the concept of grounding.
This research has also set out Kumārila's own view with tangential reference to 
the rival accounts of Buddhist thinkers.  However, given the substantial 
discursive engagement with Kumārila's view by Devendrabuddhi and 
Śākyabuddhi very shortly after Kumārila's own activity, and by Dharmottara as 
well as Śāntarak ita and Kamalaśīla in the following century, it would seem thatṣ  
research into the engagement with this topic by these thinkers would be very 
valuable in illuminating Kumārila's own understanding of his claim, as well as in 
indicating the immediate impact of Kumārila's work.  As close contemporaries 
of Kumārila, Devendrabuddhi and Śākyabuddhi may share Kumārila's own 
philosophical concerns more closely than Kumārila's own later commentators.
As discussed above, Mīmā sā authors have specialized in the analysis ofṃ  
normative statements, and as such, the methodologies they have developed 
can be brought into further engagement with similar normative concerns in 
contemporary thought, such as epistemological and ethical normativity.
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Abbreviations
The abbreviations used in the thesis are explained here.  A reference to the 
bibliography below is given in those cases where citiations have been made 
with reference to page numbers.
B  = B ha - īkā of Bha a Kumārila – see Ṭ ṛ ṭ ṭ ṭṭ Shastri (1968)
CP = Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce
K = Kāśikā of Sucarita Miśra – see Sâmbaśiva Śāstrî (1926)
MB = Mahābhā ya of Patañjaliṣ
MK = Mīmā sā Kośa – see Kevalānandasaraswatī (1960)ṃ
MMK = Mūla-madhyamaka-kārikā of Nāgārjuna – see Poussin (1903-1913)
NM = Nyāya-mañjarī of Bha a Jayanta – ṭṭ the text reflects an unpublished 
critical edition of the text prepared by Prof. Kei Kataoka; see Varadācārya 
(1969) for page references
NRM = Nyāya-ratna-mālā of Pārthasārathi Miśra – see Shastri (1982)
P = Tattva-sa graha-pañjikā of Kamalaśīla – see ṅ Shastri (1926)
PP = Prasanna-padā of Candrakīrti – see Poussin (1903-1913)
PVP = Tshad ma rnam 'grel kyi 'grel pa (= Pramā a-vārttika-paṇ ñjikā) of 
Devendrabuddhi – see Devendrabuddhi (1991)
PV  = Tshad ma rnam 'grel kyi 'grel bshad (= Pramā a-vārttika- īkā) ofṬ ṇ ṭ  
Śākyabuddhi – see Śākyabuddhi (1991)
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ŚV = Śloka-vārttika of Bha a Kumārila – see ṭṭ Kataoka (2011) Part 1
TS = Tattva-sa graha of Śāntarak ita – see ṅ ṣ Shastri (1968)
T  = Tātparya-Ṭ ṭīkā of Bha o veka – see Ramanatha Sastri (1940)ṭṭ ṃ
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Appendix 1: Transliterated B ha - īkā text extractṛ ṭ ṭ
This appendix contains a transliteration of the svata -prāmā yam presentationḥ ṇ  
in the B ha - īkā.  That presentation isṛ ṭ ṭ  preserved as a long quotation within 
Śāntarak ita's Tattva-sa graha.  ṣ ṅ The transliteration below closely follows the 
Shastri (1968) (Bauddha Bharati) edition [BB], which does not constitute a 
genuinely critical edition.  Accordingly, no credit is taken for original research in 
respect of the material in this appendix.  Emendations were made based on the 
Krishnamacharya (1926) (Gaekwad's Oriental Series) edition [GOS].  The 
Tattva-sa graha verses quoting the B ha - īkā are 2811ab, 2812 to 2815 andṅ ṛ ṭ ṭ  
2846 to 2918.  However, Kataoka notes that there is slight uncertainty as to 
whether verse 2846 is extracted from the B ha - īkā or is by Śāntarak ita.ṛ ṭ ṭ ṣ 1  See 
Kataoka (2011) 283 footnote 274 for a comparison of B ha - īkā and Śloka-ṛ ṭ ṭ
vārttika verses.  This extract covers 2811 to 2815, 2846 to 2884, and 2908 to 
2916, which concern the general case.  Verses 2885 to 2907 and 2917 to 2918, 
concerning the application to the case of the Veda, are omitted.
2811ab: svata  sarva-pramā ānā  prāmā yam iti g hyatām|ḥ ṇ ṃ ṇ ṛ
[2811cd: ity etasya ca vākyasya bhavadbhi  ko 'rtha i yate||]ḥ ṣ
2812ab: meya-bodhâdike śaktis te ām svābhāvikī sthitā|ṣ
2812cd: na hi svato 'satī śakti  kartum anyena pāryateḥ ||2
2813ab: anapek atvam evaîka  prāmā yasya nibandhanam|ṣ ṃ ṇ
2813cd: tad eva hi vināśyeta sāpek atve samāśrite||ṣ
2814ab: ko hi mūlahara  pak a  nyāyavādy adhyavasyati|ṃ ṣ ṃ
2814cd: yena tat-siddhy-upāyo 'pi svôktyaîvâsya vinaśyati||
1 See Kataoka (2011) 251
2 2812cd pāryate] BB;  śakyate GOS
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2815ab: sāpek aṣ ṃ hi pramā atva  na vyavasthāpyate kvacit|ṇ ṃ 3
2815cd: anavasthita-hetuś ca ka  sādhya  sādhayi yati||ḥ ṃ ṣ
2846ab: svatas tv asya pramā ānāṇ ṃ prāmā yasyṇ ôpavar anāt|ṇ
2846cd: svakārye v ttir jātānām athâpy abhimatā svataṛ ḥ||
2847ab: ātmalābhe hi bhāvānāṃ kāra âpek itṇ ṣ ê yate|ṣ
2847cd: labdhâtmana  svakārye u vartante svayam eva tu||ḥ ṣ
2848ab: utpāda-mātra evâto vyapek âsti svahetu u|ṣ ṣ
2848cd: jñānānām svagu e v e ā na tu niścaya-janmani||ṇ ṣ ṣ
2849ab: janane hi svatantrā āṇ ṃ prāmā yârtha-viniścite |ṇ ḥ
2849cd: svahetu-nirapek ā ām te āṣ ṇ ṣ ṃ v ttir gha âdivat||ṛ ṭ
2850ab: m tpin a-da a-cakrâdi gha o janmany apek ate|ṛ ḍ ṇḍ ṭ ṣ
2850cd: udakâhara e tv asya tad-apek ā na vidyateṇ ṣ ||
2851ab: evaṃ svata -pramā atvam ante câvaśyam eva tat|ḥ ṇ
2851cd: parādhīne pramā atve hy anavasthā prasajyate||ṇ
2852ab: maulike cet pramā atve pramā ântara-sādhyatā|ṇ ṇ 4
2852cd: tava tatraîvam icchanto na vyavasthā  labhemahi||ṃ
2853ab: yathaîva prathama  jñāna  tat-sa vādam apek ate|ṃ ṃ ṃ ṣ
2853cd: sa vādenṃ âpi sa vāda  punar m gyas tathaṃ ḥ ṛ îva hi||
2854ab: kasyacit tu yadî yeta svata eva pramā atā|ṣ ṇ
2854cd: prathamasya tathābhāve pradve a  kena hetunā||ṣ ḥ
2855ab: eva  yadi gu âdhīnā pratyak âdi-pramā atā|ṃ ṇ ṣ ṇ
3 2815ab vyavasthāpyate] vyavasthāpyata GOS; vyasthāpyate BB
4 2852ab cet] GOS; ca BB
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2855cd: gu āṇ ś ca na pramā ena vinā santi kadācana||ṇ
2856ab: tato gu a-paricchedi-pramā ântaram icchata |ṇ ṇ ḥ
2856cd: tasyâpy anya-paricchinna-gu âyattā pramā atā||ṇ ṇ
2857ab: yathâdye ca tathā 'anyatrêty anavasthaîva pūrvavat|5
2857cd: tatra tatraîvam icchanto na vyavasthā  labhemahi|ṃ
2858ab: gu a-jñāna  gu âyatta-prāmā yam atha nê yate|ṇ ṃ ṇ ṇ ṣ
2858cd: ādyam apy artha-vijñāna  nâpek eta gu a-pramām||ṃ ṣ ṇ
2859ab: ato dūram api dhyātvā prāmā ya  yat svata  kvacit|ṇ ṃ ḥ
2859cd: avaśyâbhyupagantavyam tatraîvâdau varam sthitam||
2860ab: sa vāda-gu a-vijñāne kena vā 'bhyadhike mate|ṃ ṇ 6
2860cd: ādyasya tad-adhīnatvam yad-balena bhavi yati||ṣ
2861ab: tasmāt svata -pramā atva  sarvatrautsargika  sthitam|ḥ ṇ ṃ ṃ
2861cd: bādha-kāra a-du atva-jñānābhyām taṇ ṣṭ d apohyate7||
2862ab: parâyatte 'pi caîtasmin nânavasthā prasajyate|
2862cd: pramā âdhīnam etad dhi svatas tac ca prati hitam||ṇ ṣṭ
2863ab: pramā a  hi pramā ena yathā nṇ ṃ ṇ ânyena sādhyate|
2863cd: na sidhyaty apramā atvam apramā āt tathaîva hi||ṇ ṇ
2864ab: tulya-jātâśrayatve hi prati hā nôpapadyate|ṣṭ
2864cd: vijātes tv anya-hetutvād d ha-mūla-prati hitā||ṛḍ ṣṭ
2865ab: bādhaka-pratyayas tāvad  arthânyatvâvadhāra am|ṇ
5 2857ab yathâdye ca tathā 'anyatrêty] GOS; yathaîvâdye tataś caîvam BB
6 'bhyadhike mate] GOS; printing is bad in BB
7 Kataoka reads this term as 'apodyate'
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2865cd: so 'napek a-pramā atvāt pūrva-jñānam apohateṣ ṇ 8||
2866ab: tatrâpi tv apavādasya syād apek ā puna  kvacit|ṣ ḥ
2866cd: jātâśa kasya pūrve a sā 'py alpena nivartate||ṅ ṇ
2867ab: bādhakântaram utpanna  yady asyânvi yato 'param|ṃ ṣ
2867cd: tato madhyama-bādhena pūrvasyaîva pramā atā||ṇ
2868ab: athânurūpa-yatnena samyag-anve a e k te|ṣ ṇ ṛ
2868cd: mūlâbhāvān na vijñāna  bhavet bādhaka-bādhakam||ṃ 9
2869ab: tato nirapavādatvāt tenaîvâdyaṃ balīyasā|
2869cd: bādhyate tena tasyaîva pramā atvam apohyateṇ 10||
2870ab: eva  ṃ parīk aka-jñāna-tritaya  nâtivartate|ṣ ṃ
2870cd: tataś câjāta-bādhena nâśañkya  bādhaka  punaṃ ṃ ḥ||
2871ab: utprek eta hi ṣ yo mohād ajātam api bādhakam|11
2871cd: sa sarva-vyavahāre u sa śayâtmā k aya  vrajetṣ ṃ ṣ ṃ ||
2872ab: tathā ca vāsudevena ninditā sa śayâtmatāṃ |
2872cd: nâya  lokṃ o 'sti kaunteya na para  sa śayâtmanaḥ ṃ ḥ||12
2873ab: yavān evâpavādo 'to yatra sambhāvyate matau|
2873cd: anvi e 'nupajāte ṣṭ ca tāvaty eva tad-ātmani||
2874ab: kadācit syād apîty eva  ṃ na bhūyas tatra vastuni|
2874cd: utprek amā ai  sthātavyam ṣ ṇ ḥ ātmakāmai  pramāt bhiḥ ṛ ḥ||13
8 This term should perhaps be some form of 'apod-'
9 2868cd  vijñāta ] GOS;  vijñāna  BBṃ ṃ
10 This term should perhaps be 'apodyate'
11 2871ab utprek yate] GOS; utprek eta BBṣ ṣ
12 2872cd loko] BB; loke GOS
13 2874cd ātmakāmai ] BB; nâtmakāmai  GOSḥ ḥ
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2875ab: deśa-kāla-narâvasthā-bhedā  sa vyavahārataḥ ṃ ḥ|
2875cd: siddhā eva hi ye yasmiṃs te 'pek yā bādhakârthināṣ ||
2876ab: dūra-deśa-vyavasthānād asamyag-darśane bhavet|
2876cd: anyâśa kā kvacit ṅ tatra samīpa-gati-mātrakam||
2877ab: apavādâvadhi  kāla-narâvasthântare ḥ na tu|
2877cd: vyapek ā vidyate tasmin m ga-t âdi-buddhivatṣ ṛ ṛṣṇ ||
2878ab: eva  ṃ santamase kāle yo gavâśvâdi-sa śayaṃ ḥ|
2878cd: bhrānter vā nir ayaṇ s tatra prakāśī-bhavanâvadhiḥ||
2879ab: tathā hi candra-dig-moha-veda-var a-svarṇ ādi u|ṣ
2879cd: puru ântara-sa praśnṣ ṃ ād anyathātvâvadhāra am||ṇ 14
2880ab: rāga-dve a-madônmṣ āda-k ut-tṣ ṛṣṇâdi-k atṣ êndriyai |ḥ
2880cd: durjñāne jñāyamāne 'rthe tad-abhāvād viparyaya ||ḥ
2881ab: ṛṇâdi-vyavahāre 'pi dvayor vivadamānayo |ḥ
2881cd: eka  pratyarthino vākya  dve vṃ ṃ ākye pūrva-vādina ||ḥ
2882ab: anavasthā-bhayād eva na vākya  dve likhyate 'dhikam|ṃ
2882cd: tatas tu nir aya  brūyu  svṇ ṃ ḥ āmi-sāk i-sabhṣ āsada ||ḥ
2883ab: eva  jṃ ñāna-trayasyaîva sarvatra vikriyê yate|ṣ 15
2883cd: trisatyatā 'pi devānām ata evâbhidhīyate||
2884ab: tena svata -pramā atve nḥ ṇ ânavasthôbhayor api|
2884cd: pramā atvâpramā atve ṇ ṇ yathā-yogam ata  sthite||ḥ
2908ab: nanu pramā am ity eva  pratyak âdi na g hyate|ṇ ṃ ṣ ṛ
14 2879cd anyathātvâvadhāra am] GOS; anyathātvevadhāra am BB ṇ ṇ
15 2883ab sarvârthâdhikriyê yate] BB; sarvatra vikriyê yate GOSṣ ṣ
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2908cd: na cêttham ag hītena vyavahāro 'vakalpyate||ṛ 16
2909ab: pramā a  graha āt pūrva  svarūpe a prati hitam|ṇ ṃ ṇ ṃ ṇ ṣṭ
2909cd: nirapek a  ca tat-svārthe pramite mīyate parai ||ṣ ṃ ḥ
2910ab: yathā câviditair eva cak ur-ādibhir indriyai |ṣ ḥ
2910cd: g hyante vi ayṛ ṣ ā  sarve pramā air api te tathā||ḥ ṇ
2911ab: tenâtra jñāyamānatva  prāmā ye nôpayujyate|ṃ ṇ
2911cd: vi ayṣ ânubhavo py asmād ajñātād eva labhyate||
2912ab: apramā a  puna  svārthe pramā am iva hi sthitam|ṇ ṃ ḥ ṇ
2912cd: mithyātva  tasya g hyeta na pramā āntarād te||ṃ ṛ ṇ ṛ
2913ab: na hy arthasyânyathābhāva  pūrveḥ ṇâttas tathātvavat|
2913cd: tad atrâpy anyathābhāve dhīr yad vā du a-kāraṣṭ e||ṇ
2914ab: tāvatā caîva mithyātva  g hyate nṃ ṛ ânya-hetukam|
2914cd: utpatty-avasthaṃ caîvêda  pramā am iti mīyate||ṃ ṇ 17
2915ab: ato yatrâpi mithyātva  parebhya  pratipādyate|ṃ ḥ
2915cd: tatrâpy etad dvaya  vācya  na tu sādharmya-mātrakam||ṃ ṃ
2916ab: tatrâpramā a-sādharmya-mātra  yat-kiñcid āśritṇ ṃ ā |ḥ
2916cd: sarva  pramā a-mithyātva  sādhayanty avipaścita ||ṃ ṇ ṃ ḥ
16 2908cd 'vakalpyate] BB; 'vakalpate GOS
17 2914cd caîvêda ] BB; evêda  GOSṃ ṃ
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Appendix 2: Translated B ha - īkā text extract (with transliteration inṛ ṭ ṭ  
brackets)
This appendix contains a translation of the svata -prāmā yam presentation inḥ ṇ  
the B ha - īkā in accordance with the final understanding developed in thisṛ ṭ ṭ  
thesis.  That presentation is preserved as a long quotation within Śāntarak ita'sṣ  
Tattva-sa graha.  The transliterated text below ṅ is based on the 
Krishnamacharya (1926) and Shastri (1968) (Bauddha Bharati) editions, so no 
credit is taken for original research in respect of editing the Sanskrit text. 
Those editions do not constitute genuinely critical editions, and some errors in 
translation may arise from underlying errors in the text.  The English translation 
Jha (1939) of that edition and parallel verses in Kataoka (2011) were 
consulted.  The Tattva-sa graha verses quoting the B ha - īkā are ṅ ṛ ṭ ṭ 2811ab, 2812 
to 2815 and 2846 to 2918.  However, Kataoka notes that there is slight 
uncertainty as to whether verse 2846 is extracted from the B ha - īkā or is byṛ ṭ ṭ  
Śāntarak ita.ṣ 1  See Kataoka (2011) 283 footnote 274 for a comparison of B ha -ṛ ṭ
īkā and Śloka-vārttika verses.  This translation covers ṭ 2811 to 2815, 2846 to 
2884, and 2908 to 2916, which concern the general case.  Verses 2885 to 2907 
and 2917 to 2918, concerning the application to the case of the Veda, are 
omitted.  In some cases, verses are split to make clear the flow of the 
argument.
2811ab: The capacity for epistemic success (prāmā yam) of all Good Caseṇ  
deliverances (sarva-pramā ānām) is apprehended (iti g hyatām) as being ṇ ṛ an 
intrinsic nature (svata ).ḥ
[2811cd: And (ca) what meaning (ko 'rtha ) of this statement (ity etasya …ḥ  
vākyasya) is accepted (i yate) by you (bhavadbhi )?]ṣ ḥ
2812: A capacity to cognize something etc. (meya-bodhâdike śakti ) belongs toḥ  
them [viz. Good Case deliverances] (te ām … sthitā) due to an ṣ intrinsic causal 
1 See Kataoka (2011) 251
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power (svābhāvikī).  To explain (hi), a capacity (śakti ) which is not due toḥ  
being an intrinsic nature (svato 'satī) cannot be produced (na … kartum … 
pāryate) by something else (anyena).
2813: A capacity for epistemic success is solely due to non-dependence 
(anapek atvam evaîka  prāmā yasya nibandhanam).  For (hi) just that [i.e.ṣ ṃ ṇ  
the capacity for epistemic success] (tad eva) would be destroyed (vināśyeta) if 
dependence were accepted (sāpek atve samāśrite).ṣ
2814: To explain (hi), what philosopher (ka  … nyāyavādi) acceptsḥ  
(adhyavasyati) a view that destroys the central topic (mūlahara  pak am), byṃ ṣ  
which (yena) even (api) the means of establishing that [view] (tat-siddhy-
upāya ) is destroyed (vinaśyati) by his ḥ (asya) very words (svôktyaîva).
2815: To explain (hi), dependence (sāpek am) never (na … kvacit) establishesṣ  
(vyavasthāpyate) the Goodness of Case (pramā atvam), and (ca) what (ka )ṇ ḥ  
reason which has no foundation (anavasthita-hetu ) will cause to be provedḥ  
(sādhayi yati) what is to be proved (sādhyam)?ṣ
2846ab: Rather (tu), due to the description (upavar anātṇ ) of this capacity for 
epistemic success (asya … prāmā yasya) of the Good Case ṇ deliverances 
(pramā ānām) [as] being ṇ due to an intrinsic nature (svata ), …ḥ
2846cd: … therefore (athâpi) the activity (v tti ) in operating (svakārye) of [theṛ ḥ  
Good Case deliverances which] have arisen (jātānām) is considered (abhimatā) 
[to be] due to an intrinsic nature (svata ).ḥ
2847: “To explain (hi), it is accepted that (i yate) entities (bhāvānām) dependṣ  
on causes (kāra âpek itā) in order to obtain their existence (ātmalābhe).  Butṇ ṣ  
(tu) [entities which] have obtained their existence (labdhâtmana ) functionḥ  
(vartante) in their own activities (svakārye u) just independently (svayam eva).ṣ
2848: So (ata ) there is dependency (vyapek âsti) of ḥ ṣ deliverances (jñānānām) 
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on their own causes (svahetu u) simply in being produced (utpāda-mātr[e])ṣ  
only (eva), but (tu) there is not (na) this [dependency] (e ā) [of ṣ deliverances] 
in producing (-janmani) ascertainment (niścaya-) in respect of their good 
features (svagu e u).ṇ ṣ
2849: To explain (hi), when the ascertainment of the object [and] of the 
capacity for epistemic success (prāmā yârtha-viniścite ) is being producedṇ ḥ  
(janane), the functioning (v tti ) of those [ṛ ḥ viz. Good Case deliverances] (te ām)ṣ  
which are independent (svatantrā ām) and not reliant on their own causesṇ  
(svahetu-nirapek ā ām) is like [the functioning of] a pot etc. (gha âdivat).ṣ ṇ ṭ
2850: In being produced (janmani), a pot (gha a ) depends on (apek ate) aṭ ḥ ṣ  
lump of clay, a [potter's] stick, a [potter's] wheel etc. (m tpin a-da a-ṛ ḍ ṇḍ
cakrâdi), but (tu) its (asya) [i.e. the pot's] dependency on those things (tad-
apek ā) is not present (na vidyate) ṣ when water is being extracted [in a setting 
process] (udakâhara e).ṇ
2851: Goodness of Case [being] due to an intrinsic nature (svata -ḥ
pramā atvam) is like that (evam), and (ca) that [Goodness] (tat) is certainlyṇ  
just (avaśyam eva) in the final [deliverance] (ante), for (hi) if Goodness of Case 
were dependent on something else (parādhīne pramā atve), there would beṇ  
infinite regress (anavasthā prasajyate).
2852: If it is said (cet) by you (tava) that the Goodness of Case of the first 
[deliverance] (maulike … pramā atve) is established (-sādhyatā) by a differentṇ  
Good Case deliverance (pramā ântara-), [then] in that case (tatra), seekingṇ  
(icchanta ) in this way (evam), we would not find a foundation (na vyavasthāḥ ṃ 
labhemahi).
2853: Just as (yathaîva) the first deliverance (prathama  jñānam) depends onṃ  
a deliverance which agrees with it (tat-sa vādam apek ate), in the same wayṃ ṣ  
(tathaîva hi), an agreeing deliverance (sa vāda ) should again be soughtṃ ḥ  
(punar m gya ) for that agreeing ṛ ḥ deliverance (sa vādena) also (api).ṃ
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2854: But (tu) if (yadi) you accept (i yeta) the ṣ Goodness of Case (pramā atā)ṇ  
of some [deliverance] (kasyacit) to be just due to an intrinsic nature (svata 
eva), [then] why (kena hetunā) are you averse (pradve a ) ṣ ḥ to [admitting that] 
the actual presence (tathābhāve) [of Goodness] is in the first [deliverance] 
(prathamasya)?
2855: If (yadi) the Goodness of Case of perceptual deliverances etc. 
(pratyak âdi-pramā atā) is dependent on good features (gu âdhīnā) in this wayṣ ṇ ṇ  
(evam), and (ca) good features (gu ā ) do not exist (na … santi) other than inṇ ḥ  
a Good Case deliverance (pramā ena vinā) at any time (kadācana), …ṇ
2856: … then (tata ), when seeking (icchata ) another Good Case ḥ ḥ deliverance 
(-pramā ântaram) which manifests the good feature (gu a-paricchedi-), theṇ ṇ  
Goodness of Case (pramā atā) of that (tasya) too (api) would be dependent onṇ  
a good feature manifested by another [valid cognition] (anya-paricchinna-
gu âyattā).ṇ
2857: And (ca) just as (yathā) in the case of the first (ādye), so (tathā) [in the 
case] of the next (anyatra), like before (pūrvavat) so (iti) [there would] just 
(eva) be infinite regress (anavasthā).  In this way (evam), seeking (icchanta )ḥ  
in the case of one and another (tatra tatra), we would not find a foundation (na 
vyavasthā  labhemahi).ṃ
2858: And if (atha) it is not accepted (nê yate) that cognition of the goodṣ  
feature (gu a-jñānam) has a capacity for ṇ epistemic success (-prāmā yam) thatṇ  
is dependent on a [further] good feature (gu âyatta-), [then] the firstṇ  
[deliverance] (ādyam) too (api) would not depend (nâpek eta) on theṣ  
deliverance of the object (artha-vijñānam) which is the knowledge of the good 
feature (gu a-pramām).ṇ
2859: So (ata ) having considered (dhyātvā) for a long time (dūram api), itḥ  
certainly has to be postulated (avaśyâbhyupagantavyam) that the capacity for 
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epistemic success (prāmā yam) of some [ṇ deliverance] (yat … kvacit) is due to 
an intrinsic nature (svata ).  This being the case (tatraîva) it is best (varam)ḥ  
established (sthitam) in the first [deliverance] (ādau).
2860: Or (vā) due to what (kena) are the deliverances of agreement and the 
deliverance of a good feature (sa vāda-gu a-vijñāne) considered (mate)ṃ ṇ  
superior (abhyadhike), due to the strength of which (yad-balena) the first 
[cognition] (ādyasya) will be (bhavi yati) dependent on that (tad-adhīnatvam)?ṣ
2861: So (tasmāt) Goodness of Case [being] due to an intrinsic nature (svata -ḥ
pramā atvam) remains (sthitam) the general operation (autsargikam) in allṇ  
cases (sarvatra), [and] it (tat) is replaced (apohyate2) either by a defeating 
deliverance or by the deliverance that there is a flaw in how the belief was 
formed (bādha-kāra a-du atva-jñānābhyām).ṇ ṣṭ
2862: And even though this [defeating deliverance or by the deliverance that 
there is a flaw] would be dependent on something else (parâyatte 'pi 
caîtasmin), there would be no infinite regress (nânavasthā prasajyate), for (hi) 
that [Goodness] (etat) would be dependent on a Good Case deliverance 
(pramā âdhīnam), and that (tac ca) is established (prati hitam) [as being] ṇ ṣṭ due 
to an intrinsic nature (svata ).ḥ
2863: To explain (hi), just as (yathā) a Good Case deliverance (pramā am) isṇ  
not (na) established (sādhyate) by another (anyena) Good Case deliverance 
(pramā ena), in the same way (tathaîva hi), ṇ Badness of deliverance 
(apramā atvam) is not (na) established (sidhyati) by [another] ṇ Bad Case 
deliverance (apramā ātṇ ).
2864: For (hi) when one thing is based on something else of the same kind 
(tulya-jātâśrayatve), a [final] foundation (prati hā) is not possibleṣṭ  
(nôpapadyate), whereas (tu) [something] of a different kind (vijāte ) isḥ  
securely established (d ha-mūla-prati hitā), because [in that Case] it has aṛḍ ṣṭ  
2 Kataoka reads this term as 'apodyate'
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cause that is something else (anya-hetutvāt).
2865: The mental state defeater (bādhaka-pratyaya ) is just (tāvat) theḥ  
determination (-avadhāra am) that the object is different [from how it wasṇ  
originally cognized] (arthânyatva-).  It (sa ) excludes (apohateḥ 3) the earlier 
deliverance (pūrva-jñānam) because it has Goodness of Case that is 
independent (anapek a-pramā atvāt).ṣ ṇ
2866: Although (api tu) in respect of those [defeaters] (tatra) there may be 
(syāt) dependence (apek ā) on replacement operation (apavādasya) againṣ  
(puna ) in some cases (kvacit), nevertheless (api) for a person who hasḥ  
developed a genuine doubt (jātâśa kasya) due to the earlier [ṅ deliverance] 
(pūrve a), that [dependence] (sā) will easily (alpena) come to an endṇ  
(nivartate).
2867: If (yadi) another actual defeater (bādhakântaram utpannam) of this 
[second deliverance] (asya) is additionally (aparam) sought (anvi yata ), thenṣ ḥ  
(tata ) by the defeat of the middle [second] ḥ deliverance (madhyama-bādhena), 
just the first is a Good Case (pūrvasyaîva pramā atā).ṇ
2868: And if (atha), when it has been correctly sought (samyag-anve a e k te)ṣ ṇ ṛ  
with appropriate effort (anurūpa-yatnena), a defeater of the defeater (bādhaka-
bādhakam) should not be known (na vijñāta  bhavet) as it has no basisṃ  
(mūlâbhāvāt) …
2869: … then (tata ) due to its greater strength (tenaîva … balīyasā) [of theḥ  
defeater] due to not being replaced (nirapavādatvāt), the first [deliverance] 
(ādyam) will be defeated (bādhyate tena), [and] the Goodness of Case 
(pramā atvam) of that [first ṇ deliverance] (tasyaîva) will be excluded 
(apohyate4).
3 Variant reading may be some form of 'apod-'
4 Variant reading may be 'apodyate'
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2870: Thus (evam) the inquirer does not go beyond the third deliverance 
(parīk aka-jñāna-tritaya  nâtivartate), and so (tataś ca) a further defeaterṣ ṃ  
(bādhaka  puna ) is not suspected (nâśañkyam) as no defeater has arisenṃ ḥ  
(ajāta-bādhena).
2871: To explain (hi), he (sa ) who (ya ), having a doubting natureḥ ḥ  
(sa śayâtmā) in all his everyday activities (sarva-vyavahāre u), conjecturesṃ ṣ  
(utprek yateṣ ) [a defeater] through delusion (mohāt) even when no defeater has 
arisen (ajātam api bādhakam) will perish (k aya  vrajet).ṣ ṃ
2872: And so (tathā ca) being a compulsive doubter (sa śayâtmatā) isṃ  
censured (ninditā) by Vāsudeva (vāsudevena) – “O, Kaunteya (kaunteya), 
neither this world (nâya  loka ) nor the next (na para ) is (asti) for aṃ ḥ ḥ  
compulsive doubter (sa śayâtmana ).”ṃ ḥ
2873: So (ata ) whenever (yavān eva) a replacement operation (apavāda[ ]) isḥ ḥ  
possible (sambhāvyate) for a deliverance (matau) and (ca) which (yatra) does 
not arise when sought (anvi e 'nupajāte), just in that Case (tāvaty eva) it hasṣṭ  
that nature (tad-ātmani).
2874: In regard to that object (tatra vastuni), the self-concerned (ātmakāmai )ḥ  
investigator (pramāt bhi ) should ṛ ḥ establish [its perception as correct] 
(sthātavyam), by not continuing (na bhūya ) to conjecture (utprek amā ai )ḥ ṣ ṇ ḥ  
that (ity evam) “[defeat] is possible at some [later] time” (kadācit syād api).
2875: To explain (hi), due to meeting with (sa vyavahārata ) differences (-ṃ ḥ
bhedā ) in place (deśa-), time (-kāla-), man (-nara-), circumstance (-ḥ
avasthā-), for (hi) it is established that (siddhā) [error] only (eva) [is in those] 
which (ye) [are listed above, so it is] in regard to (apek yā) those (te) in whichṣ  
(yasmin) [error is sought] by the seeker of defeaters (bādhakârthinā).
2876: When something is wrongly seen (asamyag-darśane) due to being 
situated at a faraway place (dūra-deśa-vyavasthānāt), there would be (bhavet) 
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suspicion that it is something else (anyâśa kā) in some cases (kvacit) just untilṅ  
one has come close (tatra samīpa-gati-mātrakam).
2877: [Then there is] termination of [the possibility of] replacement operation 
(apavādâvadhi ) in respect of time (kāla-), man (-nara-) and circumstance (-ḥ
avasthântare), and there is no expectation (na tu vyapek ā vidyate) in regardṣ  
to that (tasmin), like the cognition of mirage etc. (m ga-t âdi-buddhivat).ṛ ṛṣṇ
2878: In this way (evam), when it is very dark (santamase kāle), a doubt such 
as about being a cow or a horse (gavâśvâdi-sa śaya ) which [takes the form]ṃ ḥ  
(ya ) 'is [the belief formed] through error or [is it] an accurate determination?'ḥ  
(bhrānter vā nir aya ); in those cases (tatra) termination [occurs] in [theṇ ḥ  
object] being manifested (prakāśī-bhavanâvadhi ).ḥ
2879: In the same way (tathā hi), in the cases of [misperceiving] the moon 
(candra-), confusion about direction (-dig-moha-), the phonemes and accents 
of the Veda (-veda-var a-svarṇ ādi u)ṣ , etc., a determination that [the true facts 
are] otherwise (anyathātvâvadhāra am)ṇ  [occurs] by asking another person 
(puru ântara-sa praśnṣ ṃ āt).
2880: In regard to the deliverance of objects which are being badly delivered 
(durjñāne jñāyamāne 'rthe), due to senses which have been imparied by (-
k atṣ êndriyai ) passion (rḥ āga-), anger (-dve a-), intoxication (-mada-), madnessṣ  
(-unmāda-), hunger (-k ut-), thirst etc. (-tṣ ṛṣṇâdi-), the opposite [i.e. good 
cognition] (viparyaya ) [occurs] when those things do not obtain (tad-ḥ
abhāvād).
2881: Even (api) in lawsuits relating to debts etc. (ṛṇâdi-vyavahāre), of the two 
litigants (dvayor vivadamānayo ), one statement [is taken] from the defendentḥ  
(eka  pratyarthino vākyam) [and] two statements [are taken] from theṃ  
claimant (dve vākye pūrva-vādina ).ḥ
2882: Precisely (eva) because of the fear of infinite regress (anavasthā-
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bhayāt), no further statements (na vākya  … adhikam) are recorded (likhyate).ṃ  
Rather (tu), the judge (svāmi-), witnesses (-sāk i-) [and] assessors (-ṣ
sabhāsada ) should pronounce (brūyu ) a decision (nir ayam) based on thatḥ ḥ ṇ  
[number of statements] (tata ).ḥ
2883: In this way (evam), in all cases (sarvatra), production (vikriyā) of only 
three judgments (jñāna-trayasyaîva) is needed (i yate).  For this reason (ataṣ  
eva) the deities (devānām) too (api) are called (abhidhīyate) 'triple-truth' 
(trisatyatā).
2884: So (tena) when Goodness of Case is due to an intrinsic nature (svata -ḥ
pramā atve), [there is] no infinite regress (nṇ ânavasthā) of either [Goodness or 
Badness of Case] (ubhayor api).  So (ata ) Goodness and Badness of Caseḥ  
(pramā atvâpramā atveṇ ṇ ) are established (sthite) as per usual practice 
(yathāyogam).
2908ab: Objection (nanu): Perceptual and other [cognitions] (pratyak âdi) areṣ  
not apprehended (na g hyate) in the manner (evam): '[this is] a Good Caseṛ  
deliverance' (pramā am ity ).  ṇ
2908cd: And (ca) human activity (vyavahāra ) could not take place (na …ḥ  
avakalpyate) while they are not grasped (ag hītena) in this way (ittham)ṛ
2909: A Good Case deliverance (pramā am) is established (prati hitam) due toṇ ṣṭ  
its own nature (svarūpe a) even before being apprehended (graha āt pūrvam),ṇ ṇ  
independently (nirapek am) and (ca) in its own form (tat-svārthe); havingṣ  
apprehended [something] (pramite), it is [in turn] apprehended by another 
['pramā a'] (mīyate parai )ṇ ḥ
2910: And (ca) just as (yathā) objects (vi ayā ) are apprehended (g hyante) byṣ ḥ ṛ  
the senses, vision etc. (cak ur-ādibhir indriyai ) which are themselves notṣ ḥ  
cognized (aviditair eva), all those [things] (sarve … te) are likewise (tathā) 
[cognized] due to Good Case deliverances (pramā ai ).ṇ ḥ
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2911ab: So (tena) the fact that [the deliverance] is [itself] apprehended (asya 
jñāyamānatvam) does not contribute (nôpayujyate) to epistemic success 
(prāmā ye).  ṇ
2911cd: The experience of the object (vi ayânubhava ) is obtained (labhyate)ṣ ḥ  
even (api) when there is no [separate] awareness of the deliverance [itself] 
(ajñātād eva).
2912ab: To explain (hi), by contrast (punaḥ), a Bad Case deliverance 
(apramā am) is established (sthitam) inṇ  its own object (svārthe) like a Good 
Case deliverance (pramā am iva)ṇ
2912cd: The falsity of that [deliverance] (mithyātva  tasya)ṃ  is not 
apprehended without another Good Case deliverance (g hyeta naṛ  
pramā āntarād te).ṇ ṛ
2913ab: To explain (hi) that an object is different [from how it is apprehended] 
(arthasyânyathābhāva ) ḥ is not discerned (na … ātta )ḥ  from the earlier 
[deliverance] (pūrve a), [whereas] the fact that it is the same [does come fromṇ  
from the earlier deliverance] (tathātvavat).
2913cd: Here too (atrâpi), [there will be] an awareness (dhī ) that the object isḥ  
different (arthânyathā-bhāve) from that (tat) or that the cause is faulty (yad vā 
du akāra e).ṣṭ ṇ
2914ab: And just in this way (tāvataîva ca) falsity (mithyātvam), which has no 
other cause (nânyahetukam) is apprehended (g hyate).ṛ
2914cd: And (ca) just (eva) in the state of being produced (utpatty-avastham), 
it is determined that “this is a Good Case deliverance” (idam pramā am itiṇ  
mīyate).
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2915ab: Therefore (ata ) when (yatrâpi) [you opponents try to] inform othersḥ  
of (parebhya  pratipādyate)ḥ  the falsity (mithyātvam) [of a cognition which 
arises from a Vedic injunction], …
2915cd: … in that case, too (tatrâpi), [one of] these two [conditions] (etad 
dvaya ) should be stated (vācyam), but [you should] not [appeal to] a mereṃ  
similarity (na tu sādharmya-mātrakam) [to worldly statements, which might be 
true or false].
2916: Regarding that (tatra), undiscerning people (avipaścita ) establishḥ  
(sādhayanti) the falisty of all Good Case deliverances (sarva  pramā a-ṃ ṇ
mithyātvam) merely through [their] resemblance to Bad Case deliverances 
(apramā a-sādharmya-mātram) are inadequately supported (yat-kiñcidṇ  
āśritā ).ḥ
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Glossary of key terms
apavāda: Replacement operation; this is connected with the verbal form 
'apodyate', which means 'is replaced'; cf. utsarga
bādhaka: Mental state defeater; this term is connected with the noun bādha, 
which means 'defeat'.
essence: the term is used in Fine's sense whereby “an object [has] a property 
essentially just in case it is necessary that the object has the property.”1  Fine 
distinguishes this categorical form from two conditional forms, conditional on 
the existence of that object, and conditional on that object being identical with 
what it is.
intrinsic: the term is used in the sense of Harré and Madden, whereby an 
intrinsic feature is “a feature of the thing itself”2.  Such an intrinsic feature may 
be overcome by external stimuli.
jñāna: Deliverance; this translation has been borrowed from Sosa, and 
displays a similar ambiguity to the original term, between act of delivering and 
delivered content.  Depending on context, this term has also been translated as 
(occurrent) judgment.  It also can correspond to the notions of (occurrent) 
belief and (occurrent) awareness.  This term has been translated as 'cognition' 
and 'awareness' by some contemporary scholars.
non-pramā aṇ : Bad Case deliverance; this is an incorrect awareness or 
judgment as of an object which arises from a vitiated use of human faculties 
such as perception; cf. pramā aṇ
1 Fine (1994) 3
2 Harré and Madden (1975) 87
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non-pramā atvamṇ : The fact of being a Bad Case deliverance; cf. 
pramā atvamṇ
non-prāmā yamṇ : Epistemic failure; cf. prāmā yamṇ
parataḥ: 'From something else'; This term has been translated as extrinsic by 
some contemporary scholars; cf. svataḥ
paryudāsa: A form of negation which postitively excludes an injunction by 
prescribing an alternative injunction, rather than mere prohibition; cf. 
prati edhaṣ
pramā aṇ : Good Case deliverance; an awareness or judgment which arises 
from the unvitiated use of human faculties such as perception; cf. jñāna
pramā atvamṇ : The fact of being a Good Case deliverance; cf. pramā aṇ
prāmā yamṇ : A capacity for epistemic success; epistemic success consists in a 
capacity for veridical awareness, that is, a capacity for accurate determination 
of an object or fact.  Depending on context, a statement about this capacity 
may be equivalent to a statement about epistemic success itself.  This term has 
been translated as 'validity' by some contemporary scholars.  John Dunne 
understands this term as 'instrumentality' towards some end such as a 
resultant act of knowing.
prāptā: 'Is ascribed'; this term describes the provisional attribution of a 
hypothesis.
prati edhaṣ : A form of negation which merely prohibits rather than positively 
excludes by means of an alternative injunction; cf. paryudāsa
svabhāva: A causal power or disposition which is the essence of an entity 
conditional on its existence
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svataḥ: 'From itself'; this term is used by Kumārila to convey the idea of a 
default intrinsic nature of deliverances per se as an epistemic kind conditional 
on normal conditions and the idea of a kind essence of Good Case deliverances 
conditional on their identity as Good case deliverances.  This term has been 
translated as 'intrinsic' by some contemporary scholars; cf. parataḥ
utsarga: General operation; Kumārila transfers this term from ritual and 
grammatical theoretical contexts; cf. apavāda
virodha: Conflict; this term subsumes contradiction and contrariety; exegetical 
techniques were developed in the ritual interpretation literature to resolve such 
conflict; Kumārila discusses the ascription of two conflicting epistemic statuses 
to a single belief and resolution through a model of general operation and 
positive exclusion.
287
Index versorum
This index contains references to all significant quotations of verses in the 
B ha - īkā and in the Śloka-vārttika ṛ ṭ ṭ in the main body of the thesis.
B ha īkāṛ ṭṭ .................................................................................................
TS 2850.............................................................................................73
TS 2851ab.......................................................................................226
TS 2852...........................................................................................234
TS 2853...........................................................................................234
TS 2854...........................................................................................234
TS 2859...........................................................................................225
TS 2861....................................................................................156, 171
TS 2861ab.......................................................................................174
TS 2861cd........................................................................................179
TS 2865...........................................................................................187
TS 2866...........................................................................................188
TS 2867...........................................................................................189
TS 2868...........................................................................................190
TS 2869...........................................................................................190
TS 2870....................................................................................192, 203
TS 2871...........................................................................................193
TS 2872...........................................................................................193
TS 2875...........................................................................................195
TS 2877...........................................................................................195
TS 2878...........................................................................................196
TS 2879...........................................................................................196
TS 2880...........................................................................................197
288
Śloka-vārttika.........................................................................................
ŚV 2.33...........................................................................................113
ŚV 2.34ab........................................................................................117
ŚV 2.34cd........................................................................................116
ŚV 2.35ab........................................................................................121
ŚV 2.35cd........................................................................................116
ŚV 2.36ab........................................................................................121
ŚV 2.36cd........................................................................................116
ŚV 2.37ab........................................................................................123
ŚV 2.37cd........................................................................................123
ŚV 2.38abc.......................................................................................215
ŚV 2.39ab........................................................................................216
ŚV 2.39cd........................................................................................215
ŚV 2.47...........................................................................................177
ŚV 2.48.............................................................................................98
ŚV 2.48ab........................................................................................126
ŚV 2.49...........................................................................................218
ŚV 2.50...........................................................................................218
ŚV 2.51...........................................................................................218
ŚV 2.53.............................................................................154, 156, 171
ŚV 2.53ab.........................................................................142, 143, 174
ŚV 2.53cd........................................................................................179
ŚV 2.54....................................................................................101, 216
ŚV 2.55...........................................................................................217
ŚV 2.58...........................................................................................181
ŚV 2.60cd........................................................................................194
ŚV 2.61....................................................................................203, 226
ŚV 2.63cd........................................................................................238
ŚV 2.65bcd......................................................................................238
ŚV 2.68...........................................................................................238
ŚV 2.83...........................................................................................130
ŚV 2.84...........................................................................................224
ŚV 2.85...........................................................................................130
289
ŚV 2.91...........................................................................................239
ŚV 2.92ab........................................................................................239
